SB Nation - Josh Barfield

All Assumptions-Are-Dangerous Minor League Free Agent Team

Jeff — Tue, 17 Nov 2009 06:07:19 -0000

Dave at Fangraphs passed along a link to this year's crop of minor league free agents. A popular thing to do with this information is pick out a handful of guys that would make interesting and potentially worthwhile pick-ups. This is not that. This is a full team made up of guys who, years ago, were supposed to go on to do some big big things, only to end up on the fall 2009 list of mlFA's. Consider this just another reminder that you should never ever ever take a prospect's future for granted.*

C: JR House
1B: Ryan Shealy
2B: Josh Barfield
SS: Antonio Perez
3B: Dallas McPherson
LF: Wes Bankston
CF: Joe Borchard
RF: John-Ford Griffin
DH: Josh Phelps

BENCH-C: JD Closser (does Ben Davis still count?)
BENCH-INF: Eric Duncan
BENCH-OF: Dave Krynzel
BENCH-UTIL: Donnie Murphy

SP: Jerome Williams
SP: Greg Miller
SP: Kenny Baugh
SP: Humberto Sanchez
SP: Bobby Brownlie

RP: Jose Capellan
RP: Wes Littleton
RP: Casey Fossum
RP: John Van Benschoten
RP: Chad Orvella
RP: Clint Everts
RP: Andrew Brown

If there were a 26th spot, I'd give it to Dee Brown, but it would just be so damn easy to include him that I had to find an alternative. Also among the free agents are formerly established Major Leaguers like Chris Capuano and Chad Cordero, along with the astonishingly driven Jolbert Cabrera. Jolbert just wants to win. Come on, Yankees. Take the plunge. Win one for Jolbert.

If there were a 27th spot, I'd give it to Mark McGonigle, because, really? McGonigle?

* never take any player's future for granted

Fire Everyone! - Mark Shapiro

Jay — Fri, 09 Oct 2009 05:53:11 -0000

More photos » by Tony Dejak - AP

Is just developing a good process enough?

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This is the final installment in a 12-part series.

"A Hit Is A Hit" — The Sopranos, season one.

Christopher has been bankrolling a band called "Visiting Day", who are managed by his girlfriend Adriana. He plays the band's demo to his associate Hesh, an old-timer in the music business.

CHRISTOPHER: So?

HESH: I think it's ... not good.

CHRISTOPHER: Wanna be a little more specific?

HESH: There's good. And there's not good. This is not good.

CHRISTOPHER: Okay, maybe it's not your era — no offense, but ...

HESH: Kid, music is music, talent is talent. I don't care who you are. I seen it all. I seen heavy metal invented by Hendrix at the Bottom Line, he just got out of the army. I told him, "Kid, I don't know what you call it — talent, charisma, magic — whatever it is, you got it." These guys ... [gestures to the cassette] ... I'm sorry, they don't.

CHRISTOPHER: That Vito is a great guitar player, Hesh.

HESH: Good, fine, he's a great guitar player. However, there's one constant in the music business: A hit is a hit. And this, my friend, is not a hit.

CHRISTOPHER: But why?

HESH: Christ. Reasons we can never comprehend or codify, you pitiful schlepper.

Of all the installments in this series, this is the one where it's most tempting to beg off and admit, this might just above my pay grade. I'll be honest, I can't say with much confidence whether Mark Shapiro should be fired. What I can say is that there are definitely good reasons to fire him.

Before we get to that, better face up to some hard facts. If you're going to fire Shapiro, you have to believe that a better option is available. Chris Antonetti is the heir apparent, but you fire Shapiro and keep Antonetti only if you think that in keeping Antonetti, you preserve the best parts of Shapiro while rooting out his shortcomings. Heck, maybe that's actually the case, but I personally couldn't say. It doesn't seem likely. And if Antonetti was the instant front-runner for most any GM opening, what would that make Shapiro if he were available?

Shapiro's calling card is turning walk-year veterans into prospects who become multi-year contributors to the team — a truly staggering haul, including Grady Sizemore, Cliff Lee, Coco Crisp, Shin-Soo Choo, Travis Hafner, Milton Bradley, Franklin Gutierrez, Asdrubal Cabrera, Josh Bard and Kelly Shoppach. Add to that list, potentially, over the next several years, Matt LaPorta, Carlos Santana, Luis Valbuena, Michael Brantley, Lou Marson, plus a half-dozen significant pitching prospects, plus Mark DeRosa, Arthur Rhodes, Justin Masterson and Chris Perez. Even his least successful trade acquisitions — Alex Escobar, Jason Michaels, Brandon Phillips, Billy Traber, Andy Marte, Josh Barfield — have not been entirely bereft of big-league talent.

We've chanted that litany before, but it bears recalling because horse trading is one of the most important jobs of a GM, and it's notably one of the only jobs where success or failure is directly traced to his decision. Shapiro also has had an impressive run with third-tier free agent starting pitchers — Pavano made 33 starts and netted a decent prospect, Byrd completed three serviceable seasons, Millwood won the freakin' ERA title, and even Brian Anderson did okay for a couple of years. And while fans rightly bemoan the dead weight of Hafner's contract, Shapiro has not really made the big, crippling mistakes that befall most GMs — on the balance sheet, Hafner-Westbrook-Dellucci pale before Wells-Rios-Ryan.

If you're going to get rid of Shapiro and his like-minded colleagues, then you have to be willing to live without those exemplary skills — without his leadership, class, and intelligence, his deftness with trades and contracts, the respect he commands within the industry, and especially — especially — his willingness to take the public body blows when tough decisions need to be made. You can't assume that the next guy will excel in all of those areas. I am certain we'd miss those qualities.

Having said that, I can tell you why Shapiro should be fired in one word: Talent.

Baseball is never simple. As a rule, the world's most elite natural athletes cannot succeed as major leaguers. Hitting and pitching are simply too hard. Hitting at this level requires a knack that may be the hardest thing to quantify or characterize in all of sports, and if you don't have it, then all the talk or mechanics and approaches in the world can't save you, even if you have several NBA championships and MVP awards on your résumé. Pitching at this level requires a freakish combination of precise muscle control, huge arm-generated torque, resistance to elbow and shoulder injury under extreme stress, and intelligence.

Running a baseball club may be just as hard and just as unquantifiable; after all, more than a few titans of industry have tried and failed. A brilliant executive can't necessarily run a ballclub any better than a world-class athlete can hit a curveball. The brilliant executive can be an inspiring leader, managing and empowering his charges. He can define what kind of people he wants working in the organization, hire them, set expectations, evaluate them, act on them. He can fire people. He can order case studies and surveys of best practices. He can analyze statistics and devise processes, enact them, evaluate them, refine them, start over from scratch if need be. He can maintain outstanding communication with his staff, with his bosses, with the public. He can do all these things reliably, even predictably, because he simply has the tools and the skills.

For all that, however, the brilliant executive can't necessarily tell you whether it's better to overspend on Raul Ibañez or Kerry Wood. He can't necessarily devise a process to tell you that, and he can't necessarily hire the right person to tell you that, either. Nor can he devise a process to hire the right person to tell you that. It doesn't always come down to objective analysis or having a good process. Sometimes it comes down to talent: the talent to play, the talent to evaluate talent, the talent to develop talent, and the judgment to make decisions about talent.

Sometimes — often, maybe — it comes down to reasons we can never comprehend or codify, pitiful schleppers that we are.

Evaluating talent is a special skill, and here I can speak with some experience. Most of my professional life is centered around my ability to identify genuine talent — musical talent, IT talent, and even writing talent — people who reliably will perform at a high or exceptionally high level, just about 100 percent of the time. I have, on occasion, identified individuals with weak paper qualifications who later went on to excel in their field. In some cases, they thrived in part because I gave them an opportunity and aided their development. In other cases, their success was inevitable, and I just saw it earlier than some others.

I am not suggesting, by any stretch of the imagination, that I have the ability to judge baseball talent. Maybe, if I'd spent 20 years working as a baseball professional, learning from thousands of discussions with scouts and making and testing my own observations — maybe then, but perhaps not even then. For whatever it's worth, though, I can tell you that my ability to assess a person's talents is entirely intuitive. I have no ability to explain it, or to teach anyone else how to do it. I can be highly analytical in my assessments of people, breaking down facts and metrics, making rules and devising grading systems to create rankings — and I can teach these things by rote and by example. However, none of that has anything to do with being able to differentiate reliably between a high ceiling and a low ceiling.

I can't tell you for sure that it's the same for baseball, but I worry that it is. Most of the people reading this could be trained in the rudiments of being a low-level scout — doing your homework and measuring some kid's raw tools on the field. Skills are another thing entirely — evaluating footwork and positioning on defense, observing quality of command across a variety of pitches, intuiting the difference between a bad day and a chronic problem. Beyond these, another level, the crucial, game-changing question: Will this ballplayer develop skills beyond what he's showing today? How does he project to a different level at a different age, or even just to a different ballpark in a different league?

I have no doubt that great baseball scouts learned a lot from the great scouts who came before them, and I have no doubt that a gifted executive can learn immensely from a great scout, purely by his ability to listen and communicate and absorb. At the same time, I am quite sure that the greatest talent evaluators in the game are possessed of something that is innate and ineffable. And I am genuinely concerned that the Indians don't employ any of those people — and that, in fact, Shapiro may have favored others in the organization to the point where the best evaluators left.

Take a look at the AP report of Neal Huntington being hired away by the Pirates:

Huntington formerly was the assistant general manager to the Indians' Mark Shapiro, but dropped behind vice president of baseball operations Chris Antonetti and assistant general manager John Mirabelli on the front office depth chart two years ago.

Huntington accepted a different role in 2005, Shapiro said, because Antonetti's skills were in the management and administrative side, while Huntington's were in evaluation and scouting.

"My skill set and passion were more that of an evaluator, but they never technically took me out of the front office," Huntington said. "I was exposed to some incredible things -- rebuilding an organization and being involved in every decision, every tough decision, that was made."

And from the MLB.com report:

As an adviser to Shapiro and vice president of baseball operations Chris Antonetti, Huntington was involved in nearly all personnel and staffing decisions, as well as trade acquisition discussions. He also spent the majority of his time evaluating talent on both the Minor and Major League level.

When asked about Huntington, Shapiro responded: "[Huntington is] one of our chief evaluators and one of our strongest voices on every level," Shapiro said.

Here's a guy who was the highest-ranking evaluator in the organization and possibly the best, a guy with a master's degree in sports management from UMass, and essentially, he was passed over — well treated, perhaps, but pointedly not in line for a future role as GM. So too, perhaps, was John Farrell, who upon leaving Cleveland — quite amicably, as Huntington did — was quoted to say that he was looking to have a larger voice in an organization. Farrell had been a major league pitcher and a college pitching coach, and with the Indians he served stints as Farm Director and Director of Player Development. Despite his experience and impeccable reputation, Farrell too was not viewed as the future leader of the organization.

Years earlier, there was Tony LaCava, whom the Indians hired in 2002 as national cross-checker, essentially rescuing him from the sinking-ship Montreal Expos. As the Expos very recent Farm Director, LaCava naturally was instrumental in selecting the prospects to be received in the Colon deal, which is not only Shapiro's signature trade, but arguably the most successful trade of a veteran for prospects by any GM, ever. LaCava, too, was not retained in the Indians organization, moving on to the Blue Jays as Assistant GM in 2003, just one year later, while John Mirabelli continued his string of generally disastrous drafts.

Like Huntington, LaCava is going to be a GM sooner or later, yet he wasn't good enough to be Assistant GM in Cleveland. None of these guys were given large enough roles in the organization to keep them around, and no doubt the Indians were possessed of too much executive talent to keep in-house — a nice problem to have. Still, given how things have gone since, it's telling that the prince-in-waiting anointment, and present-day "co-GM" status, went not to an ace evaluator, but instead to Antonetti, a man whose background and skill set are more or less identical to Shapiro's.

For all the talk about being open to all ideas and all viewpoints, the major player-evaluation talent in the Indians organization was basically told that being a solid administrator was more important, and that their path to bigger jobs would have to be in some other, presumably less enlightened organization — and never mind that it doesn't matter how well administered your organization is if you don't know who the best talent is. (Is it any wonder, then, that when Shapiro hires a former catcher for a manager, he then populates his coaching staff almost entirely with other former catchers? All leaders lead by example, first and foremost.)

This is not to say that an executive without a scouting background cannot be an outstanding GM, but it's noteworthy that other organizations that have gone with the "Ivy League whiz kid" GM model tend to have a "wise old baseball man" figure hanging close by, advising the gifted non-scout executive. The Red Sox had Bill Lajoie attached to Theo Epstein; Allard Baird is in that role now, while Lajoie is now advising Huntington in Pittsburgh. The Rays put Gerry Hunsicker with Andrew Friedman, and down in Texas, Jon Daniels has access to no less than John Hart and Nolan Ryan. But when non-scout-gifted-executives Shapiro and Antonetti huddle to make the big decisions, who are the wise old evaluators in the room — Charles Nagy and Jason Bere?

Later that night, at home, Adriana and Christopher discuss Visiting Day's potential. Hip-hop mogul "Massive Genius" has told Adriana that the band's demos are promising.

CHRISTOPHER: You know how I use the technique of positive visualization?

ADRIANA: I know you talk about it. You're fairly negative a lot of the time.

CHRISTOPHER: I think you should mentally prepare for the possibility that Visiting Day sucks.

ADRIANA: What?

CHRISTOPHER: I think that ... the only reason you've gotten this far with Massive is ... he wants to be in your pants.

ADRIANA: Boy, oh, boy.

CHRISTOPHER: Look, I had some experts listen to the demo ... they crapped all over it. Sorry.

ADRIANA: Who, Hesh? That old synagogue cantor?

CHRISTOPHER: Silvio. Hey, he owned rock clubs in Asbury. You heard what Squid said. A professional engineer.

ADRIANA: What about my opinion? That it's good. That it's special. This is just a way for you to keep me down.

CHRISTOPHER: That ain't fair.

ADRIANA: What's wrong with it, huh? What's wrong with Visiting Day?

CHRISTOPHER: I don't know ... but it's a problem that you don't know.

This series of articles perhaps has only demonstrated the obvious, that a club this bad — which decides in June that it must not only tank the current season but the next season at the same time — has suffered multiple failures in more than one part of the organization. In any one area, we can talk about how much control that one group of people — coaches, scouts, trainers — really had, compared to the influence of the other groups and the whims of the fates. But a systemic failure points ultimately to Shapiro, who hired and is accountable for all of those groups, and the harsh truth is that every club must contend with the whims of the fates — or fail to contend with them, as the Indians have.

Amateur scouting has been a disaster since Shapiro took over; maybe time will reveal that it was fixed two or three years ago, but maybe not. Big-league scouting has been a mixed bag, with veteran acquisitions missing a lot more often than they hit — in Barfield's case, about four times more often. The training staff has won high praise from some in the industry, but they haven't stopped the Indians from being undercut severely by injuries to a half-dozen key players in just two years — in some cases, multiple injuries and disappointing rehab processes have afflicted a single player like Jake Westbrook over and over again. The farm system has been another mixed bag, producing too many players who dominate at Triple-A but can barely perform at replacement level in the majors. If all clubs were like the Indians in this regard, those MLE formulas might look a lot different.

We had a manager whose playing-time decisions often defied any imaginable logic or reason, who thought it was important to have Ramon Vazquez on his bench rather than future 30-30 man Brandon Phillips, and who thought it was a good idea to put Ryan Garko in the outfield, with a rookie flyball pitcher on the mound — scratch that, ever — and we had a GM who let him do these things. It's true that Shapiro fired Wedge, and he may be sincere in saying that bringing in a new manager is an exciting opportunity. Even so, Shapiro made it abundantly clear that he didn't think there was any real, qualitative reason why Wedge shouldn't continue to be the manager — his exact words were, "it's a cop-out."

We had extraordinarily bad — and sometimes historically bad — bullpens in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2009. Those volcanic fiascos were, at least, largely Shapiro's direct creations, and at most, entirely the fault of Shapiro and people who were hired by Shapiro, and who generally have not been fired by Shapiro. They have turned too many contenders into also-rans, too many decent squads into train-wrecks, and too many season ticket holders into non-customers.

The sum of these observations is this one, frightening, inescapable conclusion: Shapiro has not given us any concrete reason to believe that he knows how to put people into critical positions who are capable of evaluating, developing and coaching real talent — the kind that can thrive at the major league level. Without people in key roles who are possessed of that kind of judgment and talent, it doesn't make any difference how good your organizational processes are or how much class-acting you do. We cannot contend on a diet of trade-acquired minor leaguers and recycled starting pitchers alone. If these things weren't clear five years ago, or even one year ago, they ought to be crystal clear now.

I am just a scribe, neither scout nor coach, not a baseball executive and certainly not a former major leaguer. So I don't really know what's wrong with the Cleveland Indians. But it's a problem if Mark Shapiro doesn't know either. And as much respect for him as I have, I'm not at all convinced that he does.

Fire Everyone! - Derek Shelton

Ryan — Sun, 13 Sep 2009 04:56:11 -0000

Derek Shelton and Kenny Lofton

View full size photo »

This is the second installment in a 12-part series.

Derek Shelton became the Indians hitting coach in June 2005, replacing Eddie Murray. At the time, the Indians ranked towards the bottom of the league in hitting, and manager Eric Wedge thought it was time for a change:

"It's not just about right now, it's just about what we feel is best for our ballclub today, the future and long term," said manager Eric Wedge, who told Murray he was fired. "From an offensive standpoint, I feel we can do better. But it's not just about Eddie Murray. I just felt that we needed to make a change and I felt this was best for our ballclub."

Specifically, it was thought that Murray's coaching style was what caused his dismissal. Murray did not take the initiative in giving hitting advice, leaving it up the player to come to him. If Murray had had a more aggressive style of coaching, the move might not have been made even with a struggling offense, for the Indians value a satisfactory process almost as much as satisfactory results.

So, in looking at whether Derek Shelton should keep his job after the season, I have to either completely leave out of my analysis Shelton's coaching style, or to make assumptions based on snippets of articles or interviews. And all of this is moot if Eric Wedge isn't here next year, for the hitting coach comes under the manager's purview. So, for the purposes of this article, I'll assume that the Indians are satisfied with his coaching demeanor and style, and that Eric Wedge will have the opportunity to make a decision on Shelton this winter. That leaves me mainly with statistical analysis and subjective reasoning, though I have several angles in mind in which to look at the numbers.

1. Do established major-leaguer hitters improve once they arrive in Cleveland? And, did established major-league hitters improve once Shelton joined the team?

Let's tackle the performance of the 2005 team first. Murray was fired the first week of June, so let's see if there was any measurable change among the everyday players from June onwards:

OPS+	April	May	Murray	June	July	August	September	Shelton	Better
Victor Martinez	68	61	64.5	134	142	184	150	152.5	Shelton
Ben Broussard	95	138	116.5	66	72	130	118	96.5	Murray
Ron Belliard	138	101	119.5	81	86	97	138	100.5	Murray
Jhonny Peralta	97	155	126	76	118	108	96	99.5	Murray
Aaron Boone	33	22	27.5	119	107	119	74	104.75	Shelton
Coco Crisp	78	165	121.5	116	93	114	144	116.75	Murray
Grady Sizemore	64	109	86.5	184	76	132	142	133.5	Shelton
Casey Blake	64	83	73.5	109	83	141	97	107.5	Shelton
Travis Hafner	126	118	122	199	232	158	182	192.75	Shelton
Jose Hernandez	59	20	39.5	112	118	12	47	72.25	Shelton

Of the 10 players who got 200 or more at-bats, six of them improved under Shelton. Among those were very significant improvements, namely Travis Hafner and Victor Martinez. The overall team offense improved as well:

OPS+

April

May

Murray

June

July

August

September

Shelton

Better

Team

100

113

103

126

117

Shelton

So it looks like Shelton was an improvement over Murray. What about Shelton versus other hitting coaches? Here's a list of established major-leaguers the Indians brought in from 2006 through this year, their previous offensive numbers, and what they did in an Indians uniform (OPS+ with the Indians in bold):

OPS+	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Trend
Jason Michaels	98	111	85	87	40	102	Down
Trot Nixon	123	109	96	78	54	x	Down
David Dellucci	96	126	123	76	85	37	Down
Jamey Carroll	92	68	94	56	85	88	Up
Mark DeRosa	59	97	108	102	118	105	Even
Josh Barfield	x	x	96	54	x	x	Way Down

Aside from Jamey Carroll, there's no success story to point to. Most of the players on this list were older role players coming into their stints with the Indians, so there probably wasn't much upside for Shelton to tap. However, Josh Barfield was a big miss for Shelton, as he went from a decent starter with Padres to on the cusp of bombing out of the majors altogether on Shelton's watch. The others don't bother me as much; Jason Michaels has gone back to being a platoon player, and Dellucci and Nixon were winding down their careers.

2. Do players improve or regress during their years with Shelton?

Here's a list of everyday players who have spent at least two full seasons with the Indians during the Shelton era:

OPS+	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Trend
Victor Martinez	130	121	127	85	115	Down
Ben Broussard	105	109	125	x	x	Up
Jhonny Peralta	137	83	100	108	91	Down
Aaron Boone	82	77	x	x	x	Down
Grady Sizemore	123	132	122	128	103	Even
Casey Blake	99	114	101	110	x	Up
Travis Hafner	168	179	118	65	121	Down
Jason Michaels	x	85	87	40	x	Down
Ryan Garko	x	113	117	97	113	Even
Shin-Soo Choo	x	118	x	146	123	Up
Franklin Gutierrez	x	67	103	80	x	Down
Kelly Shoppach	x	x	101	123	91	Down
Asdrubal Cabrera	x	x	101	88	106	Up

Some of these trends can be chalked up to forces beyond a coach's reach, like Travis Hafner's injuries. The two that stick out to me are Jhonny Peralta (on the bad side) and Shin-Soo Choo (on the good side). Peralta's 2005 season (at age 23) seemed like the beginning of a fantastic career, but since then he hasn't come close to that production. Conversely, Choo started out his major-league career struggling at the plate, but since the second half of last year has become one of the better corner outfielders in the American League. Franklin Gutierrez and Casey Blake have both had good seasons since leaving the Indians, but nothing markedly better than some of the years they had under Shelton.

3. How has the Indians offense fared versus the rest of the American League?

AL Ranks	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Batting Average	5	4	7	12	6
On-Base Percentage	3	3	5	7	5
Slugging Percentage	3	4	5	7	8
Runs	4	2	6	6	6

Even with some upheaval in the last couple years, the Indians have remained a league-average offense. Considering that Progressive Field has played as a neutral park during the last couple years, that's a decent showing. It certainly wasn't the offense that drove the Indians out of contention this season.

Final Analysis

Each season since Derek Shelton arrived in Cleveland, the Indians have finished at least in the top half in the league in runs. During his first two seasons, the Indians offense was among the best in baseball. Although he's had a couple misses (Josh Barfield, Jhonny Peralta), the rest of his record stacks up well, especially given the circumstances in 2008 and 2009. If Wedge isn't fired, he should be brought back. And even if there is a new manager, Shelton should be recommended to remain in his position.

Early Weekend 6-Pack (7/2/09)

APV — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 07:19:57 -0000

It is a holiday weekend and I am still living quite a few hours in the future, so this week's edition of Early Weekend 6-Pack will be very early (with appropriately chosen beverage below).

1. Eric Wedge is in Hall of Fame company

In 2007, Eric Wedge coached the Indians to an impressive .593 winning percentage. Going into Thursday night’s game, the 2009 Indians are winning games at a less impressive .388 clip. If that .200+ drop-off in win% in a 2-year span seems impressive, that’s because it is. I looked at managerial records over the past 50 seasons, and it turns out this feat has only been equaled once. This is obviously a difficult list to get on, because as that gap might suggest, you have to go from coaching a very good team (~.600) to a very bad team (<.400) in a short amount of time. Given roster sizes and player movement restrictions, even in the era of free agency there tends to be a lot of continuity on a roster from one year to the next, so such a rapid change doesn’t often overcome the forces of inertia. Quite a few managers have come close. Dusty Baker did it in three years between 1993 (.636) and 1996 (.429) with the Giants. Phil Garner did it in three with the Astros, 2004 (.649) to 2007 (.443). Cito Gaston did it in three following the Jays last WS title in 1992. Tony LaRussa is good enough to have had such a drop over a 3-year time span twice, one with the White Sox in the mid-80s and again with Oakland in the early 90s. A few others got fired too early in the third season to count (i.e. Gene Lamont, Buddy Bell, Don Zimmer). But only one other coach has done it in 2-years, and that is HOFer Sparky Anderson, who saw the Tigers go from a .605 team in 1987 to a .364 team by 1989. So Wedge is truly in the company of legends. Now there is one coach who has actually topped this, and accomplished the task in just a single season. I probably don’t need to remind you, but Jim Leyland coached the 1997 Marlins to a .568 record and the eventual World Series title, only to come back in 1998 and coach the AA Marlins to a pathetic .333 record.

2. But maybe the best is yet to come...

The Indians have over the past two decades had a tendency to be a strong second-half team. Indeed, 2007 (.595) and 2008 (.588) are the 12th and 13th best back-half W% for the team since WWII. And 2005 (.622) is actually 7th on that list. As you go through the years, those ‘80s teams were generally awful, first half and second. The ‘70s teams were not great, but tended to have decent second halves. The ‘60s teams, which were better, were strikingly bad late season teams and had a few epic fades (e.g. 1965 - tied for 1st on the 4th of July, 14 games over .500, played below .500 the second half of the season and fell to 5th place). And the golden era teams, 1948-1954, were just awesome all around. Here’s the complete top 10:

	Year	Rec	W%		Year	Rec	W%
1	1954	55-16	.775	7	2005	46-28	.622
2	1995	54-23	.701	8	1953	44-27	.620
3	1952	51-28	.646	9	1955	43-27	.614
4	1996	47-27	.635	10t	2000	46-30	.605
5	1948	52-30	.634	10t	1950	46-30	.605
6	1951	49-29	.628

3. More Matt LaPorta please

Speaking of records – here is the team’s record when different individuals have appeared in the game. The "best" record goes to Matt LaPorta, who in his brief stint in Cleveland, helped the team to a near .500 (6-7) record. Way to go Matt! The worst record title is shared by Travis Hafner (10-24) and Josh Barfield (5-12).

Shoppach	18-29	Peralta	28-42	Crowe	13-17
Martinez	29-49	Choo	31-47	LaPorta	6-7
Cabrera	21-35	Hafner	10-24	Dellucci	5-9
DeRosa	29-42	Garko	24-36	Gimenez	5-7
Francisco	26-42	Carroll	13-24	Barfield	5-12
Sizemore	23-34	Valbuena	14-23

4. The defense rests

It’s only the half-way point, but at least according to UZR, the Indians defense is on pace to being 51 runs worse than last year, helping make Cleveland one of the most underperforming teams in baseball. According to the numbers, these are the four biggest culprits:

Ben Francisco -6.9
Luis Valbuena -6.1 (split between SS and 2B pretty evenly)
Shin Soo Choo -3.6
Mark DeRosa -3.1 (although about +3 in the outfield, -6 in the infield)

The Indians best defenders so far; Jamey Carroll (+3.8) and Jhonny Peralta (+2.9). Note: This is just one metric for measuring defense and half a season, and for many of these guys less than that, is generally not considered a large enough sample to be particularly reliable. I'd be interested how these numbers match up with people's perspectives...I haven't seen enough games live to say.

5. Can I get two Wegz with that LaPorta?

The Indians full-season minor league teams all have three full months in the books. Matt LaPorta had the team’s best month of April (1.103), while Nick Weglarz beat off some stiff competition from a number of players to claim the best May (1.055) and June (1.007). There are a number of other high performers, of course. Carlos Santana has been steadily good all season. Jordan Brown and Andy Marte both had big Mays. Abner Abreu screamed back from a terrible April with months of May and June not far behind Weglarz before separating his shoulder. Lonnie Chisenhall has been solid.

6. The future looks different when you get there

One of the things Baseball America does every year when it produces its organizational top 10 lists is put together a mock-up of what the team’s lineup might look like 3 years in the future. Here is what, in November 2006, they projected as the Indians 2010 lineup:

Catcher – Matt McBride SP #1 – CC Sabathia

First Base – Victor Martinez SP #2 – Adam Miller

Second Base – Josh Barfield SP #3 – Jeremy Sowers

Third Base – Andy Marte SP #4 – Cliff Lee

Shortstop – Jhonny Peralta SP #5 – Jake Westbrook

Left Field – Trevor Crowe Closer – Tony Sipp

Center Field – Grady Sizemore

Right Field – Shin Soo Choo

DH – Travis Hafner

Ahh...back when the Indians future was so clear. I actually think they did a pretty good job with this. They correctly predicted Victor’s transition to first base, while being surprisingly optimistic about Jhonny staying at SS. They got the easy ones of course, Grady in center and Hafner at DH, but also pegged Choo in RF. McBride as catcher was obviously a fail...why people love that guy is something I don’t entirely understand. Barfield did, coming off a ~~great~~ good rookie year in San Diego, seem like a reasonably safe call. Marte was still one of baseball’s top prospects. Crowe...see McBride. They may very well have 40-60% of the starting rotation correct. Adam Miller, more optimism. I’m not sure why they thought CC would both still be a #1 starter and still be with Cleveland.

It’s hard to pretend I don’t know what has happened since November 2006 and try to compare how good I thought this team would have been versus how good I think our projected 2010 team currently looks. It’s probably impossible to match my view of the above projected starting rotation (it is truly a dream world where Jake Westbrook is our #5 guy), but I think I like our offense better. Put LaPorta in for Crowe, Santana (at least by the end of 2010) in for McBride, shift Jhonny left and put Droobs and Valbuena up the middle...and I like that lineup a lot. The pitching, though...

via www.beerbeacon.com

If your world is crumbling around you and the earth shakes, do you feel it?

afh4 — Thu, 07 May 2009 06:15:51 -0000

More photos » by Michael Dwyer - AP

Undigging the hole.

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Only a month into the season, the Cleveland Indians have already been forced to dramatically reconfigure themselves because of a noxious mixture of injury and incompetence. The moves have all been well documented here: the major league debuts of Matt LaPorta and Tony Sipp, Luis Valbuena's first time in Cleveland, the return of Josh Barfield to Cleveland, and tonight, the move of Aaron Laffey and Matt Herges to the bullpen, Jeremy Sowers to the rotation, Rafael Perez to Columbus and Vinne Chulk into the ether. From a pure analysis standpoint, these events either have been or will be covered in greater detail than I can muster.

There is, as always, a larger context here. With their (extremely) slow start, the Indians are in danger of murdering a third promising season in the last four years; in both 2006 and 2008 the Indians squandered rosters that appeared to be poised for playoff runs. Neither year is a great analytical comp for this 2009 team but I think there's something to acknowledging that both seasons are very good emotional comps for 2009. Disappointment can only be parsed so many different ways; this sort of sadness only has a limited flavor palette.

The reshuffling of the roster over the last week represents a more radical· · · — — — · · · (SAVE OUR SEASON) than happened in either 2006 or 2008, at least from my recollection. This is a function of many things: the season going south even earlier than normal and the state of the farm system, to name just two. But, if we can leave left brain behind for a second, these aggressive moves are also scar tissue-lingering signs of past traumas. The organization feels what we all feel in spades: the insiders are also anxious about yet another season going by the boards. The difference between them and us, of course, is that they are in a position to do something. And they have decided to do something.

Shapiro has acknowledged this change in approach, this adoption of proactivity. From, mlb.com tonight:

"We've always had a set way of doing things here and tried to respect. But now I think we've got to have a little greater sense of urgency where those things are not going to be as important."

The sense of urgency is greater than it was in the past even though two of the last three seasons featured implosions similar to this one. Many variables are in the equation but one of the large ones is the past itself; Shapiro is acting with a greater sense of urgency than in the past because of the past.

To me, this is a highly humanizing period for the front office. For years, I have understood this front office as, above all, consummate planners. They created something that is literally and unironically called The Plan and they have become a flagship of modern front office thought through their meticulous management of every detail in The Plan. They made their decisions coolly and analytically; making a decision meant putting it through the pre-defined decision making process. It almost became fun as a fan-you could guess most of the front office's moves if you understood the decision making process: their views on service time, on the roles of certain player types, etc. Shapiro and Co, to those of us who were lazy in our thinking, became wonderful, talented automatons behind the scenes. We trusted them for the same reason we trust our computers-because we believe the programming is sound. Even their emphasis on character, on respecting players, seemed somehow a part of a larger program; it existed not because of some moral imperative but because it represented a potential competitive advantage.

This season, and especially this past week, has been a stark and sobering reminder that our brain trust, no matter how brainful, still runs on blood, not lithium ion batteries. And, in a way, it's reassuring. As I watch Shapiro panic, I realize that he and I are in this together-he wants desperately for this team to win, just like I do. He knows much more about how to make them win but he doesn't know the outcomes for all the levers he pulls; he doesn't even know a majority of the outcomes. He sensed the acrid, coppery essence of failure trying to claim another one of his clubs and he chose to fight back, to change course. I am glad he chose to fight back, to do something that might actually work, even if decisions had to be made on the fly, even if the moves don't obviously fit into the larger model, even if what's being done wasn't part of The Plan.

Game 26: Indians 9, Blue Jays 7 (12 Innings)

Ryan — Tue, 05 May 2009 04:40:30 -0000

More photos » by Frank Gunn - AP

"So, Fausto...how do you feel about finishing this one up?"

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via www.fangraphs.com

Fangraphs normally don't look like this. Oh sure, the Indians have given up leads before; that's nothing new. It's that the Indians, for as bad as they looked early in the game, got back into the game not once, not twice, but three times. And despite their best attempts to blow a third save, won one of the wackiest games you'll see all year.

The wackiness was there from the beginning. Former Tribe pitcher Brian Tallet, who had been forced into the rotation because of injury, held his former team hitless through six innings. Tallet's last start was a disaster (4 IP, 10 ER), but tonight the Indians couldn't hit his changeups, or anything else for that matter, until the seventh. Ryan Garko broke up the no-hit bid with a sharp single, bringing up the still hitless Matt LaPorta. Matt got his first hit in style, tying the game with a two-run homer. The Indians would later plate the go-ahead run in the inning, only to have starter Fausto Carmona give back the lead in the bottom of the inning.

At this point, the game was a pretty generic Indians game, no different than three or four similar scripts used by the club in 2009. But with two outs in the top of the ninth, Asdrubal Cabrera flipped the plot and drove in the tying run with a single. The Indians drove in two more runs for good measure, and surely that would be enough for Kerry Wood. Right?

Wrong. Because of various pinch-hitting and pinch-running moves, Josh Barfield was now playing left field, and given how baseball invariably works, his defensive play brought about extra innings. To be fair, the "no-doubles" defensive alignment played a big part in allowing the Jays to force the game into extra innings. Alex Rios blooped a singe that Grady Sizemore would have normally caught in almost any other alignment. It was Rios that would be the tying run, scoring on another fly ball that fell, this time in front of Josh Barfield.

But it was Barfield, who hadn't had a major-league at-bat all season, who would eventually provide the biggest hit of the game. It was his run-scoring single that drove in the go-ahead run in the twelfth. Given that the Indians still had to pitch the bottom of the inning, insurance runs were needed, and provided by a Grady Sizemore double. Despite the three-run cushion, Rafael Perez couldn't finish the 12th, leaving Jensen Lewis to try to close it out. He inexplicably did so, striking out Aaron Hill, and the Indians won a game they had by all rights lost at least twice.

The Indians, after being held hitless through six innings, collected 15 hits and scored 9 runs in the final 6 innings of the game. And most of those runs came off of one of the better bullpens in baseball.

Next Up: Anthony Reyes vs. Brett Cecil, 12:37 PM.

Highest WPA		Lowest WPA
Asdrubal Cabrera	.406	Kerry Wood	-.403
Josh Barfield	.357	Jhonny Peralta	-.369
Rafael Betancourt	.286	Fausto Carmona	-.359

Transactions: Roster Turnover

Ryan — Sat, 02 May 2009 06:57:34 -0000

More photos » by Mark Duncan - AP

Tony Graffanino was just one of 11 Indians players to be involved in a roster move in the past 10 days.

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To set things up, let's start with last Wednesday's move.

April 22, 2009

Optioned LHP Zach Jackson to Columbus (AAA)

Recalled LHP Tony Sipp from Columbus (AAA) - MLB Debut

This first move was to reinforce a bullpen that desperately needed it. Sipp, although for several years considered an excellent prospect, was in his first season in AAA because of a series of arm injuries, including an elbow injury that led to Tommy John surgery. But when healthy, he was dominant, sporting a career 11.7 SO/9 ratio in the minors. In 2006, his last full season before the elbow injury, he struck out 80 in 60.1 innings in Akron. So while bringing Sipp up was a bit of a gamble, he's had the stuff to get major-league hitters for a couple years now. Given his rousing success in his first couple outings and bullpen problems around him, he's gone from his major-league debut to key late-inning reliever in the span of a week. The next time the Indians need someone to face a tough left-hander in the eighth inning, Wedge is going to call for Sipp, not Rafael Perez.

As for Jackson, he's still on the 40-man roster, and so as long he's healthy, he's going to see the majors again this season.

On the 25-man roster: 13 pitchers, 12 position players

April 29, 2009

Placed DH Travis Hafner on the 15-Day Disabled List (shoulder)

Recalled LHP Rich Rundles from Columbus (AAA)

Travis Hafner started the season extremely well, and showed that it was his shoulder that had torpedoed his 2008 season, not a drastic deterioration of ability. But despite the Indians religiously giving him days off after several straight days in the lineup, his surgically-repaired shoulder began to bother him again. He's going to see James Andrews in the next couple of days, which hopefully is nothing but a precautionary measure. Even if he does return in two weeks, the shoulder's probably not going to be 100% for a while. And each time Hafner takes an 0-for or looks bad during an at-bat, we're going to ask ourselves, "is he ok?"

The night before Hafner went on the DL, the Indians and Red Sox decimated each other's bullpen, so even though they were already carrying 13 pitchers, for the first time I can remember, they added a 14th to the roster for Thursday's game against Boston. Rich Rundles, who saw action with the team last year (earning himself a coveted Let's Go Tribe sponsorship on his b-ref page), was under consideration to make the bullpen out of Spring Training, and has done good work thus far for the Clippers. But, as was made clear from the callup, he was the emergency staff-saver if Fausto Carmona got chased early. That didn't happen, so Rundles just got to watch the game and enjoy the post-game spread before heading back to Columbus. The two-man bench hampered the Indians towards the end of Thursday's game, as Eric Wedge couldn't pinch-run for Victor Martinez in the ninth inning in a tie game because Kelly Shoppach was the DH.

On the 25-man Roster: 14 pitchers, 11 position players

May 1, 2009

Reinstated David Dellucci from the 15-day Disabled List

Optioned LHP Rich Rundles to Columbus (AAA)

There was some initial thought to bringing up Matt LaPorta now that regular at-bats were to be had, but Dellucci was doing well in his rehab assignment and was pretty much ready to go. As unfortunate as the Hafner injury was, it was good timing for David to be ready to go as Hafner was being shut down, for his very poor throwing arm makes him a liability in the outfield. So I would assume that Dellucci will make the majority of his starts as the Designated Hitter, though the Indians will probably also make use of it to give some regulars a day off from the field.

I had assumed that the Dellucci callup would end the roster shifting for the time being. But no, the biggest flurry of the week was yet to come.

On the 25-man Roster: 13 pitchers, 12 position players.

May 2, 2009

Placed RHP Joe Smith on the 15-Day Disabled List (right shoulder)

I'm not sure which move influenced the other ones, but I'll assume that the Joe Smith DL stint was a given. According to Castrovince's story, the injury is not serious, and he'll get to go to the minors (via a rehab assignment) without the Indians using an option on him. Hopefully he'll be ready to go physically and mechanically in two weeks.

Recalled 2B Luis Valbuena from Columbus (AAA) - MLB Debut

Designated IF Tony Graffanino for Assignment

Jhonny Peralta had been in a major slump, but benching him would have meant that Little Giraffe would be starting in his place, not exactly an upgrade in the lineup over even a slumping Peralta. Jamie Carroll's still at least a few weeks from coming off the DL, so that provided a nice window of opportunity for Luis Valbuena to get some major-league experience. Valbuena has played second, short, and third for Columbus, so that will allow the Indians to have a rotation of sorts among DeRosa, Peralta, Cabrera, and Valbuena for now. To make the decision a lot easier, Valbuena was hitting .321/.436/.538 for Columbus, so he should be able to go right into the lineup without the Indians worrying him being an offensive liability.

I don't forsee this promotion being permanent for Valbuena. He's probably up here until Carroll comes off the DL, as all the positions on the infield are spoken for, and the Indians aren't going to keep him on the roster as a second utility infielder.

The Indians needed to clear a spot on the 40-man roster for Matt LaPorta, so I think Graffanino would have stuck around if the Indians had just brought up Valbuena. Instead, he'll probably pass through waivers, and will be free to become a free agent if he wishes.

Purchased the Contract of OF Matt LaPorta from Columbus (AAA) and Recalled him to Cleveland - MLB Debut

There's been plenty of speculation about when the Indians were going to bring up the centerpiece of the Sabathia trade. LaPorta's been sizzling at the plate for Columbus, posting a 1.054 OPS in his first month in AAA. There are service time implications involved, so there needed to be a compelling reason to bring him up now. Ben Francisco's offensive problems probably had the Indians Front Office thinking about the move, but it was probably the Hafner injury that made the decision clear. Pronk's injured shoulder cleared a spot for the returning David Dellucci to occupy, still leaving Francisco and Trevor Crowe sharing left field. If Hafner hadn't gotten hurt, the Indians probably would have been content to muddle along with Dellucci and Francisco in left, as imperfect as that might sound.

Eric Wedge mentioned in the Castrovince story that LaPorta would serve as part of a platoon with David Dellucci, which I don't buy at all. LaPorta should be playing left field on a regular basis, with Ben Francisco relegated to a fourth outfielder. David Dellucci, when he's in the lineup, should be the DH, and only rarely venture out into left field. There's a distinct possibility that LaPorta won't be going back to AAA, for the opportunity is there to win the everyday left field job.

Recalled IF Josh Barfield from Columbus (AAA)

Optioned OF Trevor Crowe to Columbus (AAA)

With the Indians bringing up two outfielders in as many days, they swapped their pinch-runner outfielder for a pinch-runner infielder to balance out their position players. Crowe didn't do much offensively in his time with the team, and with LaPorta coming up, was going to get little opportunity to play.

On the 25-man Roster: 12 pitchers, 13 position players.

Beyond the particular needs addressed by these moves, I look at these callups also as an attempt to jump-start the team. The Indians sit, despite their 9-14 record, just 2.5 games out of first. And frankly, LaPorta and Valbuena are better players right now, despite their age and experience, than the players they replaced on the roster (Graffanino and Crowe).

Transactions: Carroll to DL

Ryan — Wed, 08 Apr 2009 02:51:33 -0000

Placed IF Jamey Carroll on the 15-Day Disabled List (left hand)

Purchased the Contract of IF Tony Graffanino; Recalled him to Cleveland

Carroll injured his wrist in his last at-bat of the spring; the Doug Brocail pitch broke a bone in the wrist (EDIT: actually, a bone in the back of the hand), and now he'll down for at least a month. If he has surgery to repair the fracture, it won't delay his return.

Carroll came in handy last season when pressed into full-time duty at second base after Asdrubal Cabrera was sent down to work on his hitting and Josh Barfield got hurt. With Barfield, DeRosa, and now Graffanino on the roster, the Indians have enough depth to handle second, but Carroll would have been the first option to play every day had Cabrera been out for a couple weeks.

Tony Graffanino should fit almost perfectly into Carroll's role, though he isn't the defender Carroll is. Tony can play every infield position, but I see his primary responsibility as backing up DeRosa at third and Cabrera at second. He's a better hitter than Carroll, and could be used in late inning matchups as a counter-move to a LOOGY entering the ballgame.

Josh Barfield shouldn't see any increase in at-bats or playing time in the field, since Graffanino can do everything Carroll could do.

Handicapping the Field

afh4 — Fri, 27 Mar 2009 19:13:50 -0000

As Spring Training wears on, how I am amusing myself.

Click the image for a larger version.