SB Nation - Kwame Harris

Raiders Q&A with Silver and Black Pride

John (obviousman) — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 09:22:00 -0000

4 months ago: Oakland Raiders running back Darren McFadden runs during NFL football training camp in Napa, Calif., Thursday, July 30, 2009. (AP Photo/Paul Sakuma)

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The day is finally here and tonight the San Diego Chargers' season begins. I've been counting down the days to this game for 8 months now, and I'm happy the Bolts are getting the season started by playing a team that they've beaten easily in years past. However, with the Broncos getting an unlikely win yesterday and the Chiefs playing tight with Baltimore, we can't be too confident heading into this AFC West matchup.

I talked with TheRaiderWay from Silver and Black Pride, SB Nation's Oakland Raiders community, about all of the issues the team is dealing with currently and what to expect from the team in 2009:

Last year, on a scale of 1 to 10, I would've rated the Raiders offensive line as a 1 at best. Robert Gallery needs help. Do you think this year's group is improved over last year's?
At a minimum, it is addition by subtraction by getting rid of Kwame Harris. We are very satisfied with LT Mario Henderson and are excited with his continual progress. Left tackle has been a problem for years and if Mario can continue his solid play from last season, then a major part of the line's problems will be settled. Our concern is over at right tackle. Cornell Green is at best an average backup and in no way should be starting.

As the prototypical 3-4 Defensive End, where does Richard Seymour fit into the Raiders' defense?
Well, the Raiders say they are going to play him at RDE to maximize and then have him part of the rotation where in passing downs he can then slide down to DT. Stopping the run is the Raiders problem and having Seymour anywhere along the line can only improve that problem.

The rest of his insightful answers lay after the jump.

Do you think Darrius Heyward-Bey is a better WR prospect than Michael Crabtree?
For the Raiders system, definitely. It may take him a couple of years to master his position, but when he does, I believe he will be an elite receiver.

Is this JaMarcus Russell's breakout season? Why?
We sure hope so, it has to be and it better be. The Raiders have made every effort to surround JaMarcus with all the tools and weapons to be a success. The first major factor was bringing in QB coach Paul Hackett to properly teach Russell the pro game and the necessary fundamentals, both physical and mental. Next, the Raiders designed the offense to fit his skill set. The Raiders will be primarily a running team and that should help Russell's game. Having upgraded the wide receiver position and with improved line play, Russell should be an efficient QB this season. He will not need to be a superstar this season, he just needs to be able to manage the game and be as mistake free as possible, kind of in the way Joe Flacco has done for the Ravens.

The Raiders seem to have talent everywhere. The CBs are great, the LBs might be better (SDSU fans miss Kirk Morrison) and the defensive line just added a Pro Bowler. Also, nobody doubts that Russell has a cannon for an arm, nor that he has some talented receivers to throw to, nor that Oakland's trio of running backs are formidable. What's missing with this team? What's the weakness keeping them from being more consistent?
The short answer is the experience of winning, which has been lacking for most of the players on the current team. The team will win a game one week and then be a completely different team the next week because they just don't have enough experience of winning to know how to handle it on a consistent basis. Bringing in Greg Ellis and Seymour, veterans that know how to win, will be a major boon to the team on the field and in the locker room. As far as positions go, the safety position is talented but lacking experience and depth at linebacker is a serious concern.

Do the Raiders' fans still like and trust in Al Davis?
That's always a subject for much debate with opinions that are polar opposites. Al Davis is the Raiders as much as the Raiders are Al Davis and nothing is going to change that as long as he is alive. I will say, that I know of no other owner that has the desire to win as much as Al Davis does and while currently the results are not there, it's not from lack of trying.

Should Tom Cable be suspended by the league for breaking the jaw of one of his assistant coaches?
All the facts are not in yet so it's hard to just speculate, but if he did commit a crime then yes, he should be suspended.

San Diego Chargers @ Oakland Raiders Game Preview

John (obviousman) — Thu, 10 Sep 2009 18:30:31 -0000

by Gene J. Puskar - AP

3 months ago: In this Nov. 16, 2008, photo, San Diego Chargers running back LaDanian Tomlinson (21) takes a handoff from quarterback Philip Rivers against the Pittsburgh Steelers during an NFL football game in Pittsburgh. Tomlinson, the star running back, almost got the heave-ho in the offseason due to salary cap and injury concerns. (AP Photo/Gene J. Puskar)

View full size photo »

Football is back! WOOHOOO! It's like Chrismas in the Fall. Tonight, the Titans travel to Pittsburgh to take on the defending champions in a matchup of bruising defenses. I'll be watching, with a cold beer in my hand, and be happy that football means something again. However, in the back of my mind I'll be thinking about Monday's San Diego Chargers game against the Oakland Raiders.

After the jump, an in-depth preview on Monday's game.

When the Raiders Have the Ball

Week 1 games are difficult to analyze because mostly what you have to go on is the players and what happened in 2008. I'll try my best though. In 2008, the Raiders ranked 29th in total offense, 32nd in passing offense and 10th in rushing offense. You're not going to get very far with the worst passing attack in the NFL. Their leading pass catchers were Zach Miller, Darren McFadden and Johnnie Lee Higgins. McFadden had only 29 catches, Higgins only 56. I can't stress enough how horrible this passing offense was in 2008.

In his first full season as an NFL starter, JaMarcus Russell completed less than 54% of his passes. By comparison, Philip Rivers completed more than 65% of his passes. There's no doubt about it, the Raiders are a running offense. You could argue that with an improved offensive line (meaning Kwame Harris is gone) and a healthy Darren McFadden, the rushing attack will be even more potent. Also, with a legitimate deep-threat receiver in Darris Heyward-Bey, the Raiders may be facing more seven man fronts in 2009.

However, one of the reasons the Chargers were able to dominate the Raiders in 2008 (combined score 62-25) is because on defense San Diego's weaknesses were with the passing game. Although they were 25th in total defense, and 31st is passing defense, the Chargers were still able to finish 11th in rushing defense. With hope for Oakland's offense comes hope for San Diego's defense. Kevin Burnett and Shawne Merriman, along with a healthy Jamal Williams, should make the run defense even stronger. With Ron Rivera creating an aggressive scheme to get after the quarterback, Russell may have a difficult time throwing against the Bolts.

Advantage: Tie. The Raiders will try to run the ball and get control of the time of possession to keep Philip Rivers and the Chargers' potent offense off of the field. That might move the chains, but JaMarcus Russell will have to make a few plays for them to actually score touchdowns.

When the Chargers Have the Ball

Let us return to those 2008 team stats again. Last season the Raiders ranked 27th in total defense, 10th in passing defense and 31st in run defense. The Chargers ranked 11th in total offense, 7th in passing offense and 20th in rushing offense. In the offseason the Raiders replaced the very capable Gibril Wilson with fourth round draft pick Tyvon Branch (an SB Nation contributor), and have replaced DEs Kalimba Edwards and Derrick Burgess with Greg Ellis and Trevor Scott. Is that an improvement? It could be, but when you add Pro Bowl DT/DE Richard Seymour to the mix it's a definite improvement. Luckily for the Chargers, he won't be involved in this week 1 matchup.

A healthy LaDainian Tomlinson means bad news for the Raiders. Look at how consistently he's beaten them up:

10/16/05 - 31 carries, 140 yards, 1 rush TD. 2 catches, 39 yards, 1 rec TD.
12/04/05 - 25 carries, 86 yards. 5 catches, 24 yards.
9/11/06 - 31 carries, 131 yards, 1 rush TD. 3 catches, 18 yards.
11/26/06 - 19 carries, 109 yards, 2 rush TD. 1 catch, 5 yards. 1 pass, 19 yards, 1 pass TD.
10/14/07 - 24 carries, 198 yards, 4 rush TD. 3 catches, 16 yards.
12/30/07 - 16 carries, 56 yards. 1 catch, 7 yards, 1 rec TD. (*Week 17 with division clinched)
9/28/08 - 20 carries, 106 yards, 2 rush TDs. 2 catches, 9 yards.
12/04/08 - 25 carries, 91 yards, 1 rush TD.

Facing them in week 1, before he even gets a chance to get injured, means that LT should have a big game against Oakland's lack of a run defense. If they start sending their LBs on blitzes to help, Darren Sproles could create problems with the screen pass. The Raiders secondary did a good job of keeping Rivers in check in 2008, but he still managed to throw 4 TDs against only 2 interceptions against them. He won't look like a superstar against Oakland because their secondary is quite good, but should be able to find enough holes to get the job done and could probably burn the rookie SS once or twice as well.

Advantage: Chargers. There's no doubt about it. The Chargers offense is one of the best in the league and the Raiders, while respectable, will not be able to shut them out. I think the Raiders will have a hard time getting a pass-rush on Philip, which will lead to a lot of 7 yard passes over the middle to Antonio Gates. I also think the running game will be good enough to get first downs and keep the defense rested.

Don't forget to send in your Mailbag Questions to be answered on Saturday. Your questions do not necessarily have to be related to the Chargers.

Simply Kwame...

Fooch — Fri, 31 Jul 2009 21:52:37 -0000

Since things will start getting a little more intense with practice tomorrow, I thought that barring some late breaking news, we'd take you into the weekend with this video. HUGE props to armchar middle distance runner for finding this over at 49ersNews.com and posting it in our all-time OT #2 post. Since I'm sure there are plenty of folks who missed out on this, I thought it was worth moving to the front page.

This rolled around YouTube a year or two ago and then disappeared. Thankfully, IT'S BACK! I realize there were plenty of bad players surrounding Kwame Harris, but in the end, this is all about Kwame. It's simply Kwame, and man is he bad.

49ers All-time Offensive Tackle #2

Fooch — Thu, 30 Jul 2009 20:00:12 -0000

In another expected result, Jesse Sapolu ran away with the all-time center vote. In another interesting, but not entirely shocking result, Eric Heitmann grabbed 10% of the vote. Having current guys on the ballot can probably lead to some slightly skewed results. Given some of the upcoming votes, I'll be opening this up for a little more debate in the next week or so. For now though, it's time to move down the offensive line to the offensive tackle. I elected to declare Bob St. Clair the 49ers' #1 offensive tackle. St. Clair was a local product (Go Dons!) and a hall of famer as an offensive tackle. I probably should have done the same and declared Dave Wilcox one of the OLBs because of that, but such is life.

So, we now move on to the #2 offensive tackle on our all-time team. The 49ers have a long history of solid offensive tackles, and maybe one day Joe Staley will join this list. I'm sure I've missed plenty of guys, but I wanted to keep the list to 5. The toughest one to keep off had to be Kwame Harris. It breaks me up to not have him here

Harris Barton (1987-1996): Barton was a no nonsense offensive lineman who you didn't hear much about, but he was always there doing his job. Barton won 3 Super Bowl with the 49ers, while earning two First Team All-Pro appearances and a trip to the Pro Bowl. In his rookie year, Barton was the runner up in Rookie of the Year voting. Barton was apparently recruited by over 100 colleges before attending the University of North Carolina. He currently works in private equity funds and is apparently one hell of an amateur golfer.

Steve Wallace (1986-1996): My favorite memory of Steve Wallace came in the game where his "helmet shell" came off and Steve Young had to put it back on for him. I think it was in 1994 when they won the Super Bowl, but I honestly can't remember. I'm not sure why I so easily recall it, but I guess I'm just easily amused. Like Barton, Wallace took home 3 Lombardi Trophies and earned a Pro Bowl appearance. Finally, Steve Wallace was also the inspiration for a fun list post at an anti-49ers website.

Keith Fahnhorst (1974-1987): While plenty of players have played on bad teams that became good, the symmetry of Fahnhorst's career is intriguing. From 1974-1980, the 49ers were 34-70. From 1981-1987, they were 74-29-1. For more recent 49ers fans, that would be the exact opposite of Bryant Young's career. Matt Maiocco wrote a book on past 49ers and had an interesting chapter on Fahnhorst.

Len Rohde (1960-1974): Rohde played for the last three playoff teams before the Bill Walsh era. During that time Rohde played in 208 consecutive games, earning one trip to the Pro Bowl, as well as a second team and honorable mention selection. During his time with the 49ers, the team led the NFL in points scored in 1965 and 1970 and the NFC in 1972.

Cas Banaszek (1968-1977): Banaszek manned the other tackle position with Rohde. He was actually drafted out of Northwestern as a pass catching tight end, but was switched to the offensive line after an injury his rookie season. While never a Pro Bowler, he was named to the all-NFC offensive line in 1970.

Poll

Who should be our all-time #2 offensive tackle?

Harris Barton

357 votes

Steve Wallace

80 votes

Keith Fahnhorst

52 votes

Len Rohde

9 votes

Cas Banaszek

10 votes

508 votes | Poll has closed

Shallow Thoughts & Nearsighted Observations

Ted Bartlett — Tue, 30 Jun 2009 12:30:12 -0000

Happy Tuesday to all MHR community members. I've been absent for a few weeks, mostly due to craziness in my day job, but at least partially due to a lack of awe-inspiring topics to write about. This is the worst part of the football year, where nothing is going on.

Today, we'll talk about the other teams the Broncos play this season, including AFC second-place teams and the AFC West, and time permitting, I kind of feel like beating up on some MSM writing. We shall see how far I am able to get, and for now, I am going to get right to it. Ready.... BEGIN!!!

1. As promised, let's continue the around-the-league offseason evaluations...

a. Indianapolis Colts (2008 Record 12-4, Lost in Wild Card Round of Playoffs)

Smart Personnel Moves - I really liked the selection of Donald Brown, the RB from UConn. Joseph Addai is a nice player when you keep his carries down, but Brown is a workhorse kind of back. I expect that he will ultimately get 2/3 of the carries for the Colts, with Addai getting the other 1/3. Running the ball effectively is crucial for the Colts, because when the defense has to play the run, Peyton Manning just shreds secondaries. He is very good against dedicated pass coverage, but he is great against 8 in the box. I also liked the pick of Austin Collie, a WR from BYU. He has a really good feel for the passing game, and can be a good slot player in the NFL.

Questionable Personnel Moves - I get that the Colts have a minimalist strategy in free agency, but I think that they are going to regret not doing more to replace Marvin Harrison. Reggie Wayne has really been the #1 guy the past few years, but Anthony Gonzalez is below average for a #2, and should be playing in the slot. If any team should have signed Terrell Owens, it's the Colts. Peyton Manning is one QB he couldn't ever throw under the bus, and the Colts have the kind of program he would have a hard time poisoning.

ST&NO Outlook - I have some reason to think that the Colts are going to decline a little bit this season. There has been a lot of turnover on the coaching staff, and I don't see how you could have a lot of faith in Jim Caldwell, given his underwhelming tenure as a head coach at Wake Forest. I also think #2 WR and the right side of the O-Line are going to be weaknesses, and that the defense will continue to be vulnerable to the run. Despite this, the Colts will be in the playoff mix, as usual. They'll be good, but not elite.

b. New England Patriots (2008 Record 11-5, Missed Playoffs)

Smart Personnel Decisions - I really liked their first three second-round picks, Patrick Chung, Ron Brace, and Darius Butler. Chung and Butler have a chance to start as rookies, and Brace should play a lot in the D-Line rotation. I also loved the Fred Taylor signing. I expect him to lead the team in carries this season, and play well. He still has some good football in him. Joey Galloway was also worth a look, and according to PFW, he has looked good so far. It was a pretty nice offseason for the Pats, if you overlook their obviously huge errors in valuing cheaper second-round picks over more expensive first-rounders.

Questionable Personnel Decisions - It's a somewhat small complaint, but they could have done more to improve their highly overrated and underwhelming offensive line. You may not remember it amid the 41-7 shellacking the Broncos took from the Pats last season, but the Broncos sacked Matt Cassell 6 times in the game, by far their best performance of the season.

ST&NO Outlook - I've been saying since Tom Brady got hurt that it's no sure thing that he comes back as good as new. I definitely stand by that, and I could care less what they say about it in Foxboro. Carson Palmer looked great in practice once too, but he has never been the same player since his catastrophic knee injury, and Brady's was comparable. Assuming Brady is healthy, and can play at 90% of his old level (or better), the Patriots are a championship contender once again. If not, they could be a .500 team, because they really got lucky that Matt Cassel played so well last season.

c. San Diego Chargers - (2008 Record 8-8, Lost in Divisional Playoffs)

Smart Personnel Decisions - I somewhat liked the Larry English pick in the first round of the draft. He is another pass rusher, and you can never have too many of them. Picking Dominique Byrd in the 7th round has some potential upside too.

Questionable Personnel Decisions - A lot of their draft picks are really obscure, and they seemed to like them better than most other teams. The right side of the Chargers offensive line isn't very good, and they could have stood to improve quite a bit there. Also, their average IQ is pretty low, according to the screenshot below from the super-reliable ESPN.com. Really, 83 is shockingly low, when you think about it.

ST&NO Outlook - The Chargers are the favorite to win the AFC West, but they won't necessarily get it done. I can't put my finger on what it exactly is, but they have a real underachiever streak. Their talent is also downgraded a bit from last season, and for the second year in a row, they didn't do a lot to improve in the draft. The Chargers will be formidable, but they are flawed, and can be beaten.

d. Kansas City Chiefs - (2008 Record 2-14, Missed Playoffs)

Smart Personnel Decisions - I like Tyson Jackson a lot as a player, and I am not one of these guys who worries too much about draft slot. The Chiefs got a very good player for their defensive line, and that's a smart decision. I also liked the choices of Donald Washington and Ryan Succop, and the acquisition by trade of Mike Vrabel.

Questionable Personnel Decisions - I'm not too big on the Matt Cassel trade. Josh McDaniels obviously thought highly of him, but I just wonder if he can be as effective without all the playmakers around him. I am not saying it was a bad move, but it's no slam dunk as a good one either. I also think Larry Johnson should have been traded, and Tony Gonzalez shouldn't have been.

ST&NO Outlook - If Glenn Dorsey and Tyson Jackson play well on the defensive line, and Tamba Hali can get some pressure this year, the Chiefs have a 7-win ceiling. I expect their defense will still be terrible, though, and that they'll win 4 or 5 games instead.

e. Oakland Raiders - (2008 Record 5-11, Missed Playoffs)

Smart Personnel Decisions - This is the most difficult task of any team review, because even when the Raiders do something semi-smart (like sign a solid backup QB, as a hedge against a JaMarcus Russell regression or stagnation), it's always kind of dumb if you look at it a different way (Jeff Garcia is a well-known me-first guy, who isn't too interested in actually being a backup). I will give them credit for drafting Matt Shaugnessy, who I like as a player, and not just because he went to my alma mater, Norwich Free Academy of Norwich, CT. I think Shaughnessy fits the Raiders' 4-3 scheme very well, and that he will overperform his draft slot.

Questionable Personnel Decisions - The Raiders will regret taking Darrius Heyward-Bey seventh overall. I said before I am not such a draft slot guy, but when you pass up Michael Crabtree (or Percy Harvin, or Jeremy Maclin) for a guy, he'd better be a star - and DHB isn't going to be one. Also, counting on Khalif Barnes at LT is a mistake. He's a below-average starter there, even if he is a marginal upgrade over Kwame Harris.

ST&NO Outlook - The Raiders have some talent, especially at RB, LB, and LCB. If they commit to pounding the ball in the running game, and they get their defense patched up a bit, and playing sounder, this can actually be an 8-8 team. I think Garcia ends up starting by mid-season, which would be disastrous for the Raiders, (hence the reason I think it will happen). In short, I would hate to be a Raiders fan, and have to secretly hope for Al Davis's death and/or retirement.

2. Did you see this nonsense foxsports.com did around the 10 best "franchise players" under 30? Len Pasquarelli made it worse here with the continued omission of Ryan Clady, and the inclusion of Jordan Gross instead. Gross is good, but he isn't one of the 5 best LTs in the game (Clady, Thomas, Roos, W. Jones, Peters), let alone the best. All of those 5 are under 30, except for Walter Jones, too. I am not a Len Pasquarelli fan, so I don't expect any better, but come on!!! You don't have to be a stats producer to be a franchise player.

3. I think that Ed Thompson is kind of stupid, from what I have read of his 7 Points column. NYC originally made this point, but it bears repeating how asinine it is to say that the Broncos are paying Dre' Bly anything this season, since they're not. Many people don't know this, but in the NFL, unlike all the other major sports, there are no guaranteed annual contracts. The Broncos paid Dre' some bonus money in the past, but they'll pay him nothing this season. The dead money is merely an acceleration of the prorated bonus, so anything Dre' does this year is not "literally at Denver's expense." Next time you see this sort of (il)logical construct, you'll be able to spot it for what it is right away. This is not at all like the Tigers paying Gary Sheffield to play well for the Mets.

4. Here's an asinine comment from John Clayton. It seems that the Texans were lucky that their owner Bob McNair was afraid Reggie Bush received extra benefits at USC, and that stroke of luck led them to draft Mario Williams, because, nobody knew he'd be this good, right?

I mean, hell, he might have been declared ineligible by the NCAA to play in the NFL, right? What Clayton means is, he and his brethren all had that one wrong, and Charley Casserly and Gary Kubiak got it right. They all eviscerated the pick at the time, and said it was just Houston being cheap. Right....because paying $30 million in guarantees for a part-time scat-back, who is banged-up a lot, is brilliant. Even after one season, Houston was getting ripped, as if the jury was in.

The Texans drafted the player they thought was the best, and the one who filled their biggest need. It turns out, Williams seems to have actually been the best player, and it's important to remember, it was more good evaluation than good luck.

Have a great week, and I think this Tuesday debut will be the start of a total shift to Tuesday mornings for ST&NO, since I was planning to make that move anyway once the season starts. As always, thanks for reading, and for your contributions in the comments.

Poll

Which is the tougher set of incremental games: San Diego's first-place schedule, or Denver's second-place schedule?

San Diego (Tennessee, Miami)

31 votes

Denver (Indianapolis, New England)

766 votes

797 votes | Poll has closed

Holding...Offense...10 yard penalty, replay first down: Ahhhh nuts!

Fooch — Sun, 28 Jun 2009 15:00:22 -0000

While poking around SB Nation I came across a post at Field Gulls linking to a very interesting article about holding penalties. It basically argues about the value of taking a holding penalty on a given pass play. It utilizes a whole bunch of equations that are way over my head and concludes that:

The bottom line is that the probability of detection at which committing holding is worthwhile is when it is about 4/5 the chance a pass rusher will get a sack if he beats his blocker. For argument's sake, say that a pass rusher in the backfield gets a sack half the time. The probability of detection would need to be below 0.4 for the hold to make sense.

When I read over this it reminded of the old YouTube video of Kwame Harris and all his various penalties and general screw-ups. Unfortunately it's no longer available online because of the copyright issues. Such a shame.

I post this now for a few reasons. First off, I think it's an interesting take on the subject of penalties. Second, I'm curious how holding is handled by the 49ers offensive line coach. Seeing as this can apply to any offensive line, do we have any former high school or college o-linemen who could contribute to this discussion? Basically I'm curious how coaches address the idea of holding since it really seems to happen on most plays, but is obviously not called every time.

The final reason I bring it up is to get some feedback from everybody on some ideas I have. Thanks to the power of DVR I can record every game and watch it over and over again with great ease (I still have the 49ers-Packers TO catch game from when NFLN showed it a few months ago). I'm thinking that we can use these recordings each week to get a better idea of stats that aren't really accumulated anywhere on a regular basis. I'm talking primarily about penalties on different players. You can find that information sometimes but it's a real pain in the butt to locate.

So, I'm thinking I'll start keeping track of that kind of thing on a regular basis. Each week I'll provide the numbers on player penalties for the past game and cumulative to date. However, I was curious what other random stuff people would like to see accumulated from the recorded games. Are there any particular stats that would be relatively easy to track, but are not readily available anywhere? We've got some time left before the season starts, but now is as good a time as any to start planning for the upcoming season.

Previewing the Kansas City Chiefs 2009 Schedule: Week 2

Chris Thorman — Mon, 22 Jun 2009 15:49:32 -0000

OAKLAND, CA - NOVEMBER 30: Larry Johnson #27 of the Kansas City Chiefs celebrates after scoring a touchdown in the second half against the Oakland Raiders during an NFL game on November 30, 2008 at the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum in Oakland, California. (Photo by Jed Jacobsohn/Getty Images)

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On September 20th, the Oakland Raiders (5-11) will travel to Arrowhead Stadium to face the Kansas City Chiefs (2-14). This will be the Chiefs first AFC West opponent of the year, while Oakland will be in the middle of three straight divisional games to start off the season. They play San Diego in Week 1 and Denver in Week 3.

Last season, when the Kansas City Chiefs played the Oakland Raiders in Week 2, the fans got their first indication that something was seriously wrong with our football team. On 47 rushing attempts that day, the Raiders ran for 300 yards and 14 first downs. QB Jamarcus Russell only completed six passes on seventeen attempts. The Chiefs didn't even score until there was four minutes left in the game. And we gave up a Raider touchdown after that, making the final score 23 to 8.

Needless to say, it was a rough day to be a Chiefs fan.

But as a consolation, the Oakland Raiders 2009 off season has made it tough to be an Oakland Raider fan. It hasn't been the comedy of errors that we've seen play on in Denver but we're talking about Al Davis here. We're talking about the league's second worst run defense and an owner who has done virtually nothing to address the problem.

After the jump, we take a look at what the Raiders have done this off season to improve their team and then we'll examine how this Week 2 match up in Kansas City may go down.

2008 Season Snapshot

The 2008 Oakland Raiders finished the season ranked 29th in both points and yards gained per game, 32nd in passing yards and 10th in rushing yards per game. Their defense didn't fare much better over the long haul. Oakland finished 2008 24th in points allowed; 27th in yards allowed; 10th in passing yards allowed; and finally 31st in rushing yards allowed.

Where the Raiders excelled was rushing the football. They rushed for more than 150 yards in five contests and went over 100 yards rushing in nine games total last year. The rushing combo of Michael Bush, Darren McFadden and Justin Fargas was a potent one, as the team split carries mainly between those three players and amassed nearly 2,000 yards rushing for the season.

With Jamarcus Russell throwing the football last year, the Raiders were absolutely terrible in the passing game. Russell passed for over 200 yards only three times and passed under 150 yards a game nine times.

Much like the Chiefs did, the Raiders got killed in the running game last year on defense. The Raiders gave up over 2,500 yards rushing on the ground and had a middle of the season stretch where nearly every team destroyed Oakland on the ground.

2009 Off Season Roster Moves

Veteran Signings: QB Jeff Garcia, RB Gary Russell, FB Lorenzo Neal, OT Khalif Barnes, OT Erik Pears, G Marcus Johnson, C Samson Satele, DE Greg Ellis, DT Ryan Boschetti, S Keith Davis.

Draft Picks: WR Darrius Heyward-Bey, SS Michael Mitchell, DE Matt Shaughnessy, WR Louis Murphy, OLB Slade Norris, DE Stryker Sulak, TE Brandon Myers.

Offseason Losses: FB Justin Griffith, WR Ronald Curry, WR Drew Carter, WR Ashley Lelie, OT Kwame Harris, C Jake Grove, DE Kalimba Edwards, OLB Robert Thomas, SS Gibril Wilson, S Rashad Baker.

While Al Davis continues this off season to sign guys with serious knee problems, let's go straight to the source of Raiders fandom over at Silver and Black Pride to get their thoughts on the team's first round pick, WR Darrius Heyward-Bey:

40 YARD DASH TIMES ARE NOT EVERYTHING

This is why we will never win until al davis goes away. if you want fast guys there’s plenty of skiny sprinters in the olympics. WE ARE THE WORST RUN ORG IN THE NFL.

Even if he turns out to be descent picking him at 7 is terrible imo. We could have grabbed a 4th rounder and traded down a dozen spots to snag him. Bah being a Raiders fan on draft day is rough.

So, without going into too much more detail, Raiders fans are quite upset with Al Davis not properly addressing the team's needs through the draft. Through the draft, Oakland did bolster what is quickly becoming one of the best secondaries in the NFL. Despite being a reach, second round pick S Michael Mitchell is highly talented. Top corner Nnamdi Asomugha makes #2 CB Chris Johnson's job that much easier as well.

The team did address part of their offensive line needs through free agency by adding OT Khalif Barnes. As you can see though, the Raiders did pretty much nothing to address that terrible defensive line. Al Davis, at it again.

Darren McFadden #20 of the Oakland Raiders carries the ball as Derrick Johnson #56 of the Kansas City Chiefs defends during the first half of the game on September 14, 2008 at Arrowhead Stadium in Kansas City, Missouri. (Photo by Jamie Squire/Getty Images)

Why the Chiefs Will Win

It was clear last season that teams knew what to do against the Raiders - run the football. And with Al Davis doing virtually nothing to fix that problem this off season, the Chiefs' best chance to beat the Raiders in Week 2 is to pound, pound the football. Larry Johnson and Jamaal Charles are going to have to combine for at least thirty rushing attempts this game to ensure a Chiefs win. It would make no sense not to attack the Raiders biggest weak point.

Couple that terrible run defense with what will hopefully be an improved and more efficient passing game with Matt Cassel leading the way and the Chiefs should definitley have the Raiders' number on defense. If the team can't produce yards and points against this Raider defense in Week 2, it's going to feel a lot like last season's Week 2 loss in Oakland - demoralizing, depressing and a sad indication of things to come in KC.

The lack of a decent Oakland passing attack will also help the Chiefs win this game. Jamarcus Russell still hasn't impressed really anyone and the addition of WR Darrius Heyward-Bey hasn't exactly put the Raiders over the top in the receiving talent category. If you take a look at the Raiders roster, tell me who exactly besides Heyward-Bey is Russell going to throw to? Javon Walker? TE Zach Miller should see an increase in his production this year. He may end up being Oakland's most reliable target.

Why the Raiders Will Win

By far the biggest reason the Oakland Raiders were able to win one of their two games against the Chiefs last year was their ability to run the football. The Raiders may have been 31st in the NFL in rushing yards allowed but the Chiefs were 30th (and not far behind Oakland's average). The Raiders will be looking to do what the Chiefs will be looking to do against them - run the football all day long.

Quarterback Tyler Thigpen #4 of the Kansas City Chiefs is sacked by Derrick Burgess #56 of the Oakland Raiders during the first half of the game on Saptember 14, 2008 at Arrowhead Stadium in Kansas City, Missouri. (Photo by Jamie Squire/Getty Images)

I'll admit it. A new defensive scheme with hopeful but unproven younger guys makes me scared against Darren McFadden, Michael Bush and Justin Fargas. Those three destroyed the Chiefs last year in Week 2 and there really isn't a whole lot, besides the addition of Tyson Jackson, that makes me think the Chiefs will have solved their rushing problems by Week 2.

Also, I know I'm not in the minority when I emphasize how much different this offense is going to look without Tony Gonzalez. I really have no idea what to expect without TG lining up for the Chiefs. I suspect that the loss of TG is going to hurt much more than any of us really want to admit right now. We'll be finding out very early in the season, and especially during Week 2, just how well the Chiefs are going to function without the Hall of Fame tight end.

Finally, the Raiders have a big edge on special teams. Sebastian Janikowski will continue to be a top notch kicker, even if the last few seasons haven't reflected that. Shane Lechler is the NFL's best punter. Plus, Oakland has two great return men in Justin Miller and Johnnie Lee Higgins. Miller returned two kickoffs for TDs last year and Higgins took three punt returns all the way back for scores. One big return by either one of those guys, resulting in a field goal or a touchdown, could be the difference in what I predict is going to be a close game.

My Prediction

I hate admitting this but the Chiefs and Raiders are pretty close in talent level right now. Things could easily change if say our rush defense gels quickly in 2009 but for right now, these two teams are pretty even.

I don't believe that either one of these team's defenses are going to be markedly improved by Week 2. With that said, I'm not predicting a shootout either. Both secondaries could be considered team strengths, which will limit both team's relatively weak passing games. I predict a sloppy game that is decided by one or two defensive breakdowns that result in points for the opposing offense. Looking at last year's Chiefs/Raiders point totals, I predict a 20 to 17 Chiefs win. The Arrowhead Advantage pulls the Chiefs through in a close divisional game.

More...

Previewing Week 1: Baltimore Ravens

Silver and Black Pride's Sunday Community Poll: The Raiders Offense

TheRaiderWay — Sun, 21 Jun 2009 08:10:20 -0000

The 2008 Oakland Raiders finished the season ranked 29th in total offense and 29th in scoring with an incredibly low 263 points of which 35 of them were by way of special teams touchdowns. Even worse, the passing offense ranked 32nd with a paltry 2,369 passing yards, that's dead last folks. The rushing offense was the brighter spot ranking 10th.

Fortunately in the NFL, turnarounds have become more of the norm rather than the exception now and there is good reason to believe the Raiders offense is positioned for a steady rise in the rankings for 2009.

First let's examine what went wrong with the 2008 Raiders offense. To begin with, the 2008 offseason was one of the most distracting, adverse offseasons in memory. The constant Davis/Kiffin bickering followed a Raiders spending spree which bought players that could never live up to their contracts. Then we had the head coach in Kiffin who flat out did not want to be there and was doing everything in his power to get fired. This kind of dysfunction alone would be enough to bring down any team and it certainly effected the Raiders as a whole and in particular, the young Raider offense.

Next, was the coaching staff, that had Kiffin and his inexperienced college ways to go along with John DeFilippi, the quarterbacks coach, attempting to guide and tutor the 22 year old franchise QB, JaMarcus Russell the ways of the NFL. The offseason's escapades and the coaching staff at the beginning of the season were a definitive component of an inconsistent and underwhelming offense. Couple that with the fact that Russell had no veteran QB presence as a backup to tutor him on the ins and outs of the NFL.

The next component of the failures of the 2008 offense was the offensive line and in particular, Kwame Harris. It wasn't just Harris' inferior blocking abilities that hurt, it was his total lack of discipline resulting in a ridiculous amount of either holding or false start penalties. In 2008, when Harris was in, you could almost count on him to be a drive killer.

When your leading receiver is your tight end and your leading wide receiver has 22 receptions for 366 yards, you know you've got problems. Javon Walker was one of those FA acquisitions that could not live up to the size of his contract, was supposed to be the veteran presence to help guide the youngsters. Problem was, Walker could never stay on the field and the lack of veteran leadership at that position severely hurt the Raiders talented but inexperienced wide receivers.

With the above stated, it was no wonder as to why the Raiders would consider themselves a running team. The preseason injury to Oren O'Neal certainly had an adverse effect on the running game, but the young and talented core kept the team competitive for the most part. The dreaded turf toe injury to Darren McFadden cut short what would have probably been a sensational season for the 4th overall pick of the 2008 draft.

Now the reasons for optimism for the Raiders offense in 2009:

a stable and quiet offseason
a stable and experienced coaching staff, with quarterback guru Paul Hackett guiding JaMarcus Russell.
Jeff Garcia, an experienced, veteran QB, who will mentor and push JaMarcus and who can step in and win if called upon.
the offensive Line. Just by subtracting Kwame Harris from the team will cause the O-line to be improved. The addition of Pears, Khalif Barnes and Satele, as well as the encouraging play of Mario Henderson (no sacks allowed and no penalties), will have this unit improving the offense.
the wide receiver position was paid extensive attention in the draft and there will be a lot of competition in camp as a result. Javon Walker and his restructured contract, who will presumably be healthy for camp, will be added to the swiftly improving and talented Chaz Schillens and JLH to go along with the promising rookies.
Zach Miller, the soon-to-be All Pro tight end.
Lorenzo Neal. Great blocker, great leader, great teacher...Great signing.
running backs. The 2009 Raiders will employ the best depth at that position in the NFL, McFadden, Bush Fargas, Rankin and Gary Russell. Last seasons injuries clearly showed the need for at least 3 running backs and with McFadden returning healthy, this group should dominate.
the last 2 games of the 2008 season saw the Raiders put together consecutive impressive wins for the first time in 7 seasons in December. The play of JaMarcus Russell was a key part of those wins.
last and certainly not least, the maturing JaMarcus Russell. All of the above should be the formula that allows JaMarcus to succeed and become the elite quarterback that he is expected to be.

All of these factors in addition to Russell having another year of experience should have the Raiders steadily climbing up in the ranks of NFL offense and hopefully winning many more games.

Poll

Where will the 2009 Oakland Raiders rank in the NFL on offense?

top 5

87 votes

6 through 15

603 votes

16 through 31

530 votes

32 - dead last

26 votes

1246 votes | Poll has closed

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IId. The McNolan Era (2005-2008)

Florida Danny — Thu, 16 Apr 2009 00:00:14 -0000

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Sorry about the delay in getting this one posted. My computer crashed yesterday because a genius (aka me) let the battery run out, so I had to wait until it fully recharged (aka today) to continue writing up the piece.

Yesterday, in Part 2c of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Donahue regime's picks from 2002-2004 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Donahue's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks, especially when your team sucks.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
I <3 the Pac-10!
BCS or die!

In comparison with the Walsh II and Policy regimes, Donahue didn't make the Policy regime mistake of trading away picks when the team was good (2002), he used Walsh II's strategy of drafting for need on Day 1 when rebuilding, he brought back the Policy regime's affinity for Pac-10 players, and he surpassed both Walsh II and the Policy regime in percentage of picks that came from BCS conferences

In this article, I'll be ending the regime breakdowns with a look at the McNolan era (2005-2008).

After the jump, I'll put the McNolan drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; sum up the regimes; and provide the idiot's guide to McNolan draft strategy...

Here again is the link to my Excel spreadsheet of 49er draft picks in the Salary Cap Era. I realized that some of you probably don't have Excel 2007, so I converted it to be compatible with older versions (and fixed the link in previous posts as well):

49er Draft Picks 1994-2008

IN CONTEXT

In Part 2c, I told you how Donahue didn't hit the home run he needed to with his rebuilding project in the 2004 draft. One additional piece of evidence for this is the fact that, by the very next draft, Donahue's replacements had to rebuild the roster once more through the draft. Therefore, Donahue's 2004 fire sale and draft has to rank among the shortest rebuilding phases of a franchise in the history of sports (and not in a good way). Now, I'm sure you don't need some long-winded description of what the team has done record-wise since 2004, so I'll just get on with the specific needs in each of McNolan's drafts:

2005 Draft - Key Losses: WR Cedrick Wilson (free agency), OL Kyle Kosier (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (career-threatening injury), OL Scott Gragg (free agency), DL John Engelberger (trade), DB Ronnie Heard (free agency), K Todd Peterson (free agency). Weak 2004 Stats: 30^th in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA; 19^th in ST DVOA.¹ Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for QB Jeff Garcia, RB Garrison Hearst, WR Terrell Owens, and DB Zack Bronson; major injuries to QB Tim Rattay, LB Andre Carter, DB Ahmed Plummer. Needs: QB, RB, WR, OL, DL, DB, K, LB depth.

2006 Draft - Key Losses: QB Tim Rattay (trade), RB Kevan Barlow (trade), FB Fred Beasley (free agency), WR Brandon Lloyd (trade), WR Johnnie Morton (released), LB Julian Peterson (free agency), LB Andre Carter (free agency), and DB Ahmed Plummer (career-threatening injury). Weak 2005 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Garcia, Hearst, Owens, and Bronson; major injury to TE Eric Johnson. Needs: FB, WR, LB, DB, QB depth, RB depth, TE depth.

2007 Draft - Key Losses: WR Antonio Bryant (released), TE Eric Johnson (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (free agency), and DB Tony Parrish (released). Weak 2006 Stats: 22^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA; 18^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bronson; OL Larry Allen and DL Bryant Young now in their mid-30s. Needs: WR, DB, ST, TE depth, OL depth, DL depth.

2008 Draft - Key Losses: WR Darrell Jackson (free agency), OL Larry Allen (retirement), OL Justin Smiley (free agency), DL Bryant Young (retirement), DL Marques Douglas (free agency), and LB Derek Smith (free agency). Weak 2007 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bryant; major injuries to QB Alex Smith, OL Jonas Jennings, and LB Manny Lawson. Needs: WR, OL, DL, LB, QB depth.

In preparation for its drafts, McNolan has had to deal with about 7 key losses per offseason, which is fewer than Walsh II (8), but more than Donahue (4) and the Policy regime (4). Interestingly, the course of McNolan's tenure has seen a mixture of his 3 predecessors' draft contexts. The 2005 and 2006 offseasons were Walshian, with about 8 key self-induced, salary-cap-caused losses per season that generally involved kicking dead weight to the curb or trading it for draft picks. The 2007 offseason was Donahue-esque, with only 4 key losses and a team feeling good about itself after a promising season. Finally, 2008 was Policy-like in that there were two retirements to deal with. Overall, I'd say the most similar previous context to McNolan's was the Walsh II era.

I know this is totally off-topic, but, Cedrick Wilson may have made the greatest career decision in the history of the NFL by signing with PIT after the 2004 season. If he stays in SF, he's stuck on a 6-win team for the foreseeable future (at least until he roughed up his ex-girlfriend) catching passes from Rattay, Smith, Ken Dorsey, Cody Pickett, Trent Dilfer, Shaun Hill, and Chris Weinke. Instead, he goes to PIT and wins a ring his first season with the team catching passes from Ben Roethlisberger. Seriously, whatever it was that made him leave the Niners, he needs to bottle and sell it. Can you guys think of any other player in recent years who's lucked out like that?

Anyway, back to the regularly scheduled program. For the sake of comparison, here's how McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup in 2005 and 2006:

Morton (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Wilson
Snyder (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Kosier
OL Eric Heitmann (2002 Donahue draft pick) for Newberry
OL Kwame Harris (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Gragg
Douglas (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Engelberger (after moving Young to 3-4 DE)
DB Mike Adams (2003 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Heard
K Joe Nedney (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Todd Peterson
Smith (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Rattay
RB Frank Gore (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Barlow
FB Moran Norris (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Beasley
Bryant (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Lloyd
WR Arnaz Battle (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Morton
Lawson (2006 McNolan draft pick) for Julian Peterson
LB Brandon Moore (2002 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Carter (after moving him to 4-3 ROLB)
DB Shawntae Spencer (2004 Donahue draft pick) for Plummer (after moving him to LCB)

Adding it all up, McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup with 5 traditional free agents, 4 draft picks, and 6 players originally acquired by Donahue. Comparing this to the previous regimes, McNolan used free agency more than Walsh II and Donahue, but less than Policy; and they had a "holdover rate" of 33.3%, which was smack dab in between Walsh II (16.7%) and Donahue (50.0%).

So there's the context. Hopefully you sense a pattern emerging here: the contexts of McNolan drafts have been a cocktail of issues and solutions having the ingredients of each predecessor; 2 ½ parts Walsh II, 1 part Donahue, and ½ part Policy.

PICKS, PICKS, AND MORE PICKS

From 2005-2008, the 49ers made 35 selections in the NFL draft, which nearly equalled the Walsh II and Donahue rate of 9 picks per season. In 2005 and 2006, the main rebuilding years, McNolan stockpiled picks via all those trades I mentioned earlier; just like Walsh II and Donahue. The past 2 drafts, however, McNolan has tended to trade away picks (you're welcome, NE) rather than stockpile them; just like the Policy regime. Once again, the trend here is for McNolan to be a mixture of all 3 predecessor's strengths and weaknesses.

In terms of McNolan's overall Pro Bowl rate, a Donahue-esque and Walshian 5.7% of its picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers (Gore and LB Patrick Willis). However, its starter rate of 34.3% - which includes OL Chilo Rachal's midseason and DB Dashon Goldson's offseason ascensions - is the worst of the 4 regimes (Policy regime = 41.4%; Walsh II = 48.1%; Donahue = 48.1%). When you remember the differences in context between regimes, you realize that McNolan has been way worse at picking starters than the context-similar Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse than the context-different Policy regime, whose superior teams made it harder for draft picks to crack the starting lineup (i.e., the Policy regime's starter rate is artificially low due to context).

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has continued the Walsh II and Donahue standard of 9 draft picks per season.
McNolan has stockpiled picks when the team sucked, and traded away picks when (they thought) the team was good.
McNolan has been as bad at picking Pro Bowlers as the "unlikely to have Pro Bowlers because the team sucked" Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse at picking starters than the "unlikely to have draft selections start because the team was good" Policy regime.
Overall, McNolan seems to be channeling the good and bad of its 3 predecessors.

DAY ‘N' NIGHT

McNolan has taken exactly 40% of its picks on Day 1 of the draft, and 60% on Day 2. That's almost identical to Walsh II's 41/59 split, which, as I said in Part 2c, was smack dab between the Policy (52/48) and Donahue (33/67) regimes.

Looking at the relative success of its picks by draft day, we find that 64.3% of McNolan's Day 1 picks have become 49er starters, which is, again, right in the middle of the 4 regimes; not as good as Walsh II's (81.8%, which I incorrectly reported as 64.3% in Part 2b), but basically on par with the Policy regime's (60.0%) and Donahue's (55.6%). Remember, though that Walsh II and Donahue are the better comparisons in terms of team context. On Day 2, an abysmal 14.3% of McNolan picks have become 49er starters, easily the worst of the 4 regimes (again, even worse than the starter-unlikely Policy regime). So while McNolan has had pretty standard success on Day 1 in terms of starters, it's been horrible at picking Day 2 starters.

The best example of this dichotomy between Day 1 and Day 2 results is McNolan's initial rebuilding draft in 2005. Here it is:

Rd	Player	Pos	Starter?	Pro Bowl?
1	Alex Smith	QB	Yes	No
2	David Baas	OL	Yes	No
3	Frank Gore	RB	Yes	Yes
3	Adam Snyder	OL	Yes	No
5	Ronald Fields	DL	No	No
5	Rasheed Marshall	WR	No	No
6	Derrick Johnson	DB	No	No
7	Daven Holly	DB	No	No
7	Marcus Maxwell	WR	No	No
7	Patrick Estes	TE	No	No
7	Billy Bajema	TE	Yes	No

Day 1? 4 picks, 4 starters, 1 Pro Bowler. Day 2? 7 picks, 1 starter, 0 Pro Bowlers. Enough said.

With regard to Pro Bowlers, however, the preferred drink is once again "Regime Cocktail." On Day 1, 14.3% of McNolan's picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers, which is slightly worse than the Pro-Bowl-likely Policy regime (20.0%), considerably better than Donahue (0.0%), and slightly better than Walsh II (9.1%). OK, correction: McNolan drinks Regime Cocktail only on Day 1. That's because, it has yet to pick a Day 2 Pro Bowler. Of course, it's not like the other two Pro-Bowl-unlikely regimes (Walsh II = 6.3%; Donahue = 5.3%) were much better at it.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has had a Walshian 40/60 split of picks between Day 1 and Day 2.
McNolan has been worse than Walsh II, but better than Donahue, at picking Day 1 starters.
McNolan has been far less successful than the other 3 regimes at picking Day 2 starters.
McNolan has been more successful than Walsh II and Donahue at picking Day 1 Pro Bowlers, but slightly worse than these two regimes at picking Day 2 Pro Bowlers.

ASSUME THE POSITION

Here's how McNolan has used its 35 picks by position, unit, and draft day:

Pos	Day 1	Day 2	Total
QB	1	0	1
RB	1	1	2
FB	0	0	0
WR	2	5	7
TE	1	2	3
OL	4	1	5
DL	2	5	7
LB	2	1	3
DB	1	6	7
K	0	0	0
P	0	0	0
OFF Total	9	9	18
DEF Total	5	12	17
ST Total	0	0	0
Total	14	21	35

Overall, McNolan has basically split their picks up evenly between units, which is more similar to what the Policy regime and Donahue did than Walsh II's need-induced DEF preference. Also, like Walsh, McNolan hasn't taken any ST players in the draft. Of course, that may have something to do with having Nedney and ROBO-PUNTER on the roster. What's most interesting here, however, is that, although OFF has received equal attention on Days 1 and 2, 70.6% of McNolan's DEF picks have come on Day 2.

The even split of OFF picks between draft days is a little misleading because McNolan was actually Walshian in 2005 and 2006 when it had to replace most of the OFF. Going back to that 2005 draft that I showed earlier, you'll notice that all 4 Day 1 picks were on OFF. This continued in 2006 when they selected TE Vernon Davis in the 1^st round after Johnson suffered a major injury the previous season. Essentially, McNolan followed the Walsh II example of spending Day 1 of rebuilding drafts addressing the most glaring positional needs. This is really eye-opening when you consider that Scot McCloughan claims to be a devout believer in "best player available." Is he full of sh*t or is the focus on need in Day 1 of the 2005 and 2006 drafts just a coincidence? I'll leave you to decide.

DEF, however, is a different animal altogether. From the table, it's clear that the draft day disparity on DEF has been due to an inordinate amount of Day 2 picks being spent on DLs and DBs. The 5 Day 2 DLs were, in order of selection, Ronald Fields, Parys Haralson, Melvin Oliver, Jay Moore, and Joe Cohen; the 6 Day 2 DBs were Derrick Johnson, Daven Holly, Marcus Hudson, Vickiel Vaughn, Goldson, and Tarell Brown. Looking at these lists, you could say that McNolan has gotten worse over time picking Day 2 DLs, whereas it's gotten better over time picking Day 2 DBs. Either way, aside from Haralson and Goldson, that's a pretty mediocre-at-best bunch. So, if you want to know why the DEF has sucked for so long (before Singletary pulled their heads out of their asses), look no further than McNolan mostly waiting until Day 2 to pick DEF players. Couple this with McNolan's aforementioned horrible starter rate on Day 2, and you get one wet, stinking heap of also-ran-ity.

With 71.4% of picks taken on Day 2, WR is another position at which McNolan has focused little Day 1 attention. The two Day 1 WRs were Brandon Williams and Jason Hill, both 3^rd-rounders.

Hopefully, you're starting to see a trend here. McNolan gets credit for using Walsh II's "pick for need on Day 1" and "bites at the apple" strategies. However, it's made the mistake of waiting until Day 2 to take most of their bites at DL, DB, and WR. Perhaps, then, one reason why the Niners haven't been able to get over the mediocre 7-9 hump since 2005 is because their WR, DL, and DB corps are populated with Day 2 picks.

To drive it home, here's one last point about McNolan's (lack of) success wtith DEF picks. On OFF, McNolan's starter rate (44.4%) has been similar to that of the Policy regime (43.8%), Walsh II (50.0%), and Donahue (46.2%). However, the DEF starter rates for the previous 3 regimes were 47.1% for Walsh II, 41.7% for Donahue, and 33.3% for the Policy regime. McNolan's? 23.5%!

All is not lost, however. Unlike Donahue, McNolan seems to have actually learned something about positional picks as its tenure has progressed. Namely, 2 of their 3 picks in 2008 were DEF players. Whether or not DL Kentwan Balmer and DB Reggie Smith pan out in the long run, at least McNolan seems to have noticed that their previous Day 1 picks on DEF have become integral parts of the starting unit. Don't believe me? Here they are: Lawson, Willis, and DL Ray McDonald. So, their results - 2 starters, 1 Pro Bowler, and an emerging pass-rush specialist - were not shabby at all. This suggests that (a) when McNolan commits Day 1 resources to DEF, it's been pretty successful; and (b) the regime seems to have figured this out. So, at the very least, kudos to them for that.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Walsh II, McNolan has focused its Day 1 picks on the most glaring positional needs (when it had to).
McNolan has employed Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy at WR, DL, and DB. However, they've primarily waited until Day 2 to take their bites.
Given their propensity for waiting until Day 2 for DEF picks, it's not surprising that McNolan has been horrible at drafting DEF starters.
Based on 2008, McNolan seems to have learned from their "wait until Day 2 for DEF" mistake.

CONFERENCE ROOM

So far, I've basically told a story about how the McNolan regime's drafts have been a little bit Walsh II, a little bit Donahue, and a little bit Policy; how they've used the good strategies as well as the bad. Basically, not too hot, not too cold; I'll call it "Goldilocks" if you will. The conference breakdown is where that tale ends. There's one regime's lead in particular that McNolan has been happy to follow, and I'm sure you'll easily be able to figure it out. Here's how McNolan's 35 picks shake out by conference: 7 ACC picks, 7 SEC picks, 6 Big 12 picks, 6 Pac-10 picks, 4 Big 10 picks, 1 Big East pick, 1 Conference USA pick, 1 MAC pick, 1 MAII pick, and 1 MWC pick.

BCS anyone? McNolan has taken a Donahue-esque 88.6% of its picks from BCS conferences. I already detailed in Part 2c what I think of this strategy, so you know by now that I don't like it. Now, Scot McCloughan has argued that he takes BCS players because they're (a) less affected by big crowds, (b) more prepared for the NFL, and (c) better team leaders. While all of these may be true in a general sense, the draft isn't about generalities. It's about identifying and acquiring specific talented players. I'm sorry, but when you limit your available talent pool to 6 or 7 college football conferences, you're going to miss the "diamonds in the rough" that teams need to sustain success. Also, McCloughan has made it seem like picking players from BCS conferences is only a Day 1 strategy. The stats say the opposite though: A higher percentage of McNolan's Day 2 picks have come from BCS conferences (90.5%) than have its Day 2 picks (88.6%). Oh, and did I mention that McNolan's first pick ever was a QB from a non-BCS conference (Smith), and that they traded up in 2007 to take an OL from a non-BCS conference (Joe Staley)? That's 2 of McNolan's 4 non-BCS picks being taken with 1^st-round picks. Again, is he BSing us here or is this some kind of smokescreen? It's pretty interesting how a general BCS guy like McCloughan can fall in love so much with specific non-BCS players.

And now, I present a second way in which McNolan's conference preferences are similar to Donahue's: They suck just as bad at picking BCS players despite being so BCS-reliant. Wait, let me correct that. They suck even worse. Here's the evidence:

McNolan
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	10	2	12
No	21	2	23
Total	31	4	35

Donahue
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	12	1	13
No	13	1	14
Total	25	2	27

You'll recall from Part 2c that Donahue's BCS starter rate (48.0%) was worse than Walsh II's (62.5%) even though Donahue was much more BCS-heavy with his picks. Well, even Donahue's sorry BCS starter rate makes him look like a draft maven when compared to McNolan's. That's because, as the table shows, only 32.3% of McNolan's BCS picks have become regular 49er starters! As I said in Part 2c, if you're going to be limiting your talent pool so drastically, you better be good at evaluating the talent you don't ignore. Clearly, McNolan has not been good in this regard, and has been even worse than the guy for which I invented the argument.

Now, I argued in Part 2c that Donahue's preference for BCS players and lack of success in actually picking good ones was borne out of his dispositional laziness and inattention to draft detail. With respect to McNolan, however, I'm sure this hasn't been the case. To its credit, the McNolan regime has been almost pathologically engaged in draft preparation. After all, they coached the Senior Bowl 3 straight seasons, Scot McLoughan was Director of College Scouting for the Seahawks, and Scot's brother, David, now serves in the same capacity for the 49ers. So I'm kind of perplexed as to why, given their affinity for evaluating college talent, McNolan has shied away from non-BCS players. One might argue that it's because of the Alex Smith experience. However, as has been noted, McLoughan remains a big Smith supporter. So what gives here? Please help.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Donahue, almost every player McNolan has drafted has been from a BCS conference.
Despite its BCS-lust, the McNolan regime has had an even worse BCS starter rate than Donahue.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

As I've alluded to throughout this article, the McNolan drafts can be described by one word: Goldilocks. In other words, their porridge hasn't been too hot and it hasn't been too cold; just lukewarm. Here's the evidence:

McNolan's draft contexts have been a mixture of its 3 predecessors' contexts.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's "draft vs. free agency" bias.
McNolan's stockpiled picks in rebuilding drafts ala Walsh II, but also traded away picks in "we feel good about ourselves right now" drafts ala the Policy regime.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's Day1/Day 2 split.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of Day 1 starter and Pro Bowl rate.
McNolan has evenly split their picks between OFF and DEF overall.
McNolan's used Walsh's "bites at the apple" strategy, but only on Day 2.
McNolan's been on par with previous regimes in terms of picking OFF starters.
Though it's made Donahue-esque draft strategy errors, McNolan's either learned from those mistakes or has a more valid reason for why they've made them.

All in all, it sure seems like the McNolan regime has been a mixture of the good and bad of the 3 previous 49er regimes. They rebuilt like Walsh II in 2005 and 2006, but they sat on their laurels like Donahue and the Policy regime in 2007. They draft for need on Day 1 like Walsh II, but, like Donahue, only when they have to. They take a lot of bites at the apple like Walsh, but they wait until Day 2 to do it. You get the picture.

To me, understanding the Goldilocks nature of McNolan drafts helps explain why the 49ers have been stuck in "no better than 7-9" mode for the past 3 seasons. If you draft a propensity of mediocre players, or if you have a bunch of mediocre drafts, you're going to find yourself having a mediocre team. Here, another word comes to mind that has been used - with great comic effect - to describe McNolan: vanilla.

In evaluating the 4 Niner regimes since 1994, something has become very clear to me; something that I didn't fully realize until I got to McNolan. Bill Walsh was the only 49er GM in the past 15 years who went out and tried to be great in the draft. He's the only one who tried to bat 1.000 every time he stepped to the plate. The Policy regime was content to sustain success through free agency, Donahue was content to ride the coattails of Walsh II's drafts, and McNolan has been content to only be great on Day 1. Is it any wonder then that the Walsh II regime was the only one that had an upward win trajectory? Is it a coincidence that Walsh was the only GM to leave the 49ers better off than when he arrived? I mean, the 49ers regressed under the Policy regime and Donahue, and they've stagnated in 7-9 territory under McNolan. After reading my regime breakdowns, do you have any doubt that one important reason for this is because Walsh II's draft strategy differed so drastically from that of McNolan, Donahue, and the Policy regime? In re McNolan, do you think that the "hybrid" defense, not giving Hill the QB job outright, and not firing Nolan after 2007 can be described by any other word except "vanilla?"

Whether it's McSingle nee McNolan or someone else, until the person/people in charge of running the 49ers' drafts stop placing artificial constraints on themselves, and start trying to be great with every pick- by whatever means necessary - I fear the Niners are going to wallow in mediocrity.

Here's a perfect example of what I mean. The Niners need a pass rusher right now more than anything. Go out and draft the best damned pass rusher. If the consensus best pass rusher isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the pass rusher you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the Calfornia Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK pass rusher and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

Another example. Right now, you have an arguable draft bust, a good but ragged-armed journeyman, and a player KC didn't even want as your QBs. Go out and draft the best damned QB. Do whatever it takes. If the consensus best QB isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the QB you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the California Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK QB and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

You know what team drafts like this? The New England Patriots. But that's Part 3, so you'll have to wait until tomorrow to hear the details. For now, here's the idiot's guide to the McNolan regime's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks, but trade away picks when (you think) your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Use Day 2 to take a lot of bites at the apple.
BCS or die!
We're Goldilocks (aka Vanilla McNolan).

So, based on this strategy, as well as some specific draft history trends that you can find in my Excel spreadsheet, here's what (and what not) to expect from the 49ers in the 2009 draft:

Don't expect them to take more than 1 player from a non-BCS conference.
Don't expect them to take a pass rusher, QB, or WR at #10.
Don't expect them to take a RB on Day 1.
Expect them to take a WR or two on Day 2.
Expect them to take an OL on Day 1.
Expect more DEF picks (esp. DLs and DBs) on Day 2 than Day 1.
Don't expect them to take a FB, K, or P.

Remember, this is what I expect them to do or not do based on their history. If they end up going against tendency, it's not because the tendencies were wrongly identified. It's because they did something that was unexpected given their history. And there's no harm in that. It's actually worked once or twice (See Willis, Patrick).

That's it for now. Tomorrow, I'll compare the overall 49er draft strategy since 1994, which I identified in Part 1, to that of the Patriots. TO BE CONTINUED...

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

How much blame would you assign McNolan's drafts for the 49ers continuously being unable to take that next step in recent seasons?

All of the blame

37 votes

Most of the blame

83 votes

Some of the blame

103 votes

None of the blame

9 votes

232 votes | Poll has closed

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IIc. The Donahue Era (2002-2004)

Florida Danny — Tue, 14 Apr 2009 14:00:14 -0000

Yesterday, in Part 2b of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Walsh II regime's picks from 1999-2001 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Walsh II's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
This is the pros, not college. There's no need to dominate your neighborhood.
Focus Day 2 on non-BCS players because even one diamond in the rough more than makes up for several lumps of coal.

And, in comparison, here was the Policy regime's draft strategy that I detailed in Part 2a:

Draft picks are commodities best used for moving up.
Once you've addressed positional needs in free agency, there's no need to focus on them in the draft.
Dominate the neighborhood (i.e., take Pac-10 players and those near Youngstown, OH).
There's plenty of talent outside the BCS conferences, but wait until Day 2 to acquire it.

So basically, the main differences between the two regimes were (a) Walsh II used the draft to rebuild the roster, whereas the Policy regime used the draft to tinker around the edges of the roster; (b) Walsh II drafted for need (esp. on Day 1), whereas the Policy regime didn't; and (c) Walsh II didn't have a geographical bias, whereas the Policy regime did. As I said in Part 2b, difference (a) is no doubt due, in some part, to differences in context. Nevertheless, it's still a difference worth noting, and it's overshadowed by differences (b) and (c), which have nothing to do with context.

I bring up both of these draft strategies because they can serve as opposite ends of a draft strategy continuum going forward. In other words, because they're such polar opposites, we can use them as draft strategy templates with which to describe the Donahue and McNolan strategies. Speaking of Donahue, his regime's drafts are the topic of this article.

After the jump, I'll put the Donahue drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; and provide the idiot's guide to Donahue draft strategy...

Here again is the link to my Excel spreadsheet of 49er draft picks in the Salary Cap Era:

49er Draft Picks 1994-2008

IN CONTEXT

Fans of a certain age might remember Dion's song, "The Wanderer." Well, from 2002-2004, Donahue apparently remade the song in his image and called it, "The Squanderer." Probably the easiest way to describe this is in a graph:

As shown, team wins peaked in the last year of Walsh II and began its decline in the first year of Donahue. That's a pretty stark display of how Donahue squandered Walsh II's success, and is much more vivid than anything I could say in writing.

The obvious questions here are, "Why the complete turnaround?" and, "What did Donahue do to precipitate it?" Well, knowing the specific contexts of each Donahue is probably a good place to start:

2002 Draft - Key Losses: OL Ray Brown (free agency) and DB Lance Schulters (free agency). Weak 2001 Stats: 20^th in ST DVOA.¹ Lingering Issues: None. Needs: OL, DB, ST.

2003 Draft - Key Losses: DL Dana Stubblefield (free agency) and DL Chike Okeafor (free agency). Weak 2002 Stats: Dropped to 18^th in DEF DVOA; 26^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Major injuries to OL Dave Fiore and DB Zack Bronson; half of the OFF at least 30 years old. Needs: DL, ST, OFF depth, DEF depth.

2004 Draft - Key Losses: QB Jeff Garcia (free agency), RB Garrison Hearst (free agency), WR Terrell Owens (trade), WR Tai Streets (free agency), OL Derrick Deese (free agency), OL Ron Stone (free agency), DL Travis Kirschke (free agency), and DB Zack Bronson (free agency). Weak 2003 Stats: 19^th in DEF DVOA; 28^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't replaced Stubblefield; Starting OLs missed 18 total games with minor injuries. Needs: QB, RB, WR, OL, DL, DB, ST.

Looking only at 2002 and 2003, it sure seems like Walsh II set Donahue up pretty well for the future, seeing as how Donahue had to deal with 6 fewer key losses per offseason in preparation for his first two drafts. Basically, Donahue could do whatever his heart desired with his 2002 and 2003 draft picks. This certainly wasn't the case, however, with respect to the 2004 draft, after Donahue blew up the roster in a Walsh-esque salary cap purge.

So with respect to evaluating Donahue's drafts we have an interesting context to consider. He had even fewer needs in the first two drafts than the Policy regime did back in the halcyon days of 49er teams past. However, his final draft was Walsh-like in that he was tasked with a self-induced roster overhaul. Therefore, for the first two drafts, we need to see whether Donahue was sitting back on his laurels in a Policy-channeling-Nero sort of way; whereas for the 2004 draft, we need to see whether he (successfully) attacked the draft in a Walshian sense.

Before breaking things down, it's useful to detail how Donahue replaced all of those starters in 2004 so we can get a handle on his "draft vs. free agency" slant. The comparison with Walsh II is very straightforward here because both were handcuffed by the salary cap. In other words, they both had the same constraints when considering whether or not to address certain needs in free agency. So without further ado, here are Donahue's 2004 replacements along with the method via which they were acquired:

QB Tim Rattay (2000 Walsh II draft pick) for Garcia
RB Kevan Barlow (2001 Walsh II draft pick) for Hearst
WR Brandon Lloyd (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Owens
WR Cedrick Wilson (2001 Walsh II draft pick) for Streets
OL Kyle Kosier (2002 Donahue draft pick) and OL Kwame Harris (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Deese
OL Justin Smiley (2004 Donahue draft pick) and Kosier for Stone
DL Anthony Adams (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Kirschke
DB Ronnie Heard (2000 Walsh undrafted free agent signing) for Bronson

As you can see, none of the replacements were acquired via traditional free agency; very Walshian indeed. However, before we start applauding Donahue as a draft maven, notice that there was an even split between how many replacements were Walsh II leftovers and how many were of Donahue's making. Namely, Donahue's 50.0% "holdover help rate" is considerably higher than Walsh II's 16.7%. In other words, Donahue had a lot more help with replacing starters in 2004 than Walsh II did while in a similar predicament from 1999-2001. Of course, this says nothing about how Donahue handled the 4 starters he had to replace in 2002 and 2003 or about how many of his draft picks ever became 49er starters.

So there's the context. For his first two drafts, Donahue was in an even better position (thanks to Walsh II) than the 12-wins-per-season Policy regime from a need perspective. Essentially, he had none. In contrast, Donahue's 2004 draft found the team in a predicament similar to what Walsh II dealt with from 1999-2001. He had to turn over the roster through the draft due, in part, to the fact that he was constrained in free agency by salary cap woes. But here's a thought: Perhaps Donahue didn't "find" himself in the 2004 predicament. Maybe 2004 was the result of his own draft failures in 2002 and 2003. Just maybe, rather than being an innocent bystander vis-à-vis circumstances that lead to the 2004 fire sale, what if he was instead a catalyst of his own misfortune? In other words, what if these two different contexts (need-light heaven and need-heavy hell) are not mutually exclusive? For the answers to these questions, we need to break down Donahue's drafts.

PICKS, PICKS, AND MORE PICKS

From 2002-2004, the 49ers made 27 selections in the NFL draft, which works out to 9 picks per season. Once again, that was very Walshian of Donahue. Given how Walshian this amount of picks was, you might think that Donahue followed the "trade away picks when good, and acquire picks when bad" strategy of his two predecessors, such that he had more picks in the 2004 rebuilding draft than he did in the "happy days are here again" 2002 and 2003 drafts. Interestingly, this wasn't the case: Donahue had the same number of picks in 2002 (10) as he did in 2004, and he had the full repertoire of 7 picks in 2003. So, all in all, Donahue seemed to learn the lesson of Policy regime failure: Don't ignore the draft just because you're winning.

With respect to Donahue's starter and Pro Bowl rates, he was, again, very Walshian. He had the same exact starter rate (48.1%) and a similarly poor Pro Bowl rate (3.7% vs. 7.4%). Based on these stats, and given the similarity in winning percentages between the two regimes, we can come to the same conclusion about Donahue's general draft success that we did regarding Walsh II. Namely, he wasn't necessarily any better or worse than his predecessor(s).

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Donahue was eerily Walshian with respect to the number of draft picks he had and how successful those picks were overall.
Donahue stockpiled picks; even when the 49ers were good.
After you account for differences in context, the Donahue, Walsh II, and Policy regimes were pretty much equals when it came to drafting 49er starters and Pro Bowler.

DAY ‘N' NIGHT

The first difference we see between Donahue and his predecessors is related to the percentage of draft picks they had on each draft day. Specifically, whereas Policy had a 52/48 split and Walsh had a 41/59 split between draft days (which I incorrectly reported as more like 50/50 yesterday), Donahue made only 33.3% of his selections on Day 1. Part of this had to do with draft day trades in 2002 and 2004, but it was also due to compensatory selections that were awarded by the NFL (which can't be traded), and having to forfeit a Day 1 pick in 2002 thanks to Policy Era salary cap shenanigans. Either way, Donahue's draft day disparity was nowhere more evident than in the 2002 draft, when only 2 of his 10 selections came on Day 1. Perhaps if he had a few more Day 1 picks that year, maybe he wouldn't have found himself in the sorry situation that was the 2004 offseason? Hmmm.

Looking at the relative success of their Day 1 and Day 2 picks, we find that Donahue was slightly worse than Walsh II at picking starters on Day 1 (55.6% vs. 64.3%), and slightly better than Walsh II at picking starters on Day 2 (44.4% vs. 30.8%). With respect to Pro Bowlers, Donahue failed to pick one on Day 1 (Walsh II = 9.1%) and was as (un)successful as Walsh II at picking them on Day 2 (5.3% vs. 6.3%). Given the similarities in team context between the Donahue and Walsh II eras, we can conclude that they weren't all that different in draft day success except for, perhaps, Donahue's Pro Bowl swing-and-miss on Day 1.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Donahue had far more picks on Day 2 than Day 1; unlike the Policy regime and Walsh II.
Donahue was similar to Walsh II (and the Policy regime) with respect to drafting 49er starters and Pro Bowlers on a given draft day.

ASSUME THE POSITION

I established earlier that Donahue didn't really have any glaring positional needs in 2002 and 2003, and that he had a veritable sh*t-ton of them in 2004. But for the sake of comparison, here's how Donahue's Day 1 and Day 2 picks break down by team unit:

Unit	Day 1	Day 2	Total
OFF	4	9	13
DEF	5	7	12
ST	0	2	2
Total	9	18	27

As the table shows, Donahue was more Policy-esque (i.e., evenly split) than Walshian in terms of the positional breakdown by draft day. Of course, this is to be expected given that his first two drafts were ones in which he didn't have to address any glaring positional needs. He basically had "draft freedom," and he divided that freedom equally between OFF and DEF.

Donahue's 2004 draft was a different story altogether, with replacing over half of their starting OFF becoming a distinct Niner priority. As I said earlier, Donahue luckily had 10 picks in the 2004 draft. So how did he use them? Well, let's just say he must not have read the team needs like you and I just did. Specifically, Donahue drafted only 4 OFF players in 2004: 2 WRs, 1 OL, and 1 QB. I'll give him credit for taking 3 of these 4 OFF players on Day 1, which I argued in Part 2b is a good idea. However, I do have one gigantic bone to pick in re addressing needs during the 2004 draft.

Donahue waited until the 6^th round to take his lone QB draft pick despite Garcia's release having left the team with two 7^th-round QBs and a 5th-round QB on their roster. Keep in mind, here, that 2004 is now considered one of the best QB draft classes of the past 30 years (thanks to the Big 3), and that Donahue traded down twice in the 1^st round. I can only assume that Donahue tried (and failed) to trade up for Ben Roethlisberger. But once he realized he wasn't getting Roethlisberger at Pick 16 (or earlier), how does he not take a QB before the 7^th round? I want to be clear here. This is not about results: Donahue was right to trade down after the top 3 QBs were off the board, and odds are that if he had taken a QB before the 7^th round, that QB wouldn't have panned out. It's about effort. Given how Walshian other aspects of Donahue's draft strategy were, I sure wish he would have employed Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy with respect to QBs.

One more thing I'll say about (lack of) QB bites at the apple is that Donahue took 3 QBs from 2002-2004: 1 (Brandon Doman) was selected in the 5^th round, and 2 (Ken Dorsey and Cody Pickett) were selected in the 7^th round. This is certainly not a serious attempt to solidify the QB position long-term. Perhaps if he would have been more serious in 2002 and 2003 about it, he wouldn't have found himself in the 2004 predicament.

Here are two final observations I'll make about Donahue's position picks. First, he took as many Ps in 2004 as he did QBs or OLs. Granted, he drafted ROBO-PUNTER (aka Andy Lee), but what is he doing drafting a P when he has half of a starting lineup to replace? Also, when you have Hearst playing on a bionic ankle at RB in 2002 and 2003, how do you take 0 RBs in 3 drafts? Sure, Barlow showed potential; but not even 1 RB in 3 drafts? Not even for depth? Pure madness. And I haven't even mentioned the fact that he actually took a K in the 4^th round of the 2002 draft.

Now, in terms of draft success, here's how Donahue compared to Walsh II at the positions I identified earlier as needs over the course of their respective tenures:

Donahue
Starter	QB	RB	WR	OL	DL	DB	Total
Y	0	0	2	4	2	3	11
N	3	0	2	0	3	2	10
Total	3	0	4	4	5	5	21

Walsh II
Starter?	RB	OL	DB	Total
Yes	3	3	2	8
No	3	2	4	9
Total	6	5	6	17

Once again, Donahue can be described as Walshian here, and he was actually super-Walshian with his OL picks.

So far I've seemed to suggest that Donahue had more in common with Walsh than Policy when it came to drafting. If that's really the case, we still haven't figured out why the team regressed so precipitously during Donahue's tenure, and why it seems he left the franchise in such a bad situation after 2004. Well, the first clue has entirely to do with the 2004 draft. Here it is:

Rd	Player	Pos	Starter?	Pro Bowl?
1	Rashaun Woods	WR	No	No
2	Justin Smiley	OL	Yes	No
2	Shawntae Spencer	DB	Yes	No
3	Derrick Hamilton	WR	No	No
4	Isaac Sopoaga	DL	Yes	No
4	Richard Seigler	LB	No	No
6	Andy Lee	P	Yes	Yes
6	Keith Lewis	DB	Yes	No
7	Cody Pickett	QB	No	No
7	Christian Ferrara	DL	No	No

You might say, "Well, he got 4 starters and his lone Pro Bowler out of that draft. That's not so bad!" Remember the context though. He had just lost 8 starters in a fire sale, 4 of which had been Pro Bowlers during their 49er careers. This was no time for an OK result. Donahue needed a draft like Walsh's 2000 effort: one that totally revitalizes the team, and sets it up for a division championship in the near future. Unfortunately for Niner fans, Donahue's 2004 draft was just OK; not an A+, not an F, just a C.1^st-round pick? A bust. 3^rd-round pick? A bust. 4^th-round picks? A miss and a DE/DT tweener who spent 4 seasons trying to find a position. 6^th-round? These guys have contributed a lot, except only on ST. 7^th-round? Nevermind. So basically, although he had the chance to pull a Walsh II with 10 picks, Donahue instead only drafted 2 players (both 2^nd-rounders) that could be considered to have had a perennial positive impact on the OFF or DEF starting lineups. A Walsh-circa-2000 this draft was not. It's no wonder then that SF has yet to recover from the 2003 fire sale.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Walsh II, Donahue focused his Day 1 picks on the most glaring positional needs (when he had to).
Donahue seemed to sit on his laurels when the team had few needs. He didn't draft any RBs despite having a bionic starter, he didn't draft a QB before the 5^th round despite having a geriatric starter and 7^th-round backups, and he actually chose a K in the 4^th round.
Donahue didn't use Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy.
Donahue had a just-OK draft in 2004 when he needed to have a great one.

CONFERENCE ROOM

By far, the biggest difference between Donahue and his predecessors was with respect to the conferences from which he drafted his players. Before elaborating further, here's how Donahue's 27 picks shake out by conference:6 Pac-10 picks, 6 Big East picks, 5 SEC picks, 4 Big 10 picks, 2 Big 12 picks, 1 ACC pick, 1 Division 1 Independent pick, 1 MWC pick, and 1 WAC pick.

The difference I'm talking about was not related to "dominating your neighborhood." On this count, Donahue revived the Policy regime's preference for Pac-10 players. Between his ties to UCLA, his permanent SoCal home, and his (infrequent) trips to Santa Clara, Donahue had to have watched a lot of Pac-10 football.

Rather, the difference I speak of is Donahue's near-perfect BCS rate. Specifically, 92.6% of his draft picks came from BCS conferences. This rate was well above the Policy regime's (79.7%), and dwarfed Walsh II's (59.3%). Now, I'm going to speculate here about what Donahue's clear preference for BCS players might mean, so feel free to provide opposing viewpoints in the comments section.

To me, Donahue's BCS rate was just another indicator of his lackadaisical work ethic, something that 49er fans and media have accused him of since 2002. Exhibit A: His BCS rate. It sure doesn't take much work to pick players from the conferences with mega-million-dollar broadcast contracts, i.e., the conferences whose games can be found from August to January simply by turning on a TV set. Exhibit B: The 2 non-BCS conferences represented in Donahue picks, the MWC and WAC. First, MWC and WAC teams are in close proximity to California and - I don't live out there so correct me if I'm wrong on this - they have games that are broadcast locally in parts of California. Second, if you look at Jeff Sagarin's conference ratings from 2002-2004 (here, here, and here), you find that the MWC was the top-rated non-BCS conference all 3 years, and that the WAC was the 4^th-, 4^th-, and 3^rd-highest rated non-BCS conference in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively. In other words, he wasn't exactly digging into the diamond mines with the 2 non-BCS picks he did make. Exhibit C: His preference for working from home in LA. This one's been well-documented, so there's no need for me to elaborate further.

Finally, Exhibit D: He wasn't any good at it. Here are two tables comparing Donahue's success on BCS picks with Walsh II's:

Donahue
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	12	1	13
No	13	1	14
Total	25	2	27

Walsh II
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	10	3	13
No	6	8	14
Total	16	11	27

Wait a second. Donahue, the BCS-phile, was actually worse than Walsh II, the non-BCS-phile, at picking starters from BCS conferences? Apparently so: Walsh II had a 62.5% starter rate for BCS picks, whereas Donahue's was only 48.0%. Look, if you're going to be lazy, and if you're going to limit your talent pool so drastically as to have a draft strategy that says, "BCS or die," you better be darn good at it. "Darn good at it" Donahue was not. Despite it being just as easy for a Donahue pick to start as it was for a Walsh II pick to start (given their similar 3-year winning percentages), Donahue was as good as the flip of a coin at picking BCS starters.

This begs the question, "Why did he continue to ignore non-BCS players even though he kept missing with his BCS picks?" Surely, if he noticed the trend, and wasn't lazy, he might have shifted strategies midstream. He didn't, and I think it's because he was, in fact, uninterested in those mundane college scouting details that Walsh was so fond of. In other words, as much as Donahue tried to be a Walsh draft clone, he didn't possess the underlying quality that made Walsh successful: attention to detail.

So there's my take on the second piece of the "What did Donahue have to do with the 49ers' steep decline?" puzzle. Answer: laziness. Although his drafts were Walshian in several respects, Donahue simply didn't work hard enough to find those "diamonds in the rough" that are vital for sustaining NFL success. What's worse, he failed to adjust after this lack of success became painfully evident. In the words of Einstein, "The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." As I said, that's just my educated guess based on some statistical (and journalistic) evidence. Take it for what it is, and feel free to offer an opposing viewpoint in the comments section.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like the Policy regime, Donahue took a relatively large percentage of players from the Pac-10.
Almost every player Donahue drafted was from a BCS conference.
Even Donahue's rare non-BCS picks came from the best and most-watched mid-majors.
Despite Donahue's BCS-lust, he could have flipped a coin and been just as successful with his BCS picks.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

I began this article by wondering if Donahue's 2002-2004 drafts had anything to do with the decline in 49er wins over the course of his tenure (and beyond). Initial signs pointed to "they didn't."

He stockpiled picks just like Walsh II, even though he could have just as easily repeated the Policy regime mistake of trading them away when the team is good.
Like Walsh II, he didn't over-utilize free agency to replace starters.
He had a similar overall starter and Pro Bowler rate to Walsh II's.
Like Walsh II, he focused his Day 1 picks on need positions when the team context dictated it.
He was as good as or better than Walsh II at picking starters at need positions.

Alas, however, the devil is in the details. Sometimes, even though it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and talks like a duck, it's still not a duck. Similarly, even though Donahue was Walsh II's doppelganger in many respects, he made two fatal errors that were anything but Walshian. First, he had a C-grade 2004 draft when an A+ draft was necessary to rebuild the roster. Second, he limited his available talent pool - rather than expanding it like Walsh did - by relying so heavily on the overexposed (and easily scouted) BCS conferences.

The 49ers are still paying for it to this very day. And it's too bad given the tutelage Donahue enjoyed as Walsh's understudy. All I know is that, if he would have taken more notes in class, he migh have gotten that A+ draft in 2004. So, based on everything I've said in this article, here's the idiot's guide to the Donahue regime's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks, even when your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Dominate the neighborhood.
BCS or die!

That's it for now. Later today, I'll break down the McNolan drafts (2005-2008), compare them to the 3 regimes I've discussed so far, and give a heads-up on the draft strategy you might see in a couple of weeks. TO BE CONTINUED...

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

How much blame would you assign Terry Donahue's draft failures for causing the 49ers' current streak of 6 straight losing seasons?

All of the blame

60 votes

Most of the blame

132 votes

Some of the blame

83 votes

None of the blame

6 votes

281 votes | Poll has closed