SB Nation - Oliver Perez

What Have We Learned? A Brief History of a Non-Dynasty, Part 1

Mark Himmelstein — Thu, 24 Dec 2009 12:22:12 -0000

More photos » by KATHY WILLENS - AP

First things first, allow me to (re)introduce myself. Many of you, grizzled Amazin' Avenue vets that may be, are probably thinking "Who the hell is Mark Himmelstein?" Well, Mark Himmelstein is me, formerly known around these parts as Meddler. Eric Simon and co. have been generous enough to have me join the site's wonderful team of writers. I'm honored, and look forward to lamenting, and maybe one day even celebrating (please?), with the greatest community of Mets fans there is.

Just three short years ago, if you asked a Mets fan how they thought this team would be remembered once the decade was over, you probably would have heard words like "accomplishment," "chemistry," "dominance," and even "championship," without a hint of irony. After a 2006 season that included 97 wins and a trip to the NLCS, it was a success that seemed destined to go on forever. It didn't. And though for the next two seasons the team would continue to be better than most Major League Baseball teams, they would stay closer to the average than to the elite. This relative mediocrity made the process feel more like a tease than the triumph that was expected, despite the relative level of success. Now, after a 2009 season lost to plenty of bad luck and at least as many bad decisions, there aren't many straws left to grasp at. What went so wrong? Everything seemed to be lined up so nicely for a sustained run at success, even a shot at a dynasty. Two of the best young players in the game had just shot up through the farm system and the organization had the financial resources to match any other non-Yankee club in the league. Looking back on the events of the last half-decade, things clearly have not worked out as hoped.

The Mets began the Aughties with a bang. They made it all the way to first World Series since Y2K had officially not happened. Though they would flounder through the rest of the early part of the decade, it wasn't long before hope would rear its head again. There was some optimism brewing below the major league franchise. Finally, some talent coming up through the homegrown ranks. A young shortstop named Jose Reyes reached the majors the day before his 20th birthday and dazzled crowds with a stunning array of tools. Meanwhile, a third baseman from the 2001 draft class was starting to garner lots of attention in the upper levels of the minor leagues. In 2004, David Wright joined Jose Reyes on the major league roster, and it soon became clear that the two were destined to be the face of any and all efforts to revitalize a broken franchise.

2005 - The Beginning

Enter Omar Minaya. Taking over the General Manager position, Omar brought lots of promises to the table. Youth, athleticism, an "old school" mentality, and a willingness to aggressively shift the organization's financial weight around on the open market. Right away, he brought in one of the best pitchers in the game and one of the best outfielders the free agent market had seen in a long time: Pedro Martinez and Carlos Beltran. Though the overhaul seemed as yet incomplete by the end of the 2005 season, the signs were encouraging. Here's a rundown of the final product (The less commonly referenced stats are linked to their glossaries):

Making Runs Happen

PA	Avg	OBP	SLG	wOBA	HR%	HR/FB	XBH%	BB%	SO%	SB	CS	bRAA	RS
6146	.258	.322	.416	.334	2.8%	10.7%	7.9%	7.9%	17.5%	153	40	-7.0	722

Making Runs Not Happen

BF	ERA	FIP	tRA (SP)	tRA (RP)	SO%	BB%	HR%	pRAA	DE	PADE	UZR	RA
6121	3.77	4.00	4.27	4.22	16.5%	8.0%	2.2%	52.1	.701	1.50	-24.6	648

Miscellaneous Facts and Musings

The team run differential was +74. The 83-79 record may have actually been an underachievement for this team.
Pedro Martinez accounted for 50.9 of the 52.1 pRAA. The rest of the rotation produced just 1.1 pRAA, essentially average. His tRA was a stellar 2.43. It was arguably best single season pitching performance the Mets got all decade.
Tom Glavine also had his best season in a Mets uniform with a 4.36 tRA and 5.2 pRAA. After Tommy and Petey, the rest of the rotation was below average, producing a combined -4.1 pRAA, which is perfectly acceptable when your top two starters combine for 57.3 pRAA.
Only eight different starting pitchers were used all season, and four threw at least 150 innings. Ah, the good old days.
David Wright lead the team in wOBA at .410. The second best mark on the team, .384, was not Carlos Beltran, Mike Piazza, Jose Reyes, or Cliff Floyd. That leaves _________________.
Though Mike Piazza appeared to be fading away by posting just a .343 wOBA, Cliff Floyd had one of the best years of his career with a .381 mark of his own.
Fun fact: the offense had exactly the same number of walks as extra base hits: 486.
Its curious how much the PADE and UZR methods disagree on the team-wide defense.

Though the starting pitching was excellent, the rest of the team still needed work. Carlos Beltran failed to live up to expectations in his first season in Flushing, and his collision with Mike Cameron in the outfield left the offense without one of its more productive players for a good portion of the season. Still, the offense, bullpen, and defense were all within earshot of average, and the starting pitching, mostly thanks to Pedro Martinez's stellar year, was superb.

2006 - Destiny or Illusion?

Just like in 2005, Omar brought in two new marquee names for the 2006 season. Though the faded star of Mike Piazza had finally physically departed, the additions of Carlos Delgado and Billy Wagner appeared to be the perfect way to balance a roster with potential for greatness. Delgado was a force of run creation at the time, coming off an excellent year with the with the Marlins after his shift to the Senior Circuit. Billy Wagner had the fastball to dominate the late innings and high leverage situations, plus the attitude to win over the infamously ravenous New York Media. The pair seemed to be a perfect way to correct two of the team's biggest weaknesses the previous season.

Making Runs Happen

PA	Avg	OBP	SLG	wOBA	HR%	HR/FB	XBH%	BB%	SO%	SB	CS	bRAA	RS
6291	.264	.334	.445	.348	3.2%	11.8%	9.0%	8.7%	17.0%	146	35	39.0	834

Making Runs Not Happen

BF	ERA	FIP	tRA (SP)	tRA (RP)	SO%	BB%	HR%	pRAA	DE	PADE	UZR	RA
6240	4.16	4.37	5.39	3.66	18.6%	8.4%	2.9%	20.9	.703	2.34	9.8	731

Miscellaneous Facts and Musings

The team run differential was +103. They were very much for real.
The offense was absolutely stellar, lead by Carlos Beltran's ridiculous .441 wOBA, which even more incredibly was held down by a .262 BABIP.
The second highest wOBA among Mets outfielders wasn't produced by Xavier Nady, Shawn Green, or Cliff Floyd. It was Endy Chavez's .359. Endy added to that a 12.7 UZR in just 814.2 defensive innings, making him a 2.5 WAR player.
Carlos Delgado was as advertised, his .389 wOBA was third on the team behind Beltran and Wright.
The surprise of the year was easily Jose Valentin, who managed a .360 wOBA and 9.2 UZR in 94 games at second base, a position he hadn't played since 1994, and had only played 19 games at in his major league career. His 3.1 WAR made him the fifth most valuable player on the team.
Among players with at least as many as PA's as Xavier Nady's 292, there were eight wOBA's greater than .350: Beltran, Wright (.394), Delgado, Reyes (.377), Valentin, Chavez, Nady (.358), and Lo Duca (.354)
The pRAA splits were 53.7 for the bullpen and -32.8 for the rotation. The bullpen supplanted Pedro Martinez as the team's pitching strength, and there wasn't all that much else to talk about in a positive light.
13 different pitchers started games. Only four provided positive pRAA figures. Pedro Martinez still lead the team at 10.3, despite missing most of the second half. The other three were Orlando Hernandez, John Maine, and Brian Bannister, none of whom pitched the full year either, at least not for the Mets.
Like Delgado, Billy Wagner was also as advertised, posting a 2.65 tRA, tied for the team lead among qualified relievers with Chad Bradford.
Aaron Heilman, Pedro Feliciano, and Duaner Sanchez also each had sub-4.00 tRA's in at least 50 innings apiece.
The team's PADE and UZR match up much better in 2006 than 2005. They were a quality defensive squad.

This was a team that got it done in exactly the way the 2005 version didn't, as well as failed in the one area that the 2005 version was superior. Carlos Beltran emerged as the player the Mets thought they were buying and then some, while Jose Reyes finally grew into the player Mets fans had been hanging their dreams on for years. Unfortunately, once Pedro Martinez's health began to fail him, the lack of pitching depth was brutally exposed. It was the one obvious weakness on an otherwise incredibly complete team. And despite the playoff push coming to a crashing halt in Game 7 of the NLCS, there was even some hope for life after Pedro. The second half arrival of John Maine and clutchy playoff performance of Oliver Perez promised to give the future of the Mets rotation a new, younger look, and the beginnings of the depth they so lacked in 2006.

2007 - Oh So Close

The playoffs seemed like the natural end to the 2007 season even before it began. The everyday unit that carried the 2006 team was still largely intact, and the previous year's high leverage relief specialists all returned as well. However, the trademark splash Omar Minaya had become known for in his first two years on the job was strangely absent. This was a bold decision, considering Pedro Martinez, the team's most effective pitcher over the last two years, was slated to miss the majority of the season recovering from surgery to repair a torn rotator cuff. And some of the moves that were made were eyebrow raisers. Scott Schoeneweis and Guillermo Mota were given multi-year deals based on strong, but very short performances from the end of 2006, while major contributors Chad Bradford and Darren Oliver were allowed to walk away in Free Agency. Still, the roster construction was very similar to the team with a +103 run differential the previous year. How hard could a second straight NL East crown be?

Making Runs Happen

PA	Avg	OBP	SLG	wOBA	HR%	HR/FB	XBH%	BB%	SO%	SB	CS	bRAA	RS
6343	.275	.342	.432	.344	2.8%	11.1%	7.9%	8.7%	15.5%	200	46	42.0	804

Making Runs Not Happen

BF	ERA	FIP	tRA (SP)	tRA (RP)	SO%	BB%	HR%	pRAA	DE	PADE	UZR	RA
6293	4.27	4.46	4.93	4.71	18.0%	9.1%	2.6%	-6.4	.701	1.51	6.8	750

Miscellaneous Facts and Musings

The team run differential was +54 runs. We'll get back to this in a bit.
Though it functioned differently, the offensive output was very similar in 2007 to its 2006 predecessor. Less power, fewer strikeouts, a more aggressive running game, and a slightly lower league average wOBA actually meant their bRAA improved by three runs.
David Wright lead the team in wOBA with a .422 mark. Moises Alou's .398 was second.
Nine different players had a wOBA of .345 or higher in at least 200 PA: Wright, Alou, Carlos Beltran (.377), Damian Easley (.367), Luis Castillo (.361), Lastings Milledge (.357), Shawn Green (.351), Jose Reyes (.349), and Ruben Gotay (.345).
The big offensive disappointment was Carlos Delgado, whose wOBA fell to .342.
Though the team lacked a dominant starting pitcher and the rotation as a whole only improved slightly from 2006, they did have three guys who contributed more than any starter from the year before. Oliver Perez, John Maine, and Orlando Hernandez all produced pRAA figures greater than Pedro's 2006 output of 10.3. This really says more about the 2006 group than the 2007 one.
Oliver Perez's 4.19 tRA and 16.1 pRAA lead the starting staff in both categories. I'll say that again. Oliver Perez once lead a pitching staff in something meaningful.
Unfortunately, the 2007 bullpen couldn't do what the 2006 version did to make up for the lack of quality in the rotation. Wagner was once again excellent, but beyond him, no other reliever managed a sub-4.00 tRA in at least 60 innings. The only other two relievers who were above average were Aaron Heilman and Pedro Feliciano, with 4.45 and 4.13 tRA's, respectively.
Believe it or not, the second and third best tRA's among relievers with at least 20 IP were from Jorge Sosa (3.74) and Ambiorix Burgos (3.81), but neither threw enough relief innings to have a huge impact.
Though the defense wasn't quite as good as the previous year, PADE and UZR both agree that it was still pretty solid.

Of course, we all know how this season ended, with one of the greatest collapses in regular season baseball history, and one of the greatest comebacks, care of the Philadelphia Phillies. Because it went down in this way, and because the Mets did indeed control the NL East for much of the 2007 season, many fans were still willing to write off the failure as the aberration to the rule that was 2006. But there was one particularly troubling statistical sign: The +54 run differential. Looking back at 2005, the +74 run differential yielded an 83-79 record. Did the Mets actually over-perform in 2007? Using the Pythagenpat method developed by David Smyth and Patriot, we can project that the 2005 team should have had about a .550 winning percentage, approximately 89 wins, and the 2007 team a .533 winning percentage, about 86 wins, so perhaps they did. Still, the high powered offense was intact even without superior production from Carlos Delgado or the surprise contributions from Jose Valentin, and Omar had found the back half a rotation that his team lacked in 2006. Now all they needed was a front.....right?

In Part 2: 2008, 2009, and beyond

Selective Application Of Statistics

James Kannengieser — Thu, 24 Dec 2009 11:00:17 -0000

A common refrain of those who do not like their baseball analysis inundated with statistics is something along these lines:

There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.

This is usually uttered by those unwilling to let statistics disprove perceptions. In general, this is a silly statement. Statistics exist to measure whatever it is they set out to measure and nothing more. Numbers alone cannot deceive, as long as the benefits and limitations of such numbers are understood. Stats like wOBA and UZR are frequently cited here, but only because the writers and most members of the community comprehend the context neutral linear weights concept behind wOBA and the sample size limitations of UZR. Criticizing statistics without fully understanding their strengths and weaknesses happens more than it should, unfortunately, and is a major pet peeve. That said, it is true that statistics can be used by people to unfairly support biased arguments.

A post about Mike Cameron at Metsmerized provided an example of the thought that stats are sometimes used to bolster pre-conceived biased positions:

I think that more and more people would accept advanced metrics if the stats weren’t used so often to strengthen just one side of an argument.

I’m not knocking advanced metrics, but I do find fault with them when they are used to make unfair comparisons.

The point here seems to be that advanced metrics are used as a weapon to trumpet players like Cameron who, atleast in the eyes of the MMO writer, isn't as good as Fangraphs suggests. This couldn't be further from the truth. Advanced stats are cited only because the methodologies behind their calculation have been investigated, questioned and eventually accepted by the best minds in the sabermetric community. If I invented a stat and continued citing it despite being discredited by Tom Tango or Colin Wyers, my credibility would be shot. WAR, UZR, Plus/Minus, etc., have been scrutinized by the likes of The Hardball Times and Statistically Speaking and been accepted as worthwhile metrics. It's not some nonsense created with the intention of making money or fooling people. The other point about the inability to compare the values of players who play different positions is also invalid, as posts like this one by Mark illustrate.

I like to think I'm generally unbiased in any analysis I provide so coming up with an example of my own selective application of statistics is impossible. Endy Chavez is one of my favorite players but I wouldn't project a .350 wOBA as part of an argument in favor of signing him. However, I'd like to offer an example of how even an enlightened writer might appear to be selectively using numbers to agree with an agenda. Howard Megdal of SNY, MLBTR and about three dozen other outlets is a well known Oliver Perez fanatic (just look at the Baseball-Reference sponsor for the RMS ~~Titanic~~ Perez). Unsurprisingly, he has often provided opinion on Derek Lowe, a pitcher the Mets reportedly pursued last offseason before eventually settling on Perez. In a post at MLBTradeRumors from October about Lowe being available in a trade, Howard wrote:

Lowe is coming off of a season with a 4.67 ERA along with a strikeout rate of just 5.1 per nine innings. He certainly didn't finish strong, with a 5.05 second-half ERA, and a 6,23 [sic] mark from September 1 on.

ERA isn't my pitching statistic of choice but sure, Lowe had a somewhat disappointing season. At his debate site, the recommended The Perpetual Post, Howard participated in a Lowe vs. Perez discussion in November:

I think it represents the likelihood that Lowe, fresh off of an 88 ERA+, is likely to be around that or below it for the remainder of his three years and $45 million.

A healthy Perez has been considerably better than the 2009 edition of Derek Lowe. Time and reality are converging to bring Derek Lowe’s career to an unceremonious close. It isn’t time to declare Atlanta the winner in the choice of Lowe over Perez just yet.

Again, ERA+ isn't a great metric for evaluating a pitcher's performance but I can live with it. That is until reading this piece by Howard at SNY about Mike Pelfrey:

Pelfrey had a 3.72 ERA last year, while even Sunday's stellar performance only lowered his 2009 ERA to 4.83. But let's take a closer look.

Fangraphs has his FIP at 3.96 last year, 4.18 this year -- a negligible difference in performance over the two seasons.

Wait a second, why is Pelfrey afforded the FIP treatment but Lowe isn't? Lowe's 2009 FIP was 4.06, significantly better than his ERA. He was a victim of an inflated BABIP and subpar defense backing him up, much like Pelfrey. Why not consistently utilize stats for player evaluation? Having read Howard's work for some time now, I doubt he consciously wanted to unfairly paint a negative picture of Lowe. However, this is an example of how a known affinity for one player over another, and subsequent assessment of those players, might cause some readers to question a writer's intentions. In the case of Cameron and Jason Bay, reliable statistics show that the gap between them isn't as large as many think. That this doesn't jibe with most fans' perceptions of the two players has little bearing on whether it is true. Rational people can have differing opinions. Those opinions will certainly be respected as long as they're not served up with a helping of "Get your noses out of the books, and keep your eyes on the ball."

Certain metrics are largely ignored here, with good reason. For pitchers, W-L record and ERA are generally useless. For hitters, RBI doesn't really tell us anything. For fielders, errors and fielding percentage have become archaic. Better metrics are consistently applied and there isn't much bias in player evaluation. Regardless, should any of the AA writers or community members appear to be twisting stats to fit a pre-conceived agenda, I would expect a commenter to blow the whistle. If it happens, please point it out.

Also, happy holidays. Or, alternatively, bah humbug!

Stop Saying Omar Minaya Only Goes After Latino Players

James Kannengieser — Wed, 16 Dec 2009 17:30:14 -0000

The "Omar Minaya only pursues Latino players" topic has appeared again this offseason and the propagators of this myth are out in full force. Perhaps it was brought on by the signings of Alex Cora, Henry Blanco and Elmer Dessens. Maybe embarrassing rubbish like this post is promoting it. Even the mainstream media has been involved, as Bill Madden of the Daily News, ~~deserving~~ winner of this year's J.G. Taylor Spink Award for excellence in baseball journalism, wrote the following in a recent column, only to have the word "Latin" later removed:

Mets? Did somebody say the Mets? They won't spend the money for Holliday, Bay or Lackey and apparently, they're only interested in signing low-budget Latin players...

It's sad that this topic still needs to be addressed. Looking at the racial makeup of the Mets 40-man roster, as provided by a comment from Mark last week, the Mets had 15 Latinos out of 39 players, or 38%. About 29% of MLB players are Latino, meaning the Mets have four more Latin American players on their roster than average. Wow, stop the presses! How many Latinos are presently on the World Champion Yankees' roster? Answer: 19 out of 37, good for 51%. This is irrefutable evidence that Brian Cashman only goes after Latino players. Let the Yankee fan outrage begin. Former Mariners GM Bill Bavasi signed Raul Ibanez, Carlos Silva and Adrian Beltre to free agent contracts in his short tenure, and traded for Miguel Olivo and Horacio Ramirez - he too must have only gone after Latinos!

There's more research to be done here I suppose, analyzing the racial breakdown of Mets trades, free agent contracts and the minor leagues under Omar. However, it's not worth mine or anyone's time indulging the uninformed masses who think a general manager would choose 1.5 WAR* Player A over 3.5 WAR Player B because Player A shares the same heritage.

* - If you like, substitute any metric or evaluator you think Omar and co. might use in lieu of WAR. The point remains the same.

Last winter, Omar's Mets were part of a blockbuster three team trade which included Mariners and Indians. In the biggest trade of his reign, at least in terms of player volume, he gave up four Latino players and received (gasp!) three white players in return. It had nothing to do with race. Omar wanted to upgrade the bullpen at seemingly any cost and he got his guy, J.J. Putz. Flawed evaluation of players? Almost certainly. Racial bias motivating a transaction? No, sorry. It's curious how transactions like this are conveniently ignored once the Omar racism watchdogs come out of their holes to spout absurdity. Usually, Oliver Perez, Moises Alou, Orlando Hernandez and Luis Castillo are brought up with nary a mention of Tim Redding, Scott Schoeneweis, Darren Oliver or Gary Sheffield.

If you think Omar Minaya only goes after "certain players" it's because you want to believe the poorly performing GM of your favorite baseball team favors one race over another. It's because you want to believe he has some sort of scheme to decrease the number of non-Latinos in baseball, or to increase money paid out to Latinos in this country. Criticizing his moves in the strict baseball context is not enough for you - it has to become personal, an assault on Omar's character. As always, you're free to have these beliefs, but you're flat-out wrong.

Things I Would Do If It Meant Not Signing Bengie Molina To A Dumb Contract

James Kannengieser — Tue, 08 Dec 2009 10:00:19 -0000

Re-watch every one of Oliver Perez's 2009 starts.

Go donut for donut with Livan Hernandez.

Spend the 4th of July with Vince Coleman.

Read all the Twilight books (just like Cole Hamels!).

Watch every film on the IMDB Bottom 100 in a row.

Let Kevin Mitchell babysit my cat.

Interrupt Al Leiter and John Franco's annual barbecue with some gangsta rap blaring from a boombox.

Go drankin' and huntin' with Brett Myers.

Take horse race betting advice from Paul Lo Duca ("bet it all on RobTheCradle in the 5th at Saratoga").

Listen to Evan Roberts and Joe Beningo everyday.

Go out for pizza with Shane Spencer and Karim Garcia.

Endure a swift kick to my nether regions courtesy of Robocop.

Get the same haircut as Jayson Werth.

A Citi Field version of BodySuit Man.

Watch the 9th inning of Game 7 of the 2006 NLCS once a day for the rest of my life.

Read every column ever written by Kevin Kernan and Bill Madden.

Watch every Kevin Costner film in which he attempts an accent.

Enroll in "Negotiations 101", Omar Minaya's first class as a college professor.

Go out for a night on the town with Miguel Cabrera.

Hire Jerry Koosman's accountant to do my taxes.

Continue to watch almost every Met game despite the incompetents in the front office (I will still do this even if Bengie is signed, unfortunately).

Dodgers' Juan Pierre drawing interest

Eli Greenspan — Mon, 07 Dec 2009 05:02:39 -0000

More photos » by David Zalubowski - AP

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Dodgers outfielder Juan Pierre is reportedly drawing interest from three or four teams, according to Steve Henson of Yahoo! Sports. Pierre, who didn't miss a game between 2003-2007, has had his time cut significantly since joining the Dodgers. In 2009, he had more of an opportunity to prove his value with Manny Ramirez missing 50 games.

	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	K	SB	CS	AVG	OBP	SLG
2009 - Juan Pierre	145	380	57	117	16	8	0	31	27	27	30	12	.308	.365	.392

Pierre is one of the top leadoff hitters and base runners in the game. He has two years and 18.5 million dollars left on his contract, so a trade is reasonable.

Henson mentions a three-way trade that would land the Dodgers a "bad contract" starting pitcher. While I thought of the usual bad contract pitchers (Derek Lowe, Oliver Perez, etc) I thought about what teams have been trying to work three-way deals lately.

The Cubs and Rangers have been discussing a deal around Milton Bradley. While it is unclear if the Cubs have asked for Kevin Millwood, bringing in a third team could entice the Rangers.

Here are the three players and their contracts:

Kevin Millwood - 1 year, 12 million

Milton Bradley - 2 year, 21 million

Juan Pierre - 2 year, 18.5 million

If the Cubs agreed to trade Bradley and cash for Pierre and basically swapped contracts, then the Dodgers could trade Bradley with the money from the Cubs for Millwood.

Say the Cubs covered the difference between Bradley and Pierre, and included 5-6 million dollars more. I'll let you know tomorrow if it has been discussed.

The Race To "In The Best Shape Of His Life"

James Kannengieser — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 20:00:17 -0000

One of the great clichés of spring training is the declaration that Player X is "in the best shape of his life." Usually a sportswriter conveys the message but it's not uncommon for the player to deliver it himself. We're far away from pitchers and catchers but this hot stove season is exasperating. A poll to determine who people think will be the first Met declared "in the best shape of his life" (or some variant) is more attractive to me right now then fretting over a rumor by some random dude who Tweeted that the Mets want to sign Johnny Damon. Here are some candidates, followed by the poll. Feel free to add other suggestions/justifications:

Oliver Perez - He has to be the favorite in this race. After about as disastrous a 2009 as possible, and reports that he let himself go during the World Baseball Classic, Ollie is spending the offseason in Arizona at the Athletes Performance Institute. For $12 million a year, he better be in the best shape of this life by March 2010 if he has any pride in what he does.

Francisco Rodriguez - I have no way of confirming this, but it appeared that Frankie put on a few pounds this past season, at least compared to his Angels days. More importantly, and verifiably, his peripherals slipped across the board. Strange, factoring his switch from the tougher AL to the NL. His velocity didn't slip though, and in fact slightly increased from 2008. A fit Frankie would be pumped up and ready to earn that vesting option from hell.

Daniel Murphy - Discussion of Murphy's work ethic became banal awhile ago. He would contend for this crown in any year, if only because people seem to love writing about his killer drive for success. He also has something to prove next season, especially if the Mets don't sign a free agent first baseman.

Jose Reyes - Jose might be this year's version of Luis Castillo. He suffered an injury and seemed to draw the ire of the fans, for various reasons. A report of Jose being in the best shape of his life might be disconcerting - it implies that he trained like an animal. I'd rather hear reports that he was cautious and didn't train too hard or too early. He has million dollar legs and they need to be taken care of. However, given his intensity and love for the game it wouldn't be surprising to see him first to earn the "best shape" moniker.

Jeff Francoeur - Just because.

Dark Horse: Nick Evans - Nasty Nick couldn't do anything to grab Jerry Manuel's attention in late 2009 so he needs to make a splash this spring. His plan should be to become so ripped that no one, not even Professor Jerry, will be able to ignore his flawlessly toned pectorals, biceps and quads. Piazza-esque batting practice displays in Port St. Lucie will follow. Free weights and 50 Gram Slams are on the path to glory for young Nick.

Poll

Who will be first to be declared "in the best shape of his life"?

Oliver Perez

338 votes

Francisco Rodriguez

25 votes

Daniel Murphy

24 votes

Jose Reyes

99 votes

Jeff Francoeur

39 votes

Nick Evans

13 votes

Other

13 votes

551 votes | Poll has closed

The Mets' Advantage

Sam Page — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 11:00:15 -0000

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The local papers have come to their yearly consensus about the Mets offseason--it's a gap year. While the prospects of 2011 remain bright, the puppet Minaya regime are prisoners of circumstance, trapped in their bailout-funded stadium, recently painted red and blue in their latest failed attempt to appease fans. The evidence is irrefutable. The good free agent hitters won't sign because the park is too big. The good pitchers won't sign because the park isn't actually that big at all. Groundball pitchers are seeking teams with better infield defense, while the flyballs pitchers are just seeking employment. Unfortunately none of that matters, as the Madoff scandal has left the Mets with no budget at all. But we could only be that lucky, as the Wilpons actually made money off the ponzi scheme, and are prepared to invest considerable funds in the aforementioned "good" free agents, actually landmines--likely to fizzle out the second they cash their signing bonuses.

Fortunately, as is their nature, these writers have made the solution equally clear. The fundamental weaknesses remain minor league depth and fielding, so all the minor the leaguers should be sent post-haste to Toronto in a package for a pitcher who will likely walk after the season's end. Whatever money remains will be divided equally between paying-off some unwitting team to take our defensively-challenged secondbaseman and committing another four years to his similarly inept replacement.

In reality, however, the Mets have considerable advantages in this market. Many teams are still looking to shed payroll after sub-par attendance. Several talented free agents have been forced to hit the market after disappointing seasons. The Mets have payroll room and two more years of criminal-underpayment of Wright and Reyes to play with. Instead of signing Jon Garland for upwards of $10MM, they should be inquiring on Bronson Arroyo, a pitcher with better stuff and even more durable track-record, who the Reds are trying desperately to give away. The advantage here is that the Mets get their "innings-eater" on a one-year deal, while gaining leverage in a trade for a player they'd actually want to build around, like Brandon Phillips. Potentially, the Mets could even get Aaron Harang, a solid starter, not quite the caliber of John Lackey--but close enough, for little additional cost. That's $30.25MM dollars to solve their rotation issues and add another "core" player, with a cheap talent cost and without the uncertainty of negotiation, or temptation to overpay.

Or maybe the Mets will just notice that pitchers better than Jon Garland and Jason Marquis are being desperately ditched by other teams, and get the hint that multi-year, multimillion dollar commitments to pitchers with marginal stuff rarely--if ever--end well. In the never-ending myopia of the Mets brass (and some of their fans), though, the injuries of last season will create a premium on durability. Undoubtedly some nightmarish, Oliver-Perez-part-deux scenario will develop where Jeff Wilpon and John Ricco conference call with "Scott Boras," who is really just Omar Minaya in the other room, forging fake term-sheets between Jon Garland and the Brewers, which he might "accidentally" leave in the fax machine on his way out.

Get Doug Davis, Claudio Vargas, Odalis Perez, Todd Wellemeyer, whomever. They'll give you the desired 200 generic innings at virtually no cost. Get Brandon Knight back from Korea. Livan. What? Yea, Captain Rubber Arm himself. Pop quiz: who had better peripherals last season: Jon Garland or Livan Hernandez? The answer may surprise you.

Alternatively, the Mets could take Magglio Ordonez and his $18MM salary off Dave Dombrowski's hands for the inside track in negotiating a Edwin Jackson or Curtis Granderson trade. Same basic idea: rightfield is hardly a sure thing, whether you believe in Jeff Francoeur or not, and the Mets get to leverage their financial advantage to add a player for the long-term.

Both of those scenarios fill the Mets "holes," both now and in 2011-12, with a little extra cash to burn. Some have speculated that the Wilpon's budget for this season is closer to $20MM, but with so many contracts finally expiring and the luxury-tax threshold rising closer ~$160MM, they can really spend up to $50MM, if they so choose. Let's just take the first trade-scenario, the Reds one, and kind of speculate on a possible team. $31MM leaves $10MM, for the sake of being realistic, which the Mets can use to sign Rick Ankiel and Troy Glaus. Those two are solid complements to Pagan and Murphy, who have middle of the order power, when healthy. If the Mets traded for Magglio and E-Jax they could add a Sheets/Harden tandem to the rotation, which gives them four players with ace-potential. Or they could negotiate a backloaded John Lackey contract, not my favorite idea, but definitely an improvement.

Ordonez, Harang, and Arroyo are basically solid-role players with ripcords for 2011. Adding another cheap "core" caliber player also seems more necessity than luxury with Wright and Reyes' costs rising. The Mets added many high-risk, high-upside players in the 2009 offseason, but did so without accounting for the risk. Oliver Perez has no buyout. Francisco Rodriguez will destroy the payroll in 2012. J.J. Putz had an buy-out, but was a waste of talent. Now faced with high-upside free agents available on the cheap, they seem resolved to do the only thing worse: invest long-term in high-risk, no-upside players. In the year 2011, the Mets graduate their best hitting prospects in 8 years, Ike Davis and Reese Havens, but are unable to complement them with a decent leftielder or bullpen, because no one will take on Jason Marquis' contract. Wait, I know how this ends. I'll take the gap-year, please.

Why Omar Minaya Failed And What It Means For The Future

Sam Page — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 11:00:22 -0000

On July 27, 2002, Omar Minaya, then General Manager of the Montreal Expos, traded Lee Steven, Brandon Phillips, Grady Sizemore, and Cliff Lee to Mark Shapiro's Indians for Bartolo Colon and Tim Drew.

In 2002, Major League Baseball owned the Expos. The offseason before, the Expos had narrowly avoided contraction, because the Twins, the other team in line for contraction, had another year on their lease of the Metrodome. In a month the league would agree to a new collective bargaining agreement that barred contraction, but at the time it still seemed a possibility. So MLB's proxy GM, Minaya, looked for a player to maybe help the Expos win a Wild Card berth, a parting gift for Montreal.

One of the many front-office personnel the Expos shed under their reorganization by MLB was Tony LaCava, their farm director. He jumped to the Indians as a cross-checker. When Omar Minaya called Mark Shapiro about Bartolo Colon, Tony LaCava handpicked the prospects the Indians would receive. When the trade was announced, Shapiro, like Bill Smith would be six years later, was denounced as a young GM over his head. It also marked the first time, Minaya got "his guy" in a trade.

I recall this point in baseball history because it has much to do with why both of these men are currently employed as general managers. Both of these general managers are also coming off 90-loss seasons in the wake of playoff aspirations. Omar Minaya and Mark Shapiro, however, couldn't be more different.

Omar Minaya is a former pro-baseball player, drafted out of high school. Early in Minaya's tenure with the Mets, his success was championed as an exemplar of old-fashioned roster construction. Before Minaya lost "his guys," the process entailed conference call between his scouts, Sandy Johnson and Tony Bernazard, and his paperwork guy, John Ricco. This franchise doesn't just contrast the careful calculation of other front offices, it advertises the fact: "Paperwork, that's false hustle. It takes away creativity. People who are into paperwork are into covering their asses, so if things go wrong they can point to all the work they did."

No team evidences false hustle better than the Indians. Mark Shapiro graduated from Princeton and has a reputation as one of the smartest GM's in baseball. Like Minaya, Shapiro surrounded himself with men of similar background--his sidekick Chris Antonetti is a Georgetown man. The Indians under Shapiro have developed a process, which involves a lot of "paperwork," most famously, the proprietary DiamondView system, supposed to quantify a players' holistic value. As Antonetti described the goal of DiamondView: "There's still this level of variability, but we've reduced it to the smallest level we can." The Indians, the front office, are the progressive group many Mets fans clamor for, but the Indians, the team, are the 90-game losers Mets fans are sick of watching.

Therein is an interesting point of comparison: how did these two seemingly polar-opposite executives, who launched each other's career with the most lopsided trade of the decade, end up at a similar point? Of course, there's no easy answer--'They both forgot to hit the win button!'--and the two situations are, to an extent, unique. Still, one would expect the American League's smartest GM and the National League's highest payroll to battle for the playoffs, not the sixth pick in the first-year player draft.

A recent post at Let's Go Tribe entitled "Fire Everyone! - Mark Shapiro" came up with an answer, thought not a completely comfortable one. The article was the last in a series of posts on why, obviously, everyone should be fired, so there's a sense the author is playing devil's advocate. Still, he raises an interesting point about the nature of the GM's job, and this article is largely an addendum to it, so give it a read too. The crux of his argument and the cliff notes version of the post is neatly summarized here:

For all that, however, the brilliant executive can't necessarily tell you whether it's better to overspend on Raul Ibañez or Kerry Wood. He can't necessarily devise a process to tell you that, and he can't necessarily hire the right person to tell you that, either. Nor can he devise a process to hire the right person to tell you that. It doesn't always come down to objective analysis or having a good process. Sometimes it comes down to talent: the talent to play, the talent to evaluate talent, the talent to develop talent, and the judgment to make decisions about talent.

Jay argues that evaluating talent, if not innate, is at least a skill in and of itself. The Colon-trade was Shapiro's signature move, but LaCava, the scout, handpicked the players he would receive. The laundry list of players Shapiro has acquired from horse-trading is impressive, but none match up to Lee-Sizemore-Phillips. In fact, with Huntington and LaCava long gone, is it coincidence that the returns on Cliff Lee and Victor Martinez were so underwhelming?

Maybe, but I am more interested in the way this situation runs counter to the assessment I constantly hear, and occasionally have given, of Omar Minaya: "He's a great scout and evaluator of talent, but is too sloppy with resources. The Mets would be better suited with a more statistically-inclined GM." Is this Shapiro/Minaya comparison a two parts to whole situation, where one lacks the scouting acumen, the other a supercomputer called DiamondView?

First, consider Minaya's scouting reputation. Starting out as an international scout with the Rangers, he signed Sammy Sosa. That's the kind of signing you can hang your hat on, and Minaya has, as the other players he signed include non-entities: Chris Colon, Ruben Mateo, Jorge Toca, and Timo Perez(!). He also signed Fernando Tatis and Joaquin Benoit, who became pretty good players. Still, including my performance-enhanced namesake, not exactly the greatest list in the world, but a good one.

This reputation comes equally from his supposed ability to "identify players who can help the Mets" and get them, irrespective of costs. It sounds basic, but seemingly describes whatever Shapiro lacked when deciding "whether it's better to overspend on Raul Ibañez or Kerry Wood," as Jay says. Call them Minaya's guys, as in "Omar got his guy" or Minaya's favorite synonym for person.

It started with his two biggest free-agent pick-ups: Pedro Martinez and Carlos Beltran. Pedro's talent was obvious, but the contract was a minor disaster as he was injured through most of it. Minaya claimed that Pedro "made the brand," i.e. made the Mets more attractive to international free agents, but the jury is still out on that one. His other big signing, Carlos Beltran, will undoubtedly go down as the biggest success of his tenure. Beltran, one of the few true five-tool players left in baseball, has been worth significantly more than his $18M/year. It's unclear to what extent Minaya predicted, or even knows, that to be true, as he likely just sought to get Beltran for the best price he could, without any precise estimation of his value. In fact, Beltran was supposedly someone Minaya didn't get the green light to sign in Texas. Carlos had been Minaya's guy for a while.

When the Mets were at their best, in 2006, his guys were nearly always coming through. In a 2006 article, Dave Studeman identified ten players that Minaya picked up on the cheap and became integral parts of the great '06 squad: Chad Bradford, Darren Oliver, Duaner Sanchez, Pedro Feliciano, Jose Valentin, John Maine, Endy Chavez, Roberto Hernandez, Guillermo Mota, and Oliver Perez. Players like Jose Valentin, a guy no one else would expect to be a starting-caliber second baseman, were making Minaya look like a genius, like he had that something Mark Shapiro lacked. Those were ten moves that get you on the cover of Sports Illustrated, that made people pay attention when you started talking about "false hustle," as if it were secret knowledge.

In the conclusion to that piece, Studeman writes, "It may be luck, it may be skill. It may be the result of a team with money taking good calculated risks." Here's a hint: six of those players were relievers, the most luck-dependent players in baseball. Ultimately, though, time revealed the truth: it was luck. Even from that original list, of the seven he retained, five fizzled out, either from injuries or ineffectiveness. Regarding the other two, Endy Chavez was replaced by the awful Jeremy Reed and Pedro Feliciano became the last man standing in several subsequent bullpen failures.

Then, Minaya started to display some bad tendencies. He became too loyal to his guys: if a reliever with poor skills floundered in the first-half, Minaya would trust him to right the ship. Similarly, as if to underscore that he had done something right, Minaya would pay ridiculously over-market contracts to previous buy-low pick-ups, like Oliver Perez and Luis Castillo, negating the value that made the moves good in the first place. He proved unable to manage injury risks, entrusting Moises Alou and John Maine with serious duties while keeping no reliable back-ups on hand. Minaya's front office overreacted to small sample sizes, see: Omir Santos, Marlon Anderson, and Daniel Murphy. He gave away Heath Bell, Brian Bannister, and Darren O'Day.

Yet, none of these miscues sticks out as a particularly strong indictment of his ability's as a scout, just as a talent evaluator. Moises Alou was a great player, when he played. He was a horrible pick-up for a team that needed a reliable, everyday left-fielder. On the major league level, talent evaluation involves using the most accurate objective measures to evaluate a player's track record, something observation can't do reliably, in any sport or field. These past few years, the Mets would have been better suited with a Mark Shapiro-type, with no particular scouting expertise, but an ability to objectively evaluate major-league talent and make sound business decisions. With a large payroll and the established core of Wright/Reyes, it seems the Mets badly needed some false hustle, some paperwork, some stability, not a huge gamble at 15 of the the 25 roster spots every season.

But maybe it is too late for that. As fielding stats get more widely accepted, it seems a glorified Moneyball scenario, where a few teams with superior objective analysis carry an edge, is becoming less likely. As more players, are signing long-term deals with the teams that drafted them, and fewer are hitting free agency, the statistical analysis the Mets have been so neglectful of becomes just the baseline. Indeed, as Jay wrote about some of the most successful teams around the league: "it's noteworthy that other organizations that have gone with the 'Ivy League whiz kid' GM model tend to have a 'wise old baseball man' figure hanging close by, advising the gifted non-scout executive. The Red Sox had Bill Lajoie attached to Theo Epstein; Allard Baird is in that role now, while Lajoie is now advising Huntington in Pittsburgh. The Rays put Gerry Hunsicker with Andrew Friedman, and down in Texas, Jon Daniels has access to no less than John Hart and Nolan Ryan." With that pattern in mind, I was encouraged to read that the Wilpons convinced Sandy Johnson to stay out of retirement, allegedly in preparation for a non-Minaya centric front office.

For similar reasons, these forces will also probably push forward the mythical symbiosis of scouting and statistics that everyone pays lip-service to but isn't quite sure what they're referring to. More than just pitchf/x and hitf/x, the observation of both amateur and professional talent will come down to hyper-specific scouting reports that use data and observation to spot trends of growth or deterioration in a player's skills. And maybe, even then, it will take some "wise old baseball man," with a special eye for talent, to build the best franchise.

On December 10, 2008, the Mets, Indians, and Mariners completed a three-way trade, in which the Mariners received Aaron Heilman, Endy Chavez, Jason Vargas, Mike Carp, Ezequiel Carrera, Maikel Cleto, and Franklin Gutierrez. The Mets received J.J. Putz, Jeremy Reed, and Sean Green, while the Indians received Joe Smith and Luis Valbuena.

This trade, for me, perfectly encapsulates two failed models for a front office and the future of a what it means to a successful one. Omar Minaya acquired a talented player with serious injury concerns, and severely downgraded two known major-league entities, presumably not knowing he did. Shapiro acquired a minor league infielder with good stats, but a "bad body" and mixed scouting reports. While there is plenty of time for him to improve, Valbuena was merely replacement level this season. Meanwhile, Jack Zduriencik, the long-time scouting director who understands and embraces statistical analysis, brought in a 6-WAR centerfielder and a boatload of interesting prospects.

The Mets under Minaya were famed for embracing multiple perspectives, both of the scout and the statistician. Sadly, they failed to understand how those roles fit into a functioning front office. First, they need a reliable process for evaluating and valuing major league talent, a la the Indians. Then, they can get their "guys."

2009 Mets Transaction Register, Part 2

Eric Simon — Wed, 21 Oct 2009 10:15:22 -0000

More photos » by Matt York - AP

Oliver Perez doing his impression of a Mets fan watching Oliver Perez pitch. (AP Photo/Matt York)

Browse more photos »

And now, the dramatic conclusion of the epic, award-winning series that began last week.

January 22, 2009

Signed Freddy Garcia to a minor league contract. Garcia was competing for the fifth starter/long man role in Spring Training, but he was first terrible and then hurt (or maybe it was the other way around). Upon his return, he stunk in two starts for Buffalo before being waived and picked up by the White Sox where he posted a 2.90 tRA in 56 innings. That should be enough to get him a Major League deal in 2010, maybe even from the Mets!

January 23, 2009

Signed Rob Mackowiak to a minor league contract. Appeared in two games with Triple-A Buffalo and zero with the Mets. He was pretty solid on a fantasy team I had five or six years ago, but has never really been an above average player and could be done as a big leaguer at age 33.

February 2, 2009

Signed Oliver Perez for three years/$36 million. Analysis here. A day that will live in infamy, as the Mets offered three more years and thirty-six million more dollars than anyone else to secure the rights to one of the least dependable -- but most mature! -- pitchers in baseball. Perez's 6.94 tRA, -0.7 WAR and 1.92 WHIP would have been vindication enough, but he topped that off by spending three-fifths of the season on the disabled list. Given his negative win value, perhaps that was actually for the best. At roughly $4.5 million per win, Perez would have to be worth 8-9 wins over the next two seasons to justify his contract.

February 5, 2009

Signed Elmer Dessens to a minor league contract. Dessens should never have seen the light of day, but with injuries and ineptitude swallowing the Mets' 2009 season, Dessens managed to appear in 28 games in relief, showing decent control and a proclivity for groundballs (yet he still allowed five homeruns in 32.2 innings). He wasn't the worst pitcher the Mets had, and was probably quite a bit better than expected, but more playing time should expose him as a below-average reliever.

February 11, 2009

Signed Jose Valentin to a minor league deal. Didn't play a professional game in 2009. Maybe check the Ground Round?

February 13, 2009

Signed Ramon Martinez to a minor league deal. Hit .167/.182/.214 in 44 plate appearances with the Mets. Had a -2.6 UZR at shortstop in limited action.

February 14, 2009

Signed Livan Hernandez to a minor league deal. A longshot to make the club, Hernandez out-pitched Freddy Garcia in Spring Training and joined the Mets in the season's second week. Apart from a few good starts against the Nationals, Hernandez was mostly pretty bad, even for a fifth starter. He also loved donuts.

February 27, 2009

Signed Ron Villone to a minor league deal. Villone never pitched for the Mets and was nothing special after Washington picked him up. He's from Englewood, NJ, for whatever that's worth.

March 10, 2009

Released Duaner Sanchez. This move seemed smart at the time, looked dumb when Filthy shut down the Mets in the opening series at Citi Field, but went back to looking smart when the Padres likewise released Sanchez after running up a 9.00 ERA and 2.36 WHIP in 11 innings.

March 14, 2009

Claimed Fernando Nieve off waivers from Houston. Some Nieve analysis here. Not a bad gamble. Nieve was only 26 and throws in the mid-nineties, and managed a 2.95 ERA in seven starts with the Mets. Unfortunately, he walked too many and struck out too few to believe his low runs allowed rate is at all sustainable.

March 30, 2009

Signed Ken Takahashi to a minor league contract. Some analysis of one of his appearances here. Tak wasn't terrible, and was fairly dominant against righties in limited action. He was released yesterday, so, smell you later, Tak.

April 5, 2009

Signed Gary Sheffield as a free agent. The Mets paid Sheffield the league minimum (actually, a prorated portion of the league minimum) while the Tigers picked up the rest of his $14 million salary. Sheffield was worth 1.8 WAR offensively, though his defense in leftfield was woeful. UZR has him at -11.1, though it's not clear how much that is affected by the fact that UZR is still using Shea Stadium's dimensions. If that mark holds, Sheffield's overall value, including defensive adjustments, was barely above replacement (0.2 WAR). He could still be a useful designated hitter somewhere.

April 11, 2009

Released Marlon Anderson. Boo to the yah. Anderson was decent as a pinch hitter with the Mets in 2005, remarkable in 77 plate appearances after they claimed him from the Dodgers in 2007, but all kinds of terrible in 2008 and made four hapless pinch hitting appearances in 2009 before mercifully getting the heave-ho.

April 25, 2009

Signed Mike Lamb to a minor league contract. Played almost a full season in Triple-A and didn't hit a lick.

May 30, 2009

Traded Ramon Castro to the White Sox for Lance Broadway. Trade analysis here and discussion here; Castro's greatest hits here. I always liked Ramon; he had more pop than can usually be expected from a catcher, and he was big and huggable. He was also oft-injured and rumored to be difficult to deal with. He hit .184/.262/.382 with the White Sox (he also caught Mark Buerhle's perfect game). Broadway was terrible in Triple-A and with the Mets; his greatness may not extend beyond his naturally porn star-ish name.

June 5, 2009

Claimed Pat Misch off waivers from the Giants. His 4.12 ERA in 22 appearances -- including seven starts -- isn't supported by his peripherals, as Misch struck out just 3.5 batters per nine innings while walking 2.9 and allowing 1.4 homeruns. Could be worth an emergency start, but if he makes 22 appearances again the Mets are in trouble.

July 10, 2009

Traded Ryan Church to the Braves for Jeff Francoeur. Trade coverage here, here, here, here, and here. To his credit, Francoeur was worth around 1.6 WAR with his bat after the trade (his defense dragged that down a bit); Church was worth around half that in half the playing time with the Braves. 2010 is Francoeur's final year of arbitration eligibility, though there's always the (horrifying) possibility of the Mets signing him to a multi-year deal. I genuinely want Francoeur to succeed and he seems like a nice enough guy, I just find it hard to believe that he will ever be even an average big leaguer given his steadfast refusal to use the strike zone to his advantage.

August 6, 2009

Traded Greg Veloz to the Nationals for Anderson Hernandez. Hernandez is a replacement-level shorstop and slightly better than that as a second-baseman (the difference owing to his above-average defense at second). He can't hit and probably never will, though it's not as if Veloz is anything to write home about.

August 25, 2009

Traded Billy Wagner to the Red Sox for Chris Carter and Eddie Lora. More here. The Mets cleared around $4 million and picked up a couple of warm bodies. Carter could be useful against righties.

Let's Kill This Meme.

Sam Page — Fri, 18 Sep 2009 01:38:42 -0000

Here we go. Get it out of your system.

(click to embiggun this one)