Updated throughout the day with quick takes from staff.
by Rob Neyer • Mar 10, 2011 4:45 PM EST
From a press release (which means it must be true):
A new book, just released by McFarland and Company, promises to create shock waves in the baseball world. The Beauty of Short Hops: How Chance and Circumstance Confound the Moneyball Approach to Baseball exposes the myths perpetrated by the bestselling book Moneyball and the philosophy of baseball that it described.
But wait, that's not all ...
The Beauty of Short Hops demonstrates that the Moneyball approach is doubly doomed. First, it fails on its own terms: it cannot make baseball a predictable game wholly understandable in numerical terms. Indeed, the teams which use this approach have not fared well. Second, the Moneyball approach blocks out what is most compelling about the sport – its relentless capacity to surprise. The authors watched all 162 Red Sox games in 2009, and catalog the crazy events (such as a game turning on a ball striking a pigeon in the outfield) that enrich baseball and defeat the best-laid plans of sabermetricians.
Former baseball commissioner Fay Vincent calls The Beauty of Short Hops "a welcome book for those of us who have long questioned the focus on statistics in baseball. . . . Messrs Hirsch take apart the Bill James-Moneyball myths." Library Journal deems the book "highly recommended to both fans and opponents of sabermetrics."
Is it worth pointing out that these same Red Sox have built their organizational philosophy around the Bill James-Moneyball myths? That without sabermetrics the Red Sox wouldn't have won one World Series, let alone two? That every respectable sabermetrician (and most of the other ones, too) is highly aware of the Pigeon in the Outfield Factor?
Anyway, I think I ordered this book months ago. Should be a hoot.
66 comments
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Comments
People are never going to stop misunderstanding what Moneyball means.
by Eyebrows on Mar 10, 2011 4:48 PM EST reply actions
It means finding fat, slow guys that walk a lot, right?
by biggyv on Mar 10, 2011 4:51 PM EST up reply actions
don't forget dingers.
Chicks love dingers.
Learn about Batting Metrics
Learn about Pitching Metrics
by Andrew Martin on Mar 10, 2011 7:40 PM EST up reply actions 1 recs
These authors better be prepared for ridicule
by blakestein on Mar 10, 2011 4:55 PM EST reply actions
These authors are geniuses and will make a killing by selling it to all those folks who hate the expanding numbers aspect of the game. It probably does not matter how right or mind blowingly wrong they are.
Camden Depot - Orioles
by crawdaddy on Mar 10, 2011 5:00 PM EST reply actions
Does it take geniuses to pander?
by theanswerm on Mar 10, 2011 5:14 PM EST up reply actions 1 recs
completely agree
there is certainly a subpopulation of people who despise the rise of quantitative metrics in baseball. they’ll LOVE this book no matter how “right” it is.
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 10, 2011 5:40 PM EST up reply actions
That’s me! I’m in that subpopulation!
I really do want to see what this book has to say. Should be fun.
by The Burning Scheyer Jersey on Mar 10, 2011 6:11 PM EST up reply actions
Are we sure those people can read?
"Laser show. So relax."
by nuthinboutnuthin on Mar 10, 2011 11:19 PM EST up reply actions
I'm sure Murray Chass is ahead of you on the waiting list
"You know, a long time ago being crazy meant something. Nowadays everybody's crazy."
-Charles Manson
by kaweahkaweah on Mar 10, 2011 5:05 PM EST reply actions
So, the point of the book is..
Just pick players for your team out of the phone book, because freak occurrences will screw everything up anyways?
by Dave Pomerantz on Mar 10, 2011 5:10 PM EST reply actions
Took them long enough...
I’m surprised it took the baseball insiders so long to come up with something like this…Moneyball has been out for, what, 8 years? Michael Lewis must be laughing his ass off…
by BobbyTables on Mar 10, 2011 5:16 PM EST reply actions
Over under on how many pages before you find the phrase "new-fangled"?
2
by diamondnerd on Mar 10, 2011 5:17 PM EST reply actions
I’ll take the under…
MarlinsDiehards.com
by dave6834 on Mar 10, 2011 8:00 PM EST up reply actions
All 162 Red Sox games in 2009
lol SSS!
Rocktober is not a time of year, it is a religion.
by hjrrockies on Mar 10, 2011 5:23 PM EST reply actions
dude 162 is a HUGE sample
Come on now. Everyone know how big 162 is. That’s sooooo many games. Don’t you think baseball season is too long?
Learn about Batting Metrics
Learn about Pitching Metrics
by Andrew Martin on Mar 10, 2011 7:42 PM EST up reply actions
’
What a lame ass straw man argument.
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 10, 2011 5:38 PM EST reply actions
Even worse:
Damn those sabermetricians! Them and their soulless numbers. This is America!
by danmerqury on Mar 10, 2011 8:33 PM EST up reply actions
Apparently, large enough sample size has no many to these clowns.
We are a nation of mathematical illiterates.
Souldrummer twitters at @souldrummer25
"Derek Norris walks." - Gameday. 'Nuff said. Souldrummer is all in for Derek Norris. Friend of Nationalsprospects.com
by souldrummer on Mar 10, 2011 5:51 PM EST reply actions
The real question is
Why did Joe Morgan use a pen name?
MarlinsDiehards.com
by dave6834 on Mar 10, 2011 7:59 PM EST reply actions 2 recs
Big Presale?
I’m sure Murray Chass ordered at least a few dozen copies, much like the several dozen balls needed for BP during spring training. Gotta train the mind for meaningful stats like pitcher wins and RBIs.
by dizzy dean17 on Mar 10, 2011 8:12 PM EST reply actions
Also
“Confound” can be re-written as “are brushed off as statistical noise”
Learn about Batting Metrics
Learn about Pitching Metrics
by Andrew Martin on Mar 10, 2011 8:16 PM EST reply actions
Did this happen twice?
I know it got the Royals once but that was against Cleveland.
Glad I came, just wish I hadn't stayed so long.
Rock Chalk Talk
by Warden11 on Mar 10, 2011 9:45 PM EST reply actions
LMAO
Always funny watching the geeks get flummoxed… What a theory! Someone should actually leave the math lab and watch a baseball game. You need to be reminded that baseball got along fine for 100 years before the mathletes came along.
by ryanajr on Mar 10, 2011 9:49 PM EST reply actions 1 recs
Does flummoxed mean
“stomach pains from laughing so hard”?
Because that’s what’s happening here… you dumb jock.
by Guy Allen Davis on Mar 11, 2011 7:02 AM EST up reply actions
Yeah, you've got us pegged.
We don’t watch baseball at all. We just look at numbers. Yep. It’s not like we actually enjoy baseball and what to investigate it as deeply as we can. What the hell is a cap? I dunno, must me some new stat.
www.stealingfirstbase.com
by Nate Rose on Mar 12, 2011 9:54 PM EST up reply actions
a cap defined
A cap is not a new stat, it is something wanted by those who don’t want to understand new-fangled numbers.
It’s a CAP on the number of statistics that can be used in baseball.
by kenbuddha on Mar 13, 2011 12:00 PM EDT up reply actions
Hey now.
I wear a baseball cap. Because I enjoy baseball. And that includes analysis of statistics to enhance said enjoyment.
www.stealingfirstbase.com
by Nate Rose on Mar 14, 2011 4:22 PM EDT up reply actions
How many more times does this need to be said?
The Moneyball approach is finding players who are undervalued by the market. No more, no less. It’s almost tautologically a good strategy.
In the game of chess, you can never let your adversary see your pieces.
by jsimon66 on Mar 10, 2011 10:42 PM EST reply actions
Why is it always either/or?
I veer towards the sabermetric side of life, but as an Angels fan I can’t but appreciate Mike Scioscia’s approach, who (barring 2010) is able to consistently win close games with his “Contactball” and aggressive (but smart) baserunning strategy; the Angels have beaten their Pythagorean record for, I think, seven years in a row…that’s not just luck, I would think.
Now if you combine a Mike Scioscia’s field tactics with a Bill James’ team-building strategy you’d have a recipe for a true dynasty.
by Angelsjunky7 on Mar 11, 2011 12:02 AM EST reply actions
Yes, but
… the Angels play in what has been a fairly weak division for most of the past 7 years with only four teams and they have had superior pitching depth over the Rangers and Seattle at almost every time and a better offense than the A’s or Mariners at almost anytime. Now that the Rangers have both offense and pitching, things aren’t going as swimmingly.
by switchhittingmachine on Mar 11, 2011 2:08 PM EST up reply actions
Agreed.
In the years Moneyball was about when Oakland was going to the playoffs, they were battling against some pretty good Seattle teams.
2000: Seattle won 91 games in 2000 and lost to the A’s in a one-game playoff (side note: why not just make the season 161 or 163 games so you can’t end in a tie?)
2001: Oakland won 101 games and still finished behind Seattle, who had 116 wins (but made the wild card)
2002: Oakland won 103 games, Anaheim won 99, Seattle won 93…even Texas finished at a “not bad” 72.
2003: Oakland won 96 games, Seattle 93.
Compare that to post 2003 Anaheim:
2004: Anaheim wins division with 92 wins, Oakland finishes with 91
2005: Anaheim wins division with 95 wins, Oakland finishes with 88
2007: Anaheim wins division with 94 wins, Seattle finishes with 88
2008: Anaheim wins division with 100 wins, Texas finishes with 79
2009: Anaheim wins division with 97 wins, Texas finishes with 87
In all but 2004, the team finishing right behind the Angels had a barely over .500 record. In 2008 the second best team was below .500. It’s not exactly the tough division it was when Oakland was winning. Now that they have real competition with Texas, they’re not looking so hot at all.
www.stealingfirstbase.com
by Nate Rose on Mar 12, 2011 10:08 PM EST up reply actions
a note on your side note
an odd number of games overall does not mean that two teams won’t end in a tie. Unless you mean why not have them play each other an odd number of times and then have the tie-breaker be head-to-head record.
by kenbuddha on Mar 13, 2011 12:04 PM EDT up reply actions
Yeah, that.
www.stealingfirstbase.com
by Nate Rose on Mar 14, 2011 4:22 PM EDT up reply actions
a different point of view
I think there’s a strong case to be made that sabermetrics don’t add that much value. i.e. a) advanced stats and metrics don’t tell teams that much that they didn’t already know, and b) sabermetrics doesn’t have that much to say about the things that are most important to the success of an MLB team. So, I’m interested to read the book.
btw, what is the basis for saying that saber won 2 WS for the Red Sox? This is baloney, IMO. Theo is great, but I’d point out that 2004 was year 2 for him, and almost all the key players were holdovers. And that IMO, The Sox’ success has been about drafting, player development, and throwing their financial weight around. Not cleverly acquiring under-valued assets. Their trade and FA record under Theo is actually pretty mixed.
by peter745 on Mar 11, 2011 9:02 AM EST reply actions 1 recs
Sabermetrics is not just about "cleverly acquiring under-valued assets."
That is just how low-revenue teams like the A’s can use sabermetrics to keep up with the big spenders. It is not inconsistent for teams like the Red Sox to use statistics to identify good players and then pay a lot of money to get them. And the whole idea that sabermetrics and scouting are incompatible is nonsense. The goal is to get the best information possible, which usually means having diverse sources and methods of getting it.
by quacker27 on Mar 11, 2011 12:04 PM EST up reply actions
OK. Fair enough
But still ithe ways in which sabermetrics are helping the Red Sox would need to be explained to me. They seem to be a smart, aggressive and well-run organization. But I think a lot of their really good decisions at the ML level have been about team chemistry and accurate assessment of injury risk. And when they’ve tried to get cute in the FA market (i.e. doing something other than pre-emptively paying top $ for the best players) they’ve gotten hurt. So what does that leave? They’re using stats in the scouting and player development process in some innovative way? They’ve decided that prospects are over-valued relative to established talent?
by peter745 on Mar 11, 2011 12:31 PM EST up reply actions
That's a good question.
I’m not personally familiar enough with the Red Sox (as an M’s fan) to answer it. I was speaking to the more general point that it is not necessarily inconsistent for them to spend big money and use statistics. If I had to hazard a guess, maybe they helped the front office do things like target Beltre in free agency last season?
by quacker27 on Mar 11, 2011 1:51 PM EST up reply actions
yeah, I don't know either
Just ‘cuz I don’t see an impact from sabermetrics doesn’t mean there isn’t one. And I agree that the Beltre signing had a SABR-ish feel to it..
by peter745 on Mar 11, 2011 2:09 PM EST up reply actions
The Red Sox DO employ Bill James, you know
I doubt they hired him to twiddle his thumbs and not contribute any sabermetric ideas to the team.
www.stealingfirstbase.com
by Nate Rose on Mar 12, 2011 10:19 PM EST up reply actions
Before Moneyball, OBP was an undervalued asset. That’s something valuable right. Not to mention, the Rangers have relied on defensive metrics to establish a good fielding infield. They weren’t fooled by Young’s gold glove and moved him anyways.
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 11, 2011 12:40 PM EST up reply actions
I do like the fielding stuff
I’m guessing the value to clubs has been about the value of fielding relative to pitching and hitting, and the relative value of fielding at different positions. At least as much as the identification of specific players as good or bad fielders. OBP, I’m not so sure. Billy Beane thought OBP was under-valued, but it’s not clear he was right. These days, it seems like nobody, least of all Beane, is sacrificing defense for OBP.
by peter745 on Mar 11, 2011 12:56 PM EST up reply actions
Sure, but the point is that defense metrics have brought something valuable, which you disputed in your original post.
Whether people are sacrificing defense for OBP is misdirecting the original point. OBP is valuable in terms of scoring runs. The extent of its value wasn’t appreciated until Bean seized upon this market inefficiency.
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 11, 2011 2:40 PM EST up reply actions
I was agreeing with you re fielding stats
But I think Neyer in this post completely exaggerates the Red Sox reliance on stats and by inference the impact and influence of sabermetrics.
re OBP, I guess I’m saying that I’m not sure how much of a market inefficiency there was and/or how successfully Beane exploited it. Scott Hatteburg worked out pretty well, and the Red Sox did not seem to value him properly, but putting gloves on Jeremy Giambi and David Justice probably wasn’t a great idea. All their stars from that era came up through their system together. For which they deserve full credit, of course. I’m just not sure how much of their success had to do with something fundamentally new or different that they were doing.
by peter745 on Mar 11, 2011 3:10 PM EST up reply actions
Do you have evidence to support this claim? By all accounts, the Red Sox taken quantitative metrics very seriously and rely on them greatly (not exclusively of course).
I think the market inefficiency was illustrated by how teams reacted to OBP after Moneyball. Now you see teams valuing OBP much more than previously to moneyball. For example, the Sox saw that Giambi, Ortiz, Millar, Bellhorn, and Mueller all had terrific plate discipline despite their other flaws as hitters. Giambi didn’t work out but Ortiz, Millar, and Mueller were terrific pick ups. These were guys that Duquette probably doesn’t pick up because he wasn’t in tune with this market inefficiency.
Scott Hatteburg worked out pretty well, and the Red Sox did not seem to value him properly,
I’m not 100 percent sure, but he was released by Duquette not Theo.
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 11, 2011 5:21 PM EST up reply actions
I went double checked. Hatteburg was indeed released by Duquette not Theo. So Duquette did not value him properly but not the new regime. It’s very well possible that Theo would have held onto him if the Duke didn’t release him a year earlier.
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 11, 2011 5:26 PM EST up reply actions
yes, Hatteberg was pre-Theo
I didn’t mean to imply otherwise. I was crediting Beane, not debiting Theo.
That advanced stars haven’t been a big part of the Sox success is pure opinion, obviously, but one based on following the team closely. I think it’s hard to make the case that much of their success has had to do with player personnel moves informed by advanced stats. Rob is pretty snide about this book, but I think it’s an interesting topic. I.e. how have the Angels and Twins dominated their divisions without seeming to pay much attention to stats and making moves at the ML level that seem kind of boneheaded. And how much have the Red Sox really gotten out of sabermetrics.
Sox in 2003 had gaping holes at 1B and DH that really cost them. So Theo brought in a bunch of fat guys that could hit, and one of them turned out to be David Ortiz. So Theo gets full marks for this, don’t get me wrong. But I have trouble seeing it as a validation of some stat-based approach. Mueller was kind of SABR-ish, and he worked out quite well. Julio Lugo and Mike Cameron less so. Not sure if Bellhorn’s a good example. At the time there was a real debate about whether they should play Bellhorn or Pokey Reese. Seems to me if the same situation came up now, they’d probably play Pokey.
by peter745 on Mar 11, 2011 7:58 PM EST up reply actions
The Twins are helped greatly by playing in a bad, bad division.
Glad I came, just wish I hadn't stayed so long.
Rock Chalk Talk
by Warden11 on Mar 12, 2011 8:21 AM EST up reply actions
and the Angels have been over taken by a team
that does pay attention to SABR metrics while making quite the un-SABR moves (Wells).
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 12, 2011 5:04 PM EST up reply actions
It’s an opinion yes, but you can look to the facts and evidence to evaluate that opinion. For example, the fact that the Sox hired Bill James is enormously telling.
He brought in flawed guys with one underlying skill that was being undervalued (OBP). I don’t know what constitutes validation but speaks pretty damn well for a SABR approach and the role it plays within the Red Sox.
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 12, 2011 4:56 PM EST up reply actions
I think we're just not gonna agree
I think the Angels losing their division for the 2nd time in 7 years does not constitute having been over-taken. The Wells deal goes to my point. How do they keep winning despite doing stuff like that?
I understand that Bill James works for the Sox, and I’m sure he does a lot of interesting work. I just don’t see any evidence of a stat-based approach being a big factor in their success. For example, it looks like the 2011 edition will be a juggernaut. And all their key guys are either a) homegrown, or b) $15m+/yr FA. Beckett and A-Gon they got by trading tip-top prospects. So maybe there’s something sabermetric going on that’s helping them win, but it’s not at all clear to me what that might be.
Again, in 2003 they lacked a DH and a 1B. These are the easiest kind of guys to find. Big fat guys who have no value outside of the batter’s box. They’re pretty much free. Just ask Manny Ramirez or Jack Cust. And they all have good plate discipline. I can’t think of an example of a player like this who doesn’t. So, they deserve credit for correctly diagnosing the problem and for hitting the jackpot with David Ortiz, but it’s not like it was some kind of sabermetric coup.
by peter745 on Mar 12, 2011 8:42 PM EST up reply actions
Giambi
Actually, they brought in Giambi and Papi in 2003. Giambi was known as the OBP guy who would start ahead of Pap and he was obtained by trading a prospect, but Papi eventually won the job, and became a slugger for the first time, which led to him becoming an OBP guy. Papi was dirt cheap, having been released by the Twins. I agree he was no sabermetric coup, that was supposed to be Giambi, who failed miserably despite a high OBP with Oakland.
by pft on Mar 13, 2011 3:24 AM EST up reply actions
my bad
I got my years mixed up. I meant 2002 and 2003, not 2003 and 2004. And I do remember that Giambi got first shot at the job.
still, someone would really have to explain to me how the “Red Sox have built their organizational philosophy around the Bill James-Moneyball myths”. What does this even mean? Seems like lazy b.s. Seems to me the FO is smart and aggressive and has built a strong organization.
by peter745 on Mar 13, 2011 9:55 AM EDT up reply actions
It means understanding quantitative research and using that to inform decision making. The JD Drew and Carl Crawford signings are perfect examples. SABR darlings because they brought a lot of unrecognized value (well, used to be, teams are now catching up). And in Crawford’s case, he’s exactly the type of player who will age well according to past research.
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 13, 2011 5:42 PM EDT up reply actions
regarding aging
notice how the red sox’s handled papi’s extension in 2006. They gave him a contract that took him to his mid 30 because they recognized he fell under the bill james’ “old player’s skill” category. in contrast, look how the phillies handled the howard extension. much longer contract that him past his mid 30s.
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 13, 2011 5:48 PM EDT up reply actions
Papi always had plate discipline even with the Twins. His OBP wasn’t usually much better than his average even in the minors.
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 13, 2011 5:39 PM EDT up reply actions
They don’t! They lost the division last year. And until recently, they made moves that didn’t make SABR friendly cringe. For example, they way that they handled Abreu recognized that his defensive liabilities weakened his value and his pay reflected that.
Yes, and my point is that they could have have gotten any big fat guys. In other words, they could have just signed a bunch of random guys. But their behavioral pattern clearly wasn’t random. There was a method behind the madness (high OBP guys). I mean provide counter-evidence. Did they sign any 1B/DH types with poor plate discipline?
Folksy literate type.
by birdman on Mar 13, 2011 5:36 PM EDT up reply actions
I understand what you're saying
I just don’t really agree.
re the Angels: I don’t see them losing the division for the 2nd time in 7 years as evidence of an inferior approach finally catching up with them. If that’s your point. I see a team that’s dominated a division filled with pretty sharp operators using an approach that’s basically stats-free. I want to know how they do it.
re CC: they may well have great stats on aging, defense, etc, but at the end of the day, they needed a LF and paid the yrs and $ necessary to get the best one on the market. Same as the Yankees would have done if they’d been in the market for a LF. Same with Ortiz. They paid the yrs/$ they had to to keep him. More common sense and basic business than stat-based wizardry.
re Papi et al: I guess I’m suggesting that this type of player almost always has good plate discipline. That and power is all they have to offer. I can’t think of many examples of a team signing a free-swinging DH-type. Vlad Guerrero, I guess. DH-types signed in the last couple of years: Vlad, Manny, Dan Johnson, Thome, Dunn, Matsui, Cust. Can’t think of any others. 1 free-swinger, 1 multi-yr contract. This is just what teams do. If they need a DH, they bring in Nick Johnson or somebody.
by peter745 on Mar 13, 2011 8:52 PM EDT up reply actions
Theo's biggest, best moves have been
related to team chemistry (trading Nomar, getting rid of Manny, and, I suspect, letting go of Derek Lowe) and letting guys go because of injury risk (Pedro, Bay). His record with trades and FA signings has been pretty mixed. Ortiz, Mueller, Millar on the plus side, Renteria, Lugo, Cameron, Dice-K on the minus side, for example.
by peter745 on Mar 12, 2011 8:52 PM EST up reply actions
Clearly, building a team around chance is the way to go
by Freneau on Mar 11, 2011 12:59 PM EST reply actions
It's pandering. This book panders to people who already hate Moneyball.
This is quiet common in modern media. Rather than examine an issue fairly to learn the truth, simply make bold assertions with which some people will agree, and get those people to pay you to do it.
I like using semi-colons; they make me feel smart.
by Llewdor on Mar 11, 2011 3:03 PM EST reply actions
Agreed.
Moneyball will not be showing up this books Amazon “People who bought this, also bought” section…because they’re not interested in debate. They’re interested in debunking something they don’t want to have to learn in the first place.
by Kalaska on Mar 11, 2011 7:56 PM EST up reply actions
This book will probably not make a very good case...
But in snarking on it before we’ve read it (much less before it’s even been released), aren’t we just as bad as, say, Joe Morgan discrediting Moneyball when he’s admittedly never read it?
www.stealingfirstbase.com
by Nate Rose on Mar 12, 2011 10:43 PM EST reply actions
bingo
my thoughts exactly
by peter745 on Mar 13, 2011 12:10 PM EDT up reply actions
Hmmmm
Most folks would be surprised that todays advanced stats began with Branch Rickey in the 1940’s-50’s.
http://www.baseballthinkfactory.org/btf/pages/essays/rickey/goodby_to_old_idea.htm
Moneyball was basically about finding value. OBP was undervalued and cheap, and so Oakland went after it. Now OBP is not cheap, and has not been for many years, but perhaps SLG is undervalued. Fielding defense is cheaper than SLG, so team seem to be chasing it more, and for some teams is more valuable than a 1Bman who can hit 25 HR (Mariners showed how well that worked last year). Some teams like the Red Sox and Yankees can afford to chase everything.
As for the idea that chance plays a big role in individual games, and that this is somehow contrary to sabermetrics, I can only shake my head. Every sabermetrician fully appreciates the role of chance, in fact, many go way overboard and insist clutch hitting, catchers game calling influence on ERA, breakout years, etc, are simply nothing more than chance events (because they can find no evidence), but the absence of “statistical” evidence simply means it is hard to find (lack of control group, SSS, etc) .
That said, over a season, individual veteran players production can be estimated or predicted reasonably well. However, injuries and breakout years, or age related collapse can not be predicted with great certainty, nor can rookies performance in their first year, so such predictions on team performance can be wildly erroneous.
Seems to be the authors of this book are creating a straw man, and embracing some fallacies about what sabermetrics is, but I have not yet read the book.
As for the reason the Red Sox won the World Series in 2004 and 2007, they had inherited many good players from Duquette. Guys like Manny, Damon, Youkillis, Pedro, Lowe, Nomar, etc. Some of them they traded for pieces they needed (Cabrera), allowed to leave FA and obtain draft picks. They also signed Keith Foulke and Papi as FA, and Papi was a cheap and suprising gold mine given he was supposed to start the 2003 season as Jeremy Giambis backup. Not known as an OBP or SLG guy, he became both. In some cases they traded top prospects inherited from Duquette to acquire Beckett and Lowell which led to 2007 and Curt Schillin in 2004. They also went and got themselves a pretty good manager in Tito. If he was managing in 2003 instead of Little they probably would have won the World Series then too.
Lot of luck, and a lot of good drafting/development and player evaluation which was based on both scouting and the numbers. Theo has said he values both.
Sometimes they made mistakes, such as when the scouts and sabermetricians said Renteria and Lugo would be great SS at Fenway, or that JD would improve as a hitter in Fenway, or that Daisuke would be worth 103 million. A big mistake was when the Red Sox thought Arroyos numbers in 2005 meant he would not pitch well in 2006 and since they felt they had enough pitching, they traded for Wily Mo pena. In 2006, Theo discovered you can never have too much pitching. Lesson learned. Some of that is bad luck, some bad judgement, maybe even bad numbers.
by pft on Mar 13, 2011 3:16 AM EST reply actions
The Pigeon in the Outfield
My 2009 projections actually predicted the ball hitting the pigeon in the outfield, though I did get the inning wrong.
by Jay Essman on Mar 13, 2011 5:26 PM EDT reply actions
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