SB Nation - Kerry Wood

News and Notes: Acta Speaks, Again.

Ryan — Mon, 23 Nov 2009 03:28:21 -0000

Mark Shapiro, normally the public face of the Indians, has given way this offseason to Manny Acta.

Indians skipper Manny Acta: 'I want to become one of the elite six or seven' managers | Cleveland Indians - cleveland.com - - cleveland.com
Manny Acta sits down for a lengthy interview with Paul Hoynes.

The major acquisition the Indians seem to be targeting this offseason isn't a particular player, but the interest of the Cleveland sports fan. Two consecutive painful and disappointing seasons tend to drain the enthusiasm out of a fanbase, especially when this past season saw two high-profile players (Victor Martinez and Cliff Lee) get traded for prospects. And while last offseason the Indians made a splash by signing Kerry Wood to a big free agent contract, it seems extremely unlikely that type of move will happen this winter. The major moves have already been made, and aside from a couple roster decisions (Kelly Shoppach, for instance), the Indians seem content to play out the 2010 season largely with what they have.

The biggest move the Indians make this offseason will probably be the hiring of Manny Acta as manager. And to that end, the Indians have saturated the Cleveland market with him in hopes of winning him over with the fans. He's appeared on almost every radio show, in numerous newspaper and Internet articles, and on local TV to boot. Any semi-attentive sports fan in this town has probably seen or listened to or read about Acta in the past two weeks. And, in my opinion, it's been a great PR victory for the Indians, as Acta has come across very well in every interview he's done. He's come across as very prepared, understanding in detail the particular problems that face the Indians (for instance, noting baseball's adjustments to Fausto Carmona's sinker). He's been very open about his coaching philosophies, stressing his view that a manger should base his strategies on the abilities of players on the roster, not the other way around. Because the Indians do now have a roster of athletic players, the Indians will run, which will satisfy the Smallball advocates, but if the Indians become again a team of power-hitting plodders, Acta will adjust accordingly to an Earl Weaver style of managing.

In this particular interview, Acta answers all the basic questions about his coaching philosophy, including changing lineups, avoiding a slow start, the frequency of team meetings. He also speaks at length about his career as a player, and his accession up the coaching ladder.

Pondering Kerry Wood at closer for the Braves

gondeee — Fri, 13 Nov 2009 18:58:51 -0000

Keith Law makes some good points about the Indians closer, Kerry Wood:

"Wood had a better year than he's getting credit for having - once you consider ballpark, defense, and league, he probably had the best year of the three major free agent closers from last winter. With just one year left on his deal and a team motivated to cut payroll, he could be a nice pickup on the cheap for a team unwilling to go multiple years for Rafael Soriano or Mike Gonzalez."

He's not cheap at $10 million for 2010, and he may not have the durability to be used like Bobby Cox likes to use his relievers and closers, but in the right trade he could be a bargain, as Law says.

I think we'll settle on our closer late in the off-season after we let some of the other players find homes. I get the feeling that the Braves see the closer position as an off-season need, and perhaps even a priority, but not their top priority.

Free Agent Profile: Jose Valverde

davoag — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 13:00:27 -0000

More photos » by Pat Sullivan - AP

Valverde found out how much money he could save with Geico...

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I recently read these two posts on Sabernomics by JC Bradbury about free agency. They got me thinking about how the Astros crop of free agents fits into the market, what kinds of deals comparable players got last season and what we could expect the (former) hometown boys to get this winter. Thus, another mini-series of posts on free agency.

[Sidenote 1: It's also worth noting that our first profile, Valverde, plays a position where the number of players doesn't necessarily correspond to openings on teams. Relievers can market themselves as closers without having vacated that position, thus making for a possibly over-glutted market where some guys will have to sign for significantly less as setup men]

Just the other day, I argued that the Astros should not offer Jose Valverde arbitration. My thinking was that Houston would be on the hook for way too much money, since Valverde would most likely accept the arbitration offer to get a big payday (albeit a one-year payday).

This may or may not be a popular opinion around these parts, so I thought we could look at the 2008 offseason to see what kind of contracts closer got. I ran down the biggies, the Type A's and a few other contracts that are similar to Valverde's numbers. For reference, El Papa Grande earned 8 million in 2009 and pitched 54 1/3 innings, striking out 56 and walking 21. Valverde converted 25 of 29 save opportunities and gave up five home runs. FanGraphs puts his value at a solid 3 million.

[Sidenote 2: I am skeptical of how WAR rates relievers, but after combing through some of this data, it looks like it comes close to nailing down closers, at least. Take that for what it's worth in the rest of this article]

The Comparables

Francisco Rodriguez, RHP, New York Mets

Contract Details: 3 years, 37 million (2m bonus, 09-8.5m, 10-11.5m, 11, 11.5m, 12-17.5m option)

Notes: K-Rod was not worth his contract last season, earning a value of just 1.5 million. Though relievers are typically devalued in WAR, I found that this wasn't necessarily the case with closers. Plenty of the contemporaries on this list had good, valuable seasons in the past. For instance, K-Rod was worth 17 million from 2007 to 2008. Unfortunately, he picked the wrong year to get injured. This contract would appear to be the upper range of Valverde's money.

Kerry Wood, RHP, Cleveland Indians

Contract Details: 2 years, 20.5 million (09-10m, 10-10.5m, 11-11m option)

Notes: Wood was worth 1.9 million in 2009 after totaling 10 million in value the previous season. His contract seemed to be in line with that, though his performance didn't suggest it would continue. It should be noted that only one reliever got a three-year deal. The rest had to settle for two-year deals or one-year fliers.

Brian Fuentes, LHP, Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim

Contract Details: 2 years, 17.5 million (09-8.5m, 10-9m, 11-9m option)

Notes: This would appear to be the kind of deal that makes sense for Valverde. Fuentes marked one of the few Type A closers that was both offered arbitration and signed with a team in the offseason. We'll get to a couple other examples in a minute, but for now, let's say Fuentes did much better n 2008 than Valverde did last season, but still couldn't land a deal longer than two years. His almost 9 million average is just above what Valverde earned in 2009, and would certainly be a starting place for any arbitration discussion.

The Other Type A's

Trevor Hoffman, RHP, Milwaukee Brewers

Contract Details: 1 year, 6 million (re-signed for 1 year, 8 million with an '11 option of 7 million)

Notes: Hoffman shows the other side of the coin for Valverde. The Padres did not offer Hoffman arbitration heading into last offseason, meaning a team would not have to give up draft picks to sign him. Despite coming off an injury-plagued season, the Brewers gave Hoffman a 6 million dollar tryout in 2009. The venerable saves champ was worth 6.7 million last season, so he performed to the contract and was rewarded with another one year deal.

Juan Cruz, RHP, Kansas City Royals

Contract Details: 2 years, 6 million (09-2.25m, 10-3.25m, 11-4m option)

Notes: Cruz was a surprise sign as a Type A free agent, since he had the heaviest cost, yet wasn't a closer. Of course, he was not good at all in 50 relief innings for the Royals this season, but this is Dayton Moore we're talking about. He'll do anything. As the quirkiest signing of last winter, Cruz fits right in. How much his situation will impact Valverde's is less clear. Cruz wasn't used the same way and didn't have the same relative value. Still, he got a contract in line with many middle relievers that will form the base of the reliever market.

The Outlier

Kyle Farnsworth, RHP, Kansas City Royals

Contract Details: 2 years, 9.5 million (09-4.25m, 10-4.5m, 11-5.25m option)

Notes: What did I say about Moore? He gave a 9.5 million dollar contract to Kyle Farnsworth, he of the ever-straight 150 MPH fastball. Of course, Trey Hillman felt obliged to use him in bizarre situations, confounding guys like Rob Neyer and Joe Posnanski. Farnsworth probably earned more money last season than he should have, but he was still worth 3 million, according to FanGraphs. That's also what Valverde was worth, as a point of reference.

Non-Free Agents of Note

Ryan Franklin, RHP, St. Louis Cardinals

Contract Details: 2 years, 6.5 million (signed Sept. 1, 2009)

Notes: Franklin saved 38 games for the Cardinals in 2009, but will be heading into his Age 37 season. The Cardinals wisely locked him up for a reasonable 6.5 million over two seasons. That significantly lowers the salary precedent for a guy like Valverde, though, as his agent will have to work off a contract like Soria's to get comparable numbers.

Heath Bell, RHP, San Diego Padres

Contract Details: 1 year, 1.25 million (2008)

Notes: Bell will be due a big raise in 2010, since he led the NL with 42 saves in 2009. Heading into another year of arbitration, the Padres may decide a closer is not a luxury they're willing to splurge on, making Bell tradeable. I'd expect him to fetch anywhere between 4-6 million in arbitration, so that's the number a team's looking at if they go and get Bell. That also means Bell would be that much cheaper than a guy like Valverde on the open market.

Forecast for Valverde

El Papa Grande is one of nine different pitchers who could market themselves as closers this offseason, including Billy Wagner, J.J. Putz, Fernando Rodney and Brandon Lyons. Now, most people would argue that Valverde is the best of the crop, but that also carries a price. We can surmise from last year's market that even Valverde will not get more than a three year deal, and that his ceiling is probably around 10 million. Coming off an injury plagued season, though, means his market will be compressed slightly. Add to that the more reasonable deals signed by Joakim Soria (3 years, 8.75 million) and Franklin, and Valverde will be lucky to get 8m per season. In arbitration, though? The Astros risk paying him anywhere from 3 million to 11 million next season if they offer arb. and he accepts. Given that Wade will have around 15-17 million to work with, is it worth eating up that much of the budget for a closer?

My assumption is the Astros will decline to offer him arbitration and he will sign a two year deal for somewhere around 18 million, with a possible third year option for 10 million. I won't guess who'd give him that contract, but looking at both the market and last year's offseason, those numbers seem right.

MLB Trade Rumors: On the Beat with John Perrotto Version

raygu — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 14:00:37 -0000

by Eric Risberg - AP

3 months ago: Los Angeles Dodgers starting pitcher Chad Billingsley takes a break on the mound after the San Francisco Giants scored their third run in the fourth inning of a baseball game in San Francisco, Sunday, Sept. 13, 2009. San Francisco won the game 7-2; Billingsley was the losing pitcher. (AP Photo/Eric Risberg)

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Every Sunday, John Perrotto from Baseball Prospectus puts out an article talking about possible trade rumors and signings, along with analysis of the goings on around baseball. Yesterday's article was chock full of names who could be available in trade talks this offseason, with some suprise names.

Let's take a look after the jump:

Here is a list of names who could be available in trade talks per Perrotto:

Chad Billingsley Kerry Wood

Dave Bush Bobby Jenks

Jeremy Guthrie Pat Burrell

Adrian Gonzalez Nelson Cruz

Heath Bell Ryan Ludwick

Glen Perkins Dan Uggla

Kenshin Kawakami Juan Pierre

Derek Lowe Ryan Doumit

Javier Vazquez Dioner Navarro

Carlos Zambrano Jarrod Saltalamacchia

Matt Capps Geovany Soto

Christian Guzman Elijah Dukes

Corey Hart David Dejesus

Poll

What name on the Perrotto list is most surprising?

Ryan Ludwick

39 votes

Geovany Soto

61 votes

Chad Billingsley

116 votes

Ryan Doumit

17 votes

233 votes | Poll has closed

First volley of projections for 2010 Indians

Jay — Sun, 08 Nov 2009 22:00:25 -0000

More photos » by Nam Y Huh - AP

Could Sowers finally be the number-four starter of our dreams?

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ACTA Sports has begun taking orders for The Bill James Handbook 2010, which customarily will include James' projections for every major league player. (Full disclosure: ACTA occasionally sends me a review copy of one of their books, and I am totally in the bag for them.)

James' proprietary performance projections, while perhaps less obsessed-over than PECOTA or even CHONE, are among the most credible ones publicly available. More to the point, ACTA has released the projections on a few key Indians right now, so let's put our greedy little eyes on them and get an early start on the expectation-setting.

First, the pitchers:

Key Indians Pitchers (by ERA)

Player IP W L K SV
ERA

Kerry Wood 56 4 3 62 27
3.54

Justin Masterson 171 10 9 151 0
4.00

Jeremy Sowers 150 7 9 81 0
4.44

WOOD: I don't know how James is projecting the Save stat, and I certainly don't care. James' system sees Wood as a pitcher who can still rack up the strikeouts and who generally, therefore, will prevent runs from scoring. This doesn't look like a $10 million closer, but it looks more than serviceable.

MASTERSON: Probably the best news in the press release is James' divination of Masterson as a solid number-two starter in 2010. I'm not even sure what to say about it, but I like it.

SOWERS: Less surprising but still heartening is the prediction that Sowers can settle in as a solid #3-#4 guy (don't argue), and damn it, that's all we've really asked of the guy, and it didn't seem like that unreasonable of a demand.

Of course, these projections are probably purely statistical, utilizing little if any subjective information, but they do suggest that there isn't too much urgency to the idea of adding a fungible fourth-starter type on the cheap this offseason.

Now the hitters:

Key Indians Hitters (by OPS)

Player At-bats R HR
RBI SB Avg. OPS

Grady Sizemore 574 101 25 78 21 .272 .853

Shin-Soo Choo 583 95 19 86 20 .293 .850

Matt LaPorta 451 70 20 68 3 .266 .802

Kelly Shoppach 381 57 19 61 0 .249 .798

Asdrubal Cabrera 582 96 9 74 19 .294 .779

SIZEMORE: James has Grady more or less returning to form; while his 30-30 has become a 25-21, note that this is based on 574 AB. Prior to 2009, Sizemore averaged 639 AB per season; obviously, health plays a role here.

CHOO: The numbers say that Shin-Soo Choo really is as good as we think he is.

LAPORTA: That 802 OPS no doubt is less than Indians fans want to see, not to mention the 20 HR over 451 AB. My guess is that James' system is making note of LaPorta's 2009 playing time trends but doesn't know that, barring an extreme circumstance, LaPorta actually will get 600+ AB on the big leagues in 2010. It probably also isn't entirely impressed with his 917 OPS in Columbus this year, given he was already 24. Unlike the typical LGTer, James' system is unlikely to blame any faults in his rookie production on Eric Wedge. Whether its ignorance of these factors is a strength or a shortcoming is up for debate.

SHOPPACH: Surprise! James' system thinks Shoppach is a good hitter who just had a bad year, with some real power counterbalancing his mediocre contact hitting. (In 2009, a 798 OPS was a 105 OPS+.) These projections have Kelly hitting about 90 percent as well as he did in his breakout 2008 campaign. One assumes that James' system didn't actually have to watch Shoppach striking out in every-other at bat all season, and again, one can debate whether that's a plus or a minus for the system.

CABRERA: The most disappointing projection here has Cabrera hitting almost as well as in 2009 rather than taking a step forward. In this case as well, the system is not really differentiating between Cabrera's performance through injuries and his production while healthy, and arguably, we can't, either. Asdrubal had an 877 OPS in April, and he seemed to be starting the big breakout year many had predicted for him. He went 785 the rest of the season to finish at 799 — a fine full season given his all-around game, but not quite what we'd like to see from him.

Building A Cubs Champion: 2010 Edition

Al — Fri, 06 Nov 2009 15:15:22 -0000

by Charles Rex Arbogast - AP

Like it or not, one of the keys to the Cubs' success in 2010 is a resurgence by Alfonso Soriano. Here, he launches his game-winning grand slam vs. the Astros last July 27.

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Last year about this time, I made this post discussing what I thought should be the makeup of the 2009 Cubs.

Brave, isn't it, of me to post that link when I'd just as soon forget about it. I was shouted down and laughed at (people are still giving me grief for the Kevin Millar thing, and they were absolutely correct), and had the Cubs put that 25-man roster on the field last April, they'd undoubtedly have had a much worse season than they did in real life (case in point: Alex Hinshaw, who I thought was an up-and-coming LOOGY, threw only six major league innings in 2009, posting a 12.00 ERA).

So let me go about this project this year in a different sort of way. A year ago (actually, October 20, 2008 was the date I wrote the post about my proposed 2009 roster) we were all still stunned and angry that the 97-win team that had dominated the National League all season went three-and-out in the playoffs. This was before Lou's "we've gotta get more lefthanded" mantra led us to the Milton Bradley disaster, before popular favorites Kerry Wood and Mark DeRosa were let go, and a lot of us were wondering, "How can we make a team that good into one that will win 11 games in October?"

Jim Hendry and Co. were asking themselves the same question, obviously, but came up with the wrong answer. Without rehashing what we've rehashed all summer long, clearly, it didn't work -- and not just because of Hendry's moves, but because players like Alfonso Soriano, Geovany Soto and Mike Fontenot seriously underperformed their 2008 numbers by considerable margins and for various reasons, and because Aramis Ramirez, who is the Cubs' best hitter, missed 50 games with a dislocated shoulder and wasn't at full strength the rest of the season, eventually playing in only 82 games.

I believe in what new owner Tom Ricketts said at his introductory press conference: that the Cubs already have the talent that can win the World Series, and only need a few tweaks to bring the club back to pennant-contending level. I'm also going to assume that what we've heard about player payroll is correct: that it will be increased, if only "slightly", from 2009, and thus will wind up at (approximately) $145 million. That will rank third in baseball, behind the Yankees and Red Sox.

Thus, instead of trying to build a roster simply by picking pieces from here and there, let's use that $145 million to put together a winning team.

Let's begin with players we know will be with the team next year, and their payroll figures (all numbers from the excellent site Cot's Baseball Contracts). These players are under contract for 2010 and will definitely be on the team, followed by their contract amounts:

Alfonso Soriano, $19,000,000
Carlos Zambrano, $18,875,000
Aramis Ramirez, $16,500,000
Kosuke Fukudome, $14,000,000
Ryan Dempster, $13,500,000
Derrek Lee, $13,000,000
Ted Lilly, $13,000,000

That's $107,875,000 for seven players. The Cubs also owe Jeff Samardzija $1,000,000 on the major league portion of his deal (whether or not he throws a major league inning) and $500,000 to the long-ago-released Luis Vizcaino, who pitched 3.2 innings in a Cub uniform. We're now at $109,375,000, leaving "only" $35,625,000 for 18 more players to fill out the Opening Day 25-man roster. That means there are going to be a fair number of minimum-wage players in 2010, because among the players remaining, a number of them are arbitration-eligible, meaning they will be in line for raises.

The first order of business is to remove Milton Bradley from the premises. We have had many long debates about whether and for whom he should be traded, but I believe this is top priority for Jim Hendry and will happen sooner rather than later. Disagree if you wish, but I think the best of many not-so-great scenarios is to send him -- and Aaron Miles -- to the Giants for Aaron Rowand. Between Bradley and Miles, they are owed a total of $23.7 million; Rowand is owed $36 million. Since in doing a deal like this, you would be relieving the Giants, essentially, of $12 million (approximately) by taking the third year of Rowand's contract, Hendry should ask the Giants to split the difference and pay half of Rowand's 2012 contract, which would split the total dollars (approximately $60 million) between the two teams, about $30 million each.

This would also accomplish equalizing the 2010 payroll -- or come close -- to what Bradley and Miles would have been owed ($11.7 million) and what Rowand is owed ($12 million). I think the Giants would be willing to do this, because you are taking $6 million off their 2012 payroll, while leaving their 2010 and 2011 payrolls where they are now, since Bradley is owed $12 million in 2011.

I concede that Rowand has had two pretty poor offensive seasons in San Francisco (at least in part due to injuries). But in 2007, he had a fine hitting year in Philadelphia, and I believe that he has at least a chance to return to that level in Chicago. If you were looking at the possible acquisition of Rowand in a vacuum, you wouldn't do it -- but the necessity of removing Bradley from the team makes this probably about the best way to accomplish that. At best, this could turn into a Hundley-for-Grudzielanek-and-Karros sort of deal.

So, now the Cubs have a center fielder (with Fukudome moving back to his original position, right field, improving the outfield defense at two spots), but we are now at eight players and have only $23,625,000 left. They're fortunate that Geovany Soto is not yet arbitration-eligible, so let's say the Cubs bump him up to $825,000 from the $575,000 he made in 2009. That's a pretty good raise, given the bad year he had. Now we're at $22,800,000. Backup catcher Koyie Hill made $475,000 in 2009 and had a good year for a backup. Let's move him up to $600,000, leaving $22,200,000.

I'm going to leave the double-play combination alone for 2010. It's likely that by 2011, Starlin Castro will be the Cubs' starting shortstop -- but for now, because Lou and Jim like them, Jeff Baker and Ryan Theriot will return. Baker made $415,000 in 2009 and had a good run after he was acquired from Colorado -- one of Hendry's best moves last year. Let's pay him $500,000, and Theriot $700,000, both up from 2009. That's 12 players, and $21,000,000 remaining for the other 13 -- we're getting to the point where we can actually think about signing a free agent or two or making a deal.

Among our 12 signed players so far are nine hitters -- so, given the current fad of having 12 pitchers on your staff, we have room for four more offensive players. I like Andres Blanco and Sam Fuld -- both performed well in backup roles in 2009. Neither hits much, but both play outstanding defense and neither is going to be expected to start more than a handful of games. Fuld made $401,500 and Blanco $400,000 (the minimum) in 2009, and let's give them both raises to $425,000. We are at 14 players and have $20,050,000 left. We'll need one more outfielder and also a guy who could fill the role that was filled in 2007 and 2008 by Daryle Ward, and in 2009 by Micah Hoffpauir.

Sad to say, I'm non-tendering Micah. He's 30 in March and didn't really do well most of last year -- he's a one-dimensional player, since he's really not a very good outfielder, and didn't do well in the dimension (hitting) he was supposedly good at. Since we're no longer locked in to the "lefthanded" mantra of a year ago, the Cubs can put the minimum-wage Jake Fox -- bumped up to $500,000 for his good performance of a year ago -- in this slot, and re-sign Rowand's close friend Reed Johnson for $3 million to fill in when his buddy hits the brick wall at Wrigley too many times.

So, we now have $16,550,000 left for nine pitchers -- which means we're going to have to fill most of the bullpen with minimum-wage guys. That's actually fine with me -- look at the disaster that was Aaron Heilman last year (in my opinion, Heilman should be non-tendered) -- and the Cubs have a couple of real good prospects, in my opinion, to fill middle-relief roles in Justin Berg and Esmailin Caridad. They get the minimum $400,000 each, leaving $15,750,000 for seven more pitchers. It was reported earlier this week that the Cubs are negotiating a two-year deal with John Grabow; reported figures are "between $6.5 and $7.5 million" for the two years. Let's assume for this post that it's in between, and Grabow gets $3.5 million for 2010. We've got $12,250,000 left and six spots to fill on the pitching staff. Carlos Marmol is going to close; he made $575,000 in 2009, so let's bump him to $800,000. Angel Guzman will be his primary right-handed setup guy (Grabow's the lefty setup guy, or should be, if Lou would ever use him right). Guzman made $421,500 in 2009; he could be renewed at $500,000.

Our payroll drawer is nearly empty (you can almost count the remaining Benjamins, right?); we have $10,950,000 remaining and still need to fill three spots, one in the pen, and two in the starting rotation, and here's where it gets a bit dicey (and this is why I left this part for last). First, you can fill one of the starting spots with Randy Wells, who made the minimum last year and certainly deserves a raise; let's put him at $750,000 (or maybe even a bit less; he's renewable, meaning you don't have to give him that much of a raise until he's arb-eligible next year), leaving $10,200,000. The Cubs have five free agents: Rich Harden, John Grabow, Kevin Gregg, Chad Fox and Reed Johnson. I already re-signed Johnson and Grabow above; Gregg and Fox, thanks for your service, see you in another uniform next year (and please, Jim, not another minor-league invite for Chad Fox. He's done).

But what to do with Harden? If you offer him arbitration, he'll almost certainly accept. To paraphrase Longfellow's nursery rhyme, "When he's good, he's very, very good; when he's bad, he's horrid". If Harden accepts arbitration, he's likely to get pretty close to all the remaining dollars in the drawer -- so reluctantly, we say goodbye to Rich, without the arb offer, unless you can somehow agree ahead of time to get him to sign for $8 million or so. That's not unreasonable given his $7 million salary in 2009 and his mediocre performance.

For the sake of argument, then, let's say we have this $10,950,000 available for our two remaining spots. One of those spots is going to go to Sean Marshall, who, I believe, deserves another shot at the starting rotation after doing a good job as a swingman in 2009. Lou misused him as a LOOGY -- Marshall can clearly do better than getting one LH batter out -- and I'd like to see Sean, now 27 and with four major league seasons under his belt, get a shot at starting. Sean made $450,000 in 2009, and could be paid $600,000 in 2010. In this scenario Samardzija makes the team, likely because the Cubs are paying him the $1 million whether he makes it or not. Otherwise there are other possibilities, including Arizona Fall Leaguers John Gaub and Andrew Cashner, or maybe someone else who will have a good spring (and please, let's not have another David Patton scenario), for this final spot.

That leaves $10,350,000 (or just under $10 million if you use Gaub or Cashner, who would make the minimum). You could consider signing someone like Jon Garland, who just got his option declined by the Dodgers and is a free agent. Garland made $7.25 million in 2009 and had a "typical" Garland year, which is as an inning-eater; you could probably get him for about $8 million for 2010. Garland has made at least 32 starts for eight straight years, and has pitched no fewer than 191.2 innings in any of those eight. Doing that would take the pressure off the staff, especially if Ted Lilly isn't ready for Opening Day, and would let Marshall play the "swingman" role again. Or you could give that last rotation spot to Tom Gorzelanny, who made $433,000 in 2009, and save the money for a midseason acquisition.

Note that I haven't gone all DeRomantic here and proposed bringing back Mark DeRosa, although I think he'd still be a solid addition, even at age 35, for the right price, and a note in this St. Louis Post-Dispatch article indicates the Cubs may indeed make DeRo an offer. I also haven't retained Mike Fontenot, who could probably be traded -- I mentioned above non-tendering Heilman, but it may be possible that both Fontenot and Heilman could be dealt, even for low-level prospects. In fact, my 2010 team as proposed above has only two players (Rowand and Garland) who were not with the Cubs at some point in 2009 -- unless they decided not to go with Jake Fox in the bench role and instead signed a free agent (or one who soon will be) such as Ross Gload or Chad Tracy, whose option was declined by the Diamondbacks yesterday. Still, despite all the travails, injuries and bad performances in 2009, the Cubs won 83 games. With performances returning to career norms, better health and a little luck, just a few tweaks could have us returning to the postseason in 2010.

Larry Jansen (7/16/20 to 10/10/09) - What to Learn from His Brief Career

Jeff Zimmerman (TucsonRoyal) — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 18:33:55 -0000

Larry Jansen passed away this last Saturday in his sleep (great article from his local newspaper on his life). He is most remembered for the being the winning pitcher when Bobby Thompson "hit the shot heard around the world". Larry played for nine seasons and had a nice career cut short by arm trouble. He was averaging 4.4 WAR per season for his first four seasons and then his production dropped off as seen from this graph (data from Rally's WAR databas e):

Even though I could not find any reference to Larry having arm problems before 1954, his production dropped off significantly in 1952 (less SO/9 and more BB/9). He almost for sure was injured in beginning in 1952.

Season	Team	G	IP	W	L	ERA	FIP	K/9	BB/9
1947	Giants	42	248	21	5	3.16	3.56	3.77	2.07
1948	Giants	42	277	18	12	3.61	3.54	4.09	1.75
1949	Giants	37	259.2	15	16	3.85	4.18	3.92	2.15
1950	Giants	40	275	19	13	3.01	3.49	5.27	1.80
1951	Giants	39	278.2	23	11	3.04	3.29	4.68	1.81
1952	Giants	34	167.1	11	11	4.09	3.70	3.98	2.53
1953	Giants	36	184.2	11	16	4.14	4.25	4.29	2.68
1954	Giants	13	40.2	2	2	5.98	4.44	3.32	3.32
1956	Redlegs	8	34.2	2	3	5.19	4.19	4.15	2.34

Larry career was similar to many pitchers because they have a few good years, become injured and never pitch to the high standard again. Looking at Rally's ranking of 500 top pitchers of all time, Larry comes in at #350. They are several current injury prone pitchers around him such as Kerry Wood (#352), Jake Peavy (#343) and Ben Sheets (#333) that could have similar careers to Larry. I am not saying these three pitcher's careers are done, but you never know with any given player. For 5 seasons, Larry was on top of the world and it pretty much came to an end within a couple of years. Larry career should be a reminder for us to enjoy the players now because we will never know if we will see them play the same, or if at all, again.

Fire Everyone! - Mark Shapiro

Jay — Fri, 09 Oct 2009 05:53:11 -0000

More photos » by Tony Dejak - AP

Is just developing a good process enough?

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This is the final installment in a 12-part series.

"A Hit Is A Hit" — The Sopranos, season one.

Christopher has been bankrolling a band called "Visiting Day", who are managed by his girlfriend Adriana. He plays the band's demo to his associate Hesh, an old-timer in the music business.

CHRISTOPHER: So?

HESH: I think it's ... not good.

CHRISTOPHER: Wanna be a little more specific?

HESH: There's good. And there's not good. This is not good.

CHRISTOPHER: Okay, maybe it's not your era — no offense, but ...

HESH: Kid, music is music, talent is talent. I don't care who you are. I seen it all. I seen heavy metal invented by Hendrix at the Bottom Line, he just got out of the army. I told him, "Kid, I don't know what you call it — talent, charisma, magic — whatever it is, you got it." These guys ... [gestures to the cassette] ... I'm sorry, they don't.

CHRISTOPHER: That Vito is a great guitar player, Hesh.

HESH: Good, fine, he's a great guitar player. However, there's one constant in the music business: A hit is a hit. And this, my friend, is not a hit.

CHRISTOPHER: But why?

HESH: Christ. Reasons we can never comprehend or codify, you pitiful schlepper.

Of all the installments in this series, this is the one where it's most tempting to beg off and admit, this might just above my pay grade. I'll be honest, I can't say with much confidence whether Mark Shapiro should be fired. What I can say is that there are definitely good reasons to fire him.

Before we get to that, better face up to some hard facts. If you're going to fire Shapiro, you have to believe that a better option is available. Chris Antonetti is the heir apparent, but you fire Shapiro and keep Antonetti only if you think that in keeping Antonetti, you preserve the best parts of Shapiro while rooting out his shortcomings. Heck, maybe that's actually the case, but I personally couldn't say. It doesn't seem likely. And if Antonetti was the instant front-runner for most any GM opening, what would that make Shapiro if he were available?

Shapiro's calling card is turning walk-year veterans into prospects who become multi-year contributors to the team — a truly staggering haul, including Grady Sizemore, Cliff Lee, Coco Crisp, Shin-Soo Choo, Travis Hafner, Milton Bradley, Franklin Gutierrez, Asdrubal Cabrera, Josh Bard and Kelly Shoppach. Add to that list, potentially, over the next several years, Matt LaPorta, Carlos Santana, Luis Valbuena, Michael Brantley, Lou Marson, plus a half-dozen significant pitching prospects, plus Mark DeRosa, Arthur Rhodes, Justin Masterson and Chris Perez. Even his least successful trade acquisitions — Alex Escobar, Jason Michaels, Brandon Phillips, Billy Traber, Andy Marte, Josh Barfield — have not been entirely bereft of big-league talent.

We've chanted that litany before, but it bears recalling because horse trading is one of the most important jobs of a GM, and it's notably one of the only jobs where success or failure is directly traced to his decision. Shapiro also has had an impressive run with third-tier free agent starting pitchers — Pavano made 33 starts and netted a decent prospect, Byrd completed three serviceable seasons, Millwood won the freakin' ERA title, and even Brian Anderson did okay for a couple of years. And while fans rightly bemoan the dead weight of Hafner's contract, Shapiro has not really made the big, crippling mistakes that befall most GMs — on the balance sheet, Hafner-Westbrook-Dellucci pale before Wells-Rios-Ryan.

If you're going to get rid of Shapiro and his like-minded colleagues, then you have to be willing to live without those exemplary skills — without his leadership, class, and intelligence, his deftness with trades and contracts, the respect he commands within the industry, and especially — especially — his willingness to take the public body blows when tough decisions need to be made. You can't assume that the next guy will excel in all of those areas. I am certain we'd miss those qualities.

Having said that, I can tell you why Shapiro should be fired in one word: Talent.

Baseball is never simple. As a rule, the world's most elite natural athletes cannot succeed as major leaguers. Hitting and pitching are simply too hard. Hitting at this level requires a knack that may be the hardest thing to quantify or characterize in all of sports, and if you don't have it, then all the talk or mechanics and approaches in the world can't save you, even if you have several NBA championships and MVP awards on your résumé. Pitching at this level requires a freakish combination of precise muscle control, huge arm-generated torque, resistance to elbow and shoulder injury under extreme stress, and intelligence.

Running a baseball club may be just as hard and just as unquantifiable; after all, more than a few titans of industry have tried and failed. A brilliant executive can't necessarily run a ballclub any better than a world-class athlete can hit a curveball. The brilliant executive can be an inspiring leader, managing and empowering his charges. He can define what kind of people he wants working in the organization, hire them, set expectations, evaluate them, act on them. He can fire people. He can order case studies and surveys of best practices. He can analyze statistics and devise processes, enact them, evaluate them, refine them, start over from scratch if need be. He can maintain outstanding communication with his staff, with his bosses, with the public. He can do all these things reliably, even predictably, because he simply has the tools and the skills.

For all that, however, the brilliant executive can't necessarily tell you whether it's better to overspend on Raul Ibañez or Kerry Wood. He can't necessarily devise a process to tell you that, and he can't necessarily hire the right person to tell you that, either. Nor can he devise a process to hire the right person to tell you that. It doesn't always come down to objective analysis or having a good process. Sometimes it comes down to talent: the talent to play, the talent to evaluate talent, the talent to develop talent, and the judgment to make decisions about talent.

Sometimes — often, maybe — it comes down to reasons we can never comprehend or codify, pitiful schleppers that we are.

Evaluating talent is a special skill, and here I can speak with some experience. Most of my professional life is centered around my ability to identify genuine talent — musical talent, IT talent, and even writing talent — people who reliably will perform at a high or exceptionally high level, just about 100 percent of the time. I have, on occasion, identified individuals with weak paper qualifications who later went on to excel in their field. In some cases, they thrived in part because I gave them an opportunity and aided their development. In other cases, their success was inevitable, and I just saw it earlier than some others.

I am not suggesting, by any stretch of the imagination, that I have the ability to judge baseball talent. Maybe, if I'd spent 20 years working as a baseball professional, learning from thousands of discussions with scouts and making and testing my own observations — maybe then, but perhaps not even then. For whatever it's worth, though, I can tell you that my ability to assess a person's talents is entirely intuitive. I have no ability to explain it, or to teach anyone else how to do it. I can be highly analytical in my assessments of people, breaking down facts and metrics, making rules and devising grading systems to create rankings — and I can teach these things by rote and by example. However, none of that has anything to do with being able to differentiate reliably between a high ceiling and a low ceiling.

I can't tell you for sure that it's the same for baseball, but I worry that it is. Most of the people reading this could be trained in the rudiments of being a low-level scout — doing your homework and measuring some kid's raw tools on the field. Skills are another thing entirely — evaluating footwork and positioning on defense, observing quality of command across a variety of pitches, intuiting the difference between a bad day and a chronic problem. Beyond these, another level, the crucial, game-changing question: Will this ballplayer develop skills beyond what he's showing today? How does he project to a different level at a different age, or even just to a different ballpark in a different league?

I have no doubt that great baseball scouts learned a lot from the great scouts who came before them, and I have no doubt that a gifted executive can learn immensely from a great scout, purely by his ability to listen and communicate and absorb. At the same time, I am quite sure that the greatest talent evaluators in the game are possessed of something that is innate and ineffable. And I am genuinely concerned that the Indians don't employ any of those people — and that, in fact, Shapiro may have favored others in the organization to the point where the best evaluators left.

Take a look at the AP report of Neal Huntington being hired away by the Pirates:

Huntington formerly was the assistant general manager to the Indians' Mark Shapiro, but dropped behind vice president of baseball operations Chris Antonetti and assistant general manager John Mirabelli on the front office depth chart two years ago.

Huntington accepted a different role in 2005, Shapiro said, because Antonetti's skills were in the management and administrative side, while Huntington's were in evaluation and scouting.

"My skill set and passion were more that of an evaluator, but they never technically took me out of the front office," Huntington said. "I was exposed to some incredible things -- rebuilding an organization and being involved in every decision, every tough decision, that was made."

And from the MLB.com report:

As an adviser to Shapiro and vice president of baseball operations Chris Antonetti, Huntington was involved in nearly all personnel and staffing decisions, as well as trade acquisition discussions. He also spent the majority of his time evaluating talent on both the Minor and Major League level.

When asked about Huntington, Shapiro responded: "[Huntington is] one of our chief evaluators and one of our strongest voices on every level," Shapiro said.

Here's a guy who was the highest-ranking evaluator in the organization and possibly the best, a guy with a master's degree in sports management from UMass, and essentially, he was passed over — well treated, perhaps, but pointedly not in line for a future role as GM. So too, perhaps, was John Farrell, who upon leaving Cleveland — quite amicably, as Huntington did — was quoted to say that he was looking to have a larger voice in an organization. Farrell had been a major league pitcher and a college pitching coach, and with the Indians he served stints as Farm Director and Director of Player Development. Despite his experience and impeccable reputation, Farrell too was not viewed as the future leader of the organization.

Years earlier, there was Tony LaCava, whom the Indians hired in 2002 as national cross-checker, essentially rescuing him from the sinking-ship Montreal Expos. As the Expos very recent Farm Director, LaCava naturally was instrumental in selecting the prospects to be received in the Colon deal, which is not only Shapiro's signature trade, but arguably the most successful trade of a veteran for prospects by any GM, ever. LaCava, too, was not retained in the Indians organization, moving on to the Blue Jays as Assistant GM in 2003, just one year later, while John Mirabelli continued his string of generally disastrous drafts.

Like Huntington, LaCava is going to be a GM sooner or later, yet he wasn't good enough to be Assistant GM in Cleveland. None of these guys were given large enough roles in the organization to keep them around, and no doubt the Indians were possessed of too much executive talent to keep in-house — a nice problem to have. Still, given how things have gone since, it's telling that the prince-in-waiting anointment, and present-day "co-GM" status, went not to an ace evaluator, but instead to Antonetti, a man whose background and skill set are more or less identical to Shapiro's.

For all the talk about being open to all ideas and all viewpoints, the major player-evaluation talent in the Indians organization was basically told that being a solid administrator was more important, and that their path to bigger jobs would have to be in some other, presumably less enlightened organization — and never mind that it doesn't matter how well administered your organization is if you don't know who the best talent is. (Is it any wonder, then, that when Shapiro hires a former catcher for a manager, he then populates his coaching staff almost entirely with other former catchers? All leaders lead by example, first and foremost.)

This is not to say that an executive without a scouting background cannot be an outstanding GM, but it's noteworthy that other organizations that have gone with the "Ivy League whiz kid" GM model tend to have a "wise old baseball man" figure hanging close by, advising the gifted non-scout executive. The Red Sox had Bill Lajoie attached to Theo Epstein; Allard Baird is in that role now, while Lajoie is now advising Huntington in Pittsburgh. The Rays put Gerry Hunsicker with Andrew Friedman, and down in Texas, Jon Daniels has access to no less than John Hart and Nolan Ryan. But when non-scout-gifted-executives Shapiro and Antonetti huddle to make the big decisions, who are the wise old evaluators in the room — Charles Nagy and Jason Bere?

Later that night, at home, Adriana and Christopher discuss Visiting Day's potential. Hip-hop mogul "Massive Genius" has told Adriana that the band's demos are promising.

CHRISTOPHER: You know how I use the technique of positive visualization?

ADRIANA: I know you talk about it. You're fairly negative a lot of the time.

CHRISTOPHER: I think you should mentally prepare for the possibility that Visiting Day sucks.

ADRIANA: What?

CHRISTOPHER: I think that ... the only reason you've gotten this far with Massive is ... he wants to be in your pants.

ADRIANA: Boy, oh, boy.

CHRISTOPHER: Look, I had some experts listen to the demo ... they crapped all over it. Sorry.

ADRIANA: Who, Hesh? That old synagogue cantor?

CHRISTOPHER: Silvio. Hey, he owned rock clubs in Asbury. You heard what Squid said. A professional engineer.

ADRIANA: What about my opinion? That it's good. That it's special. This is just a way for you to keep me down.

CHRISTOPHER: That ain't fair.

ADRIANA: What's wrong with it, huh? What's wrong with Visiting Day?

CHRISTOPHER: I don't know ... but it's a problem that you don't know.

This series of articles perhaps has only demonstrated the obvious, that a club this bad — which decides in June that it must not only tank the current season but the next season at the same time — has suffered multiple failures in more than one part of the organization. In any one area, we can talk about how much control that one group of people — coaches, scouts, trainers — really had, compared to the influence of the other groups and the whims of the fates. But a systemic failure points ultimately to Shapiro, who hired and is accountable for all of those groups, and the harsh truth is that every club must contend with the whims of the fates — or fail to contend with them, as the Indians have.

Amateur scouting has been a disaster since Shapiro took over; maybe time will reveal that it was fixed two or three years ago, but maybe not. Big-league scouting has been a mixed bag, with veteran acquisitions missing a lot more often than they hit — in Barfield's case, about four times more often. The training staff has won high praise from some in the industry, but they haven't stopped the Indians from being undercut severely by injuries to a half-dozen key players in just two years — in some cases, multiple injuries and disappointing rehab processes have afflicted a single player like Jake Westbrook over and over again. The farm system has been another mixed bag, producing too many players who dominate at Triple-A but can barely perform at replacement level in the majors. If all clubs were like the Indians in this regard, those MLE formulas might look a lot different.

We had a manager whose playing-time decisions often defied any imaginable logic or reason, who thought it was important to have Ramon Vazquez on his bench rather than future 30-30 man Brandon Phillips, and who thought it was a good idea to put Ryan Garko in the outfield, with a rookie flyball pitcher on the mound — scratch that, ever — and we had a GM who let him do these things. It's true that Shapiro fired Wedge, and he may be sincere in saying that bringing in a new manager is an exciting opportunity. Even so, Shapiro made it abundantly clear that he didn't think there was any real, qualitative reason why Wedge shouldn't continue to be the manager — his exact words were, "it's a cop-out."

We had extraordinarily bad — and sometimes historically bad — bullpens in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2009. Those volcanic fiascos were, at least, largely Shapiro's direct creations, and at most, entirely the fault of Shapiro and people who were hired by Shapiro, and who generally have not been fired by Shapiro. They have turned too many contenders into also-rans, too many decent squads into train-wrecks, and too many season ticket holders into non-customers.

The sum of these observations is this one, frightening, inescapable conclusion: Shapiro has not given us any concrete reason to believe that he knows how to put people into critical positions who are capable of evaluating, developing and coaching real talent — the kind that can thrive at the major league level. Without people in key roles who are possessed of that kind of judgment and talent, it doesn't make any difference how good your organizational processes are or how much class-acting you do. We cannot contend on a diet of trade-acquired minor leaguers and recycled starting pitchers alone. If these things weren't clear five years ago, or even one year ago, they ought to be crystal clear now.

I am just a scribe, neither scout nor coach, not a baseball executive and certainly not a former major leaguer. So I don't really know what's wrong with the Cleveland Indians. But it's a problem if Mark Shapiro doesn't know either. And as much respect for him as I have, I'm not at all convinced that he does.

Sam Fuld's First Two Career RBI Lead Cubs To 5-2 Loss To Diamondbacks

Al — Sun, 04 Oct 2009 23:37:42 -0000

More photos » by Paul Beaty - AP

Sam Fuld was everywhere today. Here, he gets tagged out in a rundown.

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It figures, doesn't it? In this season that has made very little sense since Opening Day?

Sam Fuld, who has actually had a fairly productive rookie season, finishing just short of .300 (29-for-97, .299) and with an OPS of .821, came within two at-bats of becoming only the fifth player in major league history with as many plate appearances as he had this year (112 coming into today) with zero RBI -- and three of those were pitchers. Here is the complete list, not including today's game.

Instead, "Little Sam Fuld", as Vin Scully called him when he made that diving catch in Dodger Stadium in August, took advantage of a west wind howling out to right field and launched a fly ball that made it into the first row of the right-field bleachers for his first major league home run and RBI. Later, Sam drove in the Cubs' second run of the day with a groundout. (The wind also blew over my Super Big Gulp, nearly full, only five minutes after the gates opened. In past years spilling this drink has been considered by us as "good luck" for a Cubs win. Silly superstition, yes -- but it didn't portend the right thing today.)

That would have made for a great story if those had been the only two runs of the game; unfortunately, Fuld wasn't the only player taking advantage of the wind. The Diamondbacks' Chris Young, who has made a career of hitting homers at Wrigley Field, hit his fifth lifetime home run at Wrigley off Ryan Dempster with two men on base in the fourth inning, and that was the difference in the Cubs' season-ending 5-2 loss to Arizona, leaving the season record at 83-78, seven and a half games behind the Cardinals, who also lost today (and who enter the postseason, ominously, on a losing note -- they lost eight of their last ten regular season games).

Curiosities abounded today -- in addition to Fuld's feats, Dempster struck out ten, tying his season high and giving him the club leadership for the 2009 season at 172, one more than Rich Harden. One of the K's allowed Gerardo Parra to reach base on a wild pitch. That allowed Dempster to register four strikeouts in the fifth inning. That's the 52nd time in baseball history that a pitcher has done that; Dempster becomes the fifth Cub to do it. Here is the complete list of those who have accomplished this feat; the last Cub to do it was Kerry Wood in the second game of a doubleheader on September 2, 2002. That one was notable because in the fourth inning of that game, when Wood registered four K's, there was an out recorded other than a strikeout; Wood wild-pitched two runners on base.

Also, apart from the delayed 2001 regular season, which ended on October 7 due to the one-week suspension after the 9/11 attacks, this is the latest regular season date ever at Wrigley Field.

Dempster finishes the year with a 3.65 ERA, higher than he would have liked, I'm sure, but still within range of the 2.96 he recorded a year ago. He did manage to post a 200-inning season, something he'd been shooting for, and overall I think he had a very good year given the problems his daughter had after she was born on April 1. Dempster might have had an easier time today and maybe gotten a win, had So Taguchi not dropped Chad Tracy's popup in short left field. While it was not an easy play with the wind, Taguchi had it in his glove and then dropped it -- 3B umpire Ed Rapuano had even signaled "out" before the other umpires realized Taguchi had dropped it. That helped lead to the first two Arizona runs and after Young's homer, Lou played spring training rules with the bullpen, using four relievers to mop up for an inning each. They did all right, giving up only two hits and striking out six.

The Cubs went down meekly in the lat two innings and that, as they say, was that. Leaving the ballpark for the final time of a season that goes no further than the regular schedule is always sad, even on a day like today when the weather was sunny and decent for most of the afternoon. Jim Hendry has much work to do and as I noted this morning, he may have already begun. As noted in eths' FanShot, Von Joshua has already been dismissed as hitting coach, no real surprise, as his work didn't seem to produce any real results, and hitting coaches are often the designated management scapegoat.

We await changes and positive developments for 2010, and we go into this offseason with hope, as ever, that "next year is THE year". BCB isn't going anywhere, of course; we'll be here all offseason with updates, fun stuff and new things, so stick around. In the meantime, I leave this season as I do every season, with this quote from the late A. Bartlett Giamatti's The Green Fields of the Mind:

It breaks your heart. It is designed to break your heart. The game begins in the spring, when everything else begins again, and it blossoms in the summer, filling the afternoons and evenings, and then as soon as the chill rains come, it stops and leaves you to face the fall alone. You count on it, rely on it to buffer the passage of time, to keep the memory of sunshine and high skies alive, and then just when the days are all twilight, when you need it most, it stops.

Thinking About My Lack of Thoughts Regarding the Eric Wedge Firing

devil_fingers — Wed, 30 Sep 2009 18:19:05 -0000

More photos » by Mark Duncan - AP

Don't mourn for me (at a baseball game), I'm already gone.

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If you haven't heard by now, the Cleveland Indians announced today that manager Eric Wedge and his coaching staff will not being returning next season. It's been another disappointing season for Cleveland, and there has been speculation about Eric Wedge for a few years, despite General Manger Mark Shapiro's apparently strong commitment to Wedge in past public statements.

Wedge had a .496 winning percentage (as of this time, apparently, he and his staff are going to finish out the season) with Cleveland over the last seven seasons. That's below .500, but there are managers whom we all know have done worse. As the title indicates, I don't have much to say about this. But I thought I'd at get a few fragmentary thoughts down about what I don't have to say.

I guess I hold to the generic sabermetric line that managers don't matter all that much -- 2-3 games a season, at most. I haven't followed Cleveland game-by-game the way that fans of the franchise (Kyle?) would, but it's hard to think that Cleveland gravely disappointing seasons (I personally thought they were the best team in the AL Central at the beginning of 2009, and I wasn't alone in thinking that) the last couple years can be pinned on Wedge. And I don't think that Mark Shapiro, one of the brighter GMs in the game (although it's fair to say his star shines a little less brightly after the past couple of seasons) believes that Wedge was the main problem, either. I don't know anything, but it wouldn't surprise me if PR is the main reason for this move, given Cleveland's supposed cash flow problems this season and public disappointment.

Cleveland had real question marks about their starting pitching, other than the now-departed Cliff Lee. Behind Lee, you had Fausto Carmona (who'd really only been good in 2007) and a bunch of question marks. The bullpen had had problems in the past, but Kerry Wood was supposed to shore up a strong middle relief core of Rafael Betancourt, who actually has had a good season considering both his time in Cleveland and Colorado, and Rafeal Perez, who was excellentin 2007 and 2008 and fell apart this season. Wood, of course, has been terrible.

As for position players... well, Cleveland always has seemed to have had a good core. Grady Sizemore had been one of the best players in the baseball the last few seasons. Victor Martinez is one of the best hitting catchers in the game, and his defense is underrated. Johnny Peralta, whatever his defensive deficiencies, has hit well in the past. Shin-Soo Choo was looking to be good... and so on.

I won't list everything here about what went right and wrong. Travis Hafner's contract wasn't a great decision, but it would have been hard to foresee injuries keeping him off the field to this extent (and he hasn't been a complete liability when he's been healthy). Victor Martinez had a bad 2008. Shin-Soo Choo has had a great season this season, but that's about it, as Peralta regressed both offensively and defensively, Asdrubal Cabrera's defense has taken away from his good year at the plate, and so on.

I don't know who's responsible for making these decisions. Maybe it's all bad luck, but if it's anyone's fault, it has to fall on the front office. It's hard to see how this is Wedge's fault. Maybe it's time for him to go -- Mark Shapiro is a lot smarter than me. I don't know much about Wedge -- I don't like or dislike him. Cleveland has been bad enough the last couple seasons that no amount of lineup optimization or bullpen efficiency would have put them into the playoffs. But it has to be more of a "we need to try a new voice here and see if this will mollify angry fans" than anything to do with Wedge's ability to make the roster all perform well at once. If someone can find a manager with that magic power... let me know.

Key Indians Pitchers (by ERA)
Player	IP	W	L	K	SV	ERA
Kerry Wood	56	4	3	62	27	3.54
Justin Masterson	171	10	9	151	0	4.00
Jeremy Sowers	150	7	9	81	0	4.44

Key Indians Hitters (by OPS)
Player	At-bats	R	HR	RBI	SB	Avg.	OPS
Grady Sizemore	574	101	25	78	21	.272	.853
Shin-Soo Choo	583	95	19	86	20	.293	.850
Matt LaPorta	451	70	20	68	3	.266	.802
Kelly Shoppach	381	57	19	61	0	.249	.798
Asdrubal Cabrera	582	96	9	74	19	.294	.779