SB Nation - Melvin Oliver

The Sky Isn't Falling, It's Just Another Satellite

Vega — Tue, 27 Sep 2011 17:11:34 -0000

Well, there goes the 16-0 season.

Now that we've all had a few days to reflect on the past weekend's game, hopefully everybody has had a chance to relax and appreciate that one bad fourth quarter does not a season make.

Perhaps Matt Schaub isn't the worst quarterback in the history of mankind. Sure, he threw a big interception late in the game, but he's also a major reason why the team was in position to win. If you fault him for that, you have to credit him for the gorgeous touchdown to James Casey. Maybe he's not the source of all that is bad in the world, like the economy and this.

And yes, Mario Williams registered only a single measly tackle and no sacks, but let's not go overboard and label him a bust. I mean, I realize that we would have been better off drafting Melvin Oliver number one, but as far as mistakes go, can't we at lest agree that this mistake was worse?

I'm not here to be Little Miss Sunshine (which is a totally underrated movie) -- there is plenty of blame to go around for that horrible fourth quarter -- but let's try to take an honest look at the good and bad of Sunday's game.

Because of my ADD, we're going to do this in bullet form.

It seems to me that most of the blame is being directed at the offense's performance (or lack thereof) in the red-zone. While I'm not letting them off the hook, that's essentially saying, "If only the offense could have put up 47 points," which kind of seems to be ignoring the planetoid nose tackle in the room (if only). The biggest thing that happened during that fourth quarter is that Drew Brees -- who apparently started calling his own plays in the fourth quarter -- realized that he could just throw underneath Kareem Jackson (and the other DBs to a lesser extent) at will, and the Texans defense was unable to adjust.
With a few plays aside, the defensive line was unable to make life uncomfortable for Drew Brees. I didn't track this specifically, but I seem to recall Mario getting a large number of double teams before his knee injury, which means Connor Barwin likely had a lot of one-on-one opportunities. I haven't yet re-watched the game, though, so I can't say that for certain. A lot of credit here has to go to the Saints offensive line and to Drew Brees, who was able to shift around enough to avoid the pressure when it was there. Still, I'd much rather be giving that credit to the Texans' line.
The red-zone offense was weak and it's hard to say if it was play calling or execution. Kubiak says the plays were there to be made, but it appears that the offense was just uncomfortable. There was one particular play in the second quarter where the Texans were coming off a time out on 3rd and 9 from the 9 and were completely out of synch. Again, it's hard to say if that's on Kubiak, the receivers, or Schaub, but it's inexcusable when you just had a timeout.
That said, the offense did score 33 points. That is more production than in any game last year except three: two 34 point outputs in Week 1 against Indianapolis and Week 17 against Jacksonville, and one 35 point output in Week 6 against Kansas City. In 2009, the team had three 34 point games, which were the only times they had more output than they did on Sunday. To say that another way, the 2009 and 2010 Texans, who were ranked second and eleventh in DVOA respectively, only ever put up more points six times combined and never exceeded Sunday's output by more than two points.
On the other hand, the New Orleans Saints have put up 34 points and 30 points in their first two weeks this year against defenses that were ranked second and sixth respectively in defensive DVOA last season. They had a bit of a down year last year, but this same offense put up over 40 points five times during their Super Bowl campaign of 2009. This doesn't excuse our defensive performance any more than the previous bullet excuses our red-zone performance, but I just put it here to try to provide some context.
I was surprised to see that Advanced NFL Stats had Andre Johnson with a -0.10 win probability added and -1.3 expected points added. Clearly, he didn't have a bad game, so what gives? It seems that this is due to Andre's 53% catch rate and 50% success rate (success rate calculates how often he got the necessary yardage). You have to be careful when applying these stats to receivers because they're so dependent on other players. For example, Andre is hurt by the last play, the interception, and the play I mentioned earlier coming out of the timeout (which I'm inclined to put on Schaub because he threw the ball when none of the receivers looked ready for a pass), even though he's not really at fault for those plays. Furthermore, Andre was limited to two catches in the second half. It seems like New Orleans locked in on Andre and dared anyone else to beat them. Outside of James Casey and a fluky play to Kevin Walter, nobody stepped up.
Speaking of that fluky play, when it happened, I immediately thought to myself that if the Texans win because of that play, people would be coming out of the woodwork saying that they got lucky. Seeing as this team has lost games due to the Rosencopter and Q-Tip, I'll be damned if I ever apologize for winning on a lucky play. In fact, I'd say we're due (screw you, Gambler's Fallacy!).
While some will say that we really miss Arian Foster in the red zone, I think the area where we miss him even more is in the passing game. Ben Tate is just not as reliable catching the ball out of the backfield. Arian also has an incredible ability to make the first guy tackle air, thus giving him much bigger plays. It's a part of his game that was completely overlooked last year. I heard some fantasy head go off recently about how he expects Chris Johnson to still be a top 10 running back, but Arian Foster won't be in the top 15 because of Ben Tate. I think this element is what gets Foster back on the field the majority of the time and makes him incredibly valuable in both a fantasy and real football sense.
Lastly, how about that James Casey? It's no surprise to Texans fans that he finally showed what he can do in the passing game. I wouldn't expect 100 yard receiving games each week, but his presence alone now will force defenses to have to cover him, thus making match-ups with other receivers that much more difficult. When Foster comes back, the Texans will have four players (Andre, OD, Casey, and Foster) that are among the best receivers at their respective position.

I think that's enough for now. Ultimately, the team is still damn good (we know that), the offense is still very productive (we know that too), fault for this loss cannot go to one person (we should know that), and the defense is neither as good as they looked in the first two weeks nor as bad as they looked last week (we damn well should know that too).

There are a lot of areas this team needs to improve on, and this last weekend was as good an indication of that as any. A few weeks ago, we saw predictions that ranged from 9-7 to 13-3, but one thing that all those weeks have in common is that they result in at least a few weekends that end badly.

Hopefully this becomes one of only a few.

Texans vs Saints coverage

2006 NFL Draft Grades: Team Value and Efficiency Ratings for Rounds 3-7

(Florida) Danny Tuccitto — Thu, 12 May 2011 23:47:46 -0000

Hey everyone. Today's my super-busy day at work, so I'm going to make this post as short and sweet as humanly possible. Yesterday, in Part 3, I focused on Rounds 1 and 2 of the 2006 NFL draft. Today, I'll be focusing on Rounds 3-7. If you have no clue what my draft evaluation stats, value above expectation (VAE) and return on investment (ROI), mean, see Part 1 and Part 2. For today's post, let's throw in my definition of a "diamond in the rough":

An NFL draft diamond in the rough is a player who was selected after the 2nd round and played 100% or more above the expected performance of his specific pick number.

In other words, a diamond in the rough (DIR) is a lower pick whose ROI stat is greater than or equal to 100.0%. I'm going to use this definition at the end of the post to present how many DIRs each team drafted, as well as to list the 2006 draft picks who can objectively be considered DIRs to this point. Onward, ho!

THE 2006 NFL DRAFT - TEAM VAEs FOR ROUNDS 3-7

Below is a chart of Team VAEs for Rounds 3-7 of the 2006 NFL Draft (click to enlarge):

After the jump, I'll discuss the chart, present and discuss Team ROIs, and list the diamonds in the rough...

There were 2 teams, the Saints and Broncos, who were head and shoulders above the rest of the league in the later rounds. NO's high VAE was thanks to Jahri Evans (VAE = 8.82 AV/Yr) and Marques Colston (VAE = 8.11 AV/Yr), but more on them later. I'll also hold off on talking about the players behind DEN's high VAE, Brandon Marshaell (VAE = 6.16 AV/Yr) and Elvis Dumervil (VAE = 5.42 AV/Yr), among others.

At the bottom of the VAE rankings were 5 teams who we all pretty much consider the worst of the worst in the late-2000s NFL. I'm not going to beat the Rams' dead horse, but suffice it to say that it sure looks like atypically negative value in the later rounds might have had something to do with these 5 teams being so neatly ordered at the bottom of the NFL standings. Of course, these 5 teams did pretty badly in Rounds 1 & 2 as well, so maybe it's just overall organization-wide failure that was the problem.

Speaking of comparisons with VAEs for top picks, there were a couple of teams that reversed their fortunes - for the better - after Round 2. Specifically, the Dolphins and Bills, who were my whipping posts yesterday, ended up doing much better value-wise in the later rounds. BUF, in particular, did an about face that would make Drill Sergeant Hartman proud; going from 31st in VAE for the first 2 rounds all the way up to 4th in Rounds 3-7.

Another thing I noticed, which I haven't touched on at all this week, is that the Broncos, Texans, and Redskins have been consistently near the top of the rankings - an indicator of good drafting in 2006 - but all 3 have been mired in mediocrity over the past 5 seasons. Obviously, once Josh McDaniels blew up DEN's insane 2006 draft class, they were doomed. However, even when Jay Cutler and Brandon Marshall were still on the team, along with a healthy Elvis Dumervil, DEN still couldn't seem to break out of that 8-8 mold. Same goes for HOU and WAS (minus the Josh McDaniels part). What gives here?

As for the 49ers, we finally have them drafting well and drafting better than most of the rest of the league, including their NFC West foes. The Niners VAE for Rounds 3-7 in 2006 was mainly because of OLB Parys Haralson (VAE = 3.75 AV/Yr), who they got with the 140th pick, and another player who I'll name later.

Based on the chart, here are my VAE-based team grades for the first 2 rounds of the 2006 NFL Draft:

As - NO, DEN, HOU, BUF, IND, PHI

Bs - WAS, SF, TEN, MIN, JAX, NYG

Cs - NYJ, SD, CAR, BAL, SEA, MIA, GB, ARI

Ds - CHI, CIN, ATL, NE, KC, PIT

Fs - DAL, DET, OAK, STL, CLE, TB

THE 2006 NFL DRAFT - TEAM ROIs FOR ROUNDS 1 & 2

Below is a chart of Team ROIs for Rounds 3-7 of the 2006 NFL Draft (click to enlarge):

In terms of which team(s) got the most bang for their buck, the winner would have to be the Vikings, although the Jaguars are a close second. Armed with only 3 picks in the final 5 rounds of the 2006 draft, MIN was able to land a 4-year starter at DE, Ray Edwards (ROI = 269.1%). Similarly, of JAX's 4 picks in the last 5 rounds, 3 have yielded positive ROIs.

On the other side of the ledger, the Browns and Buccaneers, who both had 8 picks in Rounds 3-7, earned the least bang for their buck. Although it's mind-boggling to think about, both CLE and TB saw 5 of their 8 picks end up having essentially no career whatsoever. Also, remember that they were #31 and #32 in VAE. So, it's pretty clear that these 2 teams were the clear losers of Rounds 3-7 in 2006.

As far as the Niners go, we see that, like VAE, ROI also suggests they drafted well above average in the final 5 rounds. I'll be focusing on their 2006 draft class tomorrow, so won't get into much more detail here.

Based on the chart, here are my ROI-based team grades for Rounds 3-7 of the 2006 NFL Draft:

As - DEN, NO, IND, HOU, BUF, WAS

Bs - MIN, PHI, SF, JAX, TEN, NYG

Cs - SD, NYJ, CAR, SEA, MIA, BAL, GB, ARI

Ds - CHI, CIN, ATL, NE, PIT, STL

Fs - KC, DAL, CLE, OAK, DET, TB

THE 2006 NFL DRAFT - THE BUSTS (SO FAR)

To remind everyone of what I said in the opening, diamonds in the rough (DIRs) are picks in the Rounds 3-7 who have an ROI of 100.0% or better. In contrast to the (at max) draft bust total of 6 that I talked about yesterday, the 2006 NFL draft produced 39 DIRs in 191 picks (at least according to my definition). That works out to a league-wide DIR percentage of about 20%, which doubles the bust percentage.

Here's a table showing how each team did in terms of the number of DIRs they chose in Rounds 3-7 of the 2006 draft (sorted by DIR percentage):

Tm	Picks	DIRs	DIR%
HOU	5	4	80.0%
DEN	5	3	60.0%
WAS	5	3	60.0%
BUF	7	4	57.1%
IND	5	2	40.0%
NO	6	2	33.3%
MIN	3	1	33.3%
PHI	6	2	33.3%
SF	7	2	28.6%
JAX	4	1	25.0%
SEA	4	1	25.0%
TEN	9	2	22.2%
NYG	5	1	20.0%
CHI	5	1	20.0%
KC	5	1	20.0%
SD	6	1	16.7%
CAR	6	1	16.7%
CIN	6	1	16.7%
NYJ	7	1	14.3%
BAL	8	1	12.5%
GB	8	1	12.5%
PIT	8	1	12.5%
STL	8	1	12.5%
CLE	8	1	12.5%
MIA	4	0	0.0%
ARI	4	0	0.0%
ATL	5	0	0.0%
NE	8	0	0.0%
DAL	6	0	0.0%
OAK	5	0	0.0%
DET	5	0	0.0%
TB	8	0	0.0%
NFL	191	39	20.4%

And here are the best 10 picks of the Rounds 3-7 according to ROI:

Pick	Tm	Player	Pos	AVYr	Exp AVyr	VAE	ROI
252	NO	Marques Colston	WR	8.80	0.69	8.11	1180.30%
215	TEN	Cortland Finnegan	DB	7.60	0.89	6.71	751.85%
207	IND	Antoine Bethea	DB	6.20	0.94	5.26	558.81%
199	IND	Charlie Johnson	T	6.20	0.99	5.21	525.04%
197	SF	Melvin Oliver	DE	6.00	1.00	5.00	497.03%
108	NO	Jahri Evans	T	10.60	1.78	8.82	495.39%
187	SD	Jeromey Clary	T	5.60	1.07	4.53	422.31%
134	BUF	Kyle Williams	DT	7.60	1.50	6.10	405.96%
119	DEN	Brandon Marshall	WR	7.80	1.66	6.14	371.23%
126	DEN	Elvis Dumervil	DE	7.00	1.58	5.42	342.62%

So, would it be an understatement to say that Colston was a good pick? To put his ROI in perspective, Tom Brady, the very definition of "diamond in the rough" over the past 10 years - if not all-time - has an ROI to date of 965.7%. To hone in on Colston's DIR-ness even further, consider that he was taken only 3 picks ahead of Mr. Irrelevant, whoever that was. Mr. Irrelevant is generally the sad sack who we know is going nowhere. Colston, 3 picks away from being Mr. Irrelevant himself, has been a prolific #1 WR on a Super Bowl Champion. Go figure.

Of course, the Saints weren't the only team to have 2 of the Top 10 DIRs in the 2006 draft. First, there was the aforementioned Broncos, who selected 2 future Pro-Bowlers 7 picks apart in the 4th round. Second, we have the Colts, who got a multi-year starter at T and a multiple Pro-Bowl DB 8 picks apart in the 6th round. With respect to IND, it should be pointed out that it's pretty much common knowledge that Bill Polian's entire draft strategy has the acronym "DIR." According to ROI, the 2006 NFL Draft bore that out.

Oh, and about that Niner up there, discuss!

BOTTOM LINE

So, from today's post, here's what we can say about Rounds 3-7 of the 2006 NFL Draft:

The Saints and Broncos added the most value above expectation.
Five NFL cellar-dwellers of the late 2000s brought up the VAE rear.
The Vikings and Jaguars got the most bang for their buck.
The Browns and Buccaneers got the least bang for their buck.
The 49ers did much better relative to the rest of the league than they did in the first 2 rounds.
The Saints, Colts, and Broncos each found 2 of the Top 10 DIRs.
Marques Colston has been pretty decent for a Mr. Irrelevant, thrice removed.

2011 NFL Combine: It's a Wrap - Rounds 5 - 7

Drew Kerr — Mon, 07 Mar 2011 22:00:14 -0000

This is the last post in looking back at the players that could be slotted in each of these rounds as well as some of the guys that could be good fits for the 49ers.

Yesterday, we looked at the 3rd and 4th rounds and the players that may be a good fit should they be around. The later rounds are perhaps about as easy to predict as picking winning lotto numbers for a multi-million dollar jackpot. Okay, okay... maybe not that hard, but it's definitely not easy.

There's been players in each draft that pan out to be better than a majority of first round talent. Though it's not common, it makes you wonder what the heck scouts were looking at in their evaluations of those players. Maybe they had character or injury issues. Maybe they had a horrible off season leading up to the draft... there are a multitude of possible reasons, but it just goes to show that even guys who are paid to scout talent, don't always hit the nail on the head either.

Similar to yesterday, I'd like to display the picks in rounds 5 though 7 in the last decade to see how well the Niners have done from then to present.

2001

No 5th round selection

Cedrick Wilson - Wide Receiver - Tennessee - 6th Round

Rashad Holman - Cornerback - Louisville - 6th Round

Menson Holloway - Defensive End - UTEP - 6th Round

Alex Lincoln - Linebacker - Auburn - 7th Round

Eric Johnson - Tight End - Yale - 7th Round

2002

Brandon Doman - Quarterback - BYU - 5th Round

John Shaw - Defensive End - Michigan State - 5th Round

Mark Anelli - Tight End - Wisconsin - 6th Round

Eric Heitmann - Center - Stanford - 7th Round

Kyle Kosier - Tackle - Arizona State - 7th Round

Teddy Gaines - Defensive Back - Tennessee - 7th Round

2003

Aaron Walker - Tight End - Florida - 5th Round

Arnaz Battle - Wide Receiver - Notre Dame - 6th Round

Ken Dorsey - Quarterback - Miami - 7th Round

2004

No 5th round selection

Andy Lee - Punter - Pittsburgh - 6th Round

Keith Lewis - Safety - Oregon - 6th Round

Cody Pickett - Quarterback - Washington - 7th Round

Christian Ferrara - Defensive End - Syracuse - 7th Round

2005

Ronald Fields - Defensive Tackle - Mississippi State - 5th Round

Rasheed Marshall - Wide Receiver - West Virginia - 5th Round

Derrick Johnson - Cornerback - Washington - 6th Round

Daven Holly - Cornerback - Cincinnati - 7th Round

Marcus Maxwell - Wide Receiver - Oregon - 7th Round

Patrick Estes - Tight End - Virginia - 7th Round

Billy Bajema - Tight End - Oklahoma State - 7th Round

2006

Parys Haralson - Outside Linebacker - Tennessee - 5th Round

Delanie Walker - Tight End - C. Missouri State - 6th Round

Marcus Hudson - Safety - NC State - 6th Round

Melvin Oliver - Defensive End - LSU - 6th Round

Vickiel Vaughn - Safety - Arkansas - 7th Round

2007

Tarell Brown - Cornerback - Texas - 5th Round

Thomas Clayton - Running Back - Kansas State - 6th Round

No 7th round selection

2008

5th round selection forfeited for tampering charges

Josh Morgan - Wide Receiver - Virginia Tech - 6th Round

Larry Grant - Linebacker - Ohio State - 7th Round

2009

Scott McKillop - Linebacker - Pittsburgh - 5th Round

Nate Davis - Quarterback - Ball State - 5th Round

Bear Pascoe - Tight End - Fresno State - 6th Round

Curtis Taylor - Safety - LSU - 7th Round

Ricky Jean-Francois - Defensive Tackle - LSU - 7th Round

2010

No 5th round selection

Anthony Dixon - Running Back - Mississippi State - 6th Round

Nate Byham - Tight End - Pittsburgh - 6th Round

Kyle Williams - Wide Receiver - Arizona State - 6th Round

Phillip Adams - Cornerback - SC State - 7th Round

The shortlist of potential 5th rounders

Pat Devlin - Quarterback - Delaware

Richard Sherman - Cornerback - Stanford

Wayne Daniels - Outside Linebacker - TCU

David Carter - Defensive End - UCLA

Derrick Locke - Running Back - Kentucky

The shortlist of potential 6th rounders

Tyrod Taylor - Quarterback - Virginia Tech

Jalil Brown - Cornerback - Colorado

Brian Duncan - Outside Linebacker - Texas Tech

Corbin Bryant - Defensive End - Northwestern

Tori Gurley - Wide Receiver - South Carolina

The shortlist of potential 7th rounders

Ben Chappell - Quarterback - Indiana

Jason Teague - Cornerback - TCU

Jonathan Freeny - Outside Linebacker - Rutgers

Frank Kearse - Defensive End - Alabama A&M

Chad Spann - Running Back - Northern Illinois

Summary: As you notice, it's not a very common trend (with the 49ers at least) that talent is found in these later rounds; although the verdict is still out on the last couple of drafts. Trent Baalke seemed to have done a fairly decent job at finding some late round talent. There wasn't a single 49er that got cut from last years draft. With that said, let's hear some of the later round guys that you all would like to see suiting up in red and gold next season.

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IId. The McNolan Era (2005-2008)

(Florida) Danny Tuccitto — Thu, 16 Apr 2009 00:00:14 -0000

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Sorry about the delay in getting this one posted. My computer crashed yesterday because a genius (aka me) let the battery run out, so I had to wait until it fully recharged (aka today) to continue writing up the piece.

Yesterday, in Part 2c of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Donahue regime's picks from 2002-2004 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Donahue's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks, especially when your team sucks.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
I <3 the Pac-10!
BCS or die!

In comparison with the Walsh II and Policy regimes, Donahue didn't make the Policy regime mistake of trading away picks when the team was good (2002), he used Walsh II's strategy of drafting for need on Day 1 when rebuilding, he brought back the Policy regime's affinity for Pac-10 players, and he surpassed both Walsh II and the Policy regime in percentage of picks that came from BCS conferences

In this article, I'll be ending the regime breakdowns with a look at the McNolan era (2005-2008).

After the jump, I'll put the McNolan drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; sum up the regimes; and provide the idiot's guide to McNolan draft strategy...

Here again is the link to my Excel spreadsheet of 49er draft picks in the Salary Cap Era. I realized that some of you probably don't have Excel 2007, so I converted it to be compatible with older versions (and fixed the link in previous posts as well):

49er Draft Picks 1994-2008

IN CONTEXT

In Part 2c, I told you how Donahue didn't hit the home run he needed to with his rebuilding project in the 2004 draft. One additional piece of evidence for this is the fact that, by the very next draft, Donahue's replacements had to rebuild the roster once more through the draft. Therefore, Donahue's 2004 fire sale and draft has to rank among the shortest rebuilding phases of a franchise in the history of sports (and not in a good way). Now, I'm sure you don't need some long-winded description of what the team has done record-wise since 2004, so I'll just get on with the specific needs in each of McNolan's drafts:

2005 Draft - Key Losses: WR Cedrick Wilson (free agency), OL Kyle Kosier (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (career-threatening injury), OL Scott Gragg (free agency), DL John Engelberger (trade), DB Ronnie Heard (free agency), K Todd Peterson (free agency). Weak 2004 Stats: 30^th in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA; 19^th in ST DVOA.¹Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for QB Jeff Garcia, RB Garrison Hearst, WR Terrell Owens, and DB Zack Bronson; major injuries to QB Tim Rattay, LB Andre Carter, DB Ahmed Plummer. Needs: QB, RB, WR, OL, DL, DB, K, LB depth.

2006 Draft - Key Losses: QB Tim Rattay (trade), RB Kevan Barlow (trade), FB Fred Beasley (free agency), WR Brandon Lloyd (trade), WR Johnnie Morton (released), LB Julian Peterson (free agency), LB Andre Carter (free agency), and DB Ahmed Plummer (career-threatening injury). Weak 2005 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Garcia, Hearst, Owens, and Bronson; major injury to TE Eric Johnson. Needs: FB, WR, LB, DB, QB depth, RB depth, TE depth.

2007 Draft - Key Losses: WR Antonio Bryant (released), TE Eric Johnson (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (free agency), and DB Tony Parrish (released). Weak 2006 Stats: 22^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA; 18^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bronson; OL Larry Allen and DL Bryant Young now in their mid-30s. Needs: WR, DB, ST, TE depth, OL depth, DL depth.

2008 Draft - Key Losses: WR Darrell Jackson (free agency), OL Larry Allen (retirement), OL Justin Smiley (free agency), DL Bryant Young (retirement), DL Marques Douglas (free agency), and LB Derek Smith (free agency). Weak 2007 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bryant; major injuries to QB Alex Smith, OL Jonas Jennings, and LB Manny Lawson. Needs: WR, OL, DL, LB, QB depth.

In preparation for its drafts, McNolan has had to deal with about 7 key losses per offseason, which is fewer than Walsh II (8), but more than Donahue (4) and the Policy regime (4). Interestingly, the course of McNolan's tenure has seen a mixture of his 3 predecessors' draft contexts. The 2005 and 2006 offseasons were Walshian, with about 8 key self-induced, salary-cap-caused losses per season that generally involved kicking dead weight to the curb or trading it for draft picks. The 2007 offseason was Donahue-esque, with only 4 key losses and a team feeling good about itself after a promising season. Finally, 2008 was Policy-like in that there were two retirements to deal with. Overall, I'd say the most similar previous context to McNolan's was the Walsh II era.

I know this is totally off-topic, but, Cedrick Wilson may have made the greatest career decision in the history of the NFL by signing with PIT after the 2004 season. If he stays in SF, he's stuck on a 6-win team for the foreseeable future (at least until he roughed up his ex-girlfriend) catching passes from Rattay, Smith, Ken Dorsey, Cody Pickett, Trent Dilfer, Shaun Hill, and Chris Weinke. Instead, he goes to PIT and wins a ring his first season with the team catching passes from Ben Roethlisberger. Seriously, whatever it was that made him leave the Niners, he needs to bottle and sell it. Can you guys think of any other player in recent years who's lucked out like that?

Anyway, back to the regularly scheduled program. For the sake of comparison, here's how McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup in 2005 and 2006:

Morton (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Wilson
Snyder (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Kosier
OL Eric Heitmann (2002 Donahue draft pick) for Newberry
OL Kwame Harris (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Gragg
Douglas (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Engelberger (after moving Young to 3-4 DE)
DB Mike Adams (2003 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Heard
K Joe Nedney (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Todd Peterson
Smith (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Rattay
RB Frank Gore (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Barlow
FB Moran Norris (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Beasley
Bryant (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Lloyd
WR Arnaz Battle (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Morton
Lawson (2006 McNolan draft pick) for Julian Peterson
LB Brandon Moore (2002 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Carter (after moving him to 4-3 ROLB)
DB Shawntae Spencer (2004 Donahue draft pick) for Plummer (after moving him to LCB)

Adding it all up, McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup with 5 traditional free agents, 4 draft picks, and 6 players originally acquired by Donahue. Comparing this to the previous regimes, McNolan used free agency more than Walsh II and Donahue, but less than Policy; and they had a "holdover rate" of 33.3%, which was smack dab in between Walsh II (16.7%) and Donahue (50.0%).

So there's the context. Hopefully you sense a pattern emerging here: the contexts of McNolan drafts have been a cocktail of issues and solutions having the ingredients of each predecessor; 2 ½ parts Walsh II, 1 part Donahue, and ½ part Policy.

PICKS, PICKS, AND MORE PICKS

From 2005-2008, the 49ers made 35 selections in the NFL draft, which nearly equalled the Walsh II and Donahue rate of 9 picks per season. In 2005 and 2006, the main rebuilding years, McNolan stockpiled picks via all those trades I mentioned earlier; just like Walsh II and Donahue. The past 2 drafts, however, McNolan has tended to trade away picks (you're welcome, NE) rather than stockpile them; just like the Policy regime. Once again, the trend here is for McNolan to be a mixture of all 3 predecessor's strengths and weaknesses.

In terms of McNolan's overall Pro Bowl rate, a Donahue-esque and Walshian 5.7% of its picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers (Gore and LB Patrick Willis). However, its starter rate of 34.3% - which includes OL Chilo Rachal's midseason and DB Dashon Goldson's offseason ascensions - is the worst of the 4 regimes (Policy regime = 41.4%; Walsh II = 48.1%; Donahue = 48.1%). When you remember the differences in context between regimes, you realize that McNolan has been way worse at picking starters than the context-similar Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse than the context-different Policy regime, whose superior teams made it harder for draft picks to crack the starting lineup (i.e., the Policy regime's starter rate is artificially low due to context).

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has continued the Walsh II and Donahue standard of 9 draft picks per season.
McNolan has stockpiled picks when the team sucked, and traded away picks when (they thought) the team was good.
McNolan has been as bad at picking Pro Bowlers as the "unlikely to have Pro Bowlers because the team sucked" Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse at picking starters than the "unlikely to have draft selections start because the team was good" Policy regime.
Overall, McNolan seems to be channeling the good and bad of its 3 predecessors.

DAY ‘N' NIGHT

McNolan has taken exactly 40% of its picks on Day 1 of the draft, and 60% on Day 2. That's almost identical to Walsh II's 41/59 split, which, as I said in Part 2c, was smack dab between the Policy (52/48) and Donahue (33/67) regimes.

Looking at the relative success of its picks by draft day, we find that 64.3% of McNolan's Day 1 picks have become 49er starters, which is, again, right in the middle of the 4 regimes; not as good as Walsh II's (81.8%, which I incorrectly reported as 64.3% in Part 2b), but basically on par with the Policy regime's (60.0%) and Donahue's (55.6%). Remember, though that Walsh II and Donahue are the better comparisons in terms of team context. On Day 2, an abysmal 14.3% of McNolan picks have become 49er starters, easily the worst of the 4 regimes (again, even worse than the starter-unlikely Policy regime). So while McNolan has had pretty standard success on Day 1 in terms of starters, it's been horrible at picking Day 2 starters.

The best example of this dichotomy between Day 1 and Day 2 results is McNolan's initial rebuilding draft in 2005. Here it is:

Rd	Player	Pos	Starter?	Pro Bowl?
1	Alex Smith	QB	Yes	No
2	David Baas	OL	Yes	No
3	Frank Gore	RB	Yes	Yes
3	Adam Snyder	OL	Yes	No
5	Ronald Fields	DL	No	No
5	Rasheed Marshall	WR	No	No
6	Derrick Johnson	DB	No	No
7	Daven Holly	DB	No	No
7	Marcus Maxwell	WR	No	No
7	Patrick Estes	TE	No	No
7	Billy Bajema	TE	Yes	No

Day 1? 4 picks, 4 starters, 1 Pro Bowler. Day 2? 7 picks, 1 starter, 0 Pro Bowlers. Enough said.

With regard to Pro Bowlers, however, the preferred drink is once again "Regime Cocktail." On Day 1, 14.3% of McNolan's picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers, which is slightly worse than the Pro-Bowl-likely Policy regime (20.0%), considerably better than Donahue (0.0%), and slightly better than Walsh II (9.1%). OK, correction: McNolan drinks Regime Cocktail only on Day 1. That's because, it has yet to pick a Day 2 Pro Bowler. Of course, it's not like the other two Pro-Bowl-unlikely regimes (Walsh II = 6.3%; Donahue = 5.3%) were much better at it.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has had a Walshian 40/60 split of picks between Day 1 and Day 2.
McNolan has been worse than Walsh II, but better than Donahue, at picking Day 1 starters.
McNolan has been far less successful than the other 3 regimes at picking Day 2 starters.
McNolan has been more successful than Walsh II and Donahue at picking Day 1 Pro Bowlers, but slightly worse than these two regimes at picking Day 2 Pro Bowlers.

ASSUME THE POSITION

Here's how McNolan has used its 35 picks by position, unit, and draft day:

Pos	Day 1	Day 2	Total
QB	1	0	1
RB	1	1	2
FB	0	0	0
WR	2	5	7
TE	1	2	3
OL	4	1	5
DL	2	5	7
LB	2	1	3
DB	1	6	7
K	0	0	0
P	0	0	0
OFF Total	9	9	18
DEF Total	5	12	17
ST Total	0	0	0
Total	14	21	35

Overall, McNolan has basically split their picks up evenly between units, which is more similar to what the Policy regime and Donahue did than Walsh II's need-induced DEF preference. Also, like Walsh, McNolan hasn't taken any ST players in the draft. Of course, that may have something to do with having Nedney and ROBO-PUNTER on the roster. What's most interesting here, however, is that, although OFF has received equal attention on Days 1 and 2, 70.6% of McNolan's DEF picks have come on Day 2.

The even split of OFF picks between draft days is a little misleading because McNolan was actually Walshian in 2005 and 2006 when it had to replace most of the OFF. Going back to that 2005 draft that I showed earlier, you'll notice that all 4 Day 1 picks were on OFF. This continued in 2006 when they selected TE Vernon Davis in the 1^st round after Johnson suffered a major injury the previous season. Essentially, McNolan followed the Walsh II example of spending Day 1 of rebuilding drafts addressing the most glaring positional needs. This is really eye-opening when you consider that Scot McCloughan claims to be a devout believer in "best player available." Is he full of sh*t or is the focus on need in Day 1 of the 2005 and 2006 drafts just a coincidence? I'll leave you to decide.

DEF, however, is a different animal altogether. From the table, it's clear that the draft day disparity on DEF has been due to an inordinate amount of Day 2 picks being spent on DLs and DBs. The 5 Day 2 DLs were, in order of selection, Ronald Fields, Parys Haralson, Melvin Oliver, Jay Moore, and Joe Cohen; the 6 Day 2 DBs were Derrick Johnson, Daven Holly, Marcus Hudson, Vickiel Vaughn, Goldson, and Tarell Brown. Looking at these lists, you could say that McNolan has gotten worse over time picking Day 2 DLs, whereas it's gotten better over time picking Day 2 DBs. Either way, aside from Haralson and Goldson, that's a pretty mediocre-at-best bunch. So, if you want to know why the DEF has sucked for so long (before Singletary pulled their heads out of their asses), look no further than McNolan mostly waiting until Day 2 to pick DEF players. Couple this with McNolan's aforementioned horrible starter rate on Day 2, and you get one wet, stinking heap of also-ran-ity.

With 71.4% of picks taken on Day 2, WR is another position at which McNolan has focused little Day 1 attention. The two Day 1 WRs were Brandon Williams and Jason Hill, both 3^rd-rounders.

Hopefully, you're starting to see a trend here. McNolan gets credit for using Walsh II's "pick for need on Day 1" and "bites at the apple" strategies. However, it's made the mistake of waiting until Day 2 to take most of their bites at DL, DB, and WR. Perhaps, then, one reason why the Niners haven't been able to get over the mediocre 7-9 hump since 2005 is because their WR, DL, and DB corps are populated with Day 2 picks.

To drive it home, here's one last point about McNolan's (lack of) success wtith DEF picks. On OFF, McNolan's starter rate (44.4%) has been similar to that of the Policy regime (43.8%), Walsh II (50.0%), and Donahue (46.2%). However, the DEF starter rates for the previous 3 regimes were 47.1% for Walsh II, 41.7% for Donahue, and 33.3% for the Policy regime. McNolan's? 23.5%!

All is not lost, however. Unlike Donahue, McNolan seems to have actually learned something about positional picks as its tenure has progressed. Namely, 2 of their 3 picks in 2008 were DEF players. Whether or not DL Kentwan Balmer and DB Reggie Smith pan out in the long run, at least McNolan seems to have noticed that their previous Day 1 picks on DEF have become integral parts of the starting unit. Don't believe me? Here they are: Lawson, Willis, and DL Ray McDonald. So, their results - 2 starters, 1 Pro Bowler, and an emerging pass-rush specialist - were not shabby at all. This suggests that (a) when McNolan commits Day 1 resources to DEF, it's been pretty successful; and (b) the regime seems to have figured this out. So, at the very least, kudos to them for that.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Walsh II, McNolan has focused its Day 1 picks on the most glaring positional needs (when it had to).
McNolan has employed Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy at WR, DL, and DB. However, they've primarily waited until Day 2 to take their bites.
Given their propensity for waiting until Day 2 for DEF picks, it's not surprising that McNolan has been horrible at drafting DEF starters.
Based on 2008, McNolan seems to have learned from their "wait until Day 2 for DEF" mistake.

CONFERENCE ROOM

So far, I've basically told a story about how the McNolan regime's drafts have been a little bit Walsh II, a little bit Donahue, and a little bit Policy; how they've used the good strategies as well as the bad. Basically, not too hot, not too cold; I'll call it "Goldilocks" if you will. The conference breakdown is where that tale ends. There's one regime's lead in particular that McNolan has been happy to follow, and I'm sure you'll easily be able to figure it out. Here's how McNolan's 35 picks shake out by conference: 7 ACC picks, 7 SEC picks, 6 Big 12 picks, 6 Pac-10 picks, 4 Big 10 picks, 1 Big East pick, 1 Conference USA pick, 1 MAC pick, 1 MAII pick, and 1 MWC pick.

BCS anyone? McNolan has taken a Donahue-esque 88.6% of its picks from BCS conferences. I already detailed in Part 2c what I think of this strategy, so you know by now that I don't like it. Now, Scot McCloughan has argued that he takes BCS players because they're (a) less affected by big crowds, (b) more prepared for the NFL, and (c) better team leaders. While all of these may be true in a general sense, the draft isn't about generalities. It's about identifying and acquiring specific talented players. I'm sorry, but when you limit your available talent pool to 6 or 7 college football conferences, you're going to miss the "diamonds in the rough" that teams need to sustain success. Also, McCloughan has made it seem like picking players from BCS conferences is only a Day 1 strategy. The stats say the opposite though: A higher percentage of McNolan's Day 2 picks have come from BCS conferences (90.5%) than have its Day 2 picks (88.6%). Oh, and did I mention that McNolan's first pick ever was a QB from a non-BCS conference (Smith), and that they traded up in 2007 to take an OL from a non-BCS conference (Joe Staley)? That's 2 of McNolan's 4 non-BCS picks being taken with 1^st-round picks. Again, is he BSing us here or is this some kind of smokescreen? It's pretty interesting how a general BCS guy like McCloughan can fall in love so much with specific non-BCS players.

And now, I present a second way in which McNolan's conference preferences are similar to Donahue's: They suck just as bad at picking BCS players despite being so BCS-reliant. Wait, let me correct that. They suck even worse. Here's the evidence:

McNolan
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	10	2	12
No	21	2	23
Total	31	4	35

Donahue
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	12	1	13
No	13	1	14
Total	25	2	27

You'll recall from Part 2c that Donahue's BCS starter rate (48.0%) was worse than Walsh II's (62.5%) even though Donahue was much more BCS-heavy with his picks. Well, even Donahue's sorry BCS starter rate makes him look like a draft maven when compared to McNolan's. That's because, as the table shows, only 32.3% of McNolan's BCS picks have become regular 49er starters! As I said in Part 2c, if you're going to be limiting your talent pool so drastically, you better be good at evaluating the talent you don't ignore. Clearly, McNolan has not been good in this regard, and has been even worse than the guy for which I invented the argument.

Now, I argued in Part 2c that Donahue's preference for BCS players and lack of success in actually picking good ones was borne out of his dispositional laziness and inattention to draft detail. With respect to McNolan, however, I'm sure this hasn't been the case. To its credit, the McNolan regime has been almost pathologically engaged in draft preparation. After all, they coached the Senior Bowl 3 straight seasons, Scot McLoughan was Director of College Scouting for the Seahawks, and Scot's brother, David, now serves in the same capacity for the 49ers. So I'm kind of perplexed as to why, given their affinity for evaluating college talent, McNolan has shied away from non-BCS players. One might argue that it's because of the Alex Smith experience. However, as has been noted, McLoughan remains a big Smith supporter. So what gives here? Please help.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Donahue, almost every player McNolan has drafted has been from a BCS conference.
Despite its BCS-lust, the McNolan regime has had an even worse BCS starter rate than Donahue.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

As I've alluded to throughout this article, the McNolan drafts can be described by one word: Goldilocks. In other words, their porridge hasn't been too hot and it hasn't been too cold; just lukewarm. Here's the evidence:

McNolan's draft contexts have been a mixture of its 3 predecessors' contexts.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's "draft vs. free agency" bias.
McNolan's stockpiled picks in rebuilding drafts ala Walsh II, but also traded away picks in "we feel good about ourselves right now" drafts ala the Policy regime.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's Day1/Day 2 split.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of Day 1 starter and Pro Bowl rate.
McNolan has evenly split their picks between OFF and DEF overall.
McNolan's used Walsh's "bites at the apple" strategy, but only on Day 2.
McNolan's been on par with previous regimes in terms of picking OFF starters.
Though it's made Donahue-esque draft strategy errors, McNolan's either learned from those mistakes or has a more valid reason for why they've made them.

All in all, it sure seems like the McNolan regime has been a mixture of the good and bad of the 3 previous 49er regimes. They rebuilt like Walsh II in 2005 and 2006, but they sat on their laurels like Donahue and the Policy regime in 2007. They draft for need on Day 1 like Walsh II, but, like Donahue, only when they have to. They take a lot of bites at the apple like Walsh, but they wait until Day 2 to do it. You get the picture.

To me, understanding the Goldilocks nature of McNolan drafts helps explain why the 49ers have been stuck in "no better than 7-9" mode for the past 3 seasons. If you draft a propensity of mediocre players, or if you have a bunch of mediocre drafts, you're going to find yourself having a mediocre team. Here, another word comes to mind that has been used - with great comic effect - to describe McNolan: vanilla.

In evaluating the 4 Niner regimes since 1994, something has become very clear to me; something that I didn't fully realize until I got to McNolan. Bill Walsh was the only 49er GM in the past 15 years who went out and tried to be great in the draft. He's the only one who tried to bat 1.000 every time he stepped to the plate. The Policy regime was content to sustain success through free agency, Donahue was content to ride the coattails of Walsh II's drafts, and McNolan has been content to only be great on Day 1. Is it any wonder then that the Walsh II regime was the only one that had an upward win trajectory? Is it a coincidence that Walsh was the only GM to leave the 49ers better off than when he arrived? I mean, the 49ers regressed under the Policy regime and Donahue, and they've stagnated in 7-9 territory under McNolan. After reading my regime breakdowns, do you have any doubt that one important reason for this is because Walsh II's draft strategy differed so drastically from that of McNolan, Donahue, and the Policy regime? In re McNolan, do you think that the "hybrid" defense, not giving Hill the QB job outright, and not firing Nolan after 2007 can be described by any other word except "vanilla?"

Whether it's McSingle nee McNolan or someone else, until the person/people in charge of running the 49ers' drafts stop placing artificial constraints on themselves, and start trying to be great with every pick- by whatever means necessary - I fear the Niners are going to wallow in mediocrity.

Here's a perfect example of what I mean. The Niners need a pass rusher right now more than anything. Go out and draft the best damned pass rusher. If the consensus best pass rusher isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the pass rusher you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the Calfornia Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK pass rusher and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

Another example. Right now, you have an arguable draft bust, a good but ragged-armed journeyman, and a player KC didn't even want as your QBs. Go out and draft the best damned QB. Do whatever it takes. If the consensus best QB isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the QB you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the California Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK QB and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

You know what team drafts like this? The New England Patriots. But that's Part 3, so you'll have to wait until tomorrow to hear the details. For now, here's the idiot's guide to the McNolan regime's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks, but trade away picks when (you think) your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Use Day 2 to take a lot of bites at the apple.
BCS or die!
We're Goldilocks (aka Vanilla McNolan).

So, based on this strategy, as well as some specific draft history trends that you can find in my Excel spreadsheet, here's what (and what not) to expect from the 49ers in the 2009 draft:

Don't expect them to take more than 1 player from a non-BCS conference.
Don't expect them to take a pass rusher, QB, or WR at #10.
Don't expect them to take a RB on Day 1.
Expect them to take a WR or two on Day 2.
Expect them to take an OL on Day 1.
Expect more DEF picks (esp. DLs and DBs) on Day 2 than Day 1.
Don't expect them to take a FB, K, or P.

Remember, this is what I expect them to do or not do based on their history. If they end up going against tendency, it's not because the tendencies were wrongly identified. It's because they did something that was unexpected given their history. And there's no harm in that. It's actually worked once or twice (See Willis, Patrick).

That's it for now. Tomorrow, I'll compare the overall 49er draft strategy since 1994, which I identified in Part 1, to that of the Patriots. TO BE CONTINUED...

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

How much blame would you assign McNolan's drafts for the 49ers continuously being unable to take that next step in recent seasons?

All of the blame

37 votes

Most of the blame

83 votes

Some of the blame

103 votes

None of the blame

9 votes

232 votes | Poll has closed

Recent Draft History: San Francisco 49ers

Jeremy Bolander — Sun, 08 Mar 2009 20:00:09 -0000

2008 Draft:

1 (29) Kentwan Balmer, DT Backup

Not exactly a hot start for the rookie, collecting almost as many kick returns as he had tackles, all on special teams. With the anticipated switch to a 3-4 the Niners are just hoping he has the ability to move over to DE. It will probably be a suitable move that gets him on the field, as he has the length and ability to take on blockers and force double teams.

2 (39) Chilo Rachal, OG STARTER

With the advent of new Head Coach Mike Singletary, Rachal went from benchwarmer to starter. He appears to have the starting guard spot locked down, and shows the athleticism to be moved out on the edge if needed, should the Niners find themselves in a good position to target Guards in the draft.

3 (75) Reggie Smith, CB Backup

The latest addition of the highly targeted CB spot for the niners. Smith saw action on special teams, but where it gets interesting for him is his experience as a SS. While he doesn't quite have the range to drop all the way back as a FS, he certainly has the versatility to give the Niners optional looks and packages in their secondary. No doubt he will be around for awhile, as an intriguing set of possibilities.

4 (107) Cody Wallace, C Backup

Wallace will get some time to develop on the bench, as C Eric Heitmann recieved a contract extension to go along with arguably his best year as the Niner's center. Wallace is solid depth, and should be ready to step in if there wre to be interior line injuries.

6 (171) Josh Morgan, WR Backup

Morgan should get an opportunity to compete for first team reps, after a rookie season that started out with a lot of promise during the pre-season, but hit the brakes after a staph infection and then a groin injury sidelined him. He has good size/strength, and could be a playmaker if he can build up some solid connections with whomever ends up QBing the niners.

7 (214) Larry Grant, OLB Backup/Rams

Was poached early from San Francisco's practice squad, and now serves as an inexperiencd strongside backup for the Rams.

2007 Draft:

1 (11) Patrick Willis, LB STARTER

A solid all around LBer who led the league in tackles as a rookie, and who made strides in an already impressive game in his second year by becoming even more effective pass defender.

1 (28) Joe Staley, OT STARTER

He came at the cost of a future #1 starter, but the move so far looks solid, as Staley was exemplary in starting duties as a RT rookie. After a sophmore move to LT he struggled, giving up a number of sacks as he adjusted to the cream of the crop when it comes to defensive pass rushers. But after settling in in the latter half of the season, all signs point toward this young T being with the organization for a while.

3 (76) Jason Hill, WR Backup

This could be the key season for Hill, who could either line up a starting spot for himself, or drift back into the ranks of obscurity and eventual dismissal. After underachieving through an injury pagued rookie season, he was off to a less than stellar start in 08. But with injuries to the starting WR and the coaching transition midway through the season, Hill managed to step up and start putting some production with his measurables. Expect a great WR battle in training camp as Hill looks to solidify his spot on the roster.

3 (97) Ray McDonald, DE STARTER

A solid player developing nicely, he suffers from his lack of instincts, as seen by the number of penalties he draws. He is a starter for now, but the 49ers will actively look to get some more competition at the position.

4 (104) Jay Moore, OLB Backup

A solid player who has been plagued by injuries for the Niners. Last year the injury occurred in the pre-season, losing him an entire season's worht of practice time and development. This is likely his last chance to make an impact,a nd if he can't stay healthy and produce, he may be cut at the first opportunity.

4 (126) Dashon Goldson, S Backup

After limited use in his rookie campaign, he caught the coaches' eyes leading up to and during the 2008 season, but nothing ever came of it. In danger of becoming a "Workout wonder" Goldson needs to focus on his game and work to get himself moved into the starting lineup, and there was never a time as good as now, with limited options on the roster, in free agency or the draft. Word out of the 49ers camp is that they are willing to give him the first crack at the job...

4 (135) Joe Cohen, NT Backup/Miami

After an ACL injury sent him to IR in the preseason, he was subsequently waived and picked up by the Dolphins, where he will be in competition for the starter/backup position vacated by Vonnie Holliday.

5 (147) Tarell Brown, CB Backup

After a lackluster rookie campaign followed by off-field trouble, Brown stepped in after injuries sidelined the #2 corner, and didn't play terribly in his duties covering the slot. He will likely be given an opportunity to take the starting job in training camp, but the more likely scenario is settling in as the #3 corner.

6 (186) Thomas Clayton, RB Backup

After spending much of his career ont he practic squad, he was activated to hedge against Frank Gore's injuries, but no starting or even playing time ever really materialized for him. Solid depth, but an unknown quantity that may just need an opportunity to step up.

2006 Draft

1 (6) Vernon Davis, TE STARTER

Though this pickup will long be contested, there is legitimate worries as to his long term viability as a pass catcher. With clay hands and the inability to catch away from his body, Davis may be best suited to an H-bak role, where he is given the ball in space and asked to produce, as he has the physical tools to dominate after the catch. One area that is worht every dime, however, is his runblocking.

1 (22) Manny Lawson, LB STARTER

After a solid rookie campaign that included a rookie fo the week honor, he lost most of his 2007 development to an ACL tear in practice, and went to IR immediately. His return in 2008 saw a somewhat less explosive and quick player, no doubt due to the injury. As a key component of the run stopping game and TE coverage, Lawson has his spot locked up, but he needs a full, consistent year in order to look towards his future again.

3 (84) Brandon Williams, WR/KR Backup/Steelers

In duty primarily as a KR, Williams didn't impress. After average production in 13 starts he was waived and claimed by St. Louis, who would also get some spot return duty out of him, but they too would choose to waive him. Now with Pittsburgh, he may be looking at his alst chance to hang on with an NFL team.

4 (100) Michael Robinson, RB Backup

After a nice rookie campaign that saw Robinson move up to the #2 position behind Frank Gore he inexplicably fell out of favor, and his touches, and thus his production, fell steadily. After taking over the FB role due to injury, he sits in an uncomfortable position: his style of FB play does not mesh well with the heavy bruiser style that Singletary seems to envision for his new offense. Though Robinson signed an extension, he will likely be passed up on the depth chart over the next few years by more suitable FBs, until it makes sense to just let Robinson go.

5 (140) Parys Haralson, DE STARTER

Possibly a draft-day steal, Haralson has developed well and is becoming a premiere producer for the Niners defensive line. A lackluster rookie campaign, floowed by some flashes and signs of promise in his sophmore campaign came full circle with 8 sacks in 2008. All teams wish their defensive talent could develop this consistently.

6 (175) Delanie Walker, TE Backup

Though he has serious upside, this has been true for the last three years. At a certain point he will be asked to produce. But with no red flags in his game, it is likely that the 49ers will look to keep him around as long as possible, or at least until a viable alternative falls in their laps.

6 (192) Marcus Hudson, CB Backup

To many games as an inactive, and a handful of games missed due to injury certainly don't speak well for this player going into his fourth year. When his contract is up, there will be little upside to keeping him on the roster.

6 (197) Melvin Oliver, DE Out of NFL

After a very promising and productive rookie season, where he started in 14 games, a preseason ACL in jury sent him to PUP and then IR for his 2007 campaign. He was waived by the 49ers.

7 (254) Vickiel Vaughn, S Out of NFL

After breaking his finger in preseason, he spent the year on IR, only to be cut for the following season. After a short stint on the Broncos practice squad he was again cut and is now an unsigned free agent.