SB Nation - Oakland Athletics

Fantasy Baseball: 2009 xFIP Leaders and Some 2010 Sleepers

raygu — Thu, 17 Dec 2009 14:32:02 -0000

Recently, Fangraphs has teamed up with The Hardball Times to include the THT pitching stat called Expected Fielding Independent Pitching, or xFIP.
xFIP is Expected Fielding Independent Pitching. This is an experimental stat that adjusts and "normalizes" the home run component. Research has shown that home runs allowed are pretty much a function of flyballs allowed and home park, so xFIP is based on the average number of home runs allowed per outfield fly. <strong>Theoretically, this should be a better predicter of a pitcher's future ERA</strong>

With that said, here are the 2009 xFIP leaders:

Name	K/9	BB/9	K/BB	HR/9	WHIP	BABIP	LOB%	ERA	FIP	xFIP	E-X
Javier Vazquez	9.77	1.81	5.41	0.82	1.03	0.297	76.60%	2.87	2.77	2.82	0.05
Tim Lincecum	10.42	2.72	3.84	0.4	1.05	0.297	75.90%	2.48	2.34	2.87	-0.39
Roy Halladay	7.83	1.32	5.94	0.83	1.13	0.313	79.00%	2.79	3.06	3.05	-0.26
Dan Haren	8.75	1.49	5.87	1.06	1	0.28	77.00%	3.14	3.23	3.08	0.06
Jon Lester	9.96	2.83	3.52	0.89	1.23	0.323	76.90%	3.41	3.15	3.13	0.28
Zack Greinke	9.5	2	4.75	0.43	1.07	0.313	79.30%	2.16	2.33	3.15	-0.99
Justin Verlander	10.09	2.36	4.27	0.75	1.18	0.328	72.70%	3.45	2.8	3.26	0.19
Ricky Nolasco	9.49	2.14	4.43	1.12	1.25	0.336	61.00%	5.06	3.35	3.28	1.78
Josh Beckett	8.43	2.33	3.62	1.06	1.19	0.302	71.60%	3.86	3.63	3.35	0.51
Adam Wainwright	8.19	2.55	3.21	0.66	1.21	0.309	80.40%	2.63	3.11	3.36	-0.73

Here are some sleepers for 2010 based on the difference between their 2009 ERA and xFIP:

Name	K/9	BB/9	K/BB	HR/9	WHIP	BABIP	LOB%	ERA	FIP	xFIP	E-X
Ricky Nolasco	9.49	2.14	4.43	1.12	1.25	0.336	61.00%	5.06	3.35	3.28	1.78
Carl Pavano	6.64	1.76	3.77	1.17	1.37	0.335	66.10%	5.1	4	3.96	1.14
Livan Hernandez	5	3.28	1.52	0.93	1.56	0.326	67.30%	5.44	4.44	4.78	0.66
Cole Hamels	7.81	2	3.91	1.12	1.29	0.325	72.10%	4.32	3.72	3.69	0.63
Jorge de la Rosa	9.39	4.04	2.33	0.97	1.38	0.316	71.60%	4.38	3.91	3.76	0.62
Jason Hammel	6.78	2.14	3.17	0.87	1.39	0.337	69.50%	4.33	3.71	3.81	0.52
Mike Pelfrey	5.22	3.22	1.62	0.88	1.51	0.321	66.70%	5.03	4.39	4.52	0.51
Josh Beckett	8.43	2.33	3.62	1.06	1.19	0.302	71.60%	3.86	3.63	3.35	0.51
Derek Lowe	5.13	2.91	1.76	0.74	1.52	0.33	68.70%	4.67	4.06	4.19	0.48
Brett Anderson	7.7	2.31	3.33	1.03	1.28	0.317	67.00%	4.06	3.69	3.61	0.45

You can see there is a correlation between high BABIP, low LOB% and the E-X column. The E-X column takes the difference between the putcher's ERA and his xFIP. I have written about previously, how Ricky Nolasco could be a very undervalued pitcher come draft day 2010. I have him in the UBA league at $10, but risk losing him if I don't give him a raise. This table screams to give him a raise, but I am not so sure.

Poll

Should I give Nolasco a $5 raise in 2010?

An Attempt to Quantify the Division, beta edition

Matthew — Thu, 17 Dec 2009 04:25:14 -0000

It's great to know how the Mariners' projected team is stacking up, but ultimately we do not play in a vacuum but in a four-team division. In order to establish some relativity to our discussions, I went about compiling a version of the sheet that Jeff posted below for the other three teams.

First the caveats. This is a gross estimation. I am nowhere near as knowledgeable about those teams as I am about the Mariners and thus projecting depth charts was a lot tougher. That being said, most of the fringey decisions (is Macier Izturis or Brandon Wood the starter at 3B for the Angels?) do not represent much variance in terms of projected production. When I wasn't sure, I defaulted to the player with the better projection.

As for the following, they are a combination of CHONE and me glancing at past history in WAR, tRA, UZR and the like in order to determine what I thought felt about right. These are not precise, but I am pretty comfortable thinking that I overshot as much as I undershot. I am also including my own version for the Mariners, which I did independently of Jeff's.

If you have any corrections to offer, please do so in the comments. If you do it politely, you'll be listened to.

THE ANGELS

POS	Player	WAR	POS	Player	WAR
C	Napoli	3.5	SP	Santana	2.5
1B	Morales	3	SP	Weaver	3.5
2B	Kendrick	2.5	SP	Saunders	2
3B	Izturis	2	SP	Kazmir	2.5
SS	Aybar	2.5	SP	Palmer	1
LF	Rivera	2	CL	Fuentes	0.5
CF	Hunter	3.25	Pen	Assorted	1.5
RF	Abreu	2	TOTAL	-	13.5
DH	Matsui	2
Bench	Assorted	1
TOTAL	-	23.75

THE ATHLETICS

POS	Player	WAR	POS	Player	WAR
C	Suzuki	3	SP	Braden	2.25
1B	Barton	1	SP	Anderson	3.5
2B	Ellis	2	SP	Gonzalez	1.5
3B	Chavez	1	SP	Mazzaro	1
SS	Pennington	1	SP	Outman	1.25
LF	Buck	1	CL	Bailey	1
CF	Davis	2	Pen	Assorted	3
RF	Sweeney	2.5	TOTAL	-	13.5
DH	Fox	1
Bench	Assorted	0.5
TOTAL	-	15

THE MARINERS

POS	Player	WAR	POS	Player	WAR
C	Johnson	0.5	SP	Felix	5
1B	Hannahan	1	SP	Lee	5.5
2B	Lopez	2	SP	RRS	2
3B	Figgins	3	SP	Snell	1
SS	Wilson	2	SP	Morrow	1
LF	Saunders	1.5	CL	Aardsma	1
CF	Gutierrez	4	Pen	Assorted	1
RF	Ichiro!	4	TOTAL	-	16.5
DH	Carp	1
Bench	Assorted	1
TOTAL	-	20

THE RANGERS

POS	Player	WAR	POS	Player	WAR
C	Teagarden	0.5	SP	Harden	3
1B	Davis	0	SP	Feldman	2.5
2B	Kinsler	4	SP	Feliz/Holland	3.5
3B	Young	3	SP	Hunter	1.5
SS	Andrus	3	SP	McCarthy	1
LF	Murphy	1.5	CL	Francisco	1
CF	Hamilton	3	Pen	Assorted	2
RF	Cruz	3.5	TOTAL	-	14.5
DH	Borbon	1
Bench	Assorted	1
TOTAL	-	20.5

THE STANDINGS

	hWAR	pWAR	Proj. Wins
ANAHEIM	23.75	13.5	85.25
SEATTLE	20	16.5	84.5
TEXAS	20.5	14.5	83
OAKLAND	15	13.5	76.5

Some notes:

-The Athletics project to spread a lot of innings around 7-8 starters, hence the higher WAR in their assorted pen.
-I combined Feliz and Holland into one slot since I figure they'll total out to about 200 innings.

Obviously, the offseason is nowhere near complete and teams are still filling holes. That is why the WAR totals here are lower than you'd expect. The Angels are 9 wins below their 2009 total, the A's 8 wins, the Mariners 1 win and the Rangers 5 wins. It's unlikely that all four teams (though not impossible since all four were above average in 2009) take a step backward in 2010. Still, hopefully this can provide a starting point for us to figure out a better estimate for the division as the winter progresses.

Wallace Becomes Taylor? Emotionally Confusing But Objectively Positive

Nico — Wed, 16 Dec 2009 02:15:04 -0000

More photos » by Jeff Roberson - AP

I guess 3B was always going to be a stretch for Wallace.

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First of all, the A's should at least have taken the opportunity to acquire someone named Michael Gromit. But I suppose Michael Taylor will do, seeing as he actually exists and appears to be quite the toolsy young man. With this post, I address three separate issues: How it felt, emotionally, to learn of this trade, how the trade looks to me, objectively, and how I predict the A's will move forward from here.

Emotionally, my first reaction when I heard about the (presumed) trade was, "Noooooo!" because I have spent the last year thinking about "Carter, Wallace, and Cardenas." That's been my mantra. I know, shocking that I haven't been focused on "Kennedy, Eveland, and Hairston," but I haven't been. What got me through the 2009 season, and was going to sustain me as long as need be in 2010? "Carter, Wallace, and Cardenas."

The A's haven't had a really good hitter come up for so long, and I was looking forward to seeing Wallace and the sweet swing I've heard so much about. So I can't help but have a visceral reaction of disappointment to learn that his Oakland A's career will fall 2 games short of one Ryan Langerhans.

Objectively, though, I like the trade. The odds are better than not that Wallace's future is not on the left side of the infield, though frankly I will follow his career with true fascination because opinions on his defensive potential are so varied. And for the A's to trade a 1Bman or DH who can hit, for an OFer who can hit -- and run, and play defense -- is simply a good deal.

The more I read about Taylor, the more excited I am. Here's a guy who appears to have the profile of Jermaine Dye and the potential to be better (or the same, or worse -- that's the thing about a prospect). He is just the kind of player Beane has been saying he's looking for this Winter: 23, full of tools, a potential impact player who, if he is good, could be with the A's for many years alongside the core of Suzuki, Sweeney, Barton, Anderson, Cahill, Bailey, Carter, Cardenas...

What's Next? I realize that Fox and McPherson might see some time at 3B and that Chavez will be Plan A for as long as it's possible, but I have to think the A's are now in a position to deal from the OF and address the infield.

I think Ryan Sweeney will be an everyday RFer, because he was so good defensively, and the A's clearly believe in him, that I don't see them moving him to another team or moving him out of RF. I think Rajai Davis will be the CFer, because he's pretty cheap, and gives you guaranteed good defense at a key defensive position. I think if not Opening Day, then soon after, Michael Taylor will be the LFer -- giving the A's, if they keep those three, a really good defensive OF. Carter starts at AAA, Cunningham is either 4th OFer or starts at AAA, and Hairston is either a 4th OFer, or is traded if there's interest.

Buck is trade bait. Might the Tigers, having shed Curtis Granderson, be interested in a cheap, LH OFer like Buck? Perhaps -- depends on whether they think he's any good. The A's should go after (I may have mentioned this once or twice before) Brandon Inge!!!!!!, offering Buck, or Hairston, as part of a trade that is largely a salary dump for Detroit, but is a chance to fill a real need for Oakland.

Maybe you end up with this lineup in April or May, with Carter on the way to make things really interesting:

Davis - CF
Barton - 1B
Sweeney - RF
Fox/McPherson - DH
Suzuki - C
Taylor - LF
Inge - 3B
Ellis - 2B
Pennington - SS

We're getting there, folks. And it's only December 15th...

Blue Jays Trade Michael Taylor to Athletics for Brett Wallace

R.J. Anderson — Tue, 15 Dec 2009 19:43:45 -0000

Michael Taylor will turn 24 on Saturday. Yesterday, he was part of a package sent to the Toronto Blue Jays in exchange for starting pitcher Roy Halladay. Hopefully none of his family or friends went out and bought Blue Jays gear for his celebration, because Taylor is no longer with organization. Instead, he will wear the green and gold of Oakland next season as Toronto swapped him out with "third" baseman Brett Wallace.

Turnaround deals like this involving Billy Beane invoke memories of Moneyball scenes from the past with him edging on Omar Minaya to land some fat third baseman named Youkilis before flipping him to Oakland. Either this swap had been discussed before hand or Toronto worked at rapid pace while Halladay went suit-shopping for his introductory press conference.

As mentioned, Taylor is currently 23 and formerly a Stanford attendee who stands around 6'6" and weighs 250 pounds. Baseball America describes him as "A physical specimen", which is a kind way of saying he sticks out in a crowd of normal folk. The most endearing skill Taylor possesses is his power. In 128 Triple-A plate appearances - small sample, indeed - Taylor's ISO was .209; in 363 Double-A plate appearances it was .236 and even before then, in High-A it was .230. The man has the ability to crush baseballs. Defensively he has a good arm but, like his offensive game, the finer things need developing.

By comparison, the 6'1", 245 pound Wallace is small. Not many things human can make Wallace look small, but Taylor is one of them. Wallace's position is listed at third base, but that seems rather unlikely to be the case. Wallace is supposedly more polished at the plate than Taylor, but I'm not sure how much of that is true. Wallace spent most of last season in Triple-A and had a .203 ISO once joining the Cardinals. Scouts seem to like his plate approach more than Taylor's, but their walk and strikeout rates suggest Taylor does more of the former and less of the latter.

The Jays definitely need some positional players. The question is whether Wallace is a better fit than Taylor, and honestly I'm not sure. If they think Wallace can play an okay third, then fine, but otherwise their roster already holds a DH (Adam Lind) a center fielder who shouldn't play center (Vernon Wells), a corner outfielder (Travis Snider), and a first baseman (Lyle Overbay) and while Taylor would be restricted to the other corner, Wallace should probably only play first.

One thing you can throw out the window about the new Jays front office is any doubts about their willingness to pull the trigger.

Aroldis and the Astros? A Quick Scouting Report

davoag — Tue, 15 Dec 2009 19:00:20 -0000

More photos » by Peter Morgan - AP

So, basically, this whole defection thing was just a way to get out of changing diapers, Aroldis?

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Cuban defector* and left-handed pitcher Aroldis Chapman is staging a workout somewhere in Houston today. Chapman left behind his entire family, including a young wife and infant son in Cuba to get a chance to play baseball in the United States. While the location of the workout remains secret, teams are lining up to get a look at the 21-year old, including Ed Wade and Co. While I highly doubt the Astros will sign Chapman, I thought it prudent to write up a short scouting report on him just in case. After all, the workout IS in Houston (mainly because Chapman's agents, the Hendricks brothers, work here).

*Sub-question: If baseball moves to internationalize the draft, what happens with the Cubans? I asked Baseball America's Ben Badler on Twitter and he thought it would be restricted to just certain countries. This article, though, talks about blowing the doors off completely. I'm not sure I agree with that, but I'm open to other opinions.

Here's the first of two YouTube videos I was able to find on Chapman. This one is about 10 minutes, though it really should have been edited down a bit. This one is also about 10 minutes long, but is apparently of an All-Star game in Cuba to select the national team. Chapman is featured in about half of the video. Finally, here's a short video with various pictures of Chapman's delivery.

What can you see?

Let's start with the good:

Chapman definitely generates the power behind his fastball through his lower body. Watch both his windup and his stretch; each time, he uses that powerful leg kick to generate a ton of power.
He also has a slight pause at the top of his windup which can definitely be deceiving for hitters.
Chapman showed off three pitches that I saw, a 12-6 curveball, his fastball and what looked to be a slider. That last one may have been a screwball, but since he only threw one, I couldn't be sure.
Chapman's lower body seems to land in a good position, with his front foot coming down relatively softly. He falls off towards the third base side pretty heavily, but appears to be in good fielding position once he finishes his pitch.
He also doesn't appear to rely on the Inverted W when the throws, taking out one injury risk from the picture.

What about the bad?

His delivery wasn't very repeatable. Chapman threw with three different arm angles, depending on the pitch. His curveball, in fact, came almost directly over the top while his fastball sat at a low 3/4 delivery slot. That big a chance will be noticed at the big league level.
The other part of his velocity on that fastball came as part of an extended arm whip. As you can see from this post at another fine SBNation blog, Driveline Mechanics, the difference between Randy Johnson and Madison Bumgardner is that pronation of the arm across the body. Chapman's delivery brings his arm even further across his body than Bumgardner's, which is not a good sign.
I'm also concerned that his elbow flies out in front of the ball in his delivery at some points. I couldn't see this on every pitch, but I did pick up on it four or five times through the two videos. This puts added stress on his arm and could lead to elbow injuries down the road.

All in all, Chapman does look impressive. His fastball looks at fast as you've heard and appears to have some late life on it as well. His curveball is better than I'd anticipated, but its telling that Chapman doesn't throw it more. I'm very concerned about his mechanics, though, and could see him having an arm injury of some sort before he hits 27.

So what teams are looking at Chapman? The Red Sox have reportedly already made him an offer, while the Yankees, Angels, Twins and Athletics are also interested. Brian McTaggart doesn't think the Astros have the money to be a real player for the 22-year old, but who knows? Drayton does like those splashy moves.

If Boston's offer came in at 15.5 million on a major league contract, I'd expect Chapman to sign for somewhere around 20-25 million. Some team is going to see a lefty throwing 100 mph and have visions of Randy Johnson dance in their heads. Unfortunately, with Chapman's mechanics, he likely won't hold up for half as long as The Big Unit.

Excerpt: Evaluating Baseball's Managers on Tony La Russa

DanUpBaby — Tue, 15 Dec 2009 11:13:56 -0000

What's a guy have to do to get on this cover?

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A week and a half ago we did a mini-review of what Chris Jaffe's forthcoming Evaluating Baseball's Managers had to say about Cardinals managers. Now, the long-promised excerpt: a look at our very own Tony La Russa's managerial career.

Excerpt housework: the tendencies database Jaffe refers to is defined and discussed at this link; the book covers the years 1876-2008. In the interest of full disclosure, I have received no compensation or freebies on the occasion of publishing this excerpt, although I do have a copy of these exact words in .doc format.

Blog housework: Some reasoned thoughts about the Matt Holliday discussion when I'm feeling reasoned about it, or as news breaks. To be brief: I would love to have Matt Holliday, who represents the best-case scenario for the 2010 Cardinals, but if eight years—eight years! He will be 37! I will be 30! Rylee Rasmus will be eight!—and $128 million doesn't do it for him I can't imagine he'll find any welcoming market except New York.

I can't think of many players who are Ten Year guys—more than seven seems like a commitment the Cardinals should be making exclusively to players with Musial-derived nicknames.

Evaluating Baseball's Managers — Tony La Russa

by Chris Jaffe

Tony La Russa

W/L Record: 2,461-2,146 (.534)

Birnbaum Database: +1,012 runs

Individual Hitters: +240 runs

Individual Pitchers: +455 runs

Pythagenpat Difference: +138 runs

Team Offense: +297 runs

Team Defense: -118 runs

Team Characteristics: LaRussa likes the decision-making parts of the game - pinch hitters, bringing in relievers, bunting, stealing bases. However, he avoids intentional walks. His teams are pretty well rounded as they either score above average in nearly all the categories in the Birnbaum Database, or at least fare only slightly worse than a typical team.

Appropriately for someone who finished law school and passed the bar exam, LaRussa has a reputation as one of baseball's smartest managers. The Tendencies Database can test that. For example, look at one part of the job - filling out the lineup card. Thanks to Retrosheet, information on batting orders exists for all teams in the last half-century. Based on that, one can see how LaRussa fares versus other skippers.

There are three main parts of any lineup. The top two slots of the order are supposed to get on base. After them, the team's best hitters are supposed to drive them in while batting in the heart of the order, generally slots three to six. Finally, the worst hitters usually end up at the bottom of the order, where they will collect fewer plate appearances. Baseball-Reference.com makes studying these Retrosheet-generated splits much easier by providing combined offensive data for these three groups for all teams.

On base percentage is the best metric to measure top of the order hitters because their main job is to get on base. Specifically, for reasons mentioned in last chapter's Sparky Anderson commentary, take the cumulative OBP of the two top slots and divide it by the team's overall OBP. For the remaining two sections, the stat of choice is tOPS+, a Baseball-Reference invention that compares the OPS for a given split compared to the team's overall OPS. If a team with an 800 OPS had an OPS of 1200 from the heart of its order, they would have a tOPS+ of 150 because the split was 50% better than the squad as a whole. For the middle of the order, a higher tOPS+ indicates the manager did a good job filling out his lineup card. A lower tOPS+ for the bottom of the order is desired because that means he made sure his worst hitters were in the appropriate slots. Put all three of these splits through the Tendencies Database, add the results together, and determine who is best at creating batting orders.

However, a snag affects this plan. Everyone puts their best hitters in the heart of the order. That is not the case in the top or bottom of the order as some managers put speedsters who cannot steal first in the leadoff slot or walk machines at the bottom of the order, but every manager treats the middle the same. Ranking tOPS+ for the 3-6 hitters simply determines which clubs had the most impressive offensive core. There is little reason to give someone credit for realizing Barry Bonds should not bat eighth.

That split tells us little about managers, but the others can be quite illuminating. Add them together and see who has done the best job with a pencil and empty lineup card. This is not a perfect system, but it works tolerably well.

**Best job creating a batting order**
Bill Virdon	1.455
Tony La Russa	1.511
Sparky Anderson	1.610
Red Schoendienst	1.612
Earl Weaver	1.663
John McNamara	1.663

Virdon bests LaRussa, but they both have a comfortable lead on anyone else.

Also, LaRussa has a pet strategy with his batting orders that further shows he knows what he is doing: batting the pitcher eighth. While this confounds baseball tradition, a study in The Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball, Andy Dolphin, Mitchel Lichtman, and Tom Tango revealed that placing the pitcher eighth in the batting order creates runs for a team. Those researchers have some problems with LaRussa's lineups (they think the fourth- or fifth-best hitter belongs in the #3 hole, where LaRussa puts Mark McGwire and Albert Pujols) but they agree with his signature batting order maneuver.

Do not let his genius reputation fool you, though. At heart, Tony LaRussa is a redass. Normally people associate the term "redass" with a manager like Larry Bowa, who knows only one gear - full steam ahead, which can wear a team down. LaRussa performs an internal balancing act between his heart and head. In other words he continually fights an internal battle between the burning desire to push for victory in every game with the recognition of long-term interests. Essentially, he embodies a redass version of the serenity prayer - he has the desire to push for it every game, the willpower to hold back as needed, and the intelligence to know when to push and when to hold back. One story about LaRussa demonstrated the stress this inner war placed on him. In mid-2007, LaRussa told reporters he was not about to retire because there were still games "when you've got a five-run lead, when it's tense and I can't swallow. I've got a headache, and I'm afraid I'm going to throw up. You only feel this stuff because you're anxious about the outcome." That is what happens when a person continually reins himself in.

LaRussa wants his players to feel the same drive. If one lacks that passion, even if it is a star like Scott Rolen or J. D. Drew, LaRussa cannot abide him. He sent both packing, and has had as many feuds with players as any prominent manager in recent times. In dealing with a particular player these feuds may be shortsighted, but they send a message to the rest of the team. If Scott Rolen is not safe, everyone else knows they need to play relentlessly. This ensures LaRussa's teams give their maximum effort.

In this regard, a parallel exists between Tony LaRussa and Joe McCarthy. The former Yankees skipper also strongly emphasized proper conduct while possessing a deep desire to win. Even as a rookie skipper, McCarty dumped all-time great Pete Alexander for his approach to the game. Furthermore, McCarthy, like LaRussa, also experienced head-vs.-heart conflict. McCarthy handled it by drinking his way into alcoholism. More recently, authorities arrested LaRussa in early 2007 for driving while intoxicated. It is difficult to cope with the internal pressure for decades.

Nonetheless, both managers consistently had their teams play as well as possible. In 30 years, LaRussa ran only one last place team, while overseeing eleven first place squads. In fact, in full seasons his teams have had the best record in the league more times than they had losing records (seven to six). Such an achievement requires talented players, but it also demands a manager who handles them appropriately. LaRussa has done a good job finding the best roles for his players, making sure everyone knows their job, and performs their best.

The most striking example of LaRussa's ability to get the most out of his players occurred in Oakland, where he assembled the greatest bullpen in baseball history from 1988-90. In that three-year period, Oakland's relievers posted a combined ERA of 2.60. In contrast, the best single season ERA by any other AL relief unit in that span was 2.82 by the 1988 Brewers. The chart compares Oakland's bullpens to the rest of the AL in defense-independent stats walks, strikeouts, and home runs allowed from 1988-90. Oakland's domination is obvious.

Bullpens	BB/9	K/9	HR/9
Oakland	3.04	6.51	0.52
The Rest	3.67	6.10	0.75

This relief corps's performance was especially remarkable because its core members were poorly regarded prior to arriving in Oakland. The club had three bullpen mainstays in those years: Dennis Eckersley, Rick Honeycutt, and Gene Nelson. Both Eckersley and Honeycutt appeared to be washed up starters before LaRussa moved them to the bullpen. Honeycutt was so poorly thought of that Oakland acquired him for a player to be named later. Nelson previously played for LaRussa in Chicago, and had done adequately, but no more than that. The Sox shipped him along with another player to Oakland for a forgettable middle infielder. The A's augmented this bunch with more of the league's unwanted. Oakland swiped Joe Klink, who had a great year for them in 1990, from Minnesota for a minor league player-to-be-named-later. Mike Norris, a starter for Billy Martin in the early 1980s A's, was an internal reclamation project who also prospered in 1990. LaRussa converted Eric Plunk from a flop starter into a solid reliever.

With these castoffs, LaRussa constructed a bullpen that was not only spectacularly effective, but extremely influential. He used more specialized roles for his relief pitcher than had been common, subsequently affecting how other teams construct and utilize their bullpens. This opens up several thorny questions. Some contend that LaRussa's impact on contemporary bullpen usage is a mark against him. Specialization may have done more harm than good because it causes contemporary relief aces, nominally the best arms in the bullpen, to be used far less than the firemen of yore. However, one should not automatically assume that LaRussa was as influential in this area as conventional wisdom makes him out to be. As noted earlier in this chapter, Bobby Cox also helped create hyper-specialized relievers.

To examine the issue further, first one needs to tackle the issue of LaRussa's influence before assigning credit or blame. When the record is examined, the 1988-90 A's bullpen appears to have been a way-station between how relievers were used and how they have since been handled. Relief aces were already throwing fewer innings as managers like Cox reduced innings per appearance. For instance, whereas four closers threw over 100 innings in 1985 and five more did so in 1986, none tossed that many in 1987 - only three broke 90 innings. Still, the A's amplified this trend. Nothing breeds imitation like success and Oakland's glory run provided the most successful bullpen in baseball history. Innings per relief outing dropped by 20% in the AL from 1987-93. That was the sharpest reduction in league history, and it came when LaRussa's bullpen was at its height. Still, reliever roles were not as starkly defined then as they later became. Eckersley entered the game in the eighth inning twenty times a year from 1988 to 1990, far more than a present day closer would. LaRussa pointed the way forward and others went even further along.

Since LaRussa had an impact, that leads to the next question: was his influence benign or malignant? As critics of the 21st century bullpen usage rightly note, current relief aces throw considerably fewer innings than their pre-Eckersley ancestors. Instead of throwing 100 innings or more, contemporary closers are likely to toss around 60. It seems counterintuitive that an approach that limits the usage of the bullpen's most important player would be beneficial.

While true, the old-fashioned system featured a noticeable downside. If a team brought in its fireman to throw a few innings, he could not pitch for the next day or two. The current approach increases managerial flexibility, allowing closers to be available to close more games. Also, by minimizing the quantity of innings, managers can maximize quality of innings thrown from the most important bullpen arm. In a study in his book Winners, Dayn Perry argued modern closers are actually better leveraged than their predecessors. This flies in the face of a main criticism of current bullpen usage. People remember how Goose Gossage or Mike Marshall came into the seventh inning of tie games with the bases loaded and help the team out while moderns hold three-run leads in the ninth. Both scenarios existed, but neither described a typical outing for relief aces before or after Eckersley. Many seventh inning appearances from the 1970s did not come in highly dangerous scenarios and current closers hold plenty of one-run leads.

Ultimately, however, a moderate uptick in improved leveraging does not necessarily account for a considerable drop in innings. Though it has its advantages, the Oakland bullpen lessens the relief ace's importance.

However, paradoxical as it might sound, the new model bullpen does a better overall job utilizing the entire relief corps. The old version made sense provided a club had one trustworthy reliever, but normally a gigantic difference in quality between the two top arms in a bullpen does not exist. Thus if a manager spreads out the most important innings between them, and does it in a way that allows them to be called on more frequently, that helps his team's overall performance in close and late situations. Reserving roles by inning might be arbitrary and reductionist, but it has the advantage of ensuring that pitchers know their particular roles. If ever a team should have adopted this reliever strategy, it was LaRussa's Athletics. Since they featured numerous relievers pitching great, spreading out the key innings amongst them was sensible. LaRussa's handling of the Oakland relief corps was both cause and effect of their incredible quality.

Though that great bullpen was the most obvious example of LaRussa adeptly handling his talent, it was not the only one. A more recent example came with the 2008 Cardinals. St. Louis experienced a terrific stretch in the mid-2000s built around a core of Albert Pujols, Jim Edmonds, Scott Rolen, and Chris Carpenter. By 2008, only Pujols remained (well, St. Louis still had Carpenter but he was too badly injured to be of any value). The team especially lacked dependable starting pitchers. They featured mediocre journeyman Kyle Lohse, and reclamation project Joel Pineiro backed up by two converted relievers - Braden Looper and Todd Wellemeyer. Their most reliable hurler was Adam Wainwright, a 26-year-old with only 32 major league starts in his career. That was a prayer, not a stable starting rotation. LaRussa made it work, and the Cards ended the year with an unexpectedly strong 86-76 record despite playing in the NL's toughest division.

LaRussa has made a career of getting more than one would expect from his starters. He had numerous quality staffs despite rarely having elite starting pitchers. Chris Carpenter had a great stretch, but it was brief before injuries felled him. Besides, though Carpenter had been promising, he had never established himself before joining St. Louis. Tom Seaver is the only established great pitcher LaRussa has ever had, but he was at the end of his career when he came to LaRussa's White Sox. LaRussa is more likely to get good production from veteran pitchers who never wowed anyone before. The prototypical LaRussa success story was Dave Stewart. A struggling reliever before LaRussa got a hold of him, Stewart posted four consecutive twenty-win seasons for the A's. LaRussa also oversaw revivals from Darryl Kile, Woody Williams, Kent Bottenfield, Mike Moore, Floyd Bannister, Garrett Stephenson, Todd Stottlemyre, Jason Marquis, Jeff Suppan, and Bob Welch.

However, LaRussa has not had much success with young pitchers. The White Sox featured a flock of young arms emerge under him, almost all of who had disappointing careers. While drug addiction took their toll on Cy Young winner LaMarr Hoyt, and Britt Burns's career foundered due to a degenerative hip, Richard Dotson, who went 22-7 in 1983 at age 24, blew out his arm. Ross Baumgarten earned some Rookie of the Year votes in 1979, but won only seven more games in his career. Super-prospect Todd Van Poppel was a disaster in Oakland. Bud Smith came up with the Cards in 2001 and despite throwing a no-hitter, was out of baseball by his 23rd birthday. Matt Morris was runner-up in the Rookie of the Year voting in 1997, and survived an arm injury to win 22 games in 2001, but then faded out. Rick Ankiel suffered an epic mental meltdown in the 2000 playoffs, and his pitching career never recovered.

Tony LaRussa is not only baseball's best manager since Joe McCarthy, but he is on the verge of doing something unthinkable - passing John McGraw on the all-time wins list. LaRussa merely needs to survive four more seasons, averaging 76 wins per campaign. His teams won 78 or more games in each of the last nine years.

tuesday thoughts: a hazy shade of winter meetings

emperor nobody — Tue, 15 Dec 2009 09:34:27 -0000

I'm sorry, I misheard you. Did you say Oakland still has a baseball team?

and the eager pack lift up their pitchers they carry all they lackey to the sox well captain obvious at least the slegs are cryin who is their ace now colonel saunders aw the league'll fry his nuggets up nice too bad billy bob thornton doesn't live in boston man there's a casting move for the hollywood version except for the screenplay john's dialogue should only consist of one syllable words for purposes of historical accuracy speaking of virgins these Marineros on lookout landing are after about 72 of em right now because like a flock of seagulls they are living in heaven flash forward to 2010 and cliff lee has just thrown his third consecutive no-hitter against oakland he was bored sports fans so for this one he threw blindfolded and righthanded so the a's hitters might have half a chance news flash from the en time machine they didn't and if that wasn't enough reverse schadenfraude for one ten minute stretch here's rich "can't tell the coach he's hurt cuz it's too" harden reunited with ron washington and it feels so good at least until the back goes out and the arm falls off again kinda sucks we will have to face the guy ~~7 6~~ ~~5 4~~ 3 uh twice next season oh wtf sandy fookin koufax'd get toasted in that ballpark the rangers should move the fences back to fort worth if they ever wanna win anything what else what else goddammit i have me a sweet tooth and i want some cupcakes why won't ebeanezer scrooge put some tasty xmas cupcakes in my stocking come on billy get it done there's opposing lineups and postgame buffet spreads to annihilate don't we need someone comin back with some hardware on the hand to motivate the up and comin youngsters to excellence oops i forgot we don't win 80 games again until bart goes to san jose this team's seemingly intentional obsolescence is starting to grate on my very last nerve fiber like freddie krueger nails on ten thousand blackboards exactly how do we plan on getting more than 300 a night at the Coli with a team like this did i miss something did jake "less reliable offense than michael j" fox change the name to jimmie and add an x did aaron "sylvia" miles receive henry aaron's brain in a miraculous medical procedure i missed due to the fact that all the stories on yahoo news are about what haircut miley cyrus got is the secret plan to make cust manager and draw on his life experience at baseball camp teaching uncoordinated kids to hit these are the questions that try men's souls shit if you can't get me blanton back can i at least have bobby abreu so we'll have one solitary proven threat to do anything worth watching in the lineup fuck i'd take guerrero just so when we went on the road people might actually recognize any of our players this team is like the baseball equivalent of george orwell we are rebuilding we have always been rebuilding we will always be at war with east scioscia miguel tejada bobblehead futures are up a quarter of a quarter of a quarter percent next they'll put subliminals into all the Coliseum signage that say sleep obey marry and reproduce buy tickets don't ask questions like john carpenter's they live only the aliens are the principal owner and his intergalactic cabal from planet southbay

Fox, Miles, Cassevah, Vaughan: An Inside Scouting Report

Nico — Mon, 14 Dec 2009 02:00:17 -0000

Now Media Relations director for the Fresno Grizzlies, Noah Frank was with the Chicago Cubs in 2008, then in the Texas League (with the San Antonio Missions) in 2009. As a result, Noah had a chance to become familiar with Jake Fox, Aaron Miles, Bobby Cassevah, and Beau Vaughan, recent A's acquisitions through trade and the Rule 5 drafts. Here is Noah's "up close" analysis of these newest additions to the A's puzzle...

Greetings, AN. I am a long-time A's fan, raised in the East Bay, and have been working in professional baseball the last several years. I know Nico from my time in Berkeley, and when I saw the recent flurry of player movement involving players that I have recently seen first-hand, I thought I might be able to contribute some insight and shed some light on the newest members of the Green and Gold.

Specifically, I worked for the Cubs in '08 and was in charge of compiling the Minor League Report, so I got a heavy dose of Jake Fox that year. In '09 I worked as a Media Director in the Texas League and saw both Bobby Cassevah and Beau Vaughan up close. I also got to hear what all the Big League scouts thought of them in the press box, so I feel like I have a pretty good handle on what they have to offer.

In 2008 Fox, after a slow start in Iowa and a demotion back to AA-Tennessee, came on strong and tore up the Southern League at ages 25/26. He really turned it on late, going .324/.383/.676 with 9 HR in July and .362/.465/.695 with 10 HR in August. While admittedly old for AA ball at that point, it seemed like he might have finally found his groove after under-achieving throughout his minor league career. Sure enough, he came out red hot in '09 with Iowa, going .409/.495/.841 with 17 bombs in just 45 games, earning his promotion to the bigs.

A classic late bloomer, my discussions with our baseball ops guys of which older Cubs' prospect would still have a productive career was always between Fox and Micah Hoffpauir. While I loved Hoffpauir (and still do), they always seemed to have a soft spot for Fox. While the power has always been there for Jake, the plate discipline has finally come along for the ride the last couple years. Fox's highest year-long OBP had been .357 in the Florida State League in '05 before his turnaround in '08 and '09.

Fox also offers the A's another interesting piece -- he is a right-handed power hitter who has consistently performed better against right-handed pitching, both for average and power, throughout his career. His ability to be at least serviceable defensively in the corner outfields as well as the corner infields should allow the A's to move him around and shape the rest of their lineups according to specific pitching matchups. All in all, I like the pick-up, although I'm unimpressed with Aaron Miles in almost every way, and wish the A's could have gotten a better second piece.

As for Cassevah and Vaughan, I saw them both a couple times last year in the Texas League. Cassevah was really impressive for much of the year, and was on quite a roll when he came to San Antonio as the proud owner of a 12.2 inning scoreless streak. However, he did not retire any of the six batters he faced that night, giving up four hits and walking two, watching all six runs score.

That led to a poor finish for Cassevah, as his control seemed to get away from him late in the year. It put a damper on what was, overall, a very nice year out of the 'pen. Prior to that game in SA, he carried a 2.11 ERA and a .216 BAA with better than a 3.8:1 GO/AO rate. The biggest question mark for the now 24-year-old will be his BB:K rate. If he can keep the walks down, he is a good enough control/ground ball pitcher to be effective in middle relief.

Vaughan bounced back-and-forth between Double-A and Triple-A, looking far more impressive in Frisco than he did in Oklahoma City. While he wasn't bad at the higher level, he was even more dominant than his basic numbers showed in the Texas League. In 18 appearances he was 3-0 with eight saves and a 2.35 ERA, limiting opponents to just a .198 BAA. He allowed only a single homerun and walked just three while fanning 20 over that span with a good mix of pitches.

While he's a pretty big guy (6'4" 230 when drafted, and he's added weight since), and he's certainly an old prospect at 28, Vaughan could be a nice piece of the bullpen puzzle for the A's. In addition, he brings a Swisher-esque personality that Oakland has been lacking since, well, the departure of Swisher. It will be nice to get a little more color back in the clubhouse.

I hope that gives you a little better feel of what to expect from the newest Oakland A's.

- Noah

P.S. After watching Midland dominate the TL this year (with and without Chris Carter), once all the hitting joins the young pitching I think it may be the A's year in 2011.

A's Off-Season Pattern: It's ALWAYS Darkest Before The Dawn

Nico — Sun, 13 Dec 2009 17:47:37 -0000

This one's for you, PT!

Welcome to the Litigation Café, where the main entree is Chop Suey and for dessert you can claim a tort. Or if you prefer, two of you can order a large tapioca pudding and work out shared custardy. The bottom line is that the food will always settle eventually, so come on by. Just don't submit any briefs because we don't do that anymore.

On to baseball...

NOTE: Special feature coming at 6:00pm PST today! Noah Frank, the Media Relations director for the Fresno Grizzlies who was with the Chicago Cubs in 2008 and in the Texas League (San Antonio Missions) in 2009, will weigh in with an "inside look" at 3 players with whom he is familiar: Jake Fox, Bobby Cassevah, and Beau Vaughan. Stay tuned!

Beware of analyzing an A's off-season midway through. One thing that is comforting about having Billy Beane as your favorite team's GM is that you know he has a plan and that he's smart. That gives him two advantages over many GMs.

So far the A's have spent the off-season creating more holes, and only adding players who were available on the cheap because no one in their wrong mind would pay them very much based on the health and/or baseball ability they have shown so far.

That's because whatever Beane plans to do in the "big picture" scheme of the whole off-season, it's still ahead. Perhaps it involves signing Jack Cust after all and paying him less than he would have had Cust been tendered. Maybe it involves putting more FA dollars than we're expecting to the best hitter that the market overlooks. Perhaps this is another Winter where Santa will bring an unexpected trade right around Christmas -- remember that the Hudson, Mulder, Haren, and Swisher deals have gone down after the Winter Meetings, not during. It's tough when the subtractions precede the additions, but it doesn't matter in what order you do it -- what matters is how the roster looks at the end.

Here's what we know, and it's not much: In sizing up trade partnerships with other GMs, Beane found that in order to get the guys he wanted, he would have to part with players that are on his "untouchable" list -- these names probably include Suzuki, Sweeney, Anderson, Carter, Wallace, Cardenas. The A's are resolved to create a core of young, good players that can grow up and thrive together, and while Beane has said many times that no player is ever "untouchable," this particular rebuilding plan includes getting and keeping a key core that are here for the glory years to (hopefully) come.

So Beane can't easily address 3B, SS, big bat, without dealing the very players he is not open to moving. Good players aren't affordable on the FA market, and young players aren't even available. I could see the A's signing Glaus or Tejada as short-term stop-gaps, or trying to replace Cust's bat cheaper with a flyer on Delgado or Thome.

What I can't see is how the A's will continue to add young, up-and-coming pieces at positions that are still weak. Are Wallace, Carter, and Cardenas closer than we think, a la Anderson/Cahill? That's many ANers' nightmare: Start the service clock now, but why? Or are the A's just planning to be really uncompetitive, with a lousy left side of the infield and no power, for at least half a season until Wallcarternas are ready to take over? Or does Beane have something up his sleeve that I haven't thought of?

History would suggest the last one. And since it doesn't much matter what the roster looks like on December 13th, I'm waiting for the other shoe to drop. There will be additions. But who?

Brandon Inge!!!

Ongoing Debate: The "Hidden" Value Of Veterans?

Nico — Sat, 12 Dec 2009 17:22:09 -0000

What better way to start off the weekend than to discuss a topic where two sides inevitably can't agree, won't change their minds no matter what is said, but will become heated to the point of speaking sharply with a tone that artfully blends agitation and petulance? Tomorrow's post: "Pro Choice Or Pro Life: Come On, You Know You Want To Change Your Opinion."

The debate begins when a team signs a Russ Springer (one example of "a Russ Springer" would be Russ Springer) or trades for a Kevin Millwood, and includes their "veteranness" as part of the perceived value they will bring to the team. The Millwood trade, and Baltimore's comments about the importance of bringing a "veteran presence" to the pitching staff, sparked the 912th debate on AN as to whether the "mental side" of the game has any actual impact on performance on a statistical or real level. Or is it just the usual psychobabble musings of a group too lazy or too into "vegan chi in yoga sauce" to realize that your ability to locate a fastball is more important than your ability to find a good pre-game warmup routine?

My thesis today (and it's my thesis that it is, and it's mine, and it's smaller in the beginning, then much much bigger in the middle, then smaller again at the far end, and it's mine) is that the value guys like Springer and Millwood (and Justice and Gant and Karros and Giambi) bring to a team is not all that "intangible" -- it comes in the form of teaching far more than it comes in the form of "presence and osmosis."

We know that pitching coaches, infield/outfield coaches, bullpen coaches, and roving instructors, all exist in order to teach, instruct, and mentor players. But baseball involves a lot of "peer teaching" too, and sometimes the teachers who are best equipped to help a young player understand how to grip a cutter, or handle an inning that is getting out of hand, or use batting practice well when they're in a slump, or read the movement of a pitch in order to get a quick first step on defense, is an active player who has "been there" and is even still "there" -- but who has, as part of their toolbag, the best teacher of all: Experience.

Some of the help Millwood offers the Orioles may be abstract and of arguable reality: "I watch the way he carries himself after a bad outing and I learn so much." But much of the help veteran players offer is concrete, in the form of conversations in the dugout or bullpen, or on the field during batting practice, about hitting, fielding, pitching, about late movement on pitches or a trick for blocking the plate, about how to get your hands to be quicker through the strike zone or how to use your lower body to add and subtract on your fastball.

These sound like the kinds of conversations and impromptu tutorials coaches should be having, but a lot of coaching comes from veteran peers. It's the nature of major league baseball and smart GMs know it. Billy Beane has brought veterans in to provide "more than just their physical skills" nearly every year for 10 years, and he does it for a reason. And it's not even that abstract or intangible -- it's just the nature of how a lot of teaching is passed on in major league baseball.

And just about everywhere else, too. I've learned some over the years by being taught, and I've learned a ton over the years by watching, and listening, while around colleagues whom I admired and respected. Why should baseball be any different?