SB Nation - Tim Rattay

When does Josh Freeman get his shot?

Niko Houllis — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 19:12:31 -0000

Freeman would not compete for starting job during preseason, but has ended up #2 now on the depth chart.

They say death and taxes are the two inevitables in the world. You can probably add Josh Freeman starting for the Tampa Bay Buccaneers to that list, provided Raheem Morris is still head coach, of course. We've all heard the comments; "We're married to him", (nice photoshop work BTW), and how the Bucs would have used Detroit's #1 pick on him, if they were selecting that high. But here we are in week number 4 and a quarterback change has been called, yet it's Josh Joshnson, not Freeman, getting the nod. Considering he spent most of training camp behind the big battle between McCown and Leftwich, it’s probably for the better. So when then? When do the Glazers, who are "pumped up" over finally getting to have a franchise quarterback, get to see him take the lead?

Most Bucs fans are excited enough about the starting of Josh Johnson, looking forward to seeing him show off his stuff in a meaningful game. His electrifying TD run in the preseason, the result of a semi-busted play is the fuel for many fans that could really care less to ever see Mr. Freeman. They point to his lack of high caliber opponents while at Kansas State, and still did not really put up great numbers like a 1st round standout QB is supposed to.

Yet this wasn't a case of Raheem Morris falling in love like Gruden used to with his guys in Free Agency. This was a group decision according to Morris, who refused to try to sell Freeman to Bucs higher ups or decision makers, instead bringing him in to Tampa to meet everyone in a pre-draft visit. Afterwards, the consensus agreed; Freeman was the solution.

So when is the right time? When is too early, so as not to do damage to his psyche? Or maybe more importantly, when is too late, to have not taken the most advantage of a learning experience for next year? We can go back and look at our last two highly picked signal callers, but 1987 and 1994 were a long time ago and the landscape in the NFL is much different. Back then you said "Dan Marino is the only guy to win in his first year". Now, the list of first year successfuls has grown to a handful. So lets look at a situation that’s a little different, yet still close to home.

Bruce Gradkowski.

No, he wasn't a top round draft pick, but lets look at some of the facts surrounding his starts, and take a look at someone of whom popular opinion has judged as a mistake. After the week 14 halftime switch to Tim Rattay, there was an offensive outpouring of 28 points against the eventual Superbowl participant Chicago Bears which led everyone to ask Jon Gruden why he didn’t make that move much sooner. By looking at why, or why not, we can look at similar timing issues that Bucs coaches may go into when finally making the big choice.

Week 4- @ New Orleans; First Start. Gradkowski has great stats, 20/31 225 with 2 TD and 0 Picks. - This was pretty much the Best we were going to get, ever, from Bruce Gradkowski. His first start was solid, one mental mistake that resulted in a turnover. If Freeman can come out and have a game like this, the Bay area will go nuts! We ended up losing on a Bush Punt Return, but the outlook for Bruce was very positive.

Result- Loss

Week 5- Cincinnati- This is the game Michael Clayton scored a TD at the last minute (his last TD until the Oakland game last year) which was ruled incomplete but required a review. Gradkowki didn't have a great game, but he did lead the final drive into FG range.

Result- Win.

Week 6- Philadelphia- The Matt Bryant game. Another declining performance for Bruce, however it should be said, he led the team into FG range to extend the lead to 7, and after the Eagles tied it, he did get the team the extra yards to get into that 62 yard range.

Result- Win. His Performance continued for the thirdsss straight week to decline, but how do you bench a guy who is winning?

Week 7- @NY Giants- The Wind Game- Gruden's game plan was to put 48 balls in the air with 30-40 mph winds circling the Meadowlands, and to be honest, if not for drops by Joey Galloway and Michael Clayton, the plan may have worked! Down 0-14, Gradkowski passed 14 of the next 16 plays to finish out the half. You can hardly blame Bruce for this one; he did what he could, all things considered.

Result- Loss

The losses started to pile up. It’s here I ask Bucs fans to tell me when they would have pulled Bruce Gradkowski out of the QB role. But Gruden kept his faith in the youngster, as the losses got worse and worse.

Actually a win over Washington who was starting their rookie QB Jason Campbell was in the mix here. But the Pittsburgh Steelers embarrassment, where Jon Gruden elected to kick a FG on 4^th down under a minute left in the game to avoid the shutout, and the National disgrace against the Cowboys on a day we had little to give thanks for, and Bruce was in the hot seat along with his coach.

This is what the Bucs want to avoid with Josh Freeman. They want to provide him an atmosphere in which he is properly prepared for his start, and a supporting cast that is going to let him balance the attack and not have the Bucs relying on him to win the game with his arm (unless a late game heroic is needed).

So ultimately, when will the Bucs be able to provide this supporting cast?

OFFENSIVE LINE: The Return of Jeff Faine is critical. At LEAST two weeks of practice taking snaps from him too.

WIDE RECEIVER: Having a healthy Antonio Bryant is essential, or at least a WR who is on a hot streak so as to take the role of a primary threat to balance out the offense.

RUNNING BACKS: Returning to the efficiency of week 1 is critical for the passing game. The return of Faine is sure to help, if not actually be the cure-all.

DEFENSE: Freeman is going to need his chances to get a rhythm. Having the ball for only 16 minutes is not going to cut it. A defense that either has the right personnel or that is running the system correctly so it can get off the field and give some snaps to the Offense is going to be essential to this goal.

So in short, do we do it this year? Is the Bye week the time for Freeman? It gives the team two full weeks for him to practice with the starting 11, and the irony of "The Franchise" wearing the uniform of the last time the franchise turned the ball over to a savior, is quite fitting. But is it too early? Perhaps simply one start in the last game of the year, the week 16 game at home against Atlanta. This would give Freeman some film for the coaches to look at and work with him during the offseason on correcting mistakes.

Bottom-line though, it’s how Josh Johnson does that will really tell the tale. The Bucs would rather have their youngsters get valuable playing time while giving J.J. his as well. Like it or not, Freeman will be handed the keys to One Buc eventually, JJ will be the guy who will find himself one play away from starting again, and this team could prepare itself doubly so this way. By starting next year, Freeman could have the benefit of a complete offseason of OTAs and Camp as "The Man". The reps will be all his, the preseason starts will be all his too. The Team will all be his, and if done right, the Fans should be too.

Tennessee Titans Morning Links: We Do Have Players Other Than Vince Young Edition

August West — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 14:32:49 -0000

More photos » by Tony Dejak - AP

Chris Johnson's dreads are out of control...

Browse more photos »

Jim Wyatt talks with Fisher about competition for the number two spot on the depth chart, and the prospect of Vince getting a start during this preseason.

Patrick Ramsey showed he's no wash-out on Sunday night, but he's got a ways to go before I'm impressed. Still, you have to feel better about him than you have some of our previous third string guys (I'm looking at you, Tim Rattay)

People are concerned about the 'sluggish' run game on Sunday just because... they need something to talk about. Trying to discern trends from that performance is as useless as saying that it looks like we won't punt the ball on most 4th downs this year because of the fake. This was pre-pre-season, and not to be watched that closely.

Well, at least he didn't stomp it...

Follow us through the jump to figure-out if Chris Johnson missed the bus or not.

Chris Johnson missed a team bus because of his gold teeth? This doesn't make sense...

Everyone around this team is raving about Jared Cook and his highlight reel catches almost every time he hits the field. When 'Diger says you could compare to Shannon Sharpe, whom he once coached, you know you could be something special with the right focus and a few good breaks.

Yahoo! does a great job chronicling our years-long quest to get a big-framed receiver who can scoot down the field and make some big plays; failed attempts included Calico, Troupe and the truly horrible Mike Williams.

If this quote alone doesn't make you click on this link to Football Outsiders, then you're not much of a football fan by most accounts:

[Dan] Marino is the NFL's all-time comeback king, not Elway.

Is your NFL fan experience missing some mindless minutia? The CBSSportsline.com has just the cure...

If there's anything you would like to share with the MCM community, please take advantage of the comments, fanshots and fanposts to do so! Or, you can always email me at mcmaugustwest@gmail.com.

49ers All-Time Safety #2

Fooch — Mon, 06 Jul 2009 19:00:14 -0000

In a less than stunning result, Roger Craig is running away with the vote at running back at a whopping 71%. Frank Gore is second at 14%, but I'd imagine in the coming years that vote total will only go up.

I thought we'd switch things up and go over to the defensive side of the ball for this week. We'll start at safety. I decided that given the quality mix of free safeties and strong safeties, we'd just go with two generic safety positions. The first one is occupied by Ronnie Lott. If anybody feels like arguing it should be put to a vote I'm all ears. However, I think most folks would agree that the #1 safety in team history is clearly Ronnie Lott.

There are no additions to this list at this point. I know I would certainly like to see Dashon Goldson on this list in the next 5-10 years. Of course, he actually needs to stay healthy to make an impact on franchise history. Let's hope he doesn't end up as wasted potential.

Merton Hanks (1991-1998): I'd like to think everyone remembers his "funky chicken dance." Unfortunately I couldn't find video on YouTube, so you'll have to settle for a picture. If you can find video, please post it. Hanks was primarily known for that, but in reality he was a phenomenal safety, finishing 5th on the 49ers all-time INT list, and second among safeties. Equally important was that Hanks knew he was the man at that position. Hanks didn't have an especially long career, but from 1994-1997, he was one of the best free safeties in the NFL, going to the Pro Bowl all four seasons, earning all Pro honors once and finishing with 22 interceptions in that stretch.

Tim McDonald (1993-1999): McDonald combined with Merton Hanks to form a veteran duo in the defensive secondary, that was as good as any in the league. McDonald was in his prime when the 49ers signed him away from the Cardinals and in his seven seasons with th 49ers he finished with 20 interceptions, good for 13th all time. That's especially impressive given that he was a strong safety, a position that doesn't always end up with the high INT numbers and often slightly less athletic than the free safety. McDonald was named to three Pro Bowl squads during his time with the 49ers. One interesting note unrelated to his 49ers career is that he was one of six safeties named to the 1999 Walter Camp All-Century college football team (along with Ronnie Lott, among others).

Dwight Hicks (1979-1985): Hicks sits right behind Merton Hanks as sixth all-time on the 49ers INT list. Although I was only two at the time, many people might remember him for a key early interception against the Bengals in Super Bowl XVI after the 49ers had already turned over the ball. In seven season with the 49ers, Hicks returned three of his 30 interceptions for a touchdown. And oddly enough (or maybe not?), he's even got a MySpace page. I'd imagine it's real, since how many people would imitate Hicks on the Internet? (How ironic is that phrase after the Tim Rattay "incident?") Since the end of his NFL career, Hicks has actually developed into quite the character actor.

Mel Phillips (1966-1977): Consider this the old-timers division. Phillips spent 12 seasons with the 49ers and now is the secondary coach of the Dolphins. He is listed as having 12 interceptions, but some of those older numbers are a little less reliable.

Tony Parrish (2002-2006): Parrish only spent 4+ seasons with the 49ers, but it's easy to forget how much of a badass he was in that limited time. In his four full season with the 49ers, Parrish had 22 interceptions, enough to put him eighth on the all-time list. He actually had 16 interceptions in his first two seasons, along with a pair of forced fumbles and 125 total tackles. I was actually quite excited when the 49ers signed Parrish and for the first couple of seasons, he paid huge dividends.

Poll

Who should be our #2 safety?

Merton Hanks

438 votes

Tim McDonald

138 votes

Dwight Hicks

51 votes

Mel Phillips

8 votes

Tony Parrish

42 votes

677 votes | Poll has closed

I feel so betrayed... Tim Rattay's Twitter Account is a Fake

ProfessorBigelow — Tue, 23 Jun 2009 03:17:36 -0000

Well, I consider it a lesson learned. This is what I get for treating Twitter like the CNN news feed.

I was perusing some of my favorite Twitter accounts (including 49erLou's) when I decided to check back in on Tim Rattay's, see if he had any UFL updates. Much to my surprise, no UFL news. Instead, I was greeted with this, in two separate tweets:

I'm not the real Tim Rattay. I'm sorry to those who I fooled. Tim is a great QB who has posted good numbers and he deserves a chance to make

it in the football world. I never thought the media would pick up my tweets like they did. I apologize to Tim, the UFL and the fans.

I should have realized it when he failed to show up on the UFL draft list. I apologize to you Nation for being a blind, dummy fool, and to the real Tim Rattay, wherever you are, for any potentially scathing/sarcastic comments I may have made in your direction.

To make it up to you, the fans, and to Tim, I found the NFL Primetime (remember that??) highlights of Rattay's first NFL start, November 2nd, 2003 vs. the St. Louis Rams. Back in the day where He-Who-Shal-Not-Be-Named was head coach of the 49ers, Martz was HC of the Rams, Tim had a few TD's, one to Brandon Lloyd (absolutely gorgeous), one to Tai Streets (nice concentration) and one to some guy wearing number 81 named... named... oh I can't remember, just watch the clip yourself.

"Loved" 49ers alum Tim Rattay heading to the UFL

ProfessorBigelow — Thu, 18 Jun 2009 20:00:19 -0000

Ok, enough about rosters, the next season, free agents, etc. In fact, enough about the NFL COMPLETELY! I'M SICK OF IT! Ok not really, but I found this story and it is WAY too good to pass up.

I hate beginning sentences like this but... Thanks to Mike Florio at ProFootballTalk.com for finding this (grrrrrrrr); According to our "beloved" alumni Tim Rattay's Twitter page, Tim will be joining the UFL next season. He announced the move in this < 140 character message to his "Ratt Pack":

The big news: I worked out for the UFL. Coaches aren't allowed to reveal players yet, but you can bet on seeing me Thursday nights on VS tv!

Apparently the move is all set, since he continues to discuss how totally awesome the UFL is going to be:

The UFL is really starting to blossom. I love it!

and how busy he is talking with UFL teams and scouts:

Off to the airport. Gonna be in the air for most of the day. Zroom!

Oh... and he wan'ts people to know that it's not his fault he didn't have a great career in SF:

Ppl point to 2004 in SF. Everyone knows how bad that team was. TEAM. No TO, no Frank Gore. Again, look at my 04 stats.

Yeah if I had Gore and Antonio Bryant and Vernon Davis(look at Eric Johnsons stats when I threw to him) = wins

So.... What do people think about this? Does this get anyone more excited about the UFL now that we have some alumni in the league? What about TIMMAY's comments about the 49ersabout 5 years after the fact? And if any of these questions don't grab you, who is the one ex-NFL player that would make it necessary to watch the UFL?

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IId. The McNolan Era (2005-2008)

Florida Danny — Thu, 16 Apr 2009 00:00:14 -0000

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Sorry about the delay in getting this one posted. My computer crashed yesterday because a genius (aka me) let the battery run out, so I had to wait until it fully recharged (aka today) to continue writing up the piece.

Yesterday, in Part 2c of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Donahue regime's picks from 2002-2004 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Donahue's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks, especially when your team sucks.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
I <3 the Pac-10!
BCS or die!

In comparison with the Walsh II and Policy regimes, Donahue didn't make the Policy regime mistake of trading away picks when the team was good (2002), he used Walsh II's strategy of drafting for need on Day 1 when rebuilding, he brought back the Policy regime's affinity for Pac-10 players, and he surpassed both Walsh II and the Policy regime in percentage of picks that came from BCS conferences

In this article, I'll be ending the regime breakdowns with a look at the McNolan era (2005-2008).

After the jump, I'll put the McNolan drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; sum up the regimes; and provide the idiot's guide to McNolan draft strategy...

Here again is the link to my Excel spreadsheet of 49er draft picks in the Salary Cap Era. I realized that some of you probably don't have Excel 2007, so I converted it to be compatible with older versions (and fixed the link in previous posts as well):

49er Draft Picks 1994-2008

IN CONTEXT

In Part 2c, I told you how Donahue didn't hit the home run he needed to with his rebuilding project in the 2004 draft. One additional piece of evidence for this is the fact that, by the very next draft, Donahue's replacements had to rebuild the roster once more through the draft. Therefore, Donahue's 2004 fire sale and draft has to rank among the shortest rebuilding phases of a franchise in the history of sports (and not in a good way). Now, I'm sure you don't need some long-winded description of what the team has done record-wise since 2004, so I'll just get on with the specific needs in each of McNolan's drafts:

2005 Draft - Key Losses: WR Cedrick Wilson (free agency), OL Kyle Kosier (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (career-threatening injury), OL Scott Gragg (free agency), DL John Engelberger (trade), DB Ronnie Heard (free agency), K Todd Peterson (free agency). Weak 2004 Stats: 30^th in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA; 19^th in ST DVOA.¹ Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for QB Jeff Garcia, RB Garrison Hearst, WR Terrell Owens, and DB Zack Bronson; major injuries to QB Tim Rattay, LB Andre Carter, DB Ahmed Plummer. Needs: QB, RB, WR, OL, DL, DB, K, LB depth.

2006 Draft - Key Losses: QB Tim Rattay (trade), RB Kevan Barlow (trade), FB Fred Beasley (free agency), WR Brandon Lloyd (trade), WR Johnnie Morton (released), LB Julian Peterson (free agency), LB Andre Carter (free agency), and DB Ahmed Plummer (career-threatening injury). Weak 2005 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Garcia, Hearst, Owens, and Bronson; major injury to TE Eric Johnson. Needs: FB, WR, LB, DB, QB depth, RB depth, TE depth.

2007 Draft - Key Losses: WR Antonio Bryant (released), TE Eric Johnson (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (free agency), and DB Tony Parrish (released). Weak 2006 Stats: 22^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA; 18^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bronson; OL Larry Allen and DL Bryant Young now in their mid-30s. Needs: WR, DB, ST, TE depth, OL depth, DL depth.

2008 Draft - Key Losses: WR Darrell Jackson (free agency), OL Larry Allen (retirement), OL Justin Smiley (free agency), DL Bryant Young (retirement), DL Marques Douglas (free agency), and LB Derek Smith (free agency). Weak 2007 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bryant; major injuries to QB Alex Smith, OL Jonas Jennings, and LB Manny Lawson. Needs: WR, OL, DL, LB, QB depth.

In preparation for its drafts, McNolan has had to deal with about 7 key losses per offseason, which is fewer than Walsh II (8), but more than Donahue (4) and the Policy regime (4). Interestingly, the course of McNolan's tenure has seen a mixture of his 3 predecessors' draft contexts. The 2005 and 2006 offseasons were Walshian, with about 8 key self-induced, salary-cap-caused losses per season that generally involved kicking dead weight to the curb or trading it for draft picks. The 2007 offseason was Donahue-esque, with only 4 key losses and a team feeling good about itself after a promising season. Finally, 2008 was Policy-like in that there were two retirements to deal with. Overall, I'd say the most similar previous context to McNolan's was the Walsh II era.

I know this is totally off-topic, but, Cedrick Wilson may have made the greatest career decision in the history of the NFL by signing with PIT after the 2004 season. If he stays in SF, he's stuck on a 6-win team for the foreseeable future (at least until he roughed up his ex-girlfriend) catching passes from Rattay, Smith, Ken Dorsey, Cody Pickett, Trent Dilfer, Shaun Hill, and Chris Weinke. Instead, he goes to PIT and wins a ring his first season with the team catching passes from Ben Roethlisberger. Seriously, whatever it was that made him leave the Niners, he needs to bottle and sell it. Can you guys think of any other player in recent years who's lucked out like that?

Anyway, back to the regularly scheduled program. For the sake of comparison, here's how McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup in 2005 and 2006:

Morton (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Wilson
Snyder (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Kosier
OL Eric Heitmann (2002 Donahue draft pick) for Newberry
OL Kwame Harris (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Gragg
Douglas (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Engelberger (after moving Young to 3-4 DE)
DB Mike Adams (2003 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Heard
K Joe Nedney (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Todd Peterson
Smith (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Rattay
RB Frank Gore (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Barlow
FB Moran Norris (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Beasley
Bryant (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Lloyd
WR Arnaz Battle (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Morton
Lawson (2006 McNolan draft pick) for Julian Peterson
LB Brandon Moore (2002 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Carter (after moving him to 4-3 ROLB)
DB Shawntae Spencer (2004 Donahue draft pick) for Plummer (after moving him to LCB)

Adding it all up, McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup with 5 traditional free agents, 4 draft picks, and 6 players originally acquired by Donahue. Comparing this to the previous regimes, McNolan used free agency more than Walsh II and Donahue, but less than Policy; and they had a "holdover rate" of 33.3%, which was smack dab in between Walsh II (16.7%) and Donahue (50.0%).

So there's the context. Hopefully you sense a pattern emerging here: the contexts of McNolan drafts have been a cocktail of issues and solutions having the ingredients of each predecessor; 2 ½ parts Walsh II, 1 part Donahue, and ½ part Policy.

PICKS, PICKS, AND MORE PICKS

From 2005-2008, the 49ers made 35 selections in the NFL draft, which nearly equalled the Walsh II and Donahue rate of 9 picks per season. In 2005 and 2006, the main rebuilding years, McNolan stockpiled picks via all those trades I mentioned earlier; just like Walsh II and Donahue. The past 2 drafts, however, McNolan has tended to trade away picks (you're welcome, NE) rather than stockpile them; just like the Policy regime. Once again, the trend here is for McNolan to be a mixture of all 3 predecessor's strengths and weaknesses.

In terms of McNolan's overall Pro Bowl rate, a Donahue-esque and Walshian 5.7% of its picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers (Gore and LB Patrick Willis). However, its starter rate of 34.3% - which includes OL Chilo Rachal's midseason and DB Dashon Goldson's offseason ascensions - is the worst of the 4 regimes (Policy regime = 41.4%; Walsh II = 48.1%; Donahue = 48.1%). When you remember the differences in context between regimes, you realize that McNolan has been way worse at picking starters than the context-similar Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse than the context-different Policy regime, whose superior teams made it harder for draft picks to crack the starting lineup (i.e., the Policy regime's starter rate is artificially low due to context).

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has continued the Walsh II and Donahue standard of 9 draft picks per season.
McNolan has stockpiled picks when the team sucked, and traded away picks when (they thought) the team was good.
McNolan has been as bad at picking Pro Bowlers as the "unlikely to have Pro Bowlers because the team sucked" Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse at picking starters than the "unlikely to have draft selections start because the team was good" Policy regime.
Overall, McNolan seems to be channeling the good and bad of its 3 predecessors.

DAY ‘N' NIGHT

McNolan has taken exactly 40% of its picks on Day 1 of the draft, and 60% on Day 2. That's almost identical to Walsh II's 41/59 split, which, as I said in Part 2c, was smack dab between the Policy (52/48) and Donahue (33/67) regimes.

Looking at the relative success of its picks by draft day, we find that 64.3% of McNolan's Day 1 picks have become 49er starters, which is, again, right in the middle of the 4 regimes; not as good as Walsh II's (81.8%, which I incorrectly reported as 64.3% in Part 2b), but basically on par with the Policy regime's (60.0%) and Donahue's (55.6%). Remember, though that Walsh II and Donahue are the better comparisons in terms of team context. On Day 2, an abysmal 14.3% of McNolan picks have become 49er starters, easily the worst of the 4 regimes (again, even worse than the starter-unlikely Policy regime). So while McNolan has had pretty standard success on Day 1 in terms of starters, it's been horrible at picking Day 2 starters.

The best example of this dichotomy between Day 1 and Day 2 results is McNolan's initial rebuilding draft in 2005. Here it is:

Rd	Player	Pos	Starter?	Pro Bowl?
1	Alex Smith	QB	Yes	No
2	David Baas	OL	Yes	No
3	Frank Gore	RB	Yes	Yes
3	Adam Snyder	OL	Yes	No
5	Ronald Fields	DL	No	No
5	Rasheed Marshall	WR	No	No
6	Derrick Johnson	DB	No	No
7	Daven Holly	DB	No	No
7	Marcus Maxwell	WR	No	No
7	Patrick Estes	TE	No	No
7	Billy Bajema	TE	Yes	No

Day 1? 4 picks, 4 starters, 1 Pro Bowler. Day 2? 7 picks, 1 starter, 0 Pro Bowlers. Enough said.

With regard to Pro Bowlers, however, the preferred drink is once again "Regime Cocktail." On Day 1, 14.3% of McNolan's picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers, which is slightly worse than the Pro-Bowl-likely Policy regime (20.0%), considerably better than Donahue (0.0%), and slightly better than Walsh II (9.1%). OK, correction: McNolan drinks Regime Cocktail only on Day 1. That's because, it has yet to pick a Day 2 Pro Bowler. Of course, it's not like the other two Pro-Bowl-unlikely regimes (Walsh II = 6.3%; Donahue = 5.3%) were much better at it.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has had a Walshian 40/60 split of picks between Day 1 and Day 2.
McNolan has been worse than Walsh II, but better than Donahue, at picking Day 1 starters.
McNolan has been far less successful than the other 3 regimes at picking Day 2 starters.
McNolan has been more successful than Walsh II and Donahue at picking Day 1 Pro Bowlers, but slightly worse than these two regimes at picking Day 2 Pro Bowlers.

ASSUME THE POSITION

Here's how McNolan has used its 35 picks by position, unit, and draft day:

Pos	Day 1	Day 2	Total
QB	1	0	1
RB	1	1	2
FB	0	0	0
WR	2	5	7
TE	1	2	3
OL	4	1	5
DL	2	5	7
LB	2	1	3
DB	1	6	7
K	0	0	0
P	0	0	0
OFF Total	9	9	18
DEF Total	5	12	17
ST Total	0	0	0
Total	14	21	35

Overall, McNolan has basically split their picks up evenly between units, which is more similar to what the Policy regime and Donahue did than Walsh II's need-induced DEF preference. Also, like Walsh, McNolan hasn't taken any ST players in the draft. Of course, that may have something to do with having Nedney and ROBO-PUNTER on the roster. What's most interesting here, however, is that, although OFF has received equal attention on Days 1 and 2, 70.6% of McNolan's DEF picks have come on Day 2.

The even split of OFF picks between draft days is a little misleading because McNolan was actually Walshian in 2005 and 2006 when it had to replace most of the OFF. Going back to that 2005 draft that I showed earlier, you'll notice that all 4 Day 1 picks were on OFF. This continued in 2006 when they selected TE Vernon Davis in the 1^st round after Johnson suffered a major injury the previous season. Essentially, McNolan followed the Walsh II example of spending Day 1 of rebuilding drafts addressing the most glaring positional needs. This is really eye-opening when you consider that Scot McCloughan claims to be a devout believer in "best player available." Is he full of sh*t or is the focus on need in Day 1 of the 2005 and 2006 drafts just a coincidence? I'll leave you to decide.

DEF, however, is a different animal altogether. From the table, it's clear that the draft day disparity on DEF has been due to an inordinate amount of Day 2 picks being spent on DLs and DBs. The 5 Day 2 DLs were, in order of selection, Ronald Fields, Parys Haralson, Melvin Oliver, Jay Moore, and Joe Cohen; the 6 Day 2 DBs were Derrick Johnson, Daven Holly, Marcus Hudson, Vickiel Vaughn, Goldson, and Tarell Brown. Looking at these lists, you could say that McNolan has gotten worse over time picking Day 2 DLs, whereas it's gotten better over time picking Day 2 DBs. Either way, aside from Haralson and Goldson, that's a pretty mediocre-at-best bunch. So, if you want to know why the DEF has sucked for so long (before Singletary pulled their heads out of their asses), look no further than McNolan mostly waiting until Day 2 to pick DEF players. Couple this with McNolan's aforementioned horrible starter rate on Day 2, and you get one wet, stinking heap of also-ran-ity.

With 71.4% of picks taken on Day 2, WR is another position at which McNolan has focused little Day 1 attention. The two Day 1 WRs were Brandon Williams and Jason Hill, both 3^rd-rounders.

Hopefully, you're starting to see a trend here. McNolan gets credit for using Walsh II's "pick for need on Day 1" and "bites at the apple" strategies. However, it's made the mistake of waiting until Day 2 to take most of their bites at DL, DB, and WR. Perhaps, then, one reason why the Niners haven't been able to get over the mediocre 7-9 hump since 2005 is because their WR, DL, and DB corps are populated with Day 2 picks.

To drive it home, here's one last point about McNolan's (lack of) success wtith DEF picks. On OFF, McNolan's starter rate (44.4%) has been similar to that of the Policy regime (43.8%), Walsh II (50.0%), and Donahue (46.2%). However, the DEF starter rates for the previous 3 regimes were 47.1% for Walsh II, 41.7% for Donahue, and 33.3% for the Policy regime. McNolan's? 23.5%!

All is not lost, however. Unlike Donahue, McNolan seems to have actually learned something about positional picks as its tenure has progressed. Namely, 2 of their 3 picks in 2008 were DEF players. Whether or not DL Kentwan Balmer and DB Reggie Smith pan out in the long run, at least McNolan seems to have noticed that their previous Day 1 picks on DEF have become integral parts of the starting unit. Don't believe me? Here they are: Lawson, Willis, and DL Ray McDonald. So, their results - 2 starters, 1 Pro Bowler, and an emerging pass-rush specialist - were not shabby at all. This suggests that (a) when McNolan commits Day 1 resources to DEF, it's been pretty successful; and (b) the regime seems to have figured this out. So, at the very least, kudos to them for that.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Walsh II, McNolan has focused its Day 1 picks on the most glaring positional needs (when it had to).
McNolan has employed Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy at WR, DL, and DB. However, they've primarily waited until Day 2 to take their bites.
Given their propensity for waiting until Day 2 for DEF picks, it's not surprising that McNolan has been horrible at drafting DEF starters.
Based on 2008, McNolan seems to have learned from their "wait until Day 2 for DEF" mistake.

CONFERENCE ROOM

So far, I've basically told a story about how the McNolan regime's drafts have been a little bit Walsh II, a little bit Donahue, and a little bit Policy; how they've used the good strategies as well as the bad. Basically, not too hot, not too cold; I'll call it "Goldilocks" if you will. The conference breakdown is where that tale ends. There's one regime's lead in particular that McNolan has been happy to follow, and I'm sure you'll easily be able to figure it out. Here's how McNolan's 35 picks shake out by conference: 7 ACC picks, 7 SEC picks, 6 Big 12 picks, 6 Pac-10 picks, 4 Big 10 picks, 1 Big East pick, 1 Conference USA pick, 1 MAC pick, 1 MAII pick, and 1 MWC pick.

BCS anyone? McNolan has taken a Donahue-esque 88.6% of its picks from BCS conferences. I already detailed in Part 2c what I think of this strategy, so you know by now that I don't like it. Now, Scot McCloughan has argued that he takes BCS players because they're (a) less affected by big crowds, (b) more prepared for the NFL, and (c) better team leaders. While all of these may be true in a general sense, the draft isn't about generalities. It's about identifying and acquiring specific talented players. I'm sorry, but when you limit your available talent pool to 6 or 7 college football conferences, you're going to miss the "diamonds in the rough" that teams need to sustain success. Also, McCloughan has made it seem like picking players from BCS conferences is only a Day 1 strategy. The stats say the opposite though: A higher percentage of McNolan's Day 2 picks have come from BCS conferences (90.5%) than have its Day 2 picks (88.6%). Oh, and did I mention that McNolan's first pick ever was a QB from a non-BCS conference (Smith), and that they traded up in 2007 to take an OL from a non-BCS conference (Joe Staley)? That's 2 of McNolan's 4 non-BCS picks being taken with 1^st-round picks. Again, is he BSing us here or is this some kind of smokescreen? It's pretty interesting how a general BCS guy like McCloughan can fall in love so much with specific non-BCS players.

And now, I present a second way in which McNolan's conference preferences are similar to Donahue's: They suck just as bad at picking BCS players despite being so BCS-reliant. Wait, let me correct that. They suck even worse. Here's the evidence:

McNolan
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	10	2	12
No	21	2	23
Total	31	4	35

Donahue
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	12	1	13
No	13	1	14
Total	25	2	27

You'll recall from Part 2c that Donahue's BCS starter rate (48.0%) was worse than Walsh II's (62.5%) even though Donahue was much more BCS-heavy with his picks. Well, even Donahue's sorry BCS starter rate makes him look like a draft maven when compared to McNolan's. That's because, as the table shows, only 32.3% of McNolan's BCS picks have become regular 49er starters! As I said in Part 2c, if you're going to be limiting your talent pool so drastically, you better be good at evaluating the talent you don't ignore. Clearly, McNolan has not been good in this regard, and has been even worse than the guy for which I invented the argument.

Now, I argued in Part 2c that Donahue's preference for BCS players and lack of success in actually picking good ones was borne out of his dispositional laziness and inattention to draft detail. With respect to McNolan, however, I'm sure this hasn't been the case. To its credit, the McNolan regime has been almost pathologically engaged in draft preparation. After all, they coached the Senior Bowl 3 straight seasons, Scot McLoughan was Director of College Scouting for the Seahawks, and Scot's brother, David, now serves in the same capacity for the 49ers. So I'm kind of perplexed as to why, given their affinity for evaluating college talent, McNolan has shied away from non-BCS players. One might argue that it's because of the Alex Smith experience. However, as has been noted, McLoughan remains a big Smith supporter. So what gives here? Please help.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Donahue, almost every player McNolan has drafted has been from a BCS conference.
Despite its BCS-lust, the McNolan regime has had an even worse BCS starter rate than Donahue.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

As I've alluded to throughout this article, the McNolan drafts can be described by one word: Goldilocks. In other words, their porridge hasn't been too hot and it hasn't been too cold; just lukewarm. Here's the evidence:

McNolan's draft contexts have been a mixture of its 3 predecessors' contexts.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's "draft vs. free agency" bias.
McNolan's stockpiled picks in rebuilding drafts ala Walsh II, but also traded away picks in "we feel good about ourselves right now" drafts ala the Policy regime.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's Day1/Day 2 split.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of Day 1 starter and Pro Bowl rate.
McNolan has evenly split their picks between OFF and DEF overall.
McNolan's used Walsh's "bites at the apple" strategy, but only on Day 2.
McNolan's been on par with previous regimes in terms of picking OFF starters.
Though it's made Donahue-esque draft strategy errors, McNolan's either learned from those mistakes or has a more valid reason for why they've made them.

All in all, it sure seems like the McNolan regime has been a mixture of the good and bad of the 3 previous 49er regimes. They rebuilt like Walsh II in 2005 and 2006, but they sat on their laurels like Donahue and the Policy regime in 2007. They draft for need on Day 1 like Walsh II, but, like Donahue, only when they have to. They take a lot of bites at the apple like Walsh, but they wait until Day 2 to do it. You get the picture.

To me, understanding the Goldilocks nature of McNolan drafts helps explain why the 49ers have been stuck in "no better than 7-9" mode for the past 3 seasons. If you draft a propensity of mediocre players, or if you have a bunch of mediocre drafts, you're going to find yourself having a mediocre team. Here, another word comes to mind that has been used - with great comic effect - to describe McNolan: vanilla.

In evaluating the 4 Niner regimes since 1994, something has become very clear to me; something that I didn't fully realize until I got to McNolan. Bill Walsh was the only 49er GM in the past 15 years who went out and tried to be great in the draft. He's the only one who tried to bat 1.000 every time he stepped to the plate. The Policy regime was content to sustain success through free agency, Donahue was content to ride the coattails of Walsh II's drafts, and McNolan has been content to only be great on Day 1. Is it any wonder then that the Walsh II regime was the only one that had an upward win trajectory? Is it a coincidence that Walsh was the only GM to leave the 49ers better off than when he arrived? I mean, the 49ers regressed under the Policy regime and Donahue, and they've stagnated in 7-9 territory under McNolan. After reading my regime breakdowns, do you have any doubt that one important reason for this is because Walsh II's draft strategy differed so drastically from that of McNolan, Donahue, and the Policy regime? In re McNolan, do you think that the "hybrid" defense, not giving Hill the QB job outright, and not firing Nolan after 2007 can be described by any other word except "vanilla?"

Whether it's McSingle nee McNolan or someone else, until the person/people in charge of running the 49ers' drafts stop placing artificial constraints on themselves, and start trying to be great with every pick- by whatever means necessary - I fear the Niners are going to wallow in mediocrity.

Here's a perfect example of what I mean. The Niners need a pass rusher right now more than anything. Go out and draft the best damned pass rusher. If the consensus best pass rusher isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the pass rusher you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the Calfornia Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK pass rusher and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

Another example. Right now, you have an arguable draft bust, a good but ragged-armed journeyman, and a player KC didn't even want as your QBs. Go out and draft the best damned QB. Do whatever it takes. If the consensus best QB isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the QB you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the California Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK QB and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

You know what team drafts like this? The New England Patriots. But that's Part 3, so you'll have to wait until tomorrow to hear the details. For now, here's the idiot's guide to the McNolan regime's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks, but trade away picks when (you think) your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Use Day 2 to take a lot of bites at the apple.
BCS or die!
We're Goldilocks (aka Vanilla McNolan).

So, based on this strategy, as well as some specific draft history trends that you can find in my Excel spreadsheet, here's what (and what not) to expect from the 49ers in the 2009 draft:

Don't expect them to take more than 1 player from a non-BCS conference.
Don't expect them to take a pass rusher, QB, or WR at #10.
Don't expect them to take a RB on Day 1.
Expect them to take a WR or two on Day 2.
Expect them to take an OL on Day 1.
Expect more DEF picks (esp. DLs and DBs) on Day 2 than Day 1.
Don't expect them to take a FB, K, or P.

Remember, this is what I expect them to do or not do based on their history. If they end up going against tendency, it's not because the tendencies were wrongly identified. It's because they did something that was unexpected given their history. And there's no harm in that. It's actually worked once or twice (See Willis, Patrick).

That's it for now. Tomorrow, I'll compare the overall 49er draft strategy since 1994, which I identified in Part 1, to that of the Patriots. TO BE CONTINUED...

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

How much blame would you assign McNolan's drafts for the 49ers continuously being unable to take that next step in recent seasons?

All of the blame

37 votes

Most of the blame

83 votes

Some of the blame

103 votes

None of the blame

9 votes

232 votes | Poll has closed

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IIc. The Donahue Era (2002-2004)

Florida Danny — Tue, 14 Apr 2009 14:00:14 -0000

Yesterday, in Part 2b of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Walsh II regime's picks from 1999-2001 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Walsh II's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
This is the pros, not college. There's no need to dominate your neighborhood.
Focus Day 2 on non-BCS players because even one diamond in the rough more than makes up for several lumps of coal.

And, in comparison, here was the Policy regime's draft strategy that I detailed in Part 2a:

Draft picks are commodities best used for moving up.
Once you've addressed positional needs in free agency, there's no need to focus on them in the draft.
Dominate the neighborhood (i.e., take Pac-10 players and those near Youngstown, OH).
There's plenty of talent outside the BCS conferences, but wait until Day 2 to acquire it.

So basically, the main differences between the two regimes were (a) Walsh II used the draft to rebuild the roster, whereas the Policy regime used the draft to tinker around the edges of the roster; (b) Walsh II drafted for need (esp. on Day 1), whereas the Policy regime didn't; and (c) Walsh II didn't have a geographical bias, whereas the Policy regime did. As I said in Part 2b, difference (a) is no doubt due, in some part, to differences in context. Nevertheless, it's still a difference worth noting, and it's overshadowed by differences (b) and (c), which have nothing to do with context.

I bring up both of these draft strategies because they can serve as opposite ends of a draft strategy continuum going forward. In other words, because they're such polar opposites, we can use them as draft strategy templates with which to describe the Donahue and McNolan strategies. Speaking of Donahue, his regime's drafts are the topic of this article.

After the jump, I'll put the Donahue drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; and provide the idiot's guide to Donahue draft strategy...

Here again is the link to my Excel spreadsheet of 49er draft picks in the Salary Cap Era:

49er Draft Picks 1994-2008

IN CONTEXT

Fans of a certain age might remember Dion's song, "The Wanderer." Well, from 2002-2004, Donahue apparently remade the song in his image and called it, "The Squanderer." Probably the easiest way to describe this is in a graph:

As shown, team wins peaked in the last year of Walsh II and began its decline in the first year of Donahue. That's a pretty stark display of how Donahue squandered Walsh II's success, and is much more vivid than anything I could say in writing.

The obvious questions here are, "Why the complete turnaround?" and, "What did Donahue do to precipitate it?" Well, knowing the specific contexts of each Donahue is probably a good place to start:

2002 Draft - Key Losses: OL Ray Brown (free agency) and DB Lance Schulters (free agency). Weak 2001 Stats: 20^th in ST DVOA.¹ Lingering Issues: None. Needs: OL, DB, ST.

2003 Draft - Key Losses: DL Dana Stubblefield (free agency) and DL Chike Okeafor (free agency). Weak 2002 Stats: Dropped to 18^th in DEF DVOA; 26^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Major injuries to OL Dave Fiore and DB Zack Bronson; half of the OFF at least 30 years old. Needs: DL, ST, OFF depth, DEF depth.

2004 Draft - Key Losses: QB Jeff Garcia (free agency), RB Garrison Hearst (free agency), WR Terrell Owens (trade), WR Tai Streets (free agency), OL Derrick Deese (free agency), OL Ron Stone (free agency), DL Travis Kirschke (free agency), and DB Zack Bronson (free agency). Weak 2003 Stats: 19^th in DEF DVOA; 28^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't replaced Stubblefield; Starting OLs missed 18 total games with minor injuries. Needs: QB, RB, WR, OL, DL, DB, ST.

Looking only at 2002 and 2003, it sure seems like Walsh II set Donahue up pretty well for the future, seeing as how Donahue had to deal with 6 fewer key losses per offseason in preparation for his first two drafts. Basically, Donahue could do whatever his heart desired with his 2002 and 2003 draft picks. This certainly wasn't the case, however, with respect to the 2004 draft, after Donahue blew up the roster in a Walsh-esque salary cap purge.

So with respect to evaluating Donahue's drafts we have an interesting context to consider. He had even fewer needs in the first two drafts than the Policy regime did back in the halcyon days of 49er teams past. However, his final draft was Walsh-like in that he was tasked with a self-induced roster overhaul. Therefore, for the first two drafts, we need to see whether Donahue was sitting back on his laurels in a Policy-channeling-Nero sort of way; whereas for the 2004 draft, we need to see whether he (successfully) attacked the draft in a Walshian sense.

Before breaking things down, it's useful to detail how Donahue replaced all of those starters in 2004 so we can get a handle on his "draft vs. free agency" slant. The comparison with Walsh II is very straightforward here because both were handcuffed by the salary cap. In other words, they both had the same constraints when considering whether or not to address certain needs in free agency. So without further ado, here are Donahue's 2004 replacements along with the method via which they were acquired:

QB Tim Rattay (2000 Walsh II draft pick) for Garcia
RB Kevan Barlow (2001 Walsh II draft pick) for Hearst
WR Brandon Lloyd (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Owens
WR Cedrick Wilson (2001 Walsh II draft pick) for Streets
OL Kyle Kosier (2002 Donahue draft pick) and OL Kwame Harris (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Deese
OL Justin Smiley (2004 Donahue draft pick) and Kosier for Stone
DL Anthony Adams (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Kirschke
DB Ronnie Heard (2000 Walsh undrafted free agent signing) for Bronson

As you can see, none of the replacements were acquired via traditional free agency; very Walshian indeed. However, before we start applauding Donahue as a draft maven, notice that there was an even split between how many replacements were Walsh II leftovers and how many were of Donahue's making. Namely, Donahue's 50.0% "holdover help rate" is considerably higher than Walsh II's 16.7%. In other words, Donahue had a lot more help with replacing starters in 2004 than Walsh II did while in a similar predicament from 1999-2001. Of course, this says nothing about how Donahue handled the 4 starters he had to replace in 2002 and 2003 or about how many of his draft picks ever became 49er starters.

So there's the context. For his first two drafts, Donahue was in an even better position (thanks to Walsh II) than the 12-wins-per-season Policy regime from a need perspective. Essentially, he had none. In contrast, Donahue's 2004 draft found the team in a predicament similar to what Walsh II dealt with from 1999-2001. He had to turn over the roster through the draft due, in part, to the fact that he was constrained in free agency by salary cap woes. But here's a thought: Perhaps Donahue didn't "find" himself in the 2004 predicament. Maybe 2004 was the result of his own draft failures in 2002 and 2003. Just maybe, rather than being an innocent bystander vis-à-vis circumstances that lead to the 2004 fire sale, what if he was instead a catalyst of his own misfortune? In other words, what if these two different contexts (need-light heaven and need-heavy hell) are not mutually exclusive? For the answers to these questions, we need to break down Donahue's drafts.

PICKS, PICKS, AND MORE PICKS

From 2002-2004, the 49ers made 27 selections in the NFL draft, which works out to 9 picks per season. Once again, that was very Walshian of Donahue. Given how Walshian this amount of picks was, you might think that Donahue followed the "trade away picks when good, and acquire picks when bad" strategy of his two predecessors, such that he had more picks in the 2004 rebuilding draft than he did in the "happy days are here again" 2002 and 2003 drafts. Interestingly, this wasn't the case: Donahue had the same number of picks in 2002 (10) as he did in 2004, and he had the full repertoire of 7 picks in 2003. So, all in all, Donahue seemed to learn the lesson of Policy regime failure: Don't ignore the draft just because you're winning.

With respect to Donahue's starter and Pro Bowl rates, he was, again, very Walshian. He had the same exact starter rate (48.1%) and a similarly poor Pro Bowl rate (3.7% vs. 7.4%). Based on these stats, and given the similarity in winning percentages between the two regimes, we can come to the same conclusion about Donahue's general draft success that we did regarding Walsh II. Namely, he wasn't necessarily any better or worse than his predecessor(s).

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Donahue was eerily Walshian with respect to the number of draft picks he had and how successful those picks were overall.
Donahue stockpiled picks; even when the 49ers were good.
After you account for differences in context, the Donahue, Walsh II, and Policy regimes were pretty much equals when it came to drafting 49er starters and Pro Bowler.

DAY ‘N' NIGHT

The first difference we see between Donahue and his predecessors is related to the percentage of draft picks they had on each draft day. Specifically, whereas Policy had a 52/48 split and Walsh had a 41/59 split between draft days (which I incorrectly reported as more like 50/50 yesterday), Donahue made only 33.3% of his selections on Day 1. Part of this had to do with draft day trades in 2002 and 2004, but it was also due to compensatory selections that were awarded by the NFL (which can't be traded), and having to forfeit a Day 1 pick in 2002 thanks to Policy Era salary cap shenanigans. Either way, Donahue's draft day disparity was nowhere more evident than in the 2002 draft, when only 2 of his 10 selections came on Day 1. Perhaps if he had a few more Day 1 picks that year, maybe he wouldn't have found himself in the sorry situation that was the 2004 offseason? Hmmm.

Looking at the relative success of their Day 1 and Day 2 picks, we find that Donahue was slightly worse than Walsh II at picking starters on Day 1 (55.6% vs. 64.3%), and slightly better than Walsh II at picking starters on Day 2 (44.4% vs. 30.8%). With respect to Pro Bowlers, Donahue failed to pick one on Day 1 (Walsh II = 9.1%) and was as (un)successful as Walsh II at picking them on Day 2 (5.3% vs. 6.3%). Given the similarities in team context between the Donahue and Walsh II eras, we can conclude that they weren't all that different in draft day success except for, perhaps, Donahue's Pro Bowl swing-and-miss on Day 1.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Donahue had far more picks on Day 2 than Day 1; unlike the Policy regime and Walsh II.
Donahue was similar to Walsh II (and the Policy regime) with respect to drafting 49er starters and Pro Bowlers on a given draft day.

ASSUME THE POSITION

I established earlier that Donahue didn't really have any glaring positional needs in 2002 and 2003, and that he had a veritable sh*t-ton of them in 2004. But for the sake of comparison, here's how Donahue's Day 1 and Day 2 picks break down by team unit:

Unit	Day 1	Day 2	Total
OFF	4	9	13
DEF	5	7	12
ST	0	2	2
Total	9	18	27

As the table shows, Donahue was more Policy-esque (i.e., evenly split) than Walshian in terms of the positional breakdown by draft day. Of course, this is to be expected given that his first two drafts were ones in which he didn't have to address any glaring positional needs. He basically had "draft freedom," and he divided that freedom equally between OFF and DEF.

Donahue's 2004 draft was a different story altogether, with replacing over half of their starting OFF becoming a distinct Niner priority. As I said earlier, Donahue luckily had 10 picks in the 2004 draft. So how did he use them? Well, let's just say he must not have read the team needs like you and I just did. Specifically, Donahue drafted only 4 OFF players in 2004: 2 WRs, 1 OL, and 1 QB. I'll give him credit for taking 3 of these 4 OFF players on Day 1, which I argued in Part 2b is a good idea. However, I do have one gigantic bone to pick in re addressing needs during the 2004 draft.

Donahue waited until the 6^th round to take his lone QB draft pick despite Garcia's release having left the team with two 7^th-round QBs and a 5th-round QB on their roster. Keep in mind, here, that 2004 is now considered one of the best QB draft classes of the past 30 years (thanks to the Big 3), and that Donahue traded down twice in the 1^st round. I can only assume that Donahue tried (and failed) to trade up for Ben Roethlisberger. But once he realized he wasn't getting Roethlisberger at Pick 16 (or earlier), how does he not take a QB before the 7^th round? I want to be clear here. This is not about results: Donahue was right to trade down after the top 3 QBs were off the board, and odds are that if he had taken a QB before the 7^th round, that QB wouldn't have panned out. It's about effort. Given how Walshian other aspects of Donahue's draft strategy were, I sure wish he would have employed Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy with respect to QBs.

One more thing I'll say about (lack of) QB bites at the apple is that Donahue took 3 QBs from 2002-2004: 1 (Brandon Doman) was selected in the 5^th round, and 2 (Ken Dorsey and Cody Pickett) were selected in the 7^th round. This is certainly not a serious attempt to solidify the QB position long-term. Perhaps if he would have been more serious in 2002 and 2003 about it, he wouldn't have found himself in the 2004 predicament.

Here are two final observations I'll make about Donahue's position picks. First, he took as many Ps in 2004 as he did QBs or OLs. Granted, he drafted ROBO-PUNTER (aka Andy Lee), but what is he doing drafting a P when he has half of a starting lineup to replace? Also, when you have Hearst playing on a bionic ankle at RB in 2002 and 2003, how do you take 0 RBs in 3 drafts? Sure, Barlow showed potential; but not even 1 RB in 3 drafts? Not even for depth? Pure madness. And I haven't even mentioned the fact that he actually took a K in the 4^th round of the 2002 draft.

Now, in terms of draft success, here's how Donahue compared to Walsh II at the positions I identified earlier as needs over the course of their respective tenures:

Donahue
Starter	QB	RB	WR	OL	DL	DB	Total
Y	0	0	2	4	2	3	11
N	3	0	2	0	3	2	10
Total	3	0	4	4	5	5	21

Walsh II
Starter?	RB	OL	DB	Total
Yes	3	3	2	8
No	3	2	4	9
Total	6	5	6	17

Once again, Donahue can be described as Walshian here, and he was actually super-Walshian with his OL picks.

So far I've seemed to suggest that Donahue had more in common with Walsh than Policy when it came to drafting. If that's really the case, we still haven't figured out why the team regressed so precipitously during Donahue's tenure, and why it seems he left the franchise in such a bad situation after 2004. Well, the first clue has entirely to do with the 2004 draft. Here it is:

Rd	Player	Pos	Starter?	Pro Bowl?
1	Rashaun Woods	WR	No	No
2	Justin Smiley	OL	Yes	No
2	Shawntae Spencer	DB	Yes	No
3	Derrick Hamilton	WR	No	No
4	Isaac Sopoaga	DL	Yes	No
4	Richard Seigler	LB	No	No
6	Andy Lee	P	Yes	Yes
6	Keith Lewis	DB	Yes	No
7	Cody Pickett	QB	No	No
7	Christian Ferrara	DL	No	No

You might say, "Well, he got 4 starters and his lone Pro Bowler out of that draft. That's not so bad!" Remember the context though. He had just lost 8 starters in a fire sale, 4 of which had been Pro Bowlers during their 49er careers. This was no time for an OK result. Donahue needed a draft like Walsh's 2000 effort: one that totally revitalizes the team, and sets it up for a division championship in the near future. Unfortunately for Niner fans, Donahue's 2004 draft was just OK; not an A+, not an F, just a C.1^st-round pick? A bust. 3^rd-round pick? A bust. 4^th-round picks? A miss and a DE/DT tweener who spent 4 seasons trying to find a position. 6^th-round? These guys have contributed a lot, except only on ST. 7^th-round? Nevermind. So basically, although he had the chance to pull a Walsh II with 10 picks, Donahue instead only drafted 2 players (both 2^nd-rounders) that could be considered to have had a perennial positive impact on the OFF or DEF starting lineups. A Walsh-circa-2000 this draft was not. It's no wonder then that SF has yet to recover from the 2003 fire sale.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Walsh II, Donahue focused his Day 1 picks on the most glaring positional needs (when he had to).
Donahue seemed to sit on his laurels when the team had few needs. He didn't draft any RBs despite having a bionic starter, he didn't draft a QB before the 5^th round despite having a geriatric starter and 7^th-round backups, and he actually chose a K in the 4^th round.
Donahue didn't use Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy.
Donahue had a just-OK draft in 2004 when he needed to have a great one.

CONFERENCE ROOM

By far, the biggest difference between Donahue and his predecessors was with respect to the conferences from which he drafted his players. Before elaborating further, here's how Donahue's 27 picks shake out by conference:6 Pac-10 picks, 6 Big East picks, 5 SEC picks, 4 Big 10 picks, 2 Big 12 picks, 1 ACC pick, 1 Division 1 Independent pick, 1 MWC pick, and 1 WAC pick.

The difference I'm talking about was not related to "dominating your neighborhood." On this count, Donahue revived the Policy regime's preference for Pac-10 players. Between his ties to UCLA, his permanent SoCal home, and his (infrequent) trips to Santa Clara, Donahue had to have watched a lot of Pac-10 football.

Rather, the difference I speak of is Donahue's near-perfect BCS rate. Specifically, 92.6% of his draft picks came from BCS conferences. This rate was well above the Policy regime's (79.7%), and dwarfed Walsh II's (59.3%). Now, I'm going to speculate here about what Donahue's clear preference for BCS players might mean, so feel free to provide opposing viewpoints in the comments section.

To me, Donahue's BCS rate was just another indicator of his lackadaisical work ethic, something that 49er fans and media have accused him of since 2002. Exhibit A: His BCS rate. It sure doesn't take much work to pick players from the conferences with mega-million-dollar broadcast contracts, i.e., the conferences whose games can be found from August to January simply by turning on a TV set. Exhibit B: The 2 non-BCS conferences represented in Donahue picks, the MWC and WAC. First, MWC and WAC teams are in close proximity to California and - I don't live out there so correct me if I'm wrong on this - they have games that are broadcast locally in parts of California. Second, if you look at Jeff Sagarin's conference ratings from 2002-2004 (here, here, and here), you find that the MWC was the top-rated non-BCS conference all 3 years, and that the WAC was the 4^th-, 4^th-, and 3^rd-highest rated non-BCS conference in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively. In other words, he wasn't exactly digging into the diamond mines with the 2 non-BCS picks he did make. Exhibit C: His preference for working from home in LA. This one's been well-documented, so there's no need for me to elaborate further.

Finally, Exhibit D: He wasn't any good at it. Here are two tables comparing Donahue's success on BCS picks with Walsh II's:

Donahue
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	12	1	13
No	13	1	14
Total	25	2	27

Walsh II
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	10	3	13
No	6	8	14
Total	16	11	27

Wait a second. Donahue, the BCS-phile, was actually worse than Walsh II, the non-BCS-phile, at picking starters from BCS conferences? Apparently so: Walsh II had a 62.5% starter rate for BCS picks, whereas Donahue's was only 48.0%. Look, if you're going to be lazy, and if you're going to limit your talent pool so drastically as to have a draft strategy that says, "BCS or die," you better be darn good at it. "Darn good at it" Donahue was not. Despite it being just as easy for a Donahue pick to start as it was for a Walsh II pick to start (given their similar 3-year winning percentages), Donahue was as good as the flip of a coin at picking BCS starters.

This begs the question, "Why did he continue to ignore non-BCS players even though he kept missing with his BCS picks?" Surely, if he noticed the trend, and wasn't lazy, he might have shifted strategies midstream. He didn't, and I think it's because he was, in fact, uninterested in those mundane college scouting details that Walsh was so fond of. In other words, as much as Donahue tried to be a Walsh draft clone, he didn't possess the underlying quality that made Walsh successful: attention to detail.

So there's my take on the second piece of the "What did Donahue have to do with the 49ers' steep decline?" puzzle. Answer: laziness. Although his drafts were Walshian in several respects, Donahue simply didn't work hard enough to find those "diamonds in the rough" that are vital for sustaining NFL success. What's worse, he failed to adjust after this lack of success became painfully evident. In the words of Einstein, "The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." As I said, that's just my educated guess based on some statistical (and journalistic) evidence. Take it for what it is, and feel free to offer an opposing viewpoint in the comments section.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like the Policy regime, Donahue took a relatively large percentage of players from the Pac-10.
Almost every player Donahue drafted was from a BCS conference.
Even Donahue's rare non-BCS picks came from the best and most-watched mid-majors.
Despite Donahue's BCS-lust, he could have flipped a coin and been just as successful with his BCS picks.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

I began this article by wondering if Donahue's 2002-2004 drafts had anything to do with the decline in 49er wins over the course of his tenure (and beyond). Initial signs pointed to "they didn't."

He stockpiled picks just like Walsh II, even though he could have just as easily repeated the Policy regime mistake of trading them away when the team is good.
Like Walsh II, he didn't over-utilize free agency to replace starters.
He had a similar overall starter and Pro Bowler rate to Walsh II's.
Like Walsh II, he focused his Day 1 picks on need positions when the team context dictated it.
He was as good as or better than Walsh II at picking starters at need positions.

Alas, however, the devil is in the details. Sometimes, even though it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and talks like a duck, it's still not a duck. Similarly, even though Donahue was Walsh II's doppelganger in many respects, he made two fatal errors that were anything but Walshian. First, he had a C-grade 2004 draft when an A+ draft was necessary to rebuild the roster. Second, he limited his available talent pool - rather than expanding it like Walsh did - by relying so heavily on the overexposed (and easily scouted) BCS conferences.

The 49ers are still paying for it to this very day. And it's too bad given the tutelage Donahue enjoyed as Walsh's understudy. All I know is that, if he would have taken more notes in class, he migh have gotten that A+ draft in 2004. So, based on everything I've said in this article, here's the idiot's guide to the Donahue regime's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks, even when your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Dominate the neighborhood.
BCS or die!

That's it for now. Later today, I'll break down the McNolan drafts (2005-2008), compare them to the 3 regimes I've discussed so far, and give a heads-up on the draft strategy you might see in a couple of weeks. TO BE CONTINUED...

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

How much blame would you assign Terry Donahue's draft failures for causing the 49ers' current streak of 6 straight losing seasons?

All of the blame

60 votes

Most of the blame

132 votes

Some of the blame

83 votes

None of the blame

6 votes

281 votes | Poll has closed

The New 49ers OC: A Raye of Hope? (Part 2)

Florida Danny — Thu, 05 Feb 2009 16:00:10 -0000

This is Part 2 of my statistical look at Jimmy Raye II. Yesterday in Part 1, I evaluated Raye's previous offenses, compared his credecntials to those of the other 49er OC candidates, compared his OC performance with that of other current OCs, and compared his credentials to those of recent 49er OCs at the time that they were hired. In Part 2, I'm going to attempt a prediction for Raye's offense in 2009. Enjoy.

BACK TO THE FUTURE

From Part 1, we can draw 4 conclusions about Jimmy Raye II:

His previous offenses weren't as bad as some pundits and Chicken Littles seem to think, especially when you consider how relatively inefficient offenses were league-wide during those seasons.
He compared favorably to the other OC candidates, especially after Linehan was off the table.
He compared favorably to the more well-known OCs in recent 49er history.
His major drawback is a tendency for offenses to regress in his first year as OC.

Given these conclusions, what can we therefore expect from the Niners' offense next season (and beyond)? This is actually a multi-faceted question. In order to answer it, we need to examine how previous OCs's stats have changed after inheriting the 49ers' offensive personnel, as well as how the 49ers' stats have changed after inheriting a new OC. Below is a table addressing the first part (Hostler, Tollner, and Norv's DAL stats are omitted again; See here for an explanation of table abbreviations):

OC	TOTAL	TRK	TRKIMPYR1	WEIGHT	WRK	PASS	PRK	RUSH	RRK	VAR	VRK
Martz (Pre-SF)	4.7%	15.3	12	2.2%	16.3	14.7%	11.7	-9.9%	18.3	7.7%	19.7
Martz (SF)	-14.6%	27.0	5	-14.1%	28.0	-18.5%	29.0	-9.7%	27.0	4.6%	6.0
DIFFERENCE	-19.3%	-11.7	-7	-16.3%	-11.7	-33.2%	-17.3	0.2%	-8.7	-3.1%	13.7

Turner, N. (Pre-SF)	-2.2%	16.3	11.5	-6.2%	19.7	-2.6%	17.3	-2.5%	16.7	7.6%	19.3
Turner, N. (SF)	-7.8%	22.0	10	-7.5%	22.0	-13.9%	26.0	-2.1%	13.0	7.3%	20.0
DIFFERENCE	-5.6%	-5.7	-1.5	-1.3%	-2.3	-11.3%	-8.7	0.4%	3.7	-0.3%	-0.7

McCarthy (Pre-SF)	-2.4%	19.4	11	-2.1%	17.0	-0.7%	17.0	-4.3%	17.8	6.4%	13.8
McCarthy (SF)	-39.8%	32.0	-3	-38.3%	32.0	-63.1%	32.0	-19.8%	30.0	12.4%	29.0
DIFFERENCE	-37.4%	-12.6	-14	-36.2%	-15.0	-62.4%	-15.0	-15.5%	-12.2	6.0%	-15.2

Average (Pre-SF)	0.0%	17.0	11.5	-2.0%	17.7	3.8%	15.3	-5.6%	17.6	7.2%	17.6
Average (SF)	-20.7%	27.0	4.0	-20.0%	27.3	-31.8%	29.0	-10.5%	23.3	8.1%	18.3
DIFFERENCE	-20.7%	-10.0	-7.5	-18.0%	9.7	-35.6%	13.7	-5.0%	5.7	0.9%	0.7

This table is pretty clear. An OC's patina of previous performance washes away when they arrive in Santa Clara. Given the massive hit his résumé took during the 2005 season, it must have come as a total shock to Mike McCarthy when the Packers actually showed interest in him for their head coaching position. Check out that 62.4% drop in passing efficiency! Or how about Martz seeing one of his offenses actually rank 29^th in pass DVOA?

Obviously, Martz's precipitous passing decline was the result of monumental personnel differences between the 2008 49ers and the Greatest Show on Turf. But we shouldn't assume that personnel differences explain all of the discrepancy between pre-49ers and with-49ers OC performance. Here's why. McCarthy's QBs in NO were Jeff Blake, Jake Delhomme, and Aaron Brooks. Yes, that Aaron Brooks. Granted, these 3 were all better than Tim Rattay or a rookie Alex Smith, and Joe Horn was better than Brandon Lloyd, but 62.4% better??? I don't know about that. Also, Norv inherited much the same offense that McCarthy understandably abandoned, but his résumé didn't take nearly as big of a hit in 2006.

Nevertheless, I can't ignore the fact that personnel matters, and therefore, that the 49ers' offensive personnel has had a negative impact on its OCs' career DVOA stats. Now, let's examine the second part of the question: What kind of impact have post-Mooch OCs had on the 49ers' offensive performance. Here are the relevant stats, which I've broken into two tables for the sake of readability:

OC	YEAR	TOTAL	TRK	TRKIMP	WEIGHT	WRK	WRKIMP	VAR	VRK	VRKIMP
Martz	2008	-14.6%	27	5	-14.1%	28	4	4.6%	6	19
Hostler	2007	-30.5%	32	-10	-27.4%	32	-10	9.1%	25	-5
Turner, N.	2006	-7.8%	22	10	-7.5%	22	10	7.3%	20	9
McCarthy	2005	-39.8%	32	-3	-38.3%	32	-1	12.4%	29	-13
Tollner	2004	-22.8%	29	-20	-25.2%	31	-23	6.6%	16	14
AVERAGE		-23.1%	28.4	-3.6	-22.5%	29.0	-4.0	8.0%	19.2	4.8

OC	YEAR	PASS	PRK	PRKIMP	RUSH	RRK	RRKIMP
Martz	2008	-18.5%	29	3	-9.7%	27	-2
Hostler	2007	-43.9%	32	-6	-11.1%	25	-12
Turner, N.	2006	-13.9%	26	6	-2.1%	13	17
McCarthy	2005	-63.1%	32	-4	-19.8%	30	2
Tollner	2004	-21.3%	28	-21	-24.6%	32	-24
AVERAGE		-32.1%	29.4	-4.4	-13.5%	25.4	-3.8

OK, a little bit of a tangent first. This table should effectively end any debate about whether or not Mike Martz should have been retained. The guy's 49er offense had a worse rush DVOA ranking than Jim Hostler's!!! Oh, and those Martz-Norv comparisons? Norv produced a better rushing offense and a better passing offense. In fact, the only aspect of 49er offensive DVOA that Martz improved turns out to be week-to-week, or should I say "weak-to-weak," consistency. In other words, Martz's 49er offense was consistent...consistently inefficient. Now, back to the main event...

Looking at all of the columns with "IMP" in the heading, we can see that Norv Turner was the only recent 49er OC to produce any meaningful improvement in the 49ers' offensive DVOA rankings. In light of the 2005 disaster that preceded him, these improvements are all the more impressive (e.g., the +50% change in passing DVOA). Norv's success is relevant in the current context because, as has been described elsewhere, Turner and Raye are both disciples of the 3-digit "Air Coryell" system. Indeed, their careers dovetailed in LA and WAS, and rendezvoused in OAK when Raye was Turner's OC.

BOTTOM LINE

Because Norv's success in 2006 suggests that a run-oriented, 3-digit offense best matches the 49ers' personnel, a return to this system under Raye bodes well for the 49ers' offense in 2009. How well exactly is hard to tell, especially without knowing (a) who the starting QB is, (b) who the 49ers add in free agency, (c) who they draft, and (d) how far along Jason Hill and Josh Morgan are in their path to elite WR status. Nevertheless, based on what I've presented in this article, and barring any major personnel changes and/or injuries, I'd conservatively estimate that the 49ers' offensive DVOAs will look something like -10% overall, -5% running, and -15% passing. That's not great, but it would qualify as the 2^nd best offense the 49ers have had since the revolving door swung open for the first time. How's that for a Raye of hope!

**DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

How good do you think Jimmy Raye's 49er offense is going to be?

Better than Norv's

57 votes

As good as Norv's

79 votes

Worse than Norv's, but better than Martz's

86 votes

As good as Martz's

18 votes

As vomit-inducingly bad as Hostler's and McCarthy's

54 votes

294 votes | Poll has closed

All Schaub. All The Time.

Tim — Tue, 04 Nov 2008 16:03:31 -0000

Some quick hits as Sage Rosenfels prepares to take the helm against a fierce Baltimore defense:

-The Texans sent tape of the two (2) Jared Allen low-blows to the league office for review. Personally, I think a fair sentence would be letting Mario hit Allen low. With a machete.

-Awwwww, Duane Brown feels bad about letting Allen spend so much time in the backfield. Don't beat yourself up too much, Duane. Ephraim Salaam got pancaked by Allen on at least one occasion that I clearly recall, and he was the LT of record for the second shot to The Schaub's knee. Pass some of that useless remorse Salaam's way.

-McClain says the Texans will bring Tim Rattay, Bruce Gradkowski, and Craig Nall in to audition for the part of backup to Sage. Be still my beating heart. Nall had a cup of coffee as a Texan last year, so you might be inclined to think he'd be the favorite, but I wonder whether Mike Sherman's departure levels the playing field.

-Finally, a depressing observation, echoed by John McClain: 'Dre had a sprained knee last year. He missed seven (7) games.

Assuming I don't jump out a window, the Post-Game Breakdown will be up later this afternoon.

Wednesday Notes: Tim Rattay Works Out for Lions

Sean Yuille — Wed, 22 Oct 2008 06:29:39 -0000

Quarterback Tim Rattay worked out for the Lions on Tuesday. According to Tom Kowalski, a signing "is not imminent." Just as was the case with Cedric Benson, the Lions are likely just getting a look at a free agent in case a signing is necessary later on in the season.
Matt Millen was fired exactly four weeks ago.
Rod Marinelli emphatically defended his decision to bench rookie Gosder Cherilus. I completely understand why he made the move, but I do think that it is important for Cherilus to get more experience so he can learn and develop quicker. Obviously you want to do whatever will get the team closer to a win, but at this point it really doesn't matter. Building for the future should be the priority.
Drew Stanton shared some interesting things about the Roy Williams trade on his blog.

As far as the events that went down on Tuesday, I think that was a direct sign that the Lions know Calvin is their franchise receiver and they are looking to build at other positions. We are fortunate to be so deep at receiver, so losing Roy hurts but it is not devastating as Mike Furrey and Shaun McDonald are great talents.

Plain and simple, Roy did not want to be here any longer and was going to demand an insane amount of money if there was a chance of him staying.

I think that trade worked out great for everyone involved. We ended up picking up essentially a first- and third-round pick, Roy got to go back to Texas, and the Cowboys got a great talent at wide receiver.
I couldn't agree with him more.
Yes, the Lions could go 0-16.
I want to give Jason Hanson a well-deserved pat on the back for making two 54-yard field goals against the Texans. He has now made all 8 field goal attempts this season and sadly is once against putting himself in position to be this team's MVP.
As MLive's Philip Zaroo pointed out, the Lions could end up with better draft position than originally expected if the Cowboys implode. They are likely going to be without Tony Romo again this weekend, and if the losing continues, things could get really ugly in Dallas.
A transcript of Rod Marinelli's press conference from earlier this week can be found here.
Dwight Smith may be out for a few weeks due to an injury. He had a CT scan on his foot, and Marinelli said that "it doesn't look good."
Both Chuck Darby and Travis Fisher didn't play against Houston, even though they were involved in the pre-game warm-ups.
Edwin Mulitalo was inactive against the Texans. He wasn't injured; Marinelli said he just wanted to give Mulitalo a break.
Here's a depressing thought: Detroit could have hired Dick Jauron or Jim Haslett instead of Rod Marinelli. Jauron, as you probably remember, was the Lions' interim coach after Steve Mariucci was fired, but he never became an actual candidate for the job. Instead, he went to Buffalo and is the coach of a team that is currently 5-1. Haslett, on the other hand, finished second to Marinelli in the coaching search. He went on to be the Rams' defensive coordinator and became their head coach earlier this season when Scott Linehan was fired. Since Haslett took over, the Rams are 2-0.
Rudi Johnson replaced Jon Kitna as a captain.
Darren Sharper did not get fined for his hit on Calvin Johnson during the fourth quarter of the Vikings-Lions game. The hit was helmet-to-helmet and prevented Johnson from finishing the game since he had blurry vision after it.
Roy Williams is going to get $27 million in guaranteed money from the Cowboys.
The 49ers fired head coach Mike Nolan on Monday and replaced him with Mike Singletary.