DeMaurice Smith On Labor Strife And Fans: SB Nation Interviews NFLPA Director

That comes through in this interesting article.

Statements such as “individual teams sell legacy. My problem is they don’t pay for it.” are misleading. A following statement on the same subject, regarding legacy players, “You don’t pay that player anything.”, is technically correct. However, my understanding is that under the revenue sharing agreement, the revenue the teams make from selling “legacy” and all the other revenue is included, when the players share is calculated. So that revenue goes to the current players (and other places as directed by the labor agreement), by the percentage of overall revenue defined in the agreement. Players share in that revenue.

The health care issue was brought up to elicit sympathy for the players. The 3 years experience requirement was likely negotiated in the last labor agreement. The players could have negotiated for a shorter experience requirement, but that would cost a lot more, and meant some combination of the owners and/or the players getting less in profit/salaries.

This is all part of the negotiation between the players and owners. And although they both recognize the importance of fans and the popularity of the game, in reality the fans come in last in these deals. But they better reach an agreement, because it appears attendance has already peaked (with current prices); and with an uncertain economy, the NFL owners and players will likey suffer like the NHL did, if there is no football in 2011.

you know the funny thing, he makes the point about the first year player who gets hurt and the older retired players, but nothing about the stars who make over $10 million/year. how about lowering the max salaries to $10 million/year, and raise the league minimum, or having the extra go to a retirement fund. that’s the problem. If you say you want money for the lesser known players, you have to ask for more money(which is saying that you can’t even control the superstars enough to ensure the others security, and it ticks off fans who make less than $100k, approximately 1/3 of the minimum. for first year players) or you learn to manage the money you get. Now if the players say lets stick with our percentage and reorganize, we can secure more for the lesser players. Now owners are greedy buggers and should be forced to put 20% of their profits each year away for stadium upgrades or new stadium financing. This way if you go and pay money to watch local franchise, you are investing in that business sticking around. Now if an owner wants to leave a city, he has to give that money back to the city. After 5 years no owner is going to want to voluntarily give up that kind of money.

Remember this first: George Martin is a tool for 32 owners and cannot say anything without their approval. He can’t—unlike De Smith okay or recommend anything. And Martin’s response is just the continuation of attacks upon the union from former players—most of whom, indeed, all except Martin—who never played a key role in the union during their active careers.
For example, Mike Ditka was the key leader in these earlier attacks, But, had Ditka and his acolytes to put as much effort into providing actual dollars to the players they roll out, maybe these issues would be nearer to being resolved.
 
As De Smith notes the injury rate every season in the NFL is 100%; i.e., every player suffers a series of injuries that would put us non-players on the sidelines in whatever we do. Nonetheless, every NFL player also knows about Wally Pipp and fears that if he can’t play because of what might be an injury the league defines as “probable” (a 75% probability that a player will play in the next game), he might never regain his spot once he’s healthy again.

Roster turnover in the NFL ranges from 25% to 34% every season and the succession of “minor” injuries probably ranks as the largest factor. But, playing skills don’t suddenly diminish. Instead, players are cut because they’ve “lost a step”especially in the so-called “speed” positions such as running back, receivers, and defensive backs. (Why is golf the most popular sport for former NFL players? It’s the only one in which they can compete.)

 I’ve watched this controversy develop over the past three years—and while there is reason for concern that some former players have faced significant troubles what’’s ignored is that Ditka and his Gridiron Greats escapes the same level of investigation. My view is that Gridiron Greats is (1) either a sham—as shown by the paucity of funds actually going to former players if they ever will tell you; or (2) a tool by remaining hard-line owners—and they are still out there—seeking to weaken the National Football League Players Association’s gains over the last 15 years.

Had you done some deeper research, I assure you that you would have found, that, during their fabled NFL careers, neither Ditka himself or none of Ditka’s superstars were involved with the union or did anything personally to further player rights.

And before I continue, let me emphasize that I “speak” with some authority since I was a union staff member when these so-called limits on retirees took place.

Given the past history of savaging Gene Upshaw and now De Smith by the likes of Ditka and Joe DeLamielleure, I understand why responses have been so strange. And so I’m writing to provide you with a more balanced overview—and one far different that posed in Gridiron Greats press releases or by the former players such as George Martin.

After having been an NFLPA staff member for nearly 25 years, I know that Gene steadfastly believed he is only responsible to one group and one group alone—currently active and potentially active players, the members of the union’s bargaining unit—and those are the only ones to which he would answer. De Smith, upon taking office, committed himself to resolving these differences. The result has been more distortions by league tools such as George Martin.

First, however, my credentials: I spent nearly a decade working in the U.S. Congress, first as a Research Economist for the Joint Economic Committee, then as Legislative Assistant for the late Representative George E. Brown, Jr. of California and then as Legislative Analyst for Representative Ronald V. Dellums of California. And from 1981 until I retired in 2005 I was the Director of Research for the NFLPA.

When I joined the union staff in 1981—and Gene at that time was the president of the association—players were receiving approximately thirty cents out of every dollar they generated in revenues and owners were taking approximately seventy cents. That, of course, was a legacy from the Ditka era when so-called “Superstars” like Ditka made what in that period could be termed “high” salaries while the vast majority of players—"the “grunts” in the trenches—earned a pittance. While the stars such as Ditka may have been big names on the playing field, off of it, they were too afraid to challenge the owners over any issue—be it measly pensions or a lousy disability system.

By 2005 when I retired, players now are receiving well over 60% of all revenues and owners are making over 30%—and those unsettling labor/management battles between the parties of the 1960’s through the 1980’s was replaced by a constructive partnership (although I personally would call it more of a “shotgun marriage”). And current NFL players have the best post-career program of any professional sport and important steps have been taken in critical health coverage and injury issues. All of this occurred under the leadership of Gene and the elected player representatives.

So, having failed to gain traction with active players—indeed, the small group of malcontents has never attempted to build a positive coalition so that the distance between themselves and active players keeps widening—the dissidents turned to the political arena and to the media, personally, to air their complaints.

Here’s what the DeLamielleure et all empty rhetoric conveniently overlook:

(1) All decisions relating to union policies are decided by a vote of the elected Player Representatives; when it is imperative to take a quick vote—whenever it is impossible to bring together the entire Board of Player Representatives—votes are made by the elected Executive Committee. Neither Gene or De Smith, as Executive Director, does not have the power to vote in any situation. I have witnessed many instances when votes have gone against what Gene favored;

(2) Throughout every period when there has been a Collective Bargaining Agreement, the current recognized bargaining unit under the National Labor Relations Act limits membership in the NFLPA only to active and potentially active players. See if you can find any other union where retired members continue as part of the bargaining unit; so when Gene was quoted rebuffing former players because they are “not his boss”, he may seem gruff but he was technically and totally correct; even so, every annual meeting of the Board of Player Representatives has had many former players attending, and no one, Dikta included, had he ever asked, was turned away;

(3) Investigating and concentrating only on the role of the union—and De or Gene in particular—is disingenuous in terms of players receiving disability payments from a joint board. There are three player trustees and three owner trustees which means, in practical terms, only those cases that receive unanimous votes can proceed. Once again, the Executive Directors do not have a vote on the board. No matter what he personally—or any of the player-appointed trustees favors and how thorough the due diligence performed by the NFLPA staff and its consultants—the owners three representatives always vote as a group. I am not aware of any instance over the near quarter century I worked for the union when an owners’ trustee broke ranks and therefore I am puzzled by charges hurled at Gene for his alleged inability to grant disability payments;

(4) No one is more interested in extending post-career health coverage than the union and such insurance coverage has been expanded greatly since 1993. However, research conducted by the NFLPA’s Director of Benefits, Miki Yaras-Davis, uncovered that the cost of total post-career health benefits just for active players would be more than entire amount of funds going for all salaries and benefits—and to add coverage for the thousands of retired players would be literally astronomical. You don’t have to take just my word; the following article lays it all out:

Lifetime insurance not realistic

By Jason Cole, Yahoo! Sports
September 26, 2007

Jason Cole

Yahoo! Sports

While the NFL Players Association has taken heat from former players for red tape involving disability claims and lack of pension increases, the union did investigate the idea of providing medical insurance for players until they are 65 years old.

The conclusion from that study, which was conducted by the Towers Perrin consulting firm, was bleak. In March 2005, NFLPA director of benefits Miki Yaras-Davis informed all of the player reps of the 40-year estimate.

It was a $16.2 billion charge just to cover currently active players who qualified and the following wave of players who would qualify over that period until they reach 65 years of age. To qualify, players must have been in the NFL for at least three seasons generally putting them at the age of 25 when they reach eligibility.

Towers Perrin calculated that in order to fund that immediately, the NFLPA would have had to give the firm $3.1 billion in 2005, Towers Perrin senior consultant Rob Schlau said.

 “That assumes our ability to get a six percent return on the money and factors in increases in healthcare costs, among other factors,” Schlau said. “It’s a staggering amount of money.”

How staggering? That $3.1 billion figure was approximately the same amount of money that was spent on player salaries that season. In other words, every player in the NFL in 2005 would have had to play for free to fund health insurance over the next 40 years.

That fund would also not cover former players who retired prior to the plan’s possible inception. In short, none of the retired players currently clamoring for increased benefits would have received the coverage.

“When I brought the figures into the meeting, it was a pretty short conversation,” said Yaras-Davis, who has been with the union for 29 years. "I said “You can give me all the money and we’re fine.’ It got really quiet after that.”

The NFLPA currently provides qualifying players five years of medical coverage upon retirement, 18 months of COBRA coverage and gives players $25,000 per year up to 12 years ($75,000 minimum, $300,000 maximum) to pay for insurance or other medial issues.

       As it is, you might do better by investigating why insurance companies hesitate to issue coverage for any former NFL player because they assume that the players have—and they do—"too many pre-existing conditions.

   (5) It will be difficult, if not impossible; to locate any other industry in which pension benefits for already-retired members—some of them out of the industry for over 25 years—are regularly increased by significantly more than cost-of-living indices. Yet that is what the union has done every time starting in 1983; Name me some other plans that can match that? For NFL retirees—and mainly the older ones—"that started in 1983, and continued again in 1998, 2002 and 2006. And remember that any money spent to create a new benefit, improve an existing benefit, or fund future benefits for either retired or active players, comes out of current players negotiated percentage -not out of the owners-percentage (player costs = salaries and benefits). To do so—and despite bozos like Ditka’s belief to the contrary—in 2006 alone, active player salaries and benefits were reduced by $126-million, an average $70,000 per active players ($96.5 million to improve pension benefits and $20 million to fund disability benefits). Over $5.5 million is being spent monthly on current retired players, disabled players, widows and surviving children.

      (6) Indeed, Gene was able to negotiate significant increases for older former players in years when no new comprehensive Collective Bargaining Agreement talks have been on-going; there are always CBA issues and interpretations that must be dealt with, either formally or informally. Since 1993 when the current basic CBA took effect, when the NFLPA has prevailed—"and that has been the rule rather than the exception—the result most often has been that the owners have agreed to increase the share of overall revenues allocated to players (both active and retired). Assume, for instance, that increase was $20-million. Divided by the 32 clubs that would mean each club would have to increase its share by $625,000—and given past history it is likely that at best only one or two current players would end up with marginally higher salaries. Contrast that with the effects were all of the $20-million were put into new or higher benefits—either for active or retired players. Of course, when splitting that same $20-million among all former players who qualify for benefits, it means that marginal increases for every player are not very large. Nonetheless, the tendency since 1993 has been to put disproportionately more money into benefits than into salaries;

     (7) As the proportion of funds going to benefits has continued to rise at a more rapid pace than the increase for salaries, players who were not covered by pensions—"the so-called pre-59er’s and some reaching back to World War II and Korea who didn’t have the requisite number of credited seasons for pension benefits, i.e., were not covered at all because of the inability of the pre-Upshaw union’s leverage (and that includes most of the dissidents of the Ditka era who lambastedt Gene but were afraid themselves to strike during the regular season)—are now all getting pension benefits;

(8) I can assure you that the first bargaining area always dealt with by the bargaining committees led by Gene, before anything else, has been to negotiate both higher pension rates and higher disability rates for all players receiving pensions.

As for those dissidents: Looking back over the years I served on the union staff, aside from Martin, only three of them—Kyle Turley, Bruce Laird and Brent Boyd—ever were elected as a player representative or asked to be included in the various projects underway.

Laird was a Baltimore Colts player rep when I joined the union staff in 1981 and throughout the lead-up to the 1982 strike; never once during all the meetings I attended—either formally or informally—did Laird ever propose increasing benefits for then-retired players.

Boyd, as a Viking player rep, and Turley from whichever team he was then on both seemed to enjoy the yearly free trips to Hawaii but never spoke out about going back and raising disability payments or changing the system.

Mike Ditka never involved himself in the union in any role whatsoever; in blunt terms Ditka always was considered to be a management “stooge”—the type of player trying to win plaudits from owners so that they could quickly move to that side once their playing days ended and, of course, that is exactly what happened.

I sat across from Joe DeLamielleure in a team meeting visit I attended in Orchard Park and he never said anything about raising pensions for players out of the game or bringing into the pension umbrella those former players not receiving a cent at that time; as a matter of fact, he was mute throughout the whole meeting.

Then there’s Brian DeMarco—the dissidents’ poster boy and yet some serious investigating on their part would have found that, as reported by ProFootball Talk:
 

RETIRED PLAYERS’ POSTER BOY HAS ANOTHER WART

The folks who are hoping to compel the NFL Players Association to take better care of retired players have wrapped their arms around former NFL lineman Brian DeMarco, a 35-year-old man who allegedly is financially destitute, and who walks with a cane.

The NFLPA recently explained that it has been providing financial assistance to DeMarco, and ESPN reported that former teammates have questioned whether DeMarco really needs a cane.

There’s another problem with using DeMarco as the face of the cause: His face could be on a wanted poster.

A law enforcement source in Ohio has tipped us off to the existence of a warrant for DeMarco’s arrest. The warrant was issued in September 2006, after DeMarco failed to appear at a contempt hearing in connection with child support obligations.

The online court docket for the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas shows that DeMarco’s current address is in Austin , Texas . DeMarco has been identified in recent media reports as a resident of Austin, Texas .

The docket can be viewed at this address, after inserting case number 01NU059151.

And

DEMARCO IS THE WRONG POSTER BOY

The name Brian DeMarco recently has surfaced as one of the former NFL players whose on-field injuries have left him disabled and destitute. The folks targeting the NFLPA and executive director Gene Upshaw needed a compelling poster boy to give life to the cause, especially since none of the current NFL players are going to stand up and ask tough questions. And DeMarco seemed on the surface to be as good of a candidate as anyone.

The problem, however, is that a scratch or two at the surface reveals some potential flaws.

Chris Mortensen of ESPN reports that the NFLPA produced on Monday night checks reflecting contributions of almost $10,000 that have been made to DeMarco over the past 12 months for rent, utilities, and child support.

Earlier in the day, DeMarco claimed at a press conference that the union has turned its back on him during his time of financial need. (Hey, if anyone out there wants to turn their backs on us in similar fashion, we’ll be glad to, you know, cash the checks.)

Mortensen also reports that a union employee wired to DeMarco $300 as recently as this weekend. The money came out of the employee’s own pocket. Also, the union claims that it set up a job for DeMarco in Austin, Texas, but that he didn’t show up for work.

Said NFLPA executive director Gene Upshaw: “We can’t let them manipulate the media anymore. On dire need alone, we made $1.2 million worth of payments to 147 former players last year and paid another $1 million to 140 guys the year before. And we’re glad to do it. We don’t talk about it. That’s what we do.”

Also, a former teammate of DeMarco’s suggests that the former Jaguar is jaking it. “[H]e’s walking with a cane in front of cameras,” the ex-Jaguar told Mortensen. “Last time we saw him — and it was in the past two weeks — he didn’t need a cane. He has some physical problems, yes, but there are other things going on there.”

Look, we’re not saying that any of this means that real changes aren’t needed. But if the folks looking to effect change are going to rely upon apparent bunko artists to make the case, it will be hard to generate any real sympathy.

Then, there’s the wonderful example of some Hall of Fame players, led by Ron Mix, who, for years, have advocated that they should receive higher pension rates than their non-Hall of Fame peers simply because they were in the Hall, thus sweeping aside the obvious fact that none of them would have been there without blockers, other linemen, receivers, etc, i.e., some of the most perverted logic I have ever heard.

What about the role of agents in this area. Where’was DeMarco’s agent saying what he did? Pear’s? Boyd’s? DeLamielleure? You think they’re stepping up to the plate? Of course not; they wring as much money as possible from players and then let them hang out there as the agent searches for new clients and new money.

Why then has there been so much criticism?

Until 1959, no NFL players received a pension. Prior to the NFLPA’s formation players were required to provide their own “jocks-and-socks” for practices—even when there were twice a day pre-season practices in stifling late summer heat. Players received no compensation for the entire pre-season period. If injured, players would be released without any further pay. No disability payments. There was no grievance or arbitration process. And when a player’s contract expired, he was not able to negotiate with any other club. Owners held tightly to their powerful leverage over players.

For most of its history the NFL has operated both as a monopoly—having absorbed or bankrupted such short-lived potential competitors as the All American Football League (1946-1949), the American Football League (1960-1966), the World Football League (1974-1975), and the United States Football League (1983-1985)—and as a monopsony since owners recognized “gentlemens’ agreements” not to bid against each other for player services.

And yet, the weaker, pre-Upshaw union was forced to accept a bargaining unit excluding retirees—even if, improbably, that could have been achieved—the difficult disability payments process, extremely limited post-career health insurance, and everything else that the malcontents were too chicken to try and achieve.

And that is the true bottom line: Ditka, DeLamielleure and the older group of players were unwilling to challenge the owners either by striking during the regular season, or by decertifying their union so as to be able to sue the owners via the much stronger anti-trust approach rather than through weak labor laws.

Had players not struck during the 1982 season and again in 1987 and decertified in 1989 after owners imposed Plan B, I assure you that no matter how much NFL revenues have skyrocketed, players still would be stuck with lousy pensions and even worse disability plans (if any at all would have been there).

That monopsony leverage was maintained until late 1992 when the association (the NFLPA had ceased being a union in 1989 in order to not fall under the NLRA instead of the more powerful and relevant antitrust laws) prevailed in a series of major antitrust actions. The settlement between the parties resulted in the 1993 CBA which remains as the basic structure of the current CBA and under when the association once again became a recognized union.

Having worked for the union for such a long period, I was able to witness many stages in the NFLPA’s development. When the USFL competed for player services in the early 1980’s, NFL salaries rose at a rapid rate—and those players whose careers had just ended bemoaned the fact that “they were born too early”. It happened again when the Plan B system took effect for the 1989 season—only this time many of the players who benefited from the USFL experience were the ones complaining. And, of course, when the current system took effect in 1993, the Plan B group groused as salaries rose at unprecedented rates since 1993, players leaving the game also point out how fate had denied them the salaries that younger players were earning. No one group ever seems to have been exceedingly pleased—and yet, what can the union or Gene/De Smith in particular do about it?

Many, if not all, of the players’ now complaining the most made a conscious decision and took their pensions at age 45 which meant that payments were significantly below what they would have been had they waited until age 55 or 65.

I also know that in doing so, many times they were driven by fears generated by management. It took a comprehensive NIOSH study published in the 1990’s to reveal that longevity for retired players mirrored that of the general population. Until then, conventional wisdom held that the average age of death for retired players was 55; given that prospect—one trumpeted throughout locker rooms by management—waiting until the average age of death to receive a pension seemed foolish. To blame the union for their own follies is wrong.

Or the fabled case of that one Hall of Famer who is only receiving $100 a month; but, he took 25% of his pension when he left the game, which obviously reduced his pension by 25%; at age 45, the same player started collecting his pension, further reducing his pension; then, to top it off, the same player elected the Social Security option which meant he had to sign a form stating he understood that at age 62 his pension would be at $50 a month. All of these were bad choices, but, because of changes made since 1993, that can never happen again.

Ever so often I still come across vicious attacks upon Gene and now De Smith by a small cadre of embittered former players in the media and the picture created by those dissidents and through what I term as verging on shoddy journalism is very, very far from the truth.. Knowing Gene, De Smith,Miki Yaras-Davis (and, yes, George Martin a long time ago) , I am astounded by the depths to which critics have fallen and I would be amazed if the dissidents were able to produce a single instance when and where the union alone has failed to represent its former members fully.

There are many sides to this story. While I may be out of the immediate picture, I still follow these issues very closely. Focusing mainly on the union is shoddy. Not challenging Martin and/orGridiron Grates is even worse. I was proud to serve under Gene and with those hundreds of dedicated player reps and I hope this information—while obviously biasedâ€"—is helpful to you in setting the record straight.

M. J. Duberstein

Kihei , HI