SB Nation - Jose Vidro

Analyzing Market Inefficiencies: Players Below Replacement Level

Jack Moore — Thu, 28 May 2009 04:22:16 -0000

More photos » by Duane Burleson - AP

Sky's Note: I'm psyched to introduce another new BtB writer, Jack Moore. He's a Brewers fan, but we'll deal with that if he continues to write awesome articles like this one and the one below. Be nice to the new guy, and feel free to drop him a tweet at @jh_moore. Ok, enough linkage, read this:

Every year, there are at least a few players that make us scratch our head and say, "Wait, he's still in the Major Leagues?" These are players that are consistently at or below replacement level and yet continue to receive playing time and even occasionally receive contracts above the minimum in lieu of freely available talent. These consistently poor decisions made by front offices across the country beg the question - what are these players doing to earn roster spots? Let's take a look at four categories of players that have performed below replacement level over the past 3 calendar years, with a minimum of 500 plate appearances.

Category 1: One-Tool Sluggers

These guys are good at one thing, and one thing only: hitting home runs. This is the kind of market inefficiency that may be on its way out with the prevalence of defense among front offices now. Included in this category are 8 of the 23 players who have been below replacement level over the last 3 calendar years with at least 500 plate appearances.

Player	Batting	Fielding	Replacement	Positional	Wins	ISO (career)	ISO (last3)	difference	UZR+PosAdj	POS	NOTES
Marcus Thames	0.5	-12.3	21.5	-11.9	-0.2	0.256	0.252	0.004	-24.2	COF	43 HR in 646 PA
Richie Sexson	-11.0	-18.9	27.3	-16.9	-1.9	0.246	0.198	0.048	-35.8	1B	33 HR in 818 PA
Jonny Gomes	0.0	-16.3	19.4	-14.1	-1.1	0.219	0.193	0.026	-30.4	COF	25 HR in 586 PA
Jeff Baker	-11.8	-1.8	17.2	-6.7	-0.3	0.201	0.152	0.049	-8.5	ALL	16 HR in 516 PA
Wily Mo Pena	-18.3	-2.8	17.4	-7.6	-1.1	0.194	0.146	0.048	-10.4	COF	15 HR in 523 PA
Brad Wilkerson	-12.9	-4.0	23.3	-12.2	-0.6	0.193	0.180	0.013	-16.2	ALL OF	24 HR in 698 PA
Craig Monroe	-26.4	-6.1	22.2	-11.5	-2.1	0.191	0.179	0.012	-17.6	COF	23 HR in 668 PA
David Dellucci	-12.5	-7.2	20.6	-12.6	-1.1	0.180	0.148	0.032	-19.8	COF	15 HR in 619 PA

Fantasy players value players like these because they can straight up clobber the baseball out of the ballpark. Looking at other skills necessary to be a major leaguer, however, these seven just come up short. None of these seven play a premium position (Baker did play 76 games at 2B and 3B combined, but never stuck anywhere), and where they do end up fielding they are well below average with the glove. Only Jonny Gomes flashed any legitimate amount of speed on the bases (20 SB to 5 CS). Even with the bat, despite the high power numbers, only two of the seven grade out as average, as their on-base skills simply are not at a major league level. This group overall, for the 2007 and 2008 seasons, got on-base at a .299 clip and had a staggering K/BB ratio of 2.98. Combining poor fielding with the inability to reach base make these players unplayable despite their great power.

Category 2: Aging Veterans

These guys are all at least 30 years old and experiencing a definitely decline in ability with their age. Many of these players not only played well in their 20s but some were even stars (the most notable player on this list, Nomar Garciaparra, put up 41.5 WAR between 1997 and 2003). Instead of focusing on ISO, I'd like to focus on Speed Score with this group.

Player	Age	Batting	Fielding	Replacement	Positional	Wins	Spd(career)	Spd(last3)	difference	UZR+PosAdj	POS	NOTES
Nomar Garciaparra	35	-8.6	-13.0	23.3	-4.5	-0.3	5.90	2.23	3.67	-17.5	1B/3B	41.5 WAR 1997-2003
Mike Sweeney	35	-8.5	0.5	16.9	-14.0	-0.5	3.50	1.46	2.04	-13.5	1B	13.6 WAR 2000-2002
Jose Vidro	34	-5.4	-3.9	31.8	-23.1	-0.1	3.20	1.85	1.35	-27	DH	8.0 WAR 2002-2003
Mark Kotsay	33	-18.8	-5.7	22.1	1.0	-0.1	4.80	2.85	1.95	-4.7	CF	12.0 WAR 2002-2004
Frank Catalanotto	35	0.2	-10.8	21.8	-13.1	-0.2	5.00	3.85	1.15	-23.9	1B	3.9 WAR in 2001
Dave Roberts	36	-8.9	-10.1	19.1	-1.9	-0.2	8.60	7.55	1.05	-12	CF/LF	3 seasons above 2.0 WAR
Corey Patterson	30	-36.0	1.1	29.8	4.1	-0.1	7.20	6.50	0.70	5.2	CF	4.9 WAR in 2004
Gary Matthews Jr.	34	-14.9	-28.6	38.8	-4.0	-0.9	5.60	5.09	0.51	-32.6	ALL OF	9.5 WAR 2004-2006

For the most part, this group of players were, at some point in their careers, plus defenders playing at premium positions. Most notably, Roberts was pushed out of CF, Garciaparra lost the ability to play SS, and Vidro was moved from 2B to DH. Similar to the sluggers, the biggest reason these players are below replacement is because of their minimal defensive values, whether it's because they can't play their positions any more (Roberts is +37 runs career by TotalZone, and had a -7 year in 2007) or simpy don't have the bat for the position any more (Sweeney's +0.5 UZR pales when shown next to a -14.0 positional adjustment). Patterson is the anomaly here, as his defensive value including position is a quite respectable +5.2, but his bat died in 2008, posting a ridiculous -26.6 wRAA. An interesting thing to note here is the decline in speed score. Every single one of these players showed a decline of at least .50 with an average decrease of 1.55. A decline of 1.55 is certainly concerning if not alarming in a stat with a range of 0-10, and it likely explains why these players are no longer assets on defense.

Category 3: AAAA Players

This group just plain does not fit on any major league roster. Still, they seem to find work filling benches or even occasionally starting for the lowest of the low. As a fan, if you have to see one of these players getting consistent at bats, you know your team is in trouble. These players excel at nothing, and really never have.

Player	Age	Batting	Fielding	Replacement	Positional	Wins	UZR+PosAdj	POS	NOTES
Jose Castillo	29	-27.1	-4.5	22.8	3.7	-0.5	-0.8	2B/3B	-1.2 career WAR
Ross Gload	33	-15.4	3.2	27.9	-18.9	-0.3	-15.7	1B	-1.2 career WAR
Chris Burke	29	-23.1	1.9	20.7	-0.7	-0.1	1.2	ALL	1.9 career WAR

I really have explanation as to why Ross Gload has ever been on a major league roster. He's a light hitting, average fielding first baseman, which probably has never been in demand. Jose Castillo plays a decent enough 3B but has no bat to back it up. These two players have not only been terrible recently, but have made an entire career out of it. Chris Burke's career, on the other hand, may be salvageable. He does have a positive career WAR, and it is possible that he was simply being used incorrectly. As an outfielder, he has a career UZR/150 of 0.1, but at 2B his UZR/150 is 7.2. With 2B being more valuable than the COF spots that Burke had spent so much time in, it's possible that Burke could become a 1 win player going forward.

Category 4: Hot Prospects

Occasionally, a prospect gets rushed to the big leagues by virtue of injuries or shortages at the ML level or simply an overzealous front office. These three players all have received hype in some way, shape, or form, and were supposed to play like major leaguers at a very young age. Unfortunately for their fans and their front offices, they have not performed to any major leaguer's standards, much less that of a first round pick.

Player	Batting	Fielding	Replacement	Positional	Wins	ISO (career)	UZR+PosAdj	POS	NOTES
Josh Fields	-14.5	-15.6	20.4	0.7	-0.9	0.187	-14.9	3B	18th pick in 2004
Delmon Young	-12.3	-29.8	46.6	-14.4	-1.0	0.117	-44.2	COF	1st pick in 2003
Alexi Casilla	-27.1	-4.1	24.4	2.8	-0.4	0.069	-1.3	2B	Signed out of DR in 2003 at age 19

This group is probably the most unique of them all, each showing different ways to produce at a below-replacement level. Casilla has the glove to potentially be an average player right now, and Young's bat could play at a tougher position. Fields shows the worst of both worlds, showing no indication of major league talent except for the ability to hit for power. These players were likely rushed to the majors too quickly, but who knows if any amount of minor league time could correct their problems. Another problem for these GMs is that these players are too talented to just get rid of, and may clog up roster spots on these teams for years to come.

Finally, let's take a look at the salaries these players received.

Player	Wins	Salary (2007+2008)	Over Minimum	Player	Wins	Salary (2007+2008)	Over Minimum
Jeff Baker	-0.3	0.8	0	Frank Catalanotto	-0.2	7.5	6.7
Josh Fields	-0.9	0.8	0	Craig Monroe	-2.1	7.6	6.8
Alexi Casilla	-0.4	0.8	0	David Dellucci	-1.1	7.6	6.8
Chris Burke	-0.1	1.4	0.6	Brad Wilkerson	-0.6	8.3	7.5
Marcus Thames	-0.2	1.7	0.9	Mike Sweeney	-0.5	11.5	10.7
Jonny Gomes	-1.1	1.7	0.9	Dave Roberts	-0.2	11.5	10.7
Ross Gload	-0.3	1.9	1.1	Mark Kotsay	-0.1	15	14.2
Jose Castillo	-0.5	2.6	1.8	Gary Matthews Jr.	-0.9	15.8	15
Delmon Young	-1.0	2.7	1.9	Jose Vidro	-0.1	16	15.2
Wily Mo Pena	-1.1	3.2	2.4	Nomar Garciaparra	-0.3	18	17.2
Chad Tracy	-0.1	7	6.2	Richie Sexson	-1.9	31	30.2
Corey Patterson	-0.1	7.3	6.5	Average	-0.61	7.9	7.1
--	--	--	--	*TOTAL*	*-14.03*	*181.7*	*163.3*

Between these 23 players, teams have wasted 163.3 million dollars giving them roster spots. Between Jose Videro and Richie Sexson alone, the Mariners wasted 45.4 million dollars in 2007 and 2008. Even a larger market team like Seattle can't handle inexcusable contracts like those two. These are the kind of mistakes that kill small and middle market teams. As the economy worsens, it'll certainly be interesting to see if these inefficiencies remain or if different types of below replacement players surface.

Community Projection: Jose Vidro

Jeff — Mon, 22 Dec 2008 06:30:51 -0000

The ninth in a non-alphabetical and irregularly updated series of review pieces for each(?) of the players we predicted last spring.

LL/USSM Community: .280/.355/.357
Actual Line: .234/.274/.338

If 2008 was the complete opposite of 2007, then Jose Vidro was the poster boy. After benefiting from a run of good luck two seasons ago that gave him the superficial appearance of being decent, last year Vidro's regression arrow overcorrected itself, and in so doing brought its host body back to Earth with a resounding thud, or thwock, or some other funny noise. Vidro came to the plate 308 times last summer, and among the 281 players with at least 300 PAs, his BA ranked 254th, his OBP ranked 278th, his SLG ranked 237th, and his wOBA* ranked 266th. He was 13 runs below average at the plate while logging only a half season of work. He did this as the team's designated hitter. If somebody were to ask you to explain what went wrong with the Mariners last year in 50 words or less, there are countless different directions you could go with your answer, but the easiest and most telling response would be pointing out that our DHs as a unit were out-hit by Paul Bako.

As we watched Vidro's long and successful career as an everyday player come to a close, there was no last gasp. There was no grand finale. There was only a whimper. Vidro's average never rose above .239, and only twice did he record extra-base hits in consecutive games. And as if his numbers weren't already embarrassing enough, on 13 occasions he was slotted in to bat cleanup, at which point even more attention was paid to his lousy performance. By the time the break came around, it had become apparent to everyone that Vidro was counting numbered days. It wasn't a matter of if he'd be cut; it was a matter of when, and how quickly.

The day finally came in early August. God only knows what Vidro's been doing since he got his release, but he sure as hell hasn't been playing any baseball. Two years ago, Bill Bavasi traded for a bat to help make the Mariners competitive, and today that bat can't find any work. The way the whole Vidro saga played out speaks so many volumes about our old leadership that someone ought to build a memorial library.

For whatever it's worth, Vidro wasn't as bad last year as his raw batting line would suggest. His .245 BABIP in no way did justice to his line drive rate, which remained the same as it was in 2007, and a few more grounders found gloves than one would ordinarily expect. If you apply a little healthy regression, Vidro's line jumps from .234/.274/.338 up to .269/.307/.373, which - well it's a lot better anyway. But here's the problem: not only is that still totally awful, but we also never should've had to watch him struggle that often in 2008 in the first place. Applying the same regression process to Vidro's 2007 spits out a .277/.349/.343 performance, which is down quite a bit from his raw .775 OPS. And that's a much better reflection of Jose Vidro's true talent. Anybody could've seen that Vidro was set for a major statistical decline, and a smarter GM might've braced himself by finding another bat and putting Vidro on the bench, but Bavasi kept on going with his blissful ignorance until his ignorance was no longer nearly as blissful. I know it's hard to reduce the role of someone coming off a .314 season, but when it comes to flukes, you have to be proactive. When Vidro's luck didn't return for a second helping, the Mariner offense was doomed.

At this point, with his regular career dead and buried, all Vidro has left to look forward to are a few years spent scrounging for bench gigs and NRIs. The end is seldom flattering. Meanwhile, we look to close a shameful chapter in Mariners history, a three-year period during which the only competent DH the organization had was assigned to play left field. Carl Everett was a bust, the Ben Broussard/Eduardo Perez platoon was a bust, and Jose Vidro was a bust. And while Vidro chose a strange path to follow, at the end of his time in Seattle, he'd amassed a batting line of .285/.344/.374 over 232 games, which you may recognize as being almost exactly what we expected him to do. Jose Vidro was not a surprise in 2007, nor was he a disappointment in 2008. Jose Vidro was what we thought he'd be, and while his numbers bounced around in every direction, his underlying skillset remained the same, and it wasn't a skillset built to DH. It was hardly a skillset at all.

Good riddance to you, Jose, and to everything you signified. Our disappointment with the trade was never about Chris Snelling or Emiliano Fruto; it was about you, and how you weren't in any way equipped to do the job you were given. And while we hated the deal at the time, it is only now that we are being run by a competent front office that we can truly appreciate just how stupid of an acquisition you really were. Turns out old, broken-down middle infielders don't make the best DHs after all. Who knew? It's good to learn lessons.

I can't believe we survived this.