SB Nation - Luis Valbuena

Why Omar Minaya Failed And What It Means For The Future

Sam Page — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 11:00:22 -0000

On July 27, 2002, Omar Minaya, then General Manager of the Montreal Expos, traded Lee Steven, Brandon Phillips, Grady Sizemore, and Cliff Lee to Mark Shapiro's Indians for Bartolo Colon and Tim Drew.

In 2002, Major League Baseball owned the Expos. The offseason before, the Expos had narrowly avoided contraction, because the Twins, the other team in line for contraction, had another year on their lease of the Metrodome. In a month the league would agree to a new collective bargaining agreement that barred contraction, but at the time it still seemed a possibility. So MLB's proxy GM, Minaya, looked for a player to maybe help the Expos win a Wild Card berth, a parting gift for Montreal.

One of the many front-office personnel the Expos shed under their reorganization by MLB was Tony LaCava, their farm director. He jumped to the Indians as a cross-checker. When Omar Minaya called Mark Shapiro about Bartolo Colon, Tony LaCava handpicked the prospects the Indians would receive. When the trade was announced, Shapiro, like Bill Smith would be six years later, was denounced as a young GM over his head. It also marked the first time, Minaya got "his guy" in a trade.

I recall this point in baseball history because it has much to do with why both of these men are currently employed as general managers. Both of these general managers are also coming off 90-loss seasons in the wake of playoff aspirations. Omar Minaya and Mark Shapiro, however, couldn't be more different.

Omar Minaya is a former pro-baseball player, drafted out of high school. Early in Minaya's tenure with the Mets, his success was championed as an exemplar of old-fashioned roster construction. Before Minaya lost "his guys," the process entailed conference call between his scouts, Sandy Johnson and Tony Bernazard, and his paperwork guy, John Ricco. This franchise doesn't just contrast the careful calculation of other front offices, it advertises the fact: "Paperwork, that's false hustle. It takes away creativity. People who are into paperwork are into covering their asses, so if things go wrong they can point to all the work they did."

No team evidences false hustle better than the Indians. Mark Shapiro graduated from Princeton and has a reputation as one of the smartest GM's in baseball. Like Minaya, Shapiro surrounded himself with men of similar background--his sidekick Chris Antonetti is a Georgetown man. The Indians under Shapiro have developed a process, which involves a lot of "paperwork," most famously, the proprietary DiamondView system, supposed to quantify a players' holistic value. As Antonetti described the goal of DiamondView: "There's still this level of variability, but we've reduced it to the smallest level we can." The Indians, the front office, are the progressive group many Mets fans clamor for, but the Indians, the team, are the 90-game losers Mets fans are sick of watching.

Therein is an interesting point of comparison: how did these two seemingly polar-opposite executives, who launched each other's career with the most lopsided trade of the decade, end up at a similar point? Of course, there's no easy answer--'They both forgot to hit the win button!'--and the two situations are, to an extent, unique. Still, one would expect the American League's smartest GM and the National League's highest payroll to battle for the playoffs, not the sixth pick in the first-year player draft.

A recent post at Let's Go Tribe entitled "Fire Everyone! - Mark Shapiro" came up with an answer, thought not a completely comfortable one. The article was the last in a series of posts on why, obviously, everyone should be fired, so there's a sense the author is playing devil's advocate. Still, he raises an interesting point about the nature of the GM's job, and this article is largely an addendum to it, so give it a read too. The crux of his argument and the cliff notes version of the post is neatly summarized here:

For all that, however, the brilliant executive can't necessarily tell you whether it's better to overspend on Raul Ibañez or Kerry Wood. He can't necessarily devise a process to tell you that, and he can't necessarily hire the right person to tell you that, either. Nor can he devise a process to hire the right person to tell you that. It doesn't always come down to objective analysis or having a good process. Sometimes it comes down to talent: the talent to play, the talent to evaluate talent, the talent to develop talent, and the judgment to make decisions about talent.

Jay argues that evaluating talent, if not innate, is at least a skill in and of itself. The Colon-trade was Shapiro's signature move, but LaCava, the scout, handpicked the players he would receive. The laundry list of players Shapiro has acquired from horse-trading is impressive, but none match up to Lee-Sizemore-Phillips. In fact, with Huntington and LaCava long gone, is it coincidence that the returns on Cliff Lee and Victor Martinez were so underwhelming?

Maybe, but I am more interested in the way this situation runs counter to the assessment I constantly hear, and occasionally have given, of Omar Minaya: "He's a great scout and evaluator of talent, but is too sloppy with resources. The Mets would be better suited with a more statistically-inclined GM." Is this Shapiro/Minaya comparison a two parts to whole situation, where one lacks the scouting acumen, the other a supercomputer called DiamondView?

First, consider Minaya's scouting reputation. Starting out as an international scout with the Rangers, he signed Sammy Sosa. That's the kind of signing you can hang your hat on, and Minaya has, as the other players he signed include non-entities: Chris Colon, Ruben Mateo, Jorge Toca, and Timo Perez(!). He also signed Fernando Tatis and Joaquin Benoit, who became pretty good players. Still, including my performance-enhanced namesake, not exactly the greatest list in the world, but a good one.

This reputation comes equally from his supposed ability to "identify players who can help the Mets" and get them, irrespective of costs. It sounds basic, but seemingly describes whatever Shapiro lacked when deciding "whether it's better to overspend on Raul Ibañez or Kerry Wood," as Jay says. Call them Minaya's guys, as in "Omar got his guy" or Minaya's favorite synonym for person.

It started with his two biggest free-agent pick-ups: Pedro Martinez and Carlos Beltran. Pedro's talent was obvious, but the contract was a minor disaster as he was injured through most of it. Minaya claimed that Pedro "made the brand," i.e. made the Mets more attractive to international free agents, but the jury is still out on that one. His other big signing, Carlos Beltran, will undoubtedly go down as the biggest success of his tenure. Beltran, one of the few true five-tool players left in baseball, has been worth significantly more than his $18M/year. It's unclear to what extent Minaya predicted, or even knows, that to be true, as he likely just sought to get Beltran for the best price he could, without any precise estimation of his value. In fact, Beltran was supposedly someone Minaya didn't get the green light to sign in Texas. Carlos had been Minaya's guy for a while.

When the Mets were at their best, in 2006, his guys were nearly always coming through. In a 2006 article, Dave Studeman identified ten players that Minaya picked up on the cheap and became integral parts of the great '06 squad: Chad Bradford, Darren Oliver, Duaner Sanchez, Pedro Feliciano, Jose Valentin, John Maine, Endy Chavez, Roberto Hernandez, Guillermo Mota, and Oliver Perez. Players like Jose Valentin, a guy no one else would expect to be a starting-caliber second baseman, were making Minaya look like a genius, like he had that something Mark Shapiro lacked. Those were ten moves that get you on the cover of Sports Illustrated, that made people pay attention when you started talking about "false hustle," as if it were secret knowledge.

In the conclusion to that piece, Studeman writes, "It may be luck, it may be skill. It may be the result of a team with money taking good calculated risks." Here's a hint: six of those players were relievers, the most luck-dependent players in baseball. Ultimately, though, time revealed the truth: it was luck. Even from that original list, of the seven he retained, five fizzled out, either from injuries or ineffectiveness. Regarding the other two, Endy Chavez was replaced by the awful Jeremy Reed and Pedro Feliciano became the last man standing in several subsequent bullpen failures.

Then, Minaya started to display some bad tendencies. He became too loyal to his guys: if a reliever with poor skills floundered in the first-half, Minaya would trust him to right the ship. Similarly, as if to underscore that he had done something right, Minaya would pay ridiculously over-market contracts to previous buy-low pick-ups, like Oliver Perez and Luis Castillo, negating the value that made the moves good in the first place. He proved unable to manage injury risks, entrusting Moises Alou and John Maine with serious duties while keeping no reliable back-ups on hand. Minaya's front office overreacted to small sample sizes, see: Omir Santos, Marlon Anderson, and Daniel Murphy. He gave away Heath Bell, Brian Bannister, and Darren O'Day.

Yet, none of these miscues sticks out as a particularly strong indictment of his ability's as a scout, just as a talent evaluator. Moises Alou was a great player, when he played. He was a horrible pick-up for a team that needed a reliable, everyday left-fielder. On the major league level, talent evaluation involves using the most accurate objective measures to evaluate a player's track record, something observation can't do reliably, in any sport or field. These past few years, the Mets would have been better suited with a Mark Shapiro-type, with no particular scouting expertise, but an ability to objectively evaluate major-league talent and make sound business decisions. With a large payroll and the established core of Wright/Reyes, it seems the Mets badly needed some false hustle, some paperwork, some stability, not a huge gamble at 15 of the the 25 roster spots every season.

But maybe it is too late for that. As fielding stats get more widely accepted, it seems a glorified Moneyball scenario, where a few teams with superior objective analysis carry an edge, is becoming less likely. As more players, are signing long-term deals with the teams that drafted them, and fewer are hitting free agency, the statistical analysis the Mets have been so neglectful of becomes just the baseline. Indeed, as Jay wrote about some of the most successful teams around the league: "it's noteworthy that other organizations that have gone with the 'Ivy League whiz kid' GM model tend to have a 'wise old baseball man' figure hanging close by, advising the gifted non-scout executive. The Red Sox had Bill Lajoie attached to Theo Epstein; Allard Baird is in that role now, while Lajoie is now advising Huntington in Pittsburgh. The Rays put Gerry Hunsicker with Andrew Friedman, and down in Texas, Jon Daniels has access to no less than John Hart and Nolan Ryan." With that pattern in mind, I was encouraged to read that the Wilpons convinced Sandy Johnson to stay out of retirement, allegedly in preparation for a non-Minaya centric front office.

For similar reasons, these forces will also probably push forward the mythical symbiosis of scouting and statistics that everyone pays lip-service to but isn't quite sure what they're referring to. More than just pitchf/x and hitf/x, the observation of both amateur and professional talent will come down to hyper-specific scouting reports that use data and observation to spot trends of growth or deterioration in a player's skills. And maybe, even then, it will take some "wise old baseball man," with a special eye for talent, to build the best franchise.

On December 10, 2008, the Mets, Indians, and Mariners completed a three-way trade, in which the Mariners received Aaron Heilman, Endy Chavez, Jason Vargas, Mike Carp, Ezequiel Carrera, Maikel Cleto, and Franklin Gutierrez. The Mets received J.J. Putz, Jeremy Reed, and Sean Green, while the Indians received Joe Smith and Luis Valbuena.

This trade, for me, perfectly encapsulates two failed models for a front office and the future of a what it means to a successful one. Omar Minaya acquired a talented player with serious injury concerns, and severely downgraded two known major-league entities, presumably not knowing he did. Shapiro acquired a minor league infielder with good stats, but a "bad body" and mixed scouting reports. While there is plenty of time for him to improve, Valbuena was merely replacement level this season. Meanwhile, Jack Zduriencik, the long-time scouting director who understands and embraces statistical analysis, brought in a 6-WAR centerfielder and a boatload of interesting prospects.

The Mets under Minaya were famed for embracing multiple perspectives, both of the scout and the statistician. Sadly, they failed to understand how those roles fit into a functioning front office. First, they need a reliable process for evaluating and valuing major league talent, a la the Indians. Then, they can get their "guys."

Things I Learned Watching A Few Hours Of The Venezuelan Winter League

Jeff — Wed, 28 Oct 2009 05:19:52 -0000

The whole reason I tuned in in the first place was to watch Michael Saunders. Venezuela makes the third country in which Mike doesn't know when to take the bat off his shoulders.

Road team uniforms in the VWL are equipped with external brassieres, presumably in an effort to shame the wearer.

Venezuelan tools and American tools are a lot alike.

Watching a game in the VWL is completely unlike watching a game in the Majors for me, and not just because I don't care about the results. While Major League Baseball remains in large part unpredictable, I know a lot about it. I know a lot about how it works and I know a lot about the players, so if I'm watching a game, then in any given situation I can't help but call on my knowledge in thinking about all the most likely outcomes. If Willie Ballgame goes up against Mariano Rivera, I know Willie's probably not going to get on base, and he's almost certainly not going to go deep. If the Orioles play the Yankees, I know the Yankees are probably going to clobber them to death. If Miguel Batista is pitching to anyone, I know it's probably going to be annoying. I'm just constantly and instinctively thinking about everything I know such that games lose a bit of that magic I used to feel when I was a kid.

When I'm watching the VWL, though, I don't know shit about what's going on, I don't know shit about most of the players, and even if there's a guy with whom I'm somewhat familiar, I generally don't know shit about when he's in. I don't even know who the Cardenales de Lara were playing. It's just...baseball, competitive, high-level baseball as unblemished by understanding as any baseball I'm ever gonna be able to watch. I kind of knew when Saunders was hitting, and I kind of knew when Luis Valbuena was hitting, but outside of that, between the nameless uniforms and the dearth of graphics and the Spanish-language broadcast, it was just an onslaught of Game, a game about which I never once remarked "well of course he missed that" or "he should've thrown the changeup."

It's easy to say that learning so much about the numbers has enhanced my enjoyment of the sport, but the sport itself is fun enough as it is, and I can't fault anyone for not wanting to jeopardize the love they already feel by going off in pursuit of a better understanding. For many, the basics are sufficient.

I know that teams in the VWL will bring in a handful of American imports, but when you're navigating a Spanish-language website about a team in Venezuela, there are certain things you don't expect to see on the front page. This is one of them.

The phrase "sabor Venezolano" came up during the broadcast at least eight or nine times. I don't know enough Spanish to know if the announcers were referring to a particular style of baseball or if they were trying to sell me something delicious.

There were a lot of PA sound effects during certain parts of the game, such as that string sample from Psycho, suggesting that Lara's adversary has the same production budget as the Rangers.

Luis Ugueto plays for Lara. Remember Luis Ugueto? Hasn't been in a Major League organization for two years. Spent 2008 playing in Italy of all places before signing on with an independent team in Laredo. He is one of ten players on that team with a size that isn't listed as 0'0, 0 lbs. One of his teammates is named Robert Moron.

Sometimes the stadium PA would chime in with the notes to the Ole! chant, only instead of being the familiar sort, their version was played in a minor key that made it 1000% more unsettling.

The crowd wasn't huge, but it was spirited. I don't want to say that Americans are worse baseball fans (or sports fans in general), because truth be told it's just a difference in culture, but every time I watch a sporting event overseas I wish that fans here would make half as much noise. It's a difference in culture, but that part of our culture sucks.

Venezuelans believe in Santa, and their Santa puts his trust in Banco Federal.

Fire Everyone! - Mark Shapiro

Jay — Fri, 09 Oct 2009 05:53:11 -0000

More photos » by Tony Dejak - AP

Is just developing a good process enough?

Browse more photos »

This is the final installment in a 12-part series.

"A Hit Is A Hit" — The Sopranos, season one.

Christopher has been bankrolling a band called "Visiting Day", who are managed by his girlfriend Adriana. He plays the band's demo to his associate Hesh, an old-timer in the music business.

CHRISTOPHER: So?

HESH: I think it's ... not good.

CHRISTOPHER: Wanna be a little more specific?

HESH: There's good. And there's not good. This is not good.

CHRISTOPHER: Okay, maybe it's not your era — no offense, but ...

HESH: Kid, music is music, talent is talent. I don't care who you are. I seen it all. I seen heavy metal invented by Hendrix at the Bottom Line, he just got out of the army. I told him, "Kid, I don't know what you call it — talent, charisma, magic — whatever it is, you got it." These guys ... [gestures to the cassette] ... I'm sorry, they don't.

CHRISTOPHER: That Vito is a great guitar player, Hesh.

HESH: Good, fine, he's a great guitar player. However, there's one constant in the music business: A hit is a hit. And this, my friend, is not a hit.

CHRISTOPHER: But why?

HESH: Christ. Reasons we can never comprehend or codify, you pitiful schlepper.

Of all the installments in this series, this is the one where it's most tempting to beg off and admit, this might just above my pay grade. I'll be honest, I can't say with much confidence whether Mark Shapiro should be fired. What I can say is that there are definitely good reasons to fire him.

Before we get to that, better face up to some hard facts. If you're going to fire Shapiro, you have to believe that a better option is available. Chris Antonetti is the heir apparent, but you fire Shapiro and keep Antonetti only if you think that in keeping Antonetti, you preserve the best parts of Shapiro while rooting out his shortcomings. Heck, maybe that's actually the case, but I personally couldn't say. It doesn't seem likely. And if Antonetti was the instant front-runner for most any GM opening, what would that make Shapiro if he were available?

Shapiro's calling card is turning walk-year veterans into prospects who become multi-year contributors to the team — a truly staggering haul, including Grady Sizemore, Cliff Lee, Coco Crisp, Shin-Soo Choo, Travis Hafner, Milton Bradley, Franklin Gutierrez, Asdrubal Cabrera, Josh Bard and Kelly Shoppach. Add to that list, potentially, over the next several years, Matt LaPorta, Carlos Santana, Luis Valbuena, Michael Brantley, Lou Marson, plus a half-dozen significant pitching prospects, plus Mark DeRosa, Arthur Rhodes, Justin Masterson and Chris Perez. Even his least successful trade acquisitions — Alex Escobar, Jason Michaels, Brandon Phillips, Billy Traber, Andy Marte, Josh Barfield — have not been entirely bereft of big-league talent.

We've chanted that litany before, but it bears recalling because horse trading is one of the most important jobs of a GM, and it's notably one of the only jobs where success or failure is directly traced to his decision. Shapiro also has had an impressive run with third-tier free agent starting pitchers — Pavano made 33 starts and netted a decent prospect, Byrd completed three serviceable seasons, Millwood won the freakin' ERA title, and even Brian Anderson did okay for a couple of years. And while fans rightly bemoan the dead weight of Hafner's contract, Shapiro has not really made the big, crippling mistakes that befall most GMs — on the balance sheet, Hafner-Westbrook-Dellucci pale before Wells-Rios-Ryan.

If you're going to get rid of Shapiro and his like-minded colleagues, then you have to be willing to live without those exemplary skills — without his leadership, class, and intelligence, his deftness with trades and contracts, the respect he commands within the industry, and especially — especially — his willingness to take the public body blows when tough decisions need to be made. You can't assume that the next guy will excel in all of those areas. I am certain we'd miss those qualities.

Having said that, I can tell you why Shapiro should be fired in one word: Talent.

Baseball is never simple. As a rule, the world's most elite natural athletes cannot succeed as major leaguers. Hitting and pitching are simply too hard. Hitting at this level requires a knack that may be the hardest thing to quantify or characterize in all of sports, and if you don't have it, then all the talk or mechanics and approaches in the world can't save you, even if you have several NBA championships and MVP awards on your résumé. Pitching at this level requires a freakish combination of precise muscle control, huge arm-generated torque, resistance to elbow and shoulder injury under extreme stress, and intelligence.

Running a baseball club may be just as hard and just as unquantifiable; after all, more than a few titans of industry have tried and failed. A brilliant executive can't necessarily run a ballclub any better than a world-class athlete can hit a curveball. The brilliant executive can be an inspiring leader, managing and empowering his charges. He can define what kind of people he wants working in the organization, hire them, set expectations, evaluate them, act on them. He can fire people. He can order case studies and surveys of best practices. He can analyze statistics and devise processes, enact them, evaluate them, refine them, start over from scratch if need be. He can maintain outstanding communication with his staff, with his bosses, with the public. He can do all these things reliably, even predictably, because he simply has the tools and the skills.

For all that, however, the brilliant executive can't necessarily tell you whether it's better to overspend on Raul Ibañez or Kerry Wood. He can't necessarily devise a process to tell you that, and he can't necessarily hire the right person to tell you that, either. Nor can he devise a process to hire the right person to tell you that. It doesn't always come down to objective analysis or having a good process. Sometimes it comes down to talent: the talent to play, the talent to evaluate talent, the talent to develop talent, and the judgment to make decisions about talent.

Sometimes — often, maybe — it comes down to reasons we can never comprehend or codify, pitiful schleppers that we are.

Evaluating talent is a special skill, and here I can speak with some experience. Most of my professional life is centered around my ability to identify genuine talent — musical talent, IT talent, and even writing talent — people who reliably will perform at a high or exceptionally high level, just about 100 percent of the time. I have, on occasion, identified individuals with weak paper qualifications who later went on to excel in their field. In some cases, they thrived in part because I gave them an opportunity and aided their development. In other cases, their success was inevitable, and I just saw it earlier than some others.

I am not suggesting, by any stretch of the imagination, that I have the ability to judge baseball talent. Maybe, if I'd spent 20 years working as a baseball professional, learning from thousands of discussions with scouts and making and testing my own observations — maybe then, but perhaps not even then. For whatever it's worth, though, I can tell you that my ability to assess a person's talents is entirely intuitive. I have no ability to explain it, or to teach anyone else how to do it. I can be highly analytical in my assessments of people, breaking down facts and metrics, making rules and devising grading systems to create rankings — and I can teach these things by rote and by example. However, none of that has anything to do with being able to differentiate reliably between a high ceiling and a low ceiling.

I can't tell you for sure that it's the same for baseball, but I worry that it is. Most of the people reading this could be trained in the rudiments of being a low-level scout — doing your homework and measuring some kid's raw tools on the field. Skills are another thing entirely — evaluating footwork and positioning on defense, observing quality of command across a variety of pitches, intuiting the difference between a bad day and a chronic problem. Beyond these, another level, the crucial, game-changing question: Will this ballplayer develop skills beyond what he's showing today? How does he project to a different level at a different age, or even just to a different ballpark in a different league?

I have no doubt that great baseball scouts learned a lot from the great scouts who came before them, and I have no doubt that a gifted executive can learn immensely from a great scout, purely by his ability to listen and communicate and absorb. At the same time, I am quite sure that the greatest talent evaluators in the game are possessed of something that is innate and ineffable. And I am genuinely concerned that the Indians don't employ any of those people — and that, in fact, Shapiro may have favored others in the organization to the point where the best evaluators left.

Take a look at the AP report of Neal Huntington being hired away by the Pirates:

Huntington formerly was the assistant general manager to the Indians' Mark Shapiro, but dropped behind vice president of baseball operations Chris Antonetti and assistant general manager John Mirabelli on the front office depth chart two years ago.

Huntington accepted a different role in 2005, Shapiro said, because Antonetti's skills were in the management and administrative side, while Huntington's were in evaluation and scouting.

"My skill set and passion were more that of an evaluator, but they never technically took me out of the front office," Huntington said. "I was exposed to some incredible things -- rebuilding an organization and being involved in every decision, every tough decision, that was made."

And from the MLB.com report:

As an adviser to Shapiro and vice president of baseball operations Chris Antonetti, Huntington was involved in nearly all personnel and staffing decisions, as well as trade acquisition discussions. He also spent the majority of his time evaluating talent on both the Minor and Major League level.

When asked about Huntington, Shapiro responded: "[Huntington is] one of our chief evaluators and one of our strongest voices on every level," Shapiro said.

Here's a guy who was the highest-ranking evaluator in the organization and possibly the best, a guy with a master's degree in sports management from UMass, and essentially, he was passed over — well treated, perhaps, but pointedly not in line for a future role as GM. So too, perhaps, was John Farrell, who upon leaving Cleveland — quite amicably, as Huntington did — was quoted to say that he was looking to have a larger voice in an organization. Farrell had been a major league pitcher and a college pitching coach, and with the Indians he served stints as Farm Director and Director of Player Development. Despite his experience and impeccable reputation, Farrell too was not viewed as the future leader of the organization.

Years earlier, there was Tony LaCava, whom the Indians hired in 2002 as national cross-checker, essentially rescuing him from the sinking-ship Montreal Expos. As the Expos very recent Farm Director, LaCava naturally was instrumental in selecting the prospects to be received in the Colon deal, which is not only Shapiro's signature trade, but arguably the most successful trade of a veteran for prospects by any GM, ever. LaCava, too, was not retained in the Indians organization, moving on to the Blue Jays as Assistant GM in 2003, just one year later, while John Mirabelli continued his string of generally disastrous drafts.

Like Huntington, LaCava is going to be a GM sooner or later, yet he wasn't good enough to be Assistant GM in Cleveland. None of these guys were given large enough roles in the organization to keep them around, and no doubt the Indians were possessed of too much executive talent to keep in-house — a nice problem to have. Still, given how things have gone since, it's telling that the prince-in-waiting anointment, and present-day "co-GM" status, went not to an ace evaluator, but instead to Antonetti, a man whose background and skill set are more or less identical to Shapiro's.

For all the talk about being open to all ideas and all viewpoints, the major player-evaluation talent in the Indians organization was basically told that being a solid administrator was more important, and that their path to bigger jobs would have to be in some other, presumably less enlightened organization — and never mind that it doesn't matter how well administered your organization is if you don't know who the best talent is. (Is it any wonder, then, that when Shapiro hires a former catcher for a manager, he then populates his coaching staff almost entirely with other former catchers? All leaders lead by example, first and foremost.)

This is not to say that an executive without a scouting background cannot be an outstanding GM, but it's noteworthy that other organizations that have gone with the "Ivy League whiz kid" GM model tend to have a "wise old baseball man" figure hanging close by, advising the gifted non-scout executive. The Red Sox had Bill Lajoie attached to Theo Epstein; Allard Baird is in that role now, while Lajoie is now advising Huntington in Pittsburgh. The Rays put Gerry Hunsicker with Andrew Friedman, and down in Texas, Jon Daniels has access to no less than John Hart and Nolan Ryan. But when non-scout-gifted-executives Shapiro and Antonetti huddle to make the big decisions, who are the wise old evaluators in the room — Charles Nagy and Jason Bere?

Later that night, at home, Adriana and Christopher discuss Visiting Day's potential. Hip-hop mogul "Massive Genius" has told Adriana that the band's demos are promising.

CHRISTOPHER: You know how I use the technique of positive visualization?

ADRIANA: I know you talk about it. You're fairly negative a lot of the time.

CHRISTOPHER: I think you should mentally prepare for the possibility that Visiting Day sucks.

ADRIANA: What?

CHRISTOPHER: I think that ... the only reason you've gotten this far with Massive is ... he wants to be in your pants.

ADRIANA: Boy, oh, boy.

CHRISTOPHER: Look, I had some experts listen to the demo ... they crapped all over it. Sorry.

ADRIANA: Who, Hesh? That old synagogue cantor?

CHRISTOPHER: Silvio. Hey, he owned rock clubs in Asbury. You heard what Squid said. A professional engineer.

ADRIANA: What about my opinion? That it's good. That it's special. This is just a way for you to keep me down.

CHRISTOPHER: That ain't fair.

ADRIANA: What's wrong with it, huh? What's wrong with Visiting Day?

CHRISTOPHER: I don't know ... but it's a problem that you don't know.

This series of articles perhaps has only demonstrated the obvious, that a club this bad — which decides in June that it must not only tank the current season but the next season at the same time — has suffered multiple failures in more than one part of the organization. In any one area, we can talk about how much control that one group of people — coaches, scouts, trainers — really had, compared to the influence of the other groups and the whims of the fates. But a systemic failure points ultimately to Shapiro, who hired and is accountable for all of those groups, and the harsh truth is that every club must contend with the whims of the fates — or fail to contend with them, as the Indians have.

Amateur scouting has been a disaster since Shapiro took over; maybe time will reveal that it was fixed two or three years ago, but maybe not. Big-league scouting has been a mixed bag, with veteran acquisitions missing a lot more often than they hit — in Barfield's case, about four times more often. The training staff has won high praise from some in the industry, but they haven't stopped the Indians from being undercut severely by injuries to a half-dozen key players in just two years — in some cases, multiple injuries and disappointing rehab processes have afflicted a single player like Jake Westbrook over and over again. The farm system has been another mixed bag, producing too many players who dominate at Triple-A but can barely perform at replacement level in the majors. If all clubs were like the Indians in this regard, those MLE formulas might look a lot different.

We had a manager whose playing-time decisions often defied any imaginable logic or reason, who thought it was important to have Ramon Vazquez on his bench rather than future 30-30 man Brandon Phillips, and who thought it was a good idea to put Ryan Garko in the outfield, with a rookie flyball pitcher on the mound — scratch that, ever — and we had a GM who let him do these things. It's true that Shapiro fired Wedge, and he may be sincere in saying that bringing in a new manager is an exciting opportunity. Even so, Shapiro made it abundantly clear that he didn't think there was any real, qualitative reason why Wedge shouldn't continue to be the manager — his exact words were, "it's a cop-out."

We had extraordinarily bad — and sometimes historically bad — bullpens in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2009. Those volcanic fiascos were, at least, largely Shapiro's direct creations, and at most, entirely the fault of Shapiro and people who were hired by Shapiro, and who generally have not been fired by Shapiro. They have turned too many contenders into also-rans, too many decent squads into train-wrecks, and too many season ticket holders into non-customers.

The sum of these observations is this one, frightening, inescapable conclusion: Shapiro has not given us any concrete reason to believe that he knows how to put people into critical positions who are capable of evaluating, developing and coaching real talent — the kind that can thrive at the major league level. Without people in key roles who are possessed of that kind of judgment and talent, it doesn't make any difference how good your organizational processes are or how much class-acting you do. We cannot contend on a diet of trade-acquired minor leaguers and recycled starting pitchers alone. If these things weren't clear five years ago, or even one year ago, they ought to be crystal clear now.

I am just a scribe, neither scout nor coach, not a baseball executive and certainly not a former major leaguer. So I don't really know what's wrong with the Cleveland Indians. But it's a problem if Mark Shapiro doesn't know either. And as much respect for him as I have, I'm not at all convinced that he does.

Game 160: Red Sox 6, Indians 2

Ryan — Sat, 03 Oct 2009 03:42:42 -0000

More photos » by Mary Schwalm - AP

As Jason Varitek goes for a foul ball, a Sawx fan shows off his spoon-swallowing skills.

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This series so far has to me felt like Spring Training games, though the two teams have different goals in mind for them. Boston's Terry Francona is trying to give his players enough playing time to stay sharp, but also keep them rested and healthy, while Eric Wedge is just trying to get this last weekend over so he can move on to other things. Meanwhile, the Indians lost their record thirteenth straight on the road.

Jeremy Sowers checked out early after giving up 3 runs on four hits and two walks, giving way to a series of relievers just getting their work in. Meanwhile, the offense had a goal to shoot for: scoring a run. The offense hadn't plated a run in over two games, and had to be closing in on some kind of team record for sustained futility. Luis Valbuena and Trevor Crowe finally broke the ice in the fifth off Daisuke Matsuzaka, but they had a couple opportunities before that, beginning with Michael Brantley's double to lead off the game. Matsuzaka took three meandering pitches to accomplish what every one good one would do; if he had to be that fine against this Indians lineup, I don't like his chances against deeper and more talented lineups in the postseason.

Next Up: Laffey vs. Beckett, 7:10 PM

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Luis Valbuena	.091	Jeremy Sowers	-.213
Tony Sipp	.084	Jhonny Peralta	-.140
Travis Hafner	.041	Shin-Soo Choo	-.111

Games 157 and 158: Indians, White Sox Split Doubleheader

Ryan — Thu, 01 Oct 2009 02:15:34 -0000

More photos » by Mark Duncan - AP

Gone, but not yet.

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Game 157: Indians 5, White Sox 1

Game 158: White Sox 1, Indians 0

A couple hours before the first game began, GM Mark Shapiro announced that manager Eric Wedge and all members of the major-league coaching staff would not be back for the 2010 season. The move was expected, and hopefully it represents the first step towards a championship team. Wedge handled the firing with class, though you would assume it wasn't a shock to him.

The pitching performances in the doubleheader were promising as well. Fausto Carmona pitched well for the second start in a row, and Masterson was brilliant in the nightcap. These were the last starts of the season for the two pitchers, and they couldn't have ended their seasons on a better note. Carmona was efficient, showing flashes of how he pitched in 2007. He went seven innings, walking just two and striking out 5. In some ways these last two starts make his 2009 season even more maddening, for you saw what he was capable of.

In the first game, the Indians were paced by Matt LaPorta (1-1, 2B, 2 BB) and Travis Hafner (2-3, HR), who hopefully will form a formidable right-left power combination in next year's lineup. LaPorta's streaking towards a league-average OPS as the season is winding down, and even though he's made less than 200 plate appearances in the majors, he's your cleanup hitter next season.

Even though the Indians ended their home schedule with a loss in game two, Justin Masterson's gem of a start was a great takeaway. He struck out 12, walked 2, and pitched a complete game. He allowed only one run, but unfortunately neither Mark Buerhle nor three Chicago relievers allowed a single run. Masterson had struggled down the stretch, which made this start even more of a surprise. In his last start against Detroit, he couldn't make it through five innings, and he hadn't gone seven innings in any start this season. Cleveland's next pitching coach now has an archetype pitching performance to try to emulate next year.

Next Up: The last series of the season. Carrasco vs. Lester, 7:10 PM

Game Graphs and WPA leaders after the jump...

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Fausto Carmona	.242	Jhonny Peralta	-.056
Matt LaPorta	.175	Michael Brantley	-.053
Travis Hafner	.108	Luis Valbuena	-.013

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Justin Masterson	.341	Jamey Carroll	-.151
Luis Valbuena	.037	Matt LaPorta	-.114
		Shin-Soo Choo	-.114

Game 152: Tigers 11, Indians 3

Ryan — Thu, 24 Sep 2009 02:49:09 -0000

More photos » by Tony Dejak - AP

Justin Masterson only lasted four innings.

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If my math is correct, the Indians just have to win two more games to avoid ending the season with 100 losses. Even as bad as they've been playing, they should avoid that, with six upcoming games against teams tanking about as badly as the Indians. But it's almost certain that they'll blow by the 94-loss 2003 team, which means that you have to go back to 1991 to come across an Indians club with a worse record.

Unfortunately, I'd take the 1991 rotation over this one. That team had a 24-year-old Charles Nagy and a 26-year-old Greg Swindell heading it, while this is one, as currently constituted, has Aaron Laffey and a bunch of projects. Justin Masterson, a pitcher who was supposed to contribute right away, hasn't adjusted to full-time starting. Tonight, against a lineup that can to pitched to, he got rocked for six runs in 4+ innings. Yes, two of those runs were unearned because of an Andy Marte throwing error, but I'm just not seeing any improvement in his location or adjustments to past failures. I think he's actually gotten worse since he got here.

The offense got shut down yet again. What else is new. Jhonny Peralta is again in the midst of a exasperating slump, hitting .182/.250/.234 in the month of September.

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Jamey Carroll	.059	Justin Masterson	-.408
Andy Marte	.021	Luis Valbuena	-.064
Shin-Soo Choo	.017	Lou Marson	-.039

Game 151: Tigers 3, Indians 1

Ryan — Wed, 23 Sep 2009 03:08:30 -0000

More photos » by Tony Dejak - AP

3 months ago: Cleveland Indians' Matt LaPorta, right, is tagged out by Detroit Tigers catcher Gerald Laird in the second inning of a baseball game, Tuesday, Sept. 22, 2009, in Cleveland. LaPorte tried to score from second base on a single by Trevor Crowe. (AP Photo/Tony Dejak)

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One monotonous day is followed
by another monotonous, identical day. The same
things will happen, they will happen again --
the same moments find us and leave us.

A month passes and ushers in another month.
One easily guesses the coming events;
they are the boring ones of yesterday.
And the morrow ends up not resembling a morrow anymore.

-Constantine P. Cavafy

I thought the game was over when Ryan Raburn hit a home run in the third inning. It wasn't quite over, for the Indians would score a run, but it might as well have been. The Indians have been losing in boring, monotonous regularity, a feature of an especially awful baseball team. Many of the players on this team have futures, but it seems that everyone's taking their cues from their manager, who can see his end approaching. Tonight's loss made nine in a row for the Indians, a season high

Aaron Laffey pitched very well despite a tight strike zone. After struggling in his past two starts, Laffey pitched into the seventh, leaving with the Indians just down a run, a winnable situation for a club of any offensive ability. Unfortunately, the Indians' long run came after Chris Perez gave up two runs in the eighth. Although Cleveland would have an excellent opportunity in the bottom of the inning, three runs were too much to overcome for this punchless offense.

To make matters worse, Matt LaPorta had to leave the game with a hip injury. LaPorta's "only" hitting .235/.278/.426 this month, which ranks among the best on the team. Andy Marte, who is again buried on the bench in favor of Trevor Crowe, got a couple at-bats in place of LaPorta, but I expect we'll be seeing a Chris Gimenez start tomorrow.

Next Up: Porcello vs. Masterson, 7:05 PM

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Aaron Laffey	.214	Jhonny Peralta	-.220
Shin-Soo Choo	.109	Luis Valbuena	-.189
Jamey Carroll	.095	Asdrubal Cabrera	-.148

Game 147: Athletics 5, Indians 2

Ryan — Fri, 18 Sep 2009 05:45:16 -0000

More photos » by Marcio Jose Sanchez - AP

Luis Valbuena (sort of) tags out Daric Barton in the eighth.

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The big blow of the game was Kurt Suzuki's three-run blast in the third inning. Justin Masterson had allowed his second run of the game earlier in the inning, and was pitching to Suzuki with two runners on, but was ahead of the Oakland catcher 0-2. But in a situation where pitchers try not to throw a strike, Masterson made a mistake, and it got hit out of the park. Justin lasted another inning, then left after throwing 93 pitches in four innings. He allowed 11 of the 22 batters he faced to reach base. And he's going to be one of the top three pitchers in next year's Opening Day rotation.

Lou Marson had three of Cleveland's six hits, one of which was a double. It sure looks like Marson will be on next year's roster, with his exact role to be dictated by what the Indians do with Kelly Shoppach. I still think it makes sense for the Indians to have the two compete for playing time, if not to get more production out of the catching position, then at least to avoid selling low on Shoppach.

Next Up: More late-night baseball. Huff vs. Anderson, 10:05 PM

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Lou Marson	.057	Justin Masterson	-.248
Shin-Soo Choo	.043	Michael Brantley	-.094
Jensen Lewis	.041	Luis Valbuena	-.083

Game 144: Twins 6, Indians 3

Ryan — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 04:01:30 -0000

More photos » by Jim Mone - AP

Jeremy Sowers shut the Twins out through seven inning, but the bullpen imploded in the eighth.

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For seven innings the Indians played exceptional baseball, especially given the importance the game had for the Minnesota Twins. Jeremy Sowers pitched seven innings of shutout baseball, and the offense scored three runs on two home runs. Going into the eighth, it looked as through the Indians had dealt the Twins a critical blow to their playoff aspirations. Detroit had just came from behind to beat Toronto, and Minnesota was two innings away from going down 6.5 games with less than 20 games to play. The Twins have seven games left against the Tigers, but even so, there is in effect no room for error.

It was then that the Indians conveniently melted down, allowing the Twins to score six times. The disastrous eighth frame started with an Asdrubal Cabrera error on a simple backhanded play. Tony Sipp then walked Joe Mauer, bringing the tying run to the plate. No problem, for Eric Wedge had Chris Perez warming in the bullpen for this eventuality. Sipp would have stayed in had Justin Morneau been batting cleanup, but Morneau was out with an injury, so it was Michael Cuddyer at the plate, and Perez on the mound. Cuddyer blasted a game-tying three-run home run. The hilarity continued after Brendan Harris flied out for the first out of the inning; Delmon Young singled, then Matt Tolbert blooped a perfectly placed ball into shallow left field to chase Young to third. Then Lou Marson allowed a pitch to get by him to the backstop, and Young scored the go-ahead run. Jason Kubel provided the capper to the meltdown by smashing a home run into the right field upper deck.

The game doesn't really mean a whole lot to the Indians, but it was extremely depressing to see the two guys who are probably going into next season as the primary setup men completely blow a game meaningful to at least the other team.

Next Up: Carmona vs. Baker, 8:10 PM

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Jeremy Sowers	.383	Chris Perez	-.737
Trevor Crowe	.112	Tony Sipp	-.141
Lou Marson	.073	Luis Valbuena	-.069

Game 135: Twins 4, Indians 1

Ryan — Sun, 06 Sep 2009 01:02:18 -0000

by Mark Duncan - AP

Justin Masterson was wild, but effective.

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As we wind down the 2009 season, it seems to me that the Indians are in pretty good shape as far as position players are concerned. And the rebuilt rebuilt bullpen has been tremendous. But I'm still scared about the rotation going forward.There's some talent among the starting group, but also a lot of risk.

Today's outing by Justin Masterson looks pretty good if you look at it superficially; he allowed just one earned one on 5 hits. But the five walks to me are a red flag. He's given up 20 walks in his past five starts, so this game's wildness isn't a fluke. Wildness eventually will catch up to a pitcher, no matter how good his stuff, and shorten his outing. Short outings by a starter place more pressure on a bullpen, which will have negative effects on the relief staff as the season goes along.

Scott Baker may have a pedestrian 4.44 ERA, but he might as well be Roy Halladay when he faces the Indians. In his three starts prior to today, the Indians are hitting just .138/.169/.225 (MLB as a whole is hitting .246/.284/.417). His line today (6 IP, 1 ER, 3 H, 4 BB) mirrored Masterson's but usually a high walk count isn't a problem for him (31 walks in 160 innings pitched).

The only offense the Indians managed came on one swing of the bat. Andy Marte went deep off Baker in the third, his fifth of the season.

Next Up: Blackburn vs. Huff, 1:05 PM

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Justin Masterson	.080	Luis Valbuena	-.146
Wyatt Toregas	.071	Jamey Carroll	-.145
Andy Marte	.022	Matt LaPorta	-.112