After committing only four turnovers total in Game 1 of the NBA Finals, the San Antonio Spurs turned the ball over 16 times in Game 2. Tony Parker alone accounted for five of them as he tried to force passes around Miami's defense.
The Heat boxed Parker in defensively, clogging his passing lanes while staying within distance to challenge the shot. Instead of crowding Parker when he had the ball, Miami used their length to disrupt the pick-and-roll. To adjust, Parker needs to more aggressively attack the basket rather than settling for quick passes.
Parker tries to pass between two defenders, but tosses the ball into Bosh's shin.
Notice how the Heat didn't put intense pressure on Parker as a ball-handler or scorer. Instead, they took away his ability to facilitate in the pick-and-roll.
Even when Parker was able to pass away from the defense, Miami did a great job of closing out on shooters. Here, Parker takes a screen from Tim Duncan, but again finds himself surrounded by defenders. The only way he can pass to Duncan is with a behind-the-back bounce pass. This forces Duncan to gather the ball instead of having it in position to take an immediate shot, and Bosh is able to rotate in time to stop the play.
When the Spurs moved Parker off the ball, Miami was still able to contain him because he tried to pass instead of score.
Again, Mario Chalmers and Udonis Haslem don't overcommit to pressuring him while he has the ball in his hands, but stay close enough to challenge him if he shoots. It's a small adjustment, but if they crowd him too tightly, it gives Parker the opportunity to pass around them. Instead, they've found a way to contain Parker with a softer trap, using their length and quickness.
Parker tries to squeeze the pass inside to Splitter, but Chalmers gets a hand on the pass and the ball ends up in Bosh's hands.
How can Parker adjust? Here's an example of the Spurs using Parker off-ball similarly, but instead of trying to pass, Parker keeps the dribble alive and scores after driving to the rim.
The Spurs sometimes do the Heat a favor by even setting a pick-and-roll. The Heat are starting to switch a lot of these ball screens, and dragging extra defenders to pick up Parker when he does drive to the rim doesn't help him.
Here, Duncan sets a screen for Parker. This drags James to the perimeter.
The Spurs were able to peel Chalmers away from Parker, but he now has to beat James off the dribble. James does a good job of sliding with Parker without fouling, and Parker misses the layup.
These pick-and-roll switches worked out well for Miami. The counter: instead of using the pick-and-roll to create space for Parker, the Spurs need him to create off the dribble in isolation.
When Parker has Chalmers in front of him, Parker should attack off the dribble instead of using the pick-and-roll to create. Here, he drives against Chalmers and is able to beat him to the rim to score.
Parker takes the shot instead with the space he created while driving to the rim. Andersen isn't able to help and the floater goes in. Parker also had the option of kicking the ball out to Ginobili after pulling the Heat's defense into the paint.
The Heat were clogging Parker's passing lanes and the Spurs weren't able to create the ball movement necessary to find holes in Miami's defensive rotations. San Antonio's pick-and-roll attack was ineffective and made it difficult for Parker to attack the rim off the dribble. If Miami is able to take away the Spurs' effectiveness out of the pick-and-roll, San Antonio must use Parker off the ball or give him space to create with the ball in his hands in isolation.
More importantly, San Antonio can't give up the ball 16 times again, or Miami will be on their way to a 2-1 series lead.