SB Nation - Travis Hafner

Signing Most-Valuable Players

DanUpBaby — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 18:00:36 -0000

You shoulda come to the first party—we didn't get home 'til around four in the morning. I was blind for three days...

There's no new news, which means it's time we go over some old news: the decision to sign Ryan Franklin to a multi-year extension stipulating that he was not allowed to record another out in 2009. That particular clause was the main problem with the Franklin deal in particular, but since we didn't know about that at the time I think it's the principle of the thing that's wedged so tightly inside the Cardinals fanbase's collective craw. This team's management does so many things correctly; it's identified free talent like Ryan Ludwick, it's signed Adam Wainwright to a long-term deal at actual wainwright rates, and its drafts have improved tremendously since the seeds of what's become the new regime were first planted.

But Ryan Franklin was the second time in as many years that the Cardinals broke, to their own detriment, what was originally a Branch Rickey tenet and has since become a Sabermetrics 101 truism: Don't sign a player at the top of his value! This shouldn't be a difficult thing to grasp because it's so categorically true as to be basically meaningless; if you sign a guy at the very peak of his value, things can only go downhill from there.

I've thought about these contracts assuming, above all else, that John Mozeliak is a rational, above-average general manager; most of them are at this point, so it might be worthwhile to consider who else has made these two moves in recent years, and where it's left them.

THE LOHSE DEAL: Three long-term contracts obviously weirder than Kyle Lohse's

3. Juan Pierre. Five years, $44 million, 11/2006. What a terrible year for contracts this was—at the same time all of this was happening the Cardinals were getting ready to tear up Chris Carpenter's last two years, worth $15 million, so that they could hand him three more at an annual value of $15 million. Pierre is probably the nearest analogue to Kyle Lohse of the three I've got here; he's an intermittently useful regular who is being passed off, as salaries go, as the second banana on a pretty good team, not the guy who goes to the bench when somebody better shows up.

But more importantly, when the Dodgers pounced on Juan Pierre here—before the winter meetings, even—they seemed to be bidding against themselves. Pierre had just been traded from the Marlins for what at the time was a platter of second tier pitching prospects, and his year in Chicago hadn't exactly brought him back to the front of the national conscience. Who else was ready to offer Juan Pierre $44 million? Or Kyle Lohse $41?

2. Gary Matthews, Jr. Five years, $50 million, 11/2006. Stop me if you've heard this one before, maybe three times before: a player who has been useful in his own way for some time has a brilliant season that gets a lot of attention, not all of it for his tangible value. In the offseason he's signed to a contract that seems out of touch both with his apparent market value and the likely bounds of his performance, but the team in question is convinced that, despite being in his thirties, this player has found a new level of performance. He has not.

What makes the Sarge Jr. contract crazier than the Kyle Lohse deal, besides the additional year, is that the real Gary Matthews Jr. was a fourth outfielder with an inconsistent bat and a flashy glove. Since the Angels signed him, that's exactly what he's been. When it comes to inexplicable career year contracts, we're all Gary Matthews, Jr., Jr. Except for this man:

1. Vernon Wells. 114 years, $573 billion, 12/2006. Recently we were talking about how great it is to be able to lock up your own homegrown talent—how that's one of the keys to the Yankees' success, and, in the Blue Jays' case, one of the keys to competing with the Yankees. After looking at the Vernon Wells contract to this point, one might be tempted to never, ever sign another homegrown player again.

Vernon Wells was a trap; that's all there is to it. He looks like a homegrown franchise player; he plays center field, and in his second full season in the league he had an enormous season, hitting .317/.359/.550 and doing everything well. In his ill-fated contract year, he nearly reprised that season, hitting .303/.357/.542. But between those lines, and even between the lines' lines, there are more warning signals than you'll find on a pack of Canadian cigarettes. Between 2003 and 2006 are two extremely average lines; even in 2003 and 2006 there's a walk rate that keeps him from being an elite hitter. The Blue Jays were signing a player that they'd gotten for two non-contiguous years out of four to a deal that might even have been rich for that hypothetical guy.

They couldn't have known that his offense and defense would both take a complete nosedive by 2009, making him one of the worst players in baseball just in time for his contract to get to these numbers:

2010—$12.5 million
2011—$23 million

If I stopped here it would be a bad deal. But I've got more, one entirely separate bad deal—

2012—$21 million
2013—$21 million

That's like signing Vernon Wells to a bad contract—five years, $63 million—and then signing him again, at the conclusion of the contract, to Manny Ramirez's deal. (You know? It really is...)

THE FRANKLIN DEAL: Three mid-contract renegotiations less necessary than Ryan Franklin's

3. Vernon Wells. Why on earth did they renegotiate after his career year when they had one more on which to base things? Were they concerned that the Vernon Wells would take it as a serious personal affront?

2. Travis Hafner. You've got a slugger who has just turned 30 and who, while brilliant, has serious old player skills. He's gotten off to a slow start this season, but it's alright—you've got him signed through the end of the next year on a deal that's beneficial for all parties concerned. Do you A) wait out his slump, or B) sign him to a four year, $57 million contract that wipes out your attractive year and a half as a show of good will?

1. Chris Carpenter. It hurts, it really does. But at least we don't have to blame this one on John Mozeliak. I'm aware that this is easier for us to do, as armchair GMs, than it is for the actual executives, who are dealing with actual human beings they will have to see on a semi-regular basis. And it's not just the player—fans can be pretty quick to accuse teams of not opening up DeWallet, and the Vernon Wells deal was apparently engineered, to some degree, by the Blue Jays' owner.

But in general, contracts like Lohse's and Franklin's—on a smaller scale, luckily—illustrate how risky a business it is to use contracts to send messages to players, fans, or owners. A pat on the back might have done more good for Ryan Franklin than an extra $4 million on his head.

Milton Bradley: Destination Toronto?

Al — Sat, 31 Oct 2009 15:26:48 -0000

More photos » by David Zalubowski - AP

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The Toronto Sun reports this morning on a potential Milton Bradley for Vernon Wells swap:

The Chicago Cubs would like to -- have to -- deal disgruntled outfielder Milton Bradley. And one player they are eyeing as a target destination is the Blue Jays, with centre fielder Vernon Wells going to the Cubs in return.

"It's early on, but we think this one has some legs," said one Cubs official. "But they aren't the only team we are talking with."

Yes, "centre" is correct. Remember, the quote's from a Canadian paper. Vernon Wells signed an enormous contract with the Blue Jays before the 2008 season and there are six years left on the deal. How would the Cubs deal with that huge amount of money, given Tom Ricketts' statement yesterday that payroll would go up "slightly" next year, as well as Alfonso Soriano's remaining deal?

The Cubs' idea is to split the difference on monies owed -- Wells' $107 million and Bradley's $21 million for a difference of $86 million. Each team absorbs $43 million.

I was told there would be no math here, but if I have calculated this right -- and correct me, please, if I haven't -- that puts the Cubs on the hook for (approximately) $10.67 million for each of the six remaining years of Wells' deal. According to Cot's Baseball Contracts, Wells has a full no-trade clause that would have to be waived, and he can opt out of the deal after 2011.

Since the departure of Milton Bradley was only going to be made possible by taking on someone else's bad contract, this might be a possible "best of the worst". Wells is about six months younger than Bradley and had a big offensive season as recently as 2006. He can play center field, which would allow the Cubs to move Kosuke Fukudome back to right field, a better position for him. I'm not completely sold on this deal, but remember, the Cubs aren't exactly in the best bargaining position, either. The article concludes:

The Cubs have to deal Bradley. Other possible landing spots: The San Francisco Giants for lefty Barry Zito, who has four years remaining at $83 million; the Indians for Travis Hafner, three years for $40.25 million, Giants' Aaron Rowand, three years at $36 million, the Dodgers for Juan Pierre, two years at $18.5 million, and Tampa Bay's Pat Burrell, one year at $7 million.

Well. There's no way the Cubs ever, ever, EVER take Juan Pierre back. The Burrell possibility has been rumored before; Burrell's a bad outfielder, but at least the Cubs would only be stuck with his deal for one year; we've discussed the Rowand possibility also, I doubt the Giants are dealing Zito now since he had such a good second half, and there would be absolutely no point in acquiring Hafner, who hasn't played a game in the field since 2007 and can only play first base -- the Cubs already have one of those.

We, as ever, await developments.

Fire Everyone! - Mark Shapiro

Jay — Fri, 09 Oct 2009 05:53:11 -0000

More photos » by Tony Dejak - AP

Is just developing a good process enough?

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This is the final installment in a 12-part series.

"A Hit Is A Hit" — The Sopranos, season one.

Christopher has been bankrolling a band called "Visiting Day", who are managed by his girlfriend Adriana. He plays the band's demo to his associate Hesh, an old-timer in the music business.

CHRISTOPHER: So?

HESH: I think it's ... not good.

CHRISTOPHER: Wanna be a little more specific?

HESH: There's good. And there's not good. This is not good.

CHRISTOPHER: Okay, maybe it's not your era — no offense, but ...

HESH: Kid, music is music, talent is talent. I don't care who you are. I seen it all. I seen heavy metal invented by Hendrix at the Bottom Line, he just got out of the army. I told him, "Kid, I don't know what you call it — talent, charisma, magic — whatever it is, you got it." These guys ... [gestures to the cassette] ... I'm sorry, they don't.

CHRISTOPHER: That Vito is a great guitar player, Hesh.

HESH: Good, fine, he's a great guitar player. However, there's one constant in the music business: A hit is a hit. And this, my friend, is not a hit.

CHRISTOPHER: But why?

HESH: Christ. Reasons we can never comprehend or codify, you pitiful schlepper.

Of all the installments in this series, this is the one where it's most tempting to beg off and admit, this might just above my pay grade. I'll be honest, I can't say with much confidence whether Mark Shapiro should be fired. What I can say is that there are definitely good reasons to fire him.

Before we get to that, better face up to some hard facts. If you're going to fire Shapiro, you have to believe that a better option is available. Chris Antonetti is the heir apparent, but you fire Shapiro and keep Antonetti only if you think that in keeping Antonetti, you preserve the best parts of Shapiro while rooting out his shortcomings. Heck, maybe that's actually the case, but I personally couldn't say. It doesn't seem likely. And if Antonetti was the instant front-runner for most any GM opening, what would that make Shapiro if he were available?

Shapiro's calling card is turning walk-year veterans into prospects who become multi-year contributors to the team — a truly staggering haul, including Grady Sizemore, Cliff Lee, Coco Crisp, Shin-Soo Choo, Travis Hafner, Milton Bradley, Franklin Gutierrez, Asdrubal Cabrera, Josh Bard and Kelly Shoppach. Add to that list, potentially, over the next several years, Matt LaPorta, Carlos Santana, Luis Valbuena, Michael Brantley, Lou Marson, plus a half-dozen significant pitching prospects, plus Mark DeRosa, Arthur Rhodes, Justin Masterson and Chris Perez. Even his least successful trade acquisitions — Alex Escobar, Jason Michaels, Brandon Phillips, Billy Traber, Andy Marte, Josh Barfield — have not been entirely bereft of big-league talent.

We've chanted that litany before, but it bears recalling because horse trading is one of the most important jobs of a GM, and it's notably one of the only jobs where success or failure is directly traced to his decision. Shapiro also has had an impressive run with third-tier free agent starting pitchers — Pavano made 33 starts and netted a decent prospect, Byrd completed three serviceable seasons, Millwood won the freakin' ERA title, and even Brian Anderson did okay for a couple of years. And while fans rightly bemoan the dead weight of Hafner's contract, Shapiro has not really made the big, crippling mistakes that befall most GMs — on the balance sheet, Hafner-Westbrook-Dellucci pale before Wells-Rios-Ryan.

If you're going to get rid of Shapiro and his like-minded colleagues, then you have to be willing to live without those exemplary skills — without his leadership, class, and intelligence, his deftness with trades and contracts, the respect he commands within the industry, and especially — especially — his willingness to take the public body blows when tough decisions need to be made. You can't assume that the next guy will excel in all of those areas. I am certain we'd miss those qualities.

Having said that, I can tell you why Shapiro should be fired in one word: Talent.

Baseball is never simple. As a rule, the world's most elite natural athletes cannot succeed as major leaguers. Hitting and pitching are simply too hard. Hitting at this level requires a knack that may be the hardest thing to quantify or characterize in all of sports, and if you don't have it, then all the talk or mechanics and approaches in the world can't save you, even if you have several NBA championships and MVP awards on your résumé. Pitching at this level requires a freakish combination of precise muscle control, huge arm-generated torque, resistance to elbow and shoulder injury under extreme stress, and intelligence.

Running a baseball club may be just as hard and just as unquantifiable; after all, more than a few titans of industry have tried and failed. A brilliant executive can't necessarily run a ballclub any better than a world-class athlete can hit a curveball. The brilliant executive can be an inspiring leader, managing and empowering his charges. He can define what kind of people he wants working in the organization, hire them, set expectations, evaluate them, act on them. He can fire people. He can order case studies and surveys of best practices. He can analyze statistics and devise processes, enact them, evaluate them, refine them, start over from scratch if need be. He can maintain outstanding communication with his staff, with his bosses, with the public. He can do all these things reliably, even predictably, because he simply has the tools and the skills.

For all that, however, the brilliant executive can't necessarily tell you whether it's better to overspend on Raul Ibañez or Kerry Wood. He can't necessarily devise a process to tell you that, and he can't necessarily hire the right person to tell you that, either. Nor can he devise a process to hire the right person to tell you that. It doesn't always come down to objective analysis or having a good process. Sometimes it comes down to talent: the talent to play, the talent to evaluate talent, the talent to develop talent, and the judgment to make decisions about talent.

Sometimes — often, maybe — it comes down to reasons we can never comprehend or codify, pitiful schleppers that we are.

Evaluating talent is a special skill, and here I can speak with some experience. Most of my professional life is centered around my ability to identify genuine talent — musical talent, IT talent, and even writing talent — people who reliably will perform at a high or exceptionally high level, just about 100 percent of the time. I have, on occasion, identified individuals with weak paper qualifications who later went on to excel in their field. In some cases, they thrived in part because I gave them an opportunity and aided their development. In other cases, their success was inevitable, and I just saw it earlier than some others.

I am not suggesting, by any stretch of the imagination, that I have the ability to judge baseball talent. Maybe, if I'd spent 20 years working as a baseball professional, learning from thousands of discussions with scouts and making and testing my own observations — maybe then, but perhaps not even then. For whatever it's worth, though, I can tell you that my ability to assess a person's talents is entirely intuitive. I have no ability to explain it, or to teach anyone else how to do it. I can be highly analytical in my assessments of people, breaking down facts and metrics, making rules and devising grading systems to create rankings — and I can teach these things by rote and by example. However, none of that has anything to do with being able to differentiate reliably between a high ceiling and a low ceiling.

I can't tell you for sure that it's the same for baseball, but I worry that it is. Most of the people reading this could be trained in the rudiments of being a low-level scout — doing your homework and measuring some kid's raw tools on the field. Skills are another thing entirely — evaluating footwork and positioning on defense, observing quality of command across a variety of pitches, intuiting the difference between a bad day and a chronic problem. Beyond these, another level, the crucial, game-changing question: Will this ballplayer develop skills beyond what he's showing today? How does he project to a different level at a different age, or even just to a different ballpark in a different league?

I have no doubt that great baseball scouts learned a lot from the great scouts who came before them, and I have no doubt that a gifted executive can learn immensely from a great scout, purely by his ability to listen and communicate and absorb. At the same time, I am quite sure that the greatest talent evaluators in the game are possessed of something that is innate and ineffable. And I am genuinely concerned that the Indians don't employ any of those people — and that, in fact, Shapiro may have favored others in the organization to the point where the best evaluators left.

Take a look at the AP report of Neal Huntington being hired away by the Pirates:

Huntington formerly was the assistant general manager to the Indians' Mark Shapiro, but dropped behind vice president of baseball operations Chris Antonetti and assistant general manager John Mirabelli on the front office depth chart two years ago.

Huntington accepted a different role in 2005, Shapiro said, because Antonetti's skills were in the management and administrative side, while Huntington's were in evaluation and scouting.

"My skill set and passion were more that of an evaluator, but they never technically took me out of the front office," Huntington said. "I was exposed to some incredible things -- rebuilding an organization and being involved in every decision, every tough decision, that was made."

And from the MLB.com report:

As an adviser to Shapiro and vice president of baseball operations Chris Antonetti, Huntington was involved in nearly all personnel and staffing decisions, as well as trade acquisition discussions. He also spent the majority of his time evaluating talent on both the Minor and Major League level.

When asked about Huntington, Shapiro responded: "[Huntington is] one of our chief evaluators and one of our strongest voices on every level," Shapiro said.

Here's a guy who was the highest-ranking evaluator in the organization and possibly the best, a guy with a master's degree in sports management from UMass, and essentially, he was passed over — well treated, perhaps, but pointedly not in line for a future role as GM. So too, perhaps, was John Farrell, who upon leaving Cleveland — quite amicably, as Huntington did — was quoted to say that he was looking to have a larger voice in an organization. Farrell had been a major league pitcher and a college pitching coach, and with the Indians he served stints as Farm Director and Director of Player Development. Despite his experience and impeccable reputation, Farrell too was not viewed as the future leader of the organization.

Years earlier, there was Tony LaCava, whom the Indians hired in 2002 as national cross-checker, essentially rescuing him from the sinking-ship Montreal Expos. As the Expos very recent Farm Director, LaCava naturally was instrumental in selecting the prospects to be received in the Colon deal, which is not only Shapiro's signature trade, but arguably the most successful trade of a veteran for prospects by any GM, ever. LaCava, too, was not retained in the Indians organization, moving on to the Blue Jays as Assistant GM in 2003, just one year later, while John Mirabelli continued his string of generally disastrous drafts.

Like Huntington, LaCava is going to be a GM sooner or later, yet he wasn't good enough to be Assistant GM in Cleveland. None of these guys were given large enough roles in the organization to keep them around, and no doubt the Indians were possessed of too much executive talent to keep in-house — a nice problem to have. Still, given how things have gone since, it's telling that the prince-in-waiting anointment, and present-day "co-GM" status, went not to an ace evaluator, but instead to Antonetti, a man whose background and skill set are more or less identical to Shapiro's.

For all the talk about being open to all ideas and all viewpoints, the major player-evaluation talent in the Indians organization was basically told that being a solid administrator was more important, and that their path to bigger jobs would have to be in some other, presumably less enlightened organization — and never mind that it doesn't matter how well administered your organization is if you don't know who the best talent is. (Is it any wonder, then, that when Shapiro hires a former catcher for a manager, he then populates his coaching staff almost entirely with other former catchers? All leaders lead by example, first and foremost.)

This is not to say that an executive without a scouting background cannot be an outstanding GM, but it's noteworthy that other organizations that have gone with the "Ivy League whiz kid" GM model tend to have a "wise old baseball man" figure hanging close by, advising the gifted non-scout executive. The Red Sox had Bill Lajoie attached to Theo Epstein; Allard Baird is in that role now, while Lajoie is now advising Huntington in Pittsburgh. The Rays put Gerry Hunsicker with Andrew Friedman, and down in Texas, Jon Daniels has access to no less than John Hart and Nolan Ryan. But when non-scout-gifted-executives Shapiro and Antonetti huddle to make the big decisions, who are the wise old evaluators in the room — Charles Nagy and Jason Bere?

Later that night, at home, Adriana and Christopher discuss Visiting Day's potential. Hip-hop mogul "Massive Genius" has told Adriana that the band's demos are promising.

CHRISTOPHER: You know how I use the technique of positive visualization?

ADRIANA: I know you talk about it. You're fairly negative a lot of the time.

CHRISTOPHER: I think you should mentally prepare for the possibility that Visiting Day sucks.

ADRIANA: What?

CHRISTOPHER: I think that ... the only reason you've gotten this far with Massive is ... he wants to be in your pants.

ADRIANA: Boy, oh, boy.

CHRISTOPHER: Look, I had some experts listen to the demo ... they crapped all over it. Sorry.

ADRIANA: Who, Hesh? That old synagogue cantor?

CHRISTOPHER: Silvio. Hey, he owned rock clubs in Asbury. You heard what Squid said. A professional engineer.

ADRIANA: What about my opinion? That it's good. That it's special. This is just a way for you to keep me down.

CHRISTOPHER: That ain't fair.

ADRIANA: What's wrong with it, huh? What's wrong with Visiting Day?

CHRISTOPHER: I don't know ... but it's a problem that you don't know.

This series of articles perhaps has only demonstrated the obvious, that a club this bad — which decides in June that it must not only tank the current season but the next season at the same time — has suffered multiple failures in more than one part of the organization. In any one area, we can talk about how much control that one group of people — coaches, scouts, trainers — really had, compared to the influence of the other groups and the whims of the fates. But a systemic failure points ultimately to Shapiro, who hired and is accountable for all of those groups, and the harsh truth is that every club must contend with the whims of the fates — or fail to contend with them, as the Indians have.

Amateur scouting has been a disaster since Shapiro took over; maybe time will reveal that it was fixed two or three years ago, but maybe not. Big-league scouting has been a mixed bag, with veteran acquisitions missing a lot more often than they hit — in Barfield's case, about four times more often. The training staff has won high praise from some in the industry, but they haven't stopped the Indians from being undercut severely by injuries to a half-dozen key players in just two years — in some cases, multiple injuries and disappointing rehab processes have afflicted a single player like Jake Westbrook over and over again. The farm system has been another mixed bag, producing too many players who dominate at Triple-A but can barely perform at replacement level in the majors. If all clubs were like the Indians in this regard, those MLE formulas might look a lot different.

We had a manager whose playing-time decisions often defied any imaginable logic or reason, who thought it was important to have Ramon Vazquez on his bench rather than future 30-30 man Brandon Phillips, and who thought it was a good idea to put Ryan Garko in the outfield, with a rookie flyball pitcher on the mound — scratch that, ever — and we had a GM who let him do these things. It's true that Shapiro fired Wedge, and he may be sincere in saying that bringing in a new manager is an exciting opportunity. Even so, Shapiro made it abundantly clear that he didn't think there was any real, qualitative reason why Wedge shouldn't continue to be the manager — his exact words were, "it's a cop-out."

We had extraordinarily bad — and sometimes historically bad — bullpens in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2009. Those volcanic fiascos were, at least, largely Shapiro's direct creations, and at most, entirely the fault of Shapiro and people who were hired by Shapiro, and who generally have not been fired by Shapiro. They have turned too many contenders into also-rans, too many decent squads into train-wrecks, and too many season ticket holders into non-customers.

The sum of these observations is this one, frightening, inescapable conclusion: Shapiro has not given us any concrete reason to believe that he knows how to put people into critical positions who are capable of evaluating, developing and coaching real talent — the kind that can thrive at the major league level. Without people in key roles who are possessed of that kind of judgment and talent, it doesn't make any difference how good your organizational processes are or how much class-acting you do. We cannot contend on a diet of trade-acquired minor leaguers and recycled starting pitchers alone. If these things weren't clear five years ago, or even one year ago, they ought to be crystal clear now.

I am just a scribe, neither scout nor coach, not a baseball executive and certainly not a former major leaguer. So I don't really know what's wrong with the Cleveland Indians. But it's a problem if Mark Shapiro doesn't know either. And as much respect for him as I have, I'm not at all convinced that he does.

Who Actually Had the Biggest Comeback in 2009?

Jeff Zimmerman (TucsonRoyal) — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 23:18:43 -0000

It's award season, and the NL and AL Comeback Awards winners were announced earlier today. Congrats to Chris Carpenter of the Cardinals and Aaron Hill of the Blue Jays for winning the award. It is supposed to go to the players that "re-emerged on the baseball field during a given season."

I decided to take the balloting results and compare the player's WAR from this year, a recent low year and a recent high. Then. I took the total swing in WAR from the high to the low to this season's WAR value . For example Aaron Hill had 3.5 WAR in 2007, 0.5 in 2008 and then 4.2 this year for a total swing of 6.7 WAR ((3.5 WAR -0.5WAR)+(4.2 WAR - 0.5 WAR).

NL Comeback Award Comparison

Here is a comparison of the vote getters in the NL:

Voting Rank	Name and Team	High Year	Previous High (WAR)	Low Year	Lowest Between High and 2009 (WAR)	2009 WAR	Total Swing in WAR
1	Chris Carpenter, STL	2006	5.2	2007	0.2	5.6	10.4
2	Yovani Gallardo, MIL	2007	2.6	2008	0.4	2.8	4.6
3	Josh Johnson, FLA	2006	2.5	2007	0.2	5.3	7.4
4	Todd Helton, COL	2007	4.9	2008	1.5	3.5	5.4
5	Aaron Boone, HOU	2007	0.3	2008	-0.2	-0.3	0.4
6	Pedro Martinez, PHI	2007	1.2	2008	0.1	0.6	1.6
7	Luis Castillo, NYM	2007	2.4	2008	0.6	1.4	2.6
8	Jeff Weaver, LAD	2007	0.9	2008	0	0.6	1.5
9	Jonny Gomes, CIN	2007	0	2008	-1.2	0.8	3.2
10	Peter Moylan, ATL	2007	0.6	2008	0	1.5	2.1
11	Mike MacDougal, WSH	2007	0.2	2008	0.1	-0.2	-0.2

NL Observations and the AL Comparisons after the jump

NL observations:

The voters got the winner correct.
The voters also got the next four correct with the exception of Gallardo being a little high
The wasn't a whole lot to choose from after the first 4.
In two cases the players WAR value did not increase in 2009 from the previous years. In one case, Aaron Boone had open heart surgery this off season and even getting on the field should warrant some votes. I have no clue how Mike MacDougal end up with votes.

AL Comeback Award Comparison

Now here is a comparison of the vote getters in the AL:

Voting Rank	Name and Team	High Year	Previous High (WAR)	Low Year	Lowest Between High and 2009 (WAR)	2009 WAR	Total Swing in WAR
1	Aaron Hill, TOR	2007	3.5	2008	0.5	4.2	6.7
2	Victor Martinez, BOS	2007	5.1	2008	0.9	4.8	8.1
3	Michael Cuddyer, MIN	2007	2.1	2008	-0.2	2.1	4.6
4	Jorge Posada, NYY	2007	7.1	2008	0.8	4	9.5
5	Russell Branyan, SEA	2006	1.1	2007	0.5	2.8	2.9
6	Scott Podsednik, CWS	2005	1.4	2006	-0.5	1.5	3.9
7	Juan Rivera, LAA	2006	2.7	2008	-0.7	3.5	7.6
8	Rajai Davis, OAK	2007	1	2008	0.6	3.5	3.3
9	Andruw Jones, TEX	2007	3.6	2008	-0.9	0.7	6.1
10	Travis Hafner, CLE	2007	2.2	2008	-0.8	1.1	4.9
11	Fernando Rodney, DET	2007	0.7	2008	0.4	0.3	0.2

Observations on the voting for the AL Comeback Award:

The winner here did not have the largest swing in WAR, Hill was actually 4 in total swing behind Posada, Martinez, and Rivera.
The swing values in the AL were much more than in the NL on average. There was only one swing value of less than 2.9 in the AL, but 6 in the NL.
I need to look back over 5 years to see the comeback of Scott Podsednik. He has the following WAR values from 2005 to 2009: 1.4, -0.5,-0.1, -0.4, 1.5
Fernando Rodney, like Aaron Boone and Mike MacDougal got votes for actually being worse this year than last year.
There seems to be a lot of love for Russell Branyan despite being having the 9th highest swing in WAR.

Game 160: Red Sox 6, Indians 2

Ryan — Sat, 03 Oct 2009 03:42:42 -0000

More photos » by Mary Schwalm - AP

As Jason Varitek goes for a foul ball, a Sawx fan shows off his spoon-swallowing skills.

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This series so far has to me felt like Spring Training games, though the two teams have different goals in mind for them. Boston's Terry Francona is trying to give his players enough playing time to stay sharp, but also keep them rested and healthy, while Eric Wedge is just trying to get this last weekend over so he can move on to other things. Meanwhile, the Indians lost their record thirteenth straight on the road.

Jeremy Sowers checked out early after giving up 3 runs on four hits and two walks, giving way to a series of relievers just getting their work in. Meanwhile, the offense had a goal to shoot for: scoring a run. The offense hadn't plated a run in over two games, and had to be closing in on some kind of team record for sustained futility. Luis Valbuena and Trevor Crowe finally broke the ice in the fifth off Daisuke Matsuzaka, but they had a couple opportunities before that, beginning with Michael Brantley's double to lead off the game. Matsuzaka took three meandering pitches to accomplish what every one good one would do; if he had to be that fine against this Indians lineup, I don't like his chances against deeper and more talented lineups in the postseason.

Next Up: Laffey vs. Beckett, 7:10 PM

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Luis Valbuena	.091	Jeremy Sowers	-.213
Tony Sipp	.084	Jhonny Peralta	-.140
Travis Hafner	.041	Shin-Soo Choo	-.111

Saying Goodbye to the Metrodome: Top 5 Memories

Jesse — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 01:00:23 -0000

What are yours?

Barring a minor miracle, tomorrow night the Minnesota Twins will open their final series in the Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome. 28 baseball seasons ago, on April 6 1982, the first baseball game was held as the Twins played host to the Seattle Mariners. In just a few hours the Kansas City Royals will be baseball's last visitors under teflon skies.

There are a lot of easy memories when you think back. Of course there's the unbelieveable run by the 1987 Twins, when they returned to Minneapolis down three games to two but still took down the St. Louis Cardinals in seven games; Kirby Puckett, Kent Hrbek, Gary Gaetti, Tom Brunansky and Frank Viola became household names over night while a 36-year old Bert Blyleven threw a now unthinkable 267 innings. Even more of you might choose the 1991 incarnation of the Twins, starring some of the same characters while also including franchise names like Rick Aguilera, Chili Davis, Brian Harper, Kevin Tapani, Shane Mack, Scott Erickson and Jack Morris; Puckett's homer in game six and ten innings of shutout baseball by Morris in game seven. Or maybe you were there for the alpha, for a 102-loss team with 22-year olds Herbie and Viola? How about the completion of one of the greatest comebacks in the history of the organization, when the team won the AL Central title after the final out of their season was recorded in 2006?

I'm too young for some of these, at least to remember them properly. My top five metrodome memories will all be from games where I was actually there; when I was actually sitting in those horribly placed seats, under a dirty yellow sky. Check out my top five after the jump, and then feel free to share your own.

Five

This one isn't even baseball. In high school I was lucky enough to be part of a team that made the state playoffs for football. Two consecutive seasons I got to play at least one game on the turf of the Dome, the same turf as Puck and Hrbek and Radke, the same turf as Anthony Carter and John Randle and Randall McDaniel, as a member of the Breckenridge Cowboys in November of '95 and '96.

Four

On June 22, 1992, my family made a trip to the Cities for a vacation away from Greater Minnesota, and I saw my first Twins game. The Angels were in town. We arrived early enough to watch the guys warm up in the outfield, and I can still remember how in awe of them I was. They were just a few feet from me, in the flesh--real, live people, not on television. Kent Hrbek wasn't in the lineup that day, but I still got to see Knobby and Kirby. Knoblauch singled in the first, stole second base and eventually would score on a Chili Davis single. In the seventh Brian Harper walked, Pedro Munoz doubled moving him to third, and two batters later Harper scored on a Greg Gagne sac fly to make it 2-0. That was the final score, the Twins winning my first ever game on the back of those two runs and 8.1 innings of scoreless ball thrown by John Smiley. Aggy got the save, of course.

Three

I went to a Twins - Blue Jays tilt with my friend Mike on June 22, 2007. There were four drunk Jays fans in front of us, and honestly I don't even remember what the score was, although I do know the Twins won. Why? Because all I can remember is this:

Why did I take this picture, you ask? Why wouldn't I take this picture. Nasty.

Two

I got goosebumps when I saw Johan Santana pick up his 1000th strikeout on June 13, 2006, as I went to a game to see myself in Dugout Splinters for the very first time and to catch a game with some friends a couple days before my birthday. But while Johan more than did his job, striking out 13 over eight innings while allowing just five hits, he couldn't hold the Boston Red Sox scoreless. Jason Varitek's line drive home run to center field put Boston up 1-0, and the Twins would only manage to tie the game on a Michael Cuddyer homer in the bottom half of the inning. Santana left the game tied, and it wasn't solved until Jason Kubel decided to make Julian Tavarez pay for intentionally walking Torii Hunter to get to him. With the bases loaded and the count full, Kubel took Tavarez deep for a walk-off grand slam home run. It. Was. Amazing.

One

On April 5, 2004, Opening Day, I watched as the Twins slowly sunk to a four-run deficit through six innings at the hands of the Cleveland Indians. Brad Radke struggled early, giving up a second inning homer to Travis Hafner and a third inning homer to Jody Gerut, before settling down for the next couple innings. He gave up another solo shot to Hafner in the top of the sixth, and there wasn't any life in the Twins' offense, which had managed just one hit (a single by Shannon Stewart to lead off the bottom of the first) off CC Sabathia over seven innings. But then came the bottom of the eighth.

Joe Mauer walked to lead things off, and Christian Guzman followed that up with a single before the top of the order cylced around and Stewart moved both runners up on a ground out. Cuddyer followed with a hard liner to center, scoring both runs, and was moved to third base on a Doug Mientkiewicz single. Corey Koskie was sitting dead red on a 2-2 pitch and drove it into the left-center gap for a ground-rule double, scoring Cuddyer to maker it 4-3, before Hunter singled to tie the game and finish the scoring for the inning. Jacque Jones and Matt LeCroy struck out to end the rally.

Then all went silent once more.

via www.minorleagueballparks.com

J.C. Romero, Joe Nathan and Juan Rincon combined for three scoreless innings. Aaron Fultz and Joe Roa had already combined for two of their own, but those three bridge us to the bottom of the 11th. Jones struck out again, for the fourth time in four at-bats. LeCroy managed to squeeze out a walk, and was replaced on the bases by Nick Punto. Mauer pulled a hard shot into right field, allowing Punto to take third on the one out single. Guzman struck out for the second out of the inning. Alertly, Mauer took second base on defensive indifference with Stewart now at the dish, giving the Indians the option of intentionally walking Stewart to face Cuddyer. Chad Durbin and the Indians decided to go after him, and Shannon repaid them by smashing a line drive home run into the left field seats, about four rows in front of where I was sitting. The crowd went absolutely berserk, and I'm pretty sure Mike and I were already nomiating Stewart for MVP on the back of his strong showing with the Twins in 2003.

This, of course, was also Joe Mauer's very first game with the Minnesota Twins. I studied him closely before the game started, warming up with Brad Radke in the bullpen. There appeared nothing unusual, he wasn't wearing bling and he wasn't acting up and he didn't strut. He just squatted down, held out his glove and let Brad warm up. From moment one Joe was all business, even when his name was announced (hitting eighth, by the way) and the crowd rained down applause like they already knew he was Baby Joe Jesus. That in itself almost qualifies as another memory, seperate from the game, that I will always remember.

What about you?

Games 157 and 158: Indians, White Sox Split Doubleheader

Ryan — Thu, 01 Oct 2009 02:15:34 -0000

More photos » by Mark Duncan - AP

Gone, but not yet.

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Game 157: Indians 5, White Sox 1

Game 158: White Sox 1, Indians 0

A couple hours before the first game began, GM Mark Shapiro announced that manager Eric Wedge and all members of the major-league coaching staff would not be back for the 2010 season. The move was expected, and hopefully it represents the first step towards a championship team. Wedge handled the firing with class, though you would assume it wasn't a shock to him.

The pitching performances in the doubleheader were promising as well. Fausto Carmona pitched well for the second start in a row, and Masterson was brilliant in the nightcap. These were the last starts of the season for the two pitchers, and they couldn't have ended their seasons on a better note. Carmona was efficient, showing flashes of how he pitched in 2007. He went seven innings, walking just two and striking out 5. In some ways these last two starts make his 2009 season even more maddening, for you saw what he was capable of.

In the first game, the Indians were paced by Matt LaPorta (1-1, 2B, 2 BB) and Travis Hafner (2-3, HR), who hopefully will form a formidable right-left power combination in next year's lineup. LaPorta's streaking towards a league-average OPS as the season is winding down, and even though he's made less than 200 plate appearances in the majors, he's your cleanup hitter next season.

Even though the Indians ended their home schedule with a loss in game two, Justin Masterson's gem of a start was a great takeaway. He struck out 12, walked 2, and pitched a complete game. He allowed only one run, but unfortunately neither Mark Buerhle nor three Chicago relievers allowed a single run. Masterson had struggled down the stretch, which made this start even more of a surprise. In his last start against Detroit, he couldn't make it through five innings, and he hadn't gone seven innings in any start this season. Cleveland's next pitching coach now has an archetype pitching performance to try to emulate next year.

Next Up: The last series of the season. Carrasco vs. Lester, 7:10 PM

Game Graphs and WPA leaders after the jump...

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Fausto Carmona	.242	Jhonny Peralta	-.056
Matt LaPorta	.175	Michael Brantley	-.053
Travis Hafner	.108	Luis Valbuena	-.013

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Justin Masterson	.341	Jamey Carroll	-.151
Luis Valbuena	.037	Matt LaPorta	-.114
		Shin-Soo Choo	-.114

Thinking About My Lack of Thoughts Regarding the Eric Wedge Firing

devil_fingers — Wed, 30 Sep 2009 18:19:05 -0000

More photos » by Mark Duncan - AP

Don't mourn for me (at a baseball game), I'm already gone.

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If you haven't heard by now, the Cleveland Indians announced today that manager Eric Wedge and his coaching staff will not being returning next season. It's been another disappointing season for Cleveland, and there has been speculation about Eric Wedge for a few years, despite General Manger Mark Shapiro's apparently strong commitment to Wedge in past public statements.

Wedge had a .496 winning percentage (as of this time, apparently, he and his staff are going to finish out the season) with Cleveland over the last seven seasons. That's below .500, but there are managers whom we all know have done worse. As the title indicates, I don't have much to say about this. But I thought I'd at get a few fragmentary thoughts down about what I don't have to say.

I guess I hold to the generic sabermetric line that managers don't matter all that much -- 2-3 games a season, at most. I haven't followed Cleveland game-by-game the way that fans of the franchise (Kyle?) would, but it's hard to think that Cleveland gravely disappointing seasons (I personally thought they were the best team in the AL Central at the beginning of 2009, and I wasn't alone in thinking that) the last couple years can be pinned on Wedge. And I don't think that Mark Shapiro, one of the brighter GMs in the game (although it's fair to say his star shines a little less brightly after the past couple of seasons) believes that Wedge was the main problem, either. I don't know anything, but it wouldn't surprise me if PR is the main reason for this move, given Cleveland's supposed cash flow problems this season and public disappointment.

Cleveland had real question marks about their starting pitching, other than the now-departed Cliff Lee. Behind Lee, you had Fausto Carmona (who'd really only been good in 2007) and a bunch of question marks. The bullpen had had problems in the past, but Kerry Wood was supposed to shore up a strong middle relief core of Rafael Betancourt, who actually has had a good season considering both his time in Cleveland and Colorado, and Rafeal Perez, who was excellentin 2007 and 2008 and fell apart this season. Wood, of course, has been terrible.

As for position players... well, Cleveland always has seemed to have had a good core. Grady Sizemore had been one of the best players in the baseball the last few seasons. Victor Martinez is one of the best hitting catchers in the game, and his defense is underrated. Johnny Peralta, whatever his defensive deficiencies, has hit well in the past. Shin-Soo Choo was looking to be good... and so on.

I won't list everything here about what went right and wrong. Travis Hafner's contract wasn't a great decision, but it would have been hard to foresee injuries keeping him off the field to this extent (and he hasn't been a complete liability when he's been healthy). Victor Martinez had a bad 2008. Shin-Soo Choo has had a great season this season, but that's about it, as Peralta regressed both offensively and defensively, Asdrubal Cabrera's defense has taken away from his good year at the plate, and so on.

I don't know who's responsible for making these decisions. Maybe it's all bad luck, but if it's anyone's fault, it has to fall on the front office. It's hard to see how this is Wedge's fault. Maybe it's time for him to go -- Mark Shapiro is a lot smarter than me. I don't know much about Wedge -- I don't like or dislike him. Cleveland has been bad enough the last couple seasons that no amount of lineup optimization or bullpen efficiency would have put them into the playoffs. But it has to be more of a "we need to try a new voice here and see if this will mollify angry fans" than anything to do with Wedge's ability to make the roster all perform well at once. If someone can find a manager with that magic power... let me know.

Game 157: White Sox 6, Indians 1

Ryan — Tue, 29 Sep 2009 02:20:48 -0000

More photos » by Mark Duncan - AP

Aaron Laffey allowed eight hits, all of them singles, and several of them infield singles.

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This was one game where it didn't really matter much what the pitching did, because John Danks was locked in all game. He allowed three hits, two of them to Shin-Soo Choo. His lone earned run allowed was a Choo home run.

Aaron Laffey did ok with the exception of the second inning, when Chicago batted around. Normally when a club does that, the pitcher is removed, but all the base runners came via singles or walks, and the damage was limited to three runs. He stayed in the game into the eighth inning with the game still within reach, but the bullpen let the game get out of hand. Jose Veras was shaky, but got out of the eighth; Jensen Lewis, and the Indians defense, gave up three runs in the ninth to salt the game for the White Sox.

Next Up: Torres vs. Masterson, 7:05 PM

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Shin-Soo Choo	.104	Matt LaPorta	-.119
Jose Veras	.050	Jhonny Peralta	-.096
Travis Hafner	.004	Trevor Crowe	-.089

Game 153: Tigers 6, Indians 5

Ryan — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 03:37:24 -0000

More photos » by DAVID RICHARD - AP

There were some good things to take away from tonight's eleventh straight loss.

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This was, inexplicably, the best-played game during the current eleven-game losing streak. And though the matchup on paper predicted a blowout loss, the Indians had several opportunities to take control of the game.

Carlos Carrasco looked much more comfortable in his second start against the Tigers, though he's a long ways from a solid major-league starter. He got out of a couple jams early in the game, but couldn't limit the damage in the fourth inning. In that frame, he didn't give up the big hit, but three run-scoring singles and an RBI ground out. He didn't give up an extra-base hit, but instead allowed 6 singles and 3 walks.

The Indians owned Justin Verlander last year, but the lanky right-hander turned a corner in 2009. After the Indians took a 2-0 lead in the third on a Michael Brantley single, they had a great opportunity for an even larger inning with two on and still nobody out. Brantley stole second a couple pitches later to make the opportunity even more favorable. But Verlander, perhaps thinking of who was pitching for the Indians, retired the next three Indians and cruised from there. He threw a ton of pitches to get through seven innings thanks to that third inning, but the Tigers in retrospect needed him to go that long.

Meanwhile, the Indians actually made a game of it, though the two late-inning runs the bullpen allowed pushed the game just out of reach. Still, the Indians brought the winning run to the plate in the ninth inning, and would have had to the winning run on base had Brandon Inge not made a fantastic diving play to end the game.

There were some nice offensive signs. Travis Hafner pulled a ball on the inner half of the plate down the right-field line, something I can't recall him doing in quite a while. Shin-Soo Choo hit a two-run homer off Tigers closer Fernando Rodney. Michael Brantley continued to impress with his bat control; he collected another two hits, and stole a base. And Andy Marte is taking advantage of some unexpected playing time; he singled and doubled in four at-bats.

Next Up: The Indians go for a share of franchise infamy. Hernandez vs. Carmona, 7:05 PM

via www.fangraphs.com

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Michael Brantley	.121	Carlos Carrasco	-.213
Travis Hafner	.108	Jhonny Peralta	-.169
Andy Marte	.080	Jamey Carroll	-.167