SB Nation - Bryant Young

Shawntae Spencer awarded 2009 Ed Block Courage Award

Fooch — Thu, 17 Dec 2009 20:47:45 -0000

It's rather solid timing that we find this out following this morning's post about DeSean Jackson. The 49ers announced that CB Shawntae Spencer has been awarded the team's Ed Block Courage Award. The award is voted on by the players and is given annually to the player that exemplifies a commitment to sportsmanship and courage.

Spencer tore his ACL last season in week 2 and has battled back from that injury to become the team's #1 cornerback. I've always felt he was a talented CB, but it seemed like he was always battling injuries and inconsistent play. While he's certainly had some tough games this year, he's put together one of the best seasons of his career, even if it's not reflected in his stats (1 interception on the season).

As you've seen in our discussions about Nate Clements and recently Josh Morgan, we like to consider the community relations aspect of the team, given the impact it can have. The 49ers recognized this in publicizing the award. Spencer has been a staple in the Bay Area community and back in Pittsburgh (he attended Pitt). This year, Spencer joined fellow teammates who worked with Fresh Lifelines for Youth (FLY), an organization devoted to helping disadvantaged teenagers, to help share thoughts on dealing with stressful triggers and situations that come up in everyday life. He has also given back to Bay Area youth, visiting the Charles Drew Elementary School in the Bayview Hunter’s Point district in San Francisco, where he served as a judge for a Halloween parade and delivered Halloween safety tips to kids in every classroom. In addition, Spencer is helping to fund and launch a YMCA in Pittsburgh.

The Ed Block Courage Award is named after Ed Block, the former head athletic trainer of the Baltimore Colts of 23 years. Block was a pioneer in his profession and a respected humanitarian whose most passionate cause was helping children of abuse. The Ed Block Courage Award Foundation promotes the prevention of child abuse by raising awareness of the epidemic and assisting agencies who provide for the care and treatment of abused children in communities throughout the National Football League (NFL). The Edgewood Center for Children & Families in San Francisco is the local Courage House supported by the San Francisco 49ers.

Past winners of the award include Eric Heitmann, Frank Gore, Jeremy Newberry, Garrison Hearst, Bryant Young and Jerry Rice.

49ers Year-by-Year: 1999

howtheyscored — Fri, 16 Oct 2009 15:00:23 -0000

1999 wasn't the beginning of the end for the 49ers' storied dynasty. It was an affirmation of the end. With the loss of Steve Young and the continued absence of Garrison Hearst, the San Francisco 49ers discovered that their talent had diminished to the point where success was unsustainable. But as with all of these posts, the end result isn't as important as the journey. See how it all came to be right here:

Date:	Opponent:	Score:	Record:	Opponent's Record:
Sept. 12	@ Jacksonville Jaguars	L: 3-41	0-1	0-1
Sept. 19	New Orleans Saints	W: 21-28	1-1	1-1
Sept. 27	@ Arizona Cardinals	W: 24-10	2-1	1-2
Oct. 3	Tennessee Titans	W: 22-24	3-1	3-1
Oct. 10	@ St. Louis Rams	L: 20-42	3-2	4-0
Oct. 17	Carolina Panthers	L: 31-29	3-3	2-3
Oct. 24	@ Minnesota Vikings	L: 16-40	3-4	3-4
Nov. 7	Pittsburgh Steelers	L: 27-6	3-5	5-3
Nov. 14	@ New Orleans Saints	L: 6-24	3-6	2-7
Nov. 21	St. Louis Rams	L: 23-7	3-7	8-2
Nov. 29	Green Bay Packers	L: 20-3	3-8	6-5
Dec. 5	@ Cincinnati Bengals	L: 30-44	3-9	3-10
Dec. 12	Atlanta Falcons	W: 7-26	4-9	3-10
Dec. 18	@ Carolina Panthers	L: 24-41	4-10	7-7
Dec. 25	Washington Redskins	L: 26-20	4-11	9-6
Jan. 3	@ Atlanta Falcons	L: 29-34	4-12	5-11

Head Coach: Steve Mariucci

Key Losses: G Kevin Gogan, T Kirk Scrafford, DE Roy Barker, DE Chris Doleman, FS Merton Hanks, QB Jim Druckenmiller,

Key Additions: QB Jeff Garcia, RB Charlie Garner, FB Terry Jackson, DE Chike Okeafor, RB Lawrence Phillips

In 1999, the NFL welcomed the Cleveland Browns back into the league as an expansion team. The new Browns would essentially own the history of the "Browns" franchise, even though technically the original team had relocated to become the Ravens. This gave the league 31 teams, forcing the league to adopt a non-standard scheduling that called for at least one team bye in every week of the season.

Also in 1999, the Tennessee Oilers, formerly the Houston Oilers, officially changed their name to the Titans. With the name change came a new logo, uniforms, and official team colors. It also brought a first for the league, as the NFL actually retired a team name, putting the use of the name Oilers to rest for good.

With the year 2000 only a few months away, the NFL approached the new year with caution. The Y2K frenzy was in full swing by the start of the NFL season, and the league adjusted the schedule so that no teams would have to travel or play on January 1.

Finally, instant replay, a system that the NFL had adopted and abandoned in the past, was brought back with new technology and new rules in place. 1999 would be a trial run for the new system.

For the 49ers, a lot of questions were hanging in the air. The team wasn't getting any younger, or healthier. Plagued by concussions throughout his career and particularly in recent years, Steve Young's health became a question mark every time he took a sack. Jerry Rice was showing the early signs of decline as age took hold and the first major injury of his career continued to hang in the minds of fans even nearly two years after suffering it. With Terrell Owens developing into a fine young receiver, Rice's position on the team this year and in the future was beginning to become a question.

Worst of all, Garrison Hearst, who had been so good for the team in 1998, was lost to a grisly ankle injury suffered in a playoff loss to the Falcons the year before.

But while question marks littered the offense, the defense was as much of a concern. The 49ers lost Merton Hanks in the offseason, and were expecting to start players in the twilights of their careers at just about every position. From Tim McDonald to Ken Norton, Jr., to Charles Haley, the 49ers defense was loaded with talented players - only most of them had already seen their best days. Perhaps most pressing would be Bryant Young's recovery from a horrifying broken leg that he had suffered less than a year before.

To try to make up for their losses, the 49ers picked up small, shifty running back Charlie Garner and reclamation project Lawrence Phillips. Garner came out of Philadelphia, where he was never able to answer questions about his ability to be a featured back. Phillips came with a history as a clubhouse cancer and with an off-field record that included an assault charge to match. His troubles had driven him out of the NFL and into NFL Europe, but the 49ers were willing to give him a chance to solve their running back woes.

The 49ers attempted to address their aging defense in the draft, but failed to make any significant splashes that season. But perhaps most importantly, the 49ers built in a contingency plan for Steve Young. Giving up on former quarterback of the future Jim Druckenmiller, the 49ers followed the counsel of Bill Walsh in looking to the Canadian Football league and Jeff Garcia to fill their need for a competent backup.

In the preseason, many of the 49ers starters were held out of games in order to keep them healthy for the season. When the season started, the decision was apparent. In Jacksonville, the team was completely off balance and out of rhythm on both sides of the ball. The eventual 41-3 loss was the franchise's worst in nearly 13 years.

Things didn't look better a week later against a miserable Saints team, but San Francisco was able to pick up the pieces enough in the second half to salvage a win against their division rivals.

Things wouldn't get any easier. At first, it seemed like they would, as San Francisco jumped on Jake Plummer and the Cardinals for a 17-0 first-half lead. And then Steve Young found himself on his back with another concussion, his first since 1997, and would remain out of the game for the second half. Up 17 with less than two minutes to play in the half, Mariucci and the 49ers were trying to keep the throttle down and knock the Cardinals out. Instead, as Young dropped back to pass, Lawrence Phillips missed a key block on Aeneas Williams, who hammered Young to end the play. Though termed mild, the blow left Young unconscious for a short period and shook him up emotionally. Though worried, he did try to get back in the game, but the coaches wouldn't let him.

Mariucci's decision to play it "conservatively" in the second half by holding Young out was informed by his decision in 1997 to let Young return against the Buccaneers under somewhat similar circumstances. After Young suffered an injury in that game, Mariucci was not willing to continue to take chances with his quarterback. Similarly, the tragic loss of Young while attempting to play out an aggressive, attacking half may conceivably have affected Mariucci's style of gamecalling from that point forward, as conservative play would become his trademark among fans.

Young wouldn't play the following week, and would ultimately miss the rest of the season and have to retire in order to protect his health in the long term. Jeff Garcia stepped in against Tennessee and led the team ably, defeating the previously undefeated Titans and giving 49er fans a glimmer of hope that the season wasn't lost.

But from that point forward, the wheels came off. The 49ers were decimated by the high-octane Rams the next week, and lost again the week after that (to none other than former coach George Seifert and his Carolina Panthers) to drop to .500. Only two games removed from a victory over one of the league's top teams, it was unclear which version of these Steve Young-less 49ers was the real one. The real answer to that question was not one any fan of the team was ready to accept.

But the 49ers kept on losing. First Jeff George torched the defense for three touchdowns. Then, the Niner defense made Kordell Stewart look like a model of efficiency. Then, the one-win Saints doubled their total, while Billy Joe Tolliver accounted for three scores against a seemingly inept San Francisco defense in a 24-6 romp. Then the Packers. Then the Bengals. And then, with the Falcons coming to town, the 49ers were on the verge of their first 10 loss season since 1980.

On a day that saw Charlie Garner go over 1,000 rushing yards on the season and that was marked by some of the strongest play of the season from recovering defensive star Bryant Young, the 49ers knocked Chris Chandler and the struggling Falcons around pretty much all game. For one week, the 49ers looked like they once did. And for one week, they staved off that tenth loss.

It would only be one week, though, as George Seifert proved that his Panthers had the 49ers' number that year by beating them handily on December 18^th. The 49ers were in the midst of their worst season in almost two decades, and it wasn't getting any better. After losing to Washington in week 16, the 49ers season was finally allowed to end on January 3^rd as - falling behind 31-7 to the Falcons in Atlanta - even their best comeback attempt would come up short.

At long last, the 49ers dynasty had unraveled. With an aging and hurting team, could it possibly be reborn?

Primary References:

http://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/sfo/1999_games.htm
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/oct/18/sports/sp-23718
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/nov/15/sports/sp-33817
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/dec/13/sports/sp-43575
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/dec/19/sports/sp-45612
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/13/sports/sp-9802
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/20/sports/sp-12335
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/28/sports/sp-15061
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/04/sports/nfl-week-4-titans-handed-first-loss.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_NFL_season
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_Phillips

49ers Year-by-Year: 1996

howtheyscored — Fri, 11 Sep 2009 15:00:35 -0000

In this installment of the 49ers Year-by-Year, we take a look at the 1996 season. This is another one of those glorious, punishing seasons. From unbridled hope to injury riddled mess to healthy resurrection to devastating playoff loss, the 49ers took fans on quite the roller coaster in 1996. It was a fun season, but it was also excruciating (especially for the battered and beaten Steve Young). And you can read about it here. Enjoy:

Date:	Opponent:	Score:	Record:	Opponent's Record:
Sept. 1	New Orleans Saints	W: 11-27	1-0	0-1
Sept. 8	St. Louis Rams	W: 0-34	2-0	1-1
Sept. 22	@ Carolina Panthers	L: 7-23	2-1	3-0
Sept. 29	Atlanta Falcons	W: 17-39	3-1	0-4
Oct. 6	@ St. Louis Rams	W: 28-11	4-1	1-5
Oct. 14	@ Green Bay Packers	L: 20-23	4-2	6-1
Oct. 20	Cincinnati Bengals	W: 21-28	5-2	1-6
Oct. 27	@ Houston Oilers	W: 10-9	6-2	5-3
Nov. 3	@ New Orleans Saints	W: 24-17	7-2	2-7
Nov. 10	Dallas Cowboys	L: 20-17	7-3	6-4
Nov. 17	Baltimore Ravens	W: 20-38	8-3	3-8
Nov. 24	@ Washington Redskins	W: 19-16	9-3	8-4
Dec. 2	@ Atlanta Falcons	W: 34-10	10-3	2-11
Dec. 8	Carolina Panthers	L: 30-24	10-4	10-4
Dec. 15	@ Pittsburgh Steelers	W: 25-15	11-4	10-5
Dec. 23	Detroit Lions	W: 14-24	12-4	5-11
Playoffs:
Dec. 29	Philadelphia Eagles	W: 0-14	13-4	10-7
Jan. 4	@ Green Bay Packers	L: 14-35	13-5	14-3

Head Coach: George Seifert

Key Losses: WR John Taylor, C Bart Oates, DE Ricky Jackson, CB Eric Davis

Key Additions: RB Terry Kirby, WR Terrell Owens, G Ray Brown, DE Chris Doleman, DE Roy Barker

The offseason between 1995 and 1996 was an ugly one for the NFL. Though the offseason was marked by only one controversy, it was a huge controversy that inspired a heated media blitz and eventually ended in an intervention by the commissioner. The controversy arose when Cleveland Browns owner Art Modell decided that he wanted to relocate the storied franchise. The Browns had been in the NFL for more than four decades, after making the transition along with the 49ers and the Baltimore Colts from the AAFC in 1950. The reaction from fans was one of complete outrage, and the media picked up on the attitude. Ultimately, the league had to make an agreement with the city of Cleveland that the Browns name, colors, and history would continue to belong to the city, and that the Browns would be replaced one way or another within the next few years.

Coming off of a playoff loss to the Packers, the 49ers went into 1996 looking to reassert their dominance. Despite losing starters John Taylor, Bart Oates, and Ricky Jackson to retirement, not to mention Eric Davis to free agency (signing with the Panthers instead), the 49ers pushed forward aggressively. They went into free agency looking to retool the roster, signing veterans like guard Ray Brown and defensive linemen Chris Doleman and Roy Barker. They made efforts to address the aging defense through the draft, but only managed to land one impact player in wide receiver Terrell Owens. Otherwise, the team still had many of the stalwarts who had made them one of the best teams in the league during head coach George Seifert's entire tenure.

The season started fast with easy victories over the Saints and Rams. However, in the second game, Steve Young suffered a mild groin strain that would continue to nag him over the next few games. In the third game of the season the 49ers played the division rival Carolina Panthers, and both teams were out to make a statement.

Dom Capers team, led by backup quarterback Steve Beuerlein and an aggressive, innovative defensive scheme went for the throat right from the start. Steve Young, hobbled but playing, along with the rest of the 49ers illustrious offense, was stymied by Capers's unpredictable defensive playcalling. The Panthers dominated the game, and established themselves early as a threat to win the division.

After the loss, the 49ers looked to get healthy against a weak stretch of schedule. Steve Young sat out in favor of Elvis Grbac against a struggling Atlanta team that was trying to deal with a suspension to their starting quarterback, Jeff George, and Brent Jones also missed the game. The 49ers won handily before marching into St. Louis and dismantling the Rams in a similar fashion, as Young and Jones continued to rest.

Then, at 4-1, the 49ers traveled to Lambeau Field to take on the Green Bay Packers, in a much awaited rematch of the previous season's critical playoff game. Elvis Grbac again got the start, and even behind their backup quarterback the 49ers jumped out to a 17-6 halftime lead. Jerry Rice caught both touchdown passes, and the 49ers appeared to be in control of the game. Then, in the third quarter, Brett Favre threw a 29 yard strike to the outstretched Don Beebe, who appeared to be touched on the ground by Marquez Pope. But when no whistle blew, Beebe stood up and raced to the endzone for a touchdown. Replays clearly showed Pope's hand on Beebe while the receiver cradled the ball after his diving catch, but without an active replay system the play stood. The ensuing two-point conversion made the score 17-14 in favor of the 49ers.

But the Packers had the momentum, and slowly but surely they played the game into a 20-20 fourth-quarter tie, eventually winning on an overtime field goal. The loss could have been a crushing blow for the 49ers, and it almost seemed like that would be the case.

Steve Young returned the next week against the Bengals, but was removed from the game after continuing to struggle with his groin through the first quarter. Replaced by Grbac, the game got ugly fast. At the end of the first half, Grbac went down with a shoulder injury and, down by 21, Young had to return for the second half. Miraculously, Young managed to put his injury behind him for two quarters, throwing for two touchdowns and eventually running for winning score. The resilient 49ers had secured a victory, but with Young hobbled and Grbac out, they were again battered.

Still, Young would start the next game, against Houston, but after on throw he was knocked to the turf and out of the game with a concussion. Third-string quarterback Jeff Brohm would play the rest of the game, and it would be just enough to secure another victory. But after the ugly effort, one thing was sure: the 49ers would have to get healthy fast if they wanted to continue winning.

Steve Young did return, again, the next week as the 49ers coasted to a win against the Saints in a warm up for their matchup against their long-time rivals, the Dallas Cowboys. With the 49ers battling for a division title, the game would undoubtedly have playoff implications. The 49ers jumped out to an early lead, but Young suffered his second concussion of the season before the first half was over and had to be removed from the game. Grbac replaced him and was less than stellar. After throwing a key interception late in the game that gave Dallas the chance to come back, the Cowboys did exactly that, eventually winning the game in overtime. After the game, Grbac blamed himself for the loss.

The next day, San Francisco mayor Willie Brown infamously remarked that Grbac was an "embarrassment to humankind." When he later learned that Grbac's mind had been occupied with the recent surgery of his young son and had trouble focusing on the game for that reason, Brown would apologize.

Finally getting healthy again, with Young, Jones, and even an injured William Floyd returning, the 49ers rallied off three consecutive victories before meeting the Panthers for the second time. At 10-3, the 49ers had a chance to virtually secure a division title by defeating the 9-4 Panthers, but Carolina had San Francisco's number that season. In a shootout loss, perhaps the most painful moment came when former 49er Eric Davis made a key interception in the fourth quarter that gave the Panthers the momentum they needed to win the game.

The 49ers won their last two games and tied the Panthers for the season with a 12-4 record, but lost the tiebreaker and, disappointingly, would have to settle for a wild-card berth into the playoffs.

Against Ty Detmer, Ricky Watters, Irving Fryer, Guy McIntyre, Troy Vincent, Brian Dawkins, Don Griffin (a few familiar faces in the bunch) and the rest of the Eagles, the 49ers actually struggled. Philadelphia dominated the game on both sides of the ball only to ultimately be held out of the endzone time and time again by the 49ers determined defense. But after knocking Detmer out of the game with a hamstring injury in the first half, the 49ers were able to hang on for a 14-0 victory. However, Philadelphia returned the favor, as Young suffered two broken ribs during the game.

And as if by fate, they were headed back to Green Bay. Young was determined to play and managed to start despite his broken ribs thanks to a combination of courage and painkillers. Unfortunately for the 49ers, he would only last two series before the ribs forced him out of the game. To make matters worse, Bryant Young also had to leave the game early, with an injury to his neck and back. Again hobbled by injury, the 49ers struggled to keep pace with the Packers for most of the game before finally succumbing to Green Bay in the second half. After three consecutive losses to the Packers, it was becoming clear that the Packers were a healthier and stronger team - and that they might even be more talented and better coached.

The 49ers season, again, was ended without a return to the Super Bowl.

Primary References:

http://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/sfo/1996_games.htm
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/05/sports/49ers-lose-young-and-the-game.html
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/21/sports/ailing-young-rallies-49ers-from-a-21-point-deficit.html
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-10-28/sports/sp-58779_1_jeff-brohm
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/11/sports/cowboys-turn-tables-on-49ers-with-comeback.html
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/e/a/1996/12/09/SPORTS16113.dtl&type=printable
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/1996/12/30/SP24667.DTL
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/23/sports/panthers-upset-of-49ers-almost-looks-too-easy.html
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-09-30/sports/sp-49137_1_elvis-grbac
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-10-15/sports/sp-53973_1_green-bay
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_San_Francisco_49ers_season
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-10-07/sports/sp-51419_1_san-francisco-49ers
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_NFL_season
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/11/nyregion/chronicle-690368.html

49ers All-Time Defensive End #2

Fooch — Thu, 03 Sep 2009 20:00:21 -0000

After almost doubling our vote total from last season, Fred Dean has won again, this time with two-thirds of the vote. Although Hardman and Hart had greater career numbers with the 49ers, Fred Dean is definitely one of the truly beloved 49ers. It helped being on the Super Bowl teams as that helped provide him with some serious publicity. We now move on to the #2 defensive end to round out our defensive line.

Cedrick Hardman (1970-1979): I had mentioned Bryant Young was the 49ers all-time sack leader. However, the 49ers home page has included unofficial sacks recorded before 1982, giving us a new leader. Cedrick Hardman finished his career with 112.5 sacks and two Pro Bowl appearances. Even better? He was the first player signed by the Oakland Invaders of newly formed USFL. Unfortunately for Hardman, playing for some pretty bad squads (finishing his career with back-to-back 2-14 teams) has probably damages his Hall of Fame chances. Consider this though, according to Maiocco's book, Hardman had 18 sacks in 1971, a season of 14 games. Not too shabby.

Tommy Hart (1968-1977): Hart teamed with Hardman to form one of the deadliest defensive end combinations in NFL history. The year before Hardman rolled up 18 sacks, Hart had 16 sacks, including six in a Monday night battle with the Rams. Hart was originally cut by the team as a linebacker before packing weight and establishing himself as a monster defensive end. Hart finished his career with 106 sacks.

Dwaine Board (1979-1988): Board was a member of two championship teams and finished his career with 61 sacks. Board was part of a group of teams that rotated the likes of Fred Dean, Board and Michael Carter to create a ton of pressure. Since retiring, Board has been a defensive line coach for the 49ers, the Seahawks, and the Raiders, where he continues as DL coach.

Poll

Who should be our All-Time #2 Defensive End?

Cedrick Hardman

154 votes

Tommy Hart

48 votes

Dwaine Board

90 votes

292 votes | Poll has closed

49ers All-Time Defensive End #1

Fooch — Mon, 31 Aug 2009 20:00:10 -0000

In a not so surprising result, Tom Rathman had an easy victory at fullback over Joe Perry. Plenty of folks are going to be disappointed by that, but as I mentioned in that post, I think the answer is to separate out the all-times by pre-Walsh and Walsh to the present. We'll see how we deal with it next time around. In the meantime, we move back over to the defense. I went with two automatic selections at defensive tackle: Leo Nomellini and Bryant Young.

Thus, we move on to defensive end. The 49ers have put together some fearsome defensive lines in their history and these four represent the best among them. As I mentioned before, there were numerous great defensive ends in 49ers history (Chris Doleman, Jeff Stover, Kevin Fagan, Dennis Brown), but I think these are four of the best. It's still too early in his 49ers career, but will Justin Smith add himself to this illustrious group? He's not a huge sack machine, but he does so many other things well, while still picking up some sacks. He's got a long term deal so maybe he'll make his way onto this.

Fred Dean (1981-1985): Dean the first 6+ years of his career in San Diego, before joining the 49ers in 1981 as they moved towards their first Super Bowl title. Dean had 12 sacks in 11 games his first season with the 49ers, a season that resulted in a Pro Bowl appearance. Two years later Dean made the Pro Bowl again, leading the NFC with 17.5 sacks. After numerous attempts, Dean was elected to the NFL Hall of Fame this year.

Poll

Who should be our All-Time #1 Defensive End?

Cedrick Hardman

86 votes

Tommy Hart

21 votes

Fred Dean

269 votes

Dwaine Board

27 votes

403 votes | Poll has closed

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IId. The McNolan Era (2005-2008)

Florida Danny — Thu, 16 Apr 2009 00:00:14 -0000

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Sorry about the delay in getting this one posted. My computer crashed yesterday because a genius (aka me) let the battery run out, so I had to wait until it fully recharged (aka today) to continue writing up the piece.

Yesterday, in Part 2c of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Donahue regime's picks from 2002-2004 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Donahue's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks, especially when your team sucks.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
I <3 the Pac-10!
BCS or die!

In comparison with the Walsh II and Policy regimes, Donahue didn't make the Policy regime mistake of trading away picks when the team was good (2002), he used Walsh II's strategy of drafting for need on Day 1 when rebuilding, he brought back the Policy regime's affinity for Pac-10 players, and he surpassed both Walsh II and the Policy regime in percentage of picks that came from BCS conferences

In this article, I'll be ending the regime breakdowns with a look at the McNolan era (2005-2008).

After the jump, I'll put the McNolan drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; sum up the regimes; and provide the idiot's guide to McNolan draft strategy...

Here again is the link to my Excel spreadsheet of 49er draft picks in the Salary Cap Era. I realized that some of you probably don't have Excel 2007, so I converted it to be compatible with older versions (and fixed the link in previous posts as well):

49er Draft Picks 1994-2008

IN CONTEXT

In Part 2c, I told you how Donahue didn't hit the home run he needed to with his rebuilding project in the 2004 draft. One additional piece of evidence for this is the fact that, by the very next draft, Donahue's replacements had to rebuild the roster once more through the draft. Therefore, Donahue's 2004 fire sale and draft has to rank among the shortest rebuilding phases of a franchise in the history of sports (and not in a good way). Now, I'm sure you don't need some long-winded description of what the team has done record-wise since 2004, so I'll just get on with the specific needs in each of McNolan's drafts:

2005 Draft - Key Losses: WR Cedrick Wilson (free agency), OL Kyle Kosier (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (career-threatening injury), OL Scott Gragg (free agency), DL John Engelberger (trade), DB Ronnie Heard (free agency), K Todd Peterson (free agency). Weak 2004 Stats: 30^th in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA; 19^th in ST DVOA.¹ Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for QB Jeff Garcia, RB Garrison Hearst, WR Terrell Owens, and DB Zack Bronson; major injuries to QB Tim Rattay, LB Andre Carter, DB Ahmed Plummer. Needs: QB, RB, WR, OL, DL, DB, K, LB depth.

2006 Draft - Key Losses: QB Tim Rattay (trade), RB Kevan Barlow (trade), FB Fred Beasley (free agency), WR Brandon Lloyd (trade), WR Johnnie Morton (released), LB Julian Peterson (free agency), LB Andre Carter (free agency), and DB Ahmed Plummer (career-threatening injury). Weak 2005 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Garcia, Hearst, Owens, and Bronson; major injury to TE Eric Johnson. Needs: FB, WR, LB, DB, QB depth, RB depth, TE depth.

2007 Draft - Key Losses: WR Antonio Bryant (released), TE Eric Johnson (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (free agency), and DB Tony Parrish (released). Weak 2006 Stats: 22^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA; 18^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bronson; OL Larry Allen and DL Bryant Young now in their mid-30s. Needs: WR, DB, ST, TE depth, OL depth, DL depth.

2008 Draft - Key Losses: WR Darrell Jackson (free agency), OL Larry Allen (retirement), OL Justin Smiley (free agency), DL Bryant Young (retirement), DL Marques Douglas (free agency), and LB Derek Smith (free agency). Weak 2007 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bryant; major injuries to QB Alex Smith, OL Jonas Jennings, and LB Manny Lawson. Needs: WR, OL, DL, LB, QB depth.

In preparation for its drafts, McNolan has had to deal with about 7 key losses per offseason, which is fewer than Walsh II (8), but more than Donahue (4) and the Policy regime (4). Interestingly, the course of McNolan's tenure has seen a mixture of his 3 predecessors' draft contexts. The 2005 and 2006 offseasons were Walshian, with about 8 key self-induced, salary-cap-caused losses per season that generally involved kicking dead weight to the curb or trading it for draft picks. The 2007 offseason was Donahue-esque, with only 4 key losses and a team feeling good about itself after a promising season. Finally, 2008 was Policy-like in that there were two retirements to deal with. Overall, I'd say the most similar previous context to McNolan's was the Walsh II era.

I know this is totally off-topic, but, Cedrick Wilson may have made the greatest career decision in the history of the NFL by signing with PIT after the 2004 season. If he stays in SF, he's stuck on a 6-win team for the foreseeable future (at least until he roughed up his ex-girlfriend) catching passes from Rattay, Smith, Ken Dorsey, Cody Pickett, Trent Dilfer, Shaun Hill, and Chris Weinke. Instead, he goes to PIT and wins a ring his first season with the team catching passes from Ben Roethlisberger. Seriously, whatever it was that made him leave the Niners, he needs to bottle and sell it. Can you guys think of any other player in recent years who's lucked out like that?

Anyway, back to the regularly scheduled program. For the sake of comparison, here's how McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup in 2005 and 2006:

Morton (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Wilson
Snyder (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Kosier
OL Eric Heitmann (2002 Donahue draft pick) for Newberry
OL Kwame Harris (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Gragg
Douglas (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Engelberger (after moving Young to 3-4 DE)
DB Mike Adams (2003 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Heard
K Joe Nedney (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Todd Peterson
Smith (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Rattay
RB Frank Gore (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Barlow
FB Moran Norris (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Beasley
Bryant (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Lloyd
WR Arnaz Battle (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Morton
Lawson (2006 McNolan draft pick) for Julian Peterson
LB Brandon Moore (2002 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Carter (after moving him to 4-3 ROLB)
DB Shawntae Spencer (2004 Donahue draft pick) for Plummer (after moving him to LCB)

Adding it all up, McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup with 5 traditional free agents, 4 draft picks, and 6 players originally acquired by Donahue. Comparing this to the previous regimes, McNolan used free agency more than Walsh II and Donahue, but less than Policy; and they had a "holdover rate" of 33.3%, which was smack dab in between Walsh II (16.7%) and Donahue (50.0%).

So there's the context. Hopefully you sense a pattern emerging here: the contexts of McNolan drafts have been a cocktail of issues and solutions having the ingredients of each predecessor; 2 ½ parts Walsh II, 1 part Donahue, and ½ part Policy.

PICKS, PICKS, AND MORE PICKS

From 2005-2008, the 49ers made 35 selections in the NFL draft, which nearly equalled the Walsh II and Donahue rate of 9 picks per season. In 2005 and 2006, the main rebuilding years, McNolan stockpiled picks via all those trades I mentioned earlier; just like Walsh II and Donahue. The past 2 drafts, however, McNolan has tended to trade away picks (you're welcome, NE) rather than stockpile them; just like the Policy regime. Once again, the trend here is for McNolan to be a mixture of all 3 predecessor's strengths and weaknesses.

In terms of McNolan's overall Pro Bowl rate, a Donahue-esque and Walshian 5.7% of its picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers (Gore and LB Patrick Willis). However, its starter rate of 34.3% - which includes OL Chilo Rachal's midseason and DB Dashon Goldson's offseason ascensions - is the worst of the 4 regimes (Policy regime = 41.4%; Walsh II = 48.1%; Donahue = 48.1%). When you remember the differences in context between regimes, you realize that McNolan has been way worse at picking starters than the context-similar Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse than the context-different Policy regime, whose superior teams made it harder for draft picks to crack the starting lineup (i.e., the Policy regime's starter rate is artificially low due to context).

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has continued the Walsh II and Donahue standard of 9 draft picks per season.
McNolan has stockpiled picks when the team sucked, and traded away picks when (they thought) the team was good.
McNolan has been as bad at picking Pro Bowlers as the "unlikely to have Pro Bowlers because the team sucked" Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse at picking starters than the "unlikely to have draft selections start because the team was good" Policy regime.
Overall, McNolan seems to be channeling the good and bad of its 3 predecessors.

DAY ‘N' NIGHT

McNolan has taken exactly 40% of its picks on Day 1 of the draft, and 60% on Day 2. That's almost identical to Walsh II's 41/59 split, which, as I said in Part 2c, was smack dab between the Policy (52/48) and Donahue (33/67) regimes.

Looking at the relative success of its picks by draft day, we find that 64.3% of McNolan's Day 1 picks have become 49er starters, which is, again, right in the middle of the 4 regimes; not as good as Walsh II's (81.8%, which I incorrectly reported as 64.3% in Part 2b), but basically on par with the Policy regime's (60.0%) and Donahue's (55.6%). Remember, though that Walsh II and Donahue are the better comparisons in terms of team context. On Day 2, an abysmal 14.3% of McNolan picks have become 49er starters, easily the worst of the 4 regimes (again, even worse than the starter-unlikely Policy regime). So while McNolan has had pretty standard success on Day 1 in terms of starters, it's been horrible at picking Day 2 starters.

The best example of this dichotomy between Day 1 and Day 2 results is McNolan's initial rebuilding draft in 2005. Here it is:

Rd	Player	Pos	Starter?	Pro Bowl?
1	Alex Smith	QB	Yes	No
2	David Baas	OL	Yes	No
3	Frank Gore	RB	Yes	Yes
3	Adam Snyder	OL	Yes	No
5	Ronald Fields	DL	No	No
5	Rasheed Marshall	WR	No	No
6	Derrick Johnson	DB	No	No
7	Daven Holly	DB	No	No
7	Marcus Maxwell	WR	No	No
7	Patrick Estes	TE	No	No
7	Billy Bajema	TE	Yes	No

Day 1? 4 picks, 4 starters, 1 Pro Bowler. Day 2? 7 picks, 1 starter, 0 Pro Bowlers. Enough said.

With regard to Pro Bowlers, however, the preferred drink is once again "Regime Cocktail." On Day 1, 14.3% of McNolan's picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers, which is slightly worse than the Pro-Bowl-likely Policy regime (20.0%), considerably better than Donahue (0.0%), and slightly better than Walsh II (9.1%). OK, correction: McNolan drinks Regime Cocktail only on Day 1. That's because, it has yet to pick a Day 2 Pro Bowler. Of course, it's not like the other two Pro-Bowl-unlikely regimes (Walsh II = 6.3%; Donahue = 5.3%) were much better at it.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has had a Walshian 40/60 split of picks between Day 1 and Day 2.
McNolan has been worse than Walsh II, but better than Donahue, at picking Day 1 starters.
McNolan has been far less successful than the other 3 regimes at picking Day 2 starters.
McNolan has been more successful than Walsh II and Donahue at picking Day 1 Pro Bowlers, but slightly worse than these two regimes at picking Day 2 Pro Bowlers.

ASSUME THE POSITION

Here's how McNolan has used its 35 picks by position, unit, and draft day:

Pos	Day 1	Day 2	Total
QB	1	0	1
RB	1	1	2
FB	0	0	0
WR	2	5	7
TE	1	2	3
OL	4	1	5
DL	2	5	7
LB	2	1	3
DB	1	6	7
K	0	0	0
P	0	0	0
OFF Total	9	9	18
DEF Total	5	12	17
ST Total	0	0	0
Total	14	21	35

Overall, McNolan has basically split their picks up evenly between units, which is more similar to what the Policy regime and Donahue did than Walsh II's need-induced DEF preference. Also, like Walsh, McNolan hasn't taken any ST players in the draft. Of course, that may have something to do with having Nedney and ROBO-PUNTER on the roster. What's most interesting here, however, is that, although OFF has received equal attention on Days 1 and 2, 70.6% of McNolan's DEF picks have come on Day 2.

The even split of OFF picks between draft days is a little misleading because McNolan was actually Walshian in 2005 and 2006 when it had to replace most of the OFF. Going back to that 2005 draft that I showed earlier, you'll notice that all 4 Day 1 picks were on OFF. This continued in 2006 when they selected TE Vernon Davis in the 1^st round after Johnson suffered a major injury the previous season. Essentially, McNolan followed the Walsh II example of spending Day 1 of rebuilding drafts addressing the most glaring positional needs. This is really eye-opening when you consider that Scot McCloughan claims to be a devout believer in "best player available." Is he full of sh*t or is the focus on need in Day 1 of the 2005 and 2006 drafts just a coincidence? I'll leave you to decide.

DEF, however, is a different animal altogether. From the table, it's clear that the draft day disparity on DEF has been due to an inordinate amount of Day 2 picks being spent on DLs and DBs. The 5 Day 2 DLs were, in order of selection, Ronald Fields, Parys Haralson, Melvin Oliver, Jay Moore, and Joe Cohen; the 6 Day 2 DBs were Derrick Johnson, Daven Holly, Marcus Hudson, Vickiel Vaughn, Goldson, and Tarell Brown. Looking at these lists, you could say that McNolan has gotten worse over time picking Day 2 DLs, whereas it's gotten better over time picking Day 2 DBs. Either way, aside from Haralson and Goldson, that's a pretty mediocre-at-best bunch. So, if you want to know why the DEF has sucked for so long (before Singletary pulled their heads out of their asses), look no further than McNolan mostly waiting until Day 2 to pick DEF players. Couple this with McNolan's aforementioned horrible starter rate on Day 2, and you get one wet, stinking heap of also-ran-ity.

With 71.4% of picks taken on Day 2, WR is another position at which McNolan has focused little Day 1 attention. The two Day 1 WRs were Brandon Williams and Jason Hill, both 3^rd-rounders.

Hopefully, you're starting to see a trend here. McNolan gets credit for using Walsh II's "pick for need on Day 1" and "bites at the apple" strategies. However, it's made the mistake of waiting until Day 2 to take most of their bites at DL, DB, and WR. Perhaps, then, one reason why the Niners haven't been able to get over the mediocre 7-9 hump since 2005 is because their WR, DL, and DB corps are populated with Day 2 picks.

To drive it home, here's one last point about McNolan's (lack of) success wtith DEF picks. On OFF, McNolan's starter rate (44.4%) has been similar to that of the Policy regime (43.8%), Walsh II (50.0%), and Donahue (46.2%). However, the DEF starter rates for the previous 3 regimes were 47.1% for Walsh II, 41.7% for Donahue, and 33.3% for the Policy regime. McNolan's? 23.5%!

All is not lost, however. Unlike Donahue, McNolan seems to have actually learned something about positional picks as its tenure has progressed. Namely, 2 of their 3 picks in 2008 were DEF players. Whether or not DL Kentwan Balmer and DB Reggie Smith pan out in the long run, at least McNolan seems to have noticed that their previous Day 1 picks on DEF have become integral parts of the starting unit. Don't believe me? Here they are: Lawson, Willis, and DL Ray McDonald. So, their results - 2 starters, 1 Pro Bowler, and an emerging pass-rush specialist - were not shabby at all. This suggests that (a) when McNolan commits Day 1 resources to DEF, it's been pretty successful; and (b) the regime seems to have figured this out. So, at the very least, kudos to them for that.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Walsh II, McNolan has focused its Day 1 picks on the most glaring positional needs (when it had to).
McNolan has employed Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy at WR, DL, and DB. However, they've primarily waited until Day 2 to take their bites.
Given their propensity for waiting until Day 2 for DEF picks, it's not surprising that McNolan has been horrible at drafting DEF starters.
Based on 2008, McNolan seems to have learned from their "wait until Day 2 for DEF" mistake.

CONFERENCE ROOM

So far, I've basically told a story about how the McNolan regime's drafts have been a little bit Walsh II, a little bit Donahue, and a little bit Policy; how they've used the good strategies as well as the bad. Basically, not too hot, not too cold; I'll call it "Goldilocks" if you will. The conference breakdown is where that tale ends. There's one regime's lead in particular that McNolan has been happy to follow, and I'm sure you'll easily be able to figure it out. Here's how McNolan's 35 picks shake out by conference: 7 ACC picks, 7 SEC picks, 6 Big 12 picks, 6 Pac-10 picks, 4 Big 10 picks, 1 Big East pick, 1 Conference USA pick, 1 MAC pick, 1 MAII pick, and 1 MWC pick.

BCS anyone? McNolan has taken a Donahue-esque 88.6% of its picks from BCS conferences. I already detailed in Part 2c what I think of this strategy, so you know by now that I don't like it. Now, Scot McCloughan has argued that he takes BCS players because they're (a) less affected by big crowds, (b) more prepared for the NFL, and (c) better team leaders. While all of these may be true in a general sense, the draft isn't about generalities. It's about identifying and acquiring specific talented players. I'm sorry, but when you limit your available talent pool to 6 or 7 college football conferences, you're going to miss the "diamonds in the rough" that teams need to sustain success. Also, McCloughan has made it seem like picking players from BCS conferences is only a Day 1 strategy. The stats say the opposite though: A higher percentage of McNolan's Day 2 picks have come from BCS conferences (90.5%) than have its Day 2 picks (88.6%). Oh, and did I mention that McNolan's first pick ever was a QB from a non-BCS conference (Smith), and that they traded up in 2007 to take an OL from a non-BCS conference (Joe Staley)? That's 2 of McNolan's 4 non-BCS picks being taken with 1^st-round picks. Again, is he BSing us here or is this some kind of smokescreen? It's pretty interesting how a general BCS guy like McCloughan can fall in love so much with specific non-BCS players.

And now, I present a second way in which McNolan's conference preferences are similar to Donahue's: They suck just as bad at picking BCS players despite being so BCS-reliant. Wait, let me correct that. They suck even worse. Here's the evidence:

McNolan
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	10	2	12
No	21	2	23
Total	31	4	35

Donahue
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	12	1	13
No	13	1	14
Total	25	2	27

You'll recall from Part 2c that Donahue's BCS starter rate (48.0%) was worse than Walsh II's (62.5%) even though Donahue was much more BCS-heavy with his picks. Well, even Donahue's sorry BCS starter rate makes him look like a draft maven when compared to McNolan's. That's because, as the table shows, only 32.3% of McNolan's BCS picks have become regular 49er starters! As I said in Part 2c, if you're going to be limiting your talent pool so drastically, you better be good at evaluating the talent you don't ignore. Clearly, McNolan has not been good in this regard, and has been even worse than the guy for which I invented the argument.

Now, I argued in Part 2c that Donahue's preference for BCS players and lack of success in actually picking good ones was borne out of his dispositional laziness and inattention to draft detail. With respect to McNolan, however, I'm sure this hasn't been the case. To its credit, the McNolan regime has been almost pathologically engaged in draft preparation. After all, they coached the Senior Bowl 3 straight seasons, Scot McLoughan was Director of College Scouting for the Seahawks, and Scot's brother, David, now serves in the same capacity for the 49ers. So I'm kind of perplexed as to why, given their affinity for evaluating college talent, McNolan has shied away from non-BCS players. One might argue that it's because of the Alex Smith experience. However, as has been noted, McLoughan remains a big Smith supporter. So what gives here? Please help.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Donahue, almost every player McNolan has drafted has been from a BCS conference.
Despite its BCS-lust, the McNolan regime has had an even worse BCS starter rate than Donahue.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

As I've alluded to throughout this article, the McNolan drafts can be described by one word: Goldilocks. In other words, their porridge hasn't been too hot and it hasn't been too cold; just lukewarm. Here's the evidence:

McNolan's draft contexts have been a mixture of its 3 predecessors' contexts.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's "draft vs. free agency" bias.
McNolan's stockpiled picks in rebuilding drafts ala Walsh II, but also traded away picks in "we feel good about ourselves right now" drafts ala the Policy regime.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's Day1/Day 2 split.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of Day 1 starter and Pro Bowl rate.
McNolan has evenly split their picks between OFF and DEF overall.
McNolan's used Walsh's "bites at the apple" strategy, but only on Day 2.
McNolan's been on par with previous regimes in terms of picking OFF starters.
Though it's made Donahue-esque draft strategy errors, McNolan's either learned from those mistakes or has a more valid reason for why they've made them.

All in all, it sure seems like the McNolan regime has been a mixture of the good and bad of the 3 previous 49er regimes. They rebuilt like Walsh II in 2005 and 2006, but they sat on their laurels like Donahue and the Policy regime in 2007. They draft for need on Day 1 like Walsh II, but, like Donahue, only when they have to. They take a lot of bites at the apple like Walsh, but they wait until Day 2 to do it. You get the picture.

To me, understanding the Goldilocks nature of McNolan drafts helps explain why the 49ers have been stuck in "no better than 7-9" mode for the past 3 seasons. If you draft a propensity of mediocre players, or if you have a bunch of mediocre drafts, you're going to find yourself having a mediocre team. Here, another word comes to mind that has been used - with great comic effect - to describe McNolan: vanilla.

In evaluating the 4 Niner regimes since 1994, something has become very clear to me; something that I didn't fully realize until I got to McNolan. Bill Walsh was the only 49er GM in the past 15 years who went out and tried to be great in the draft. He's the only one who tried to bat 1.000 every time he stepped to the plate. The Policy regime was content to sustain success through free agency, Donahue was content to ride the coattails of Walsh II's drafts, and McNolan has been content to only be great on Day 1. Is it any wonder then that the Walsh II regime was the only one that had an upward win trajectory? Is it a coincidence that Walsh was the only GM to leave the 49ers better off than when he arrived? I mean, the 49ers regressed under the Policy regime and Donahue, and they've stagnated in 7-9 territory under McNolan. After reading my regime breakdowns, do you have any doubt that one important reason for this is because Walsh II's draft strategy differed so drastically from that of McNolan, Donahue, and the Policy regime? In re McNolan, do you think that the "hybrid" defense, not giving Hill the QB job outright, and not firing Nolan after 2007 can be described by any other word except "vanilla?"

Whether it's McSingle nee McNolan or someone else, until the person/people in charge of running the 49ers' drafts stop placing artificial constraints on themselves, and start trying to be great with every pick- by whatever means necessary - I fear the Niners are going to wallow in mediocrity.

Here's a perfect example of what I mean. The Niners need a pass rusher right now more than anything. Go out and draft the best damned pass rusher. If the consensus best pass rusher isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the pass rusher you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the Calfornia Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK pass rusher and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

Another example. Right now, you have an arguable draft bust, a good but ragged-armed journeyman, and a player KC didn't even want as your QBs. Go out and draft the best damned QB. Do whatever it takes. If the consensus best QB isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the QB you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the California Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK QB and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

You know what team drafts like this? The New England Patriots. But that's Part 3, so you'll have to wait until tomorrow to hear the details. For now, here's the idiot's guide to the McNolan regime's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks, but trade away picks when (you think) your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Use Day 2 to take a lot of bites at the apple.
BCS or die!
We're Goldilocks (aka Vanilla McNolan).

So, based on this strategy, as well as some specific draft history trends that you can find in my Excel spreadsheet, here's what (and what not) to expect from the 49ers in the 2009 draft:

Don't expect them to take more than 1 player from a non-BCS conference.
Don't expect them to take a pass rusher, QB, or WR at #10.
Don't expect them to take a RB on Day 1.
Expect them to take a WR or two on Day 2.
Expect them to take an OL on Day 1.
Expect more DEF picks (esp. DLs and DBs) on Day 2 than Day 1.
Don't expect them to take a FB, K, or P.

Remember, this is what I expect them to do or not do based on their history. If they end up going against tendency, it's not because the tendencies were wrongly identified. It's because they did something that was unexpected given their history. And there's no harm in that. It's actually worked once or twice (See Willis, Patrick).

That's it for now. Tomorrow, I'll compare the overall 49er draft strategy since 1994, which I identified in Part 1, to that of the Patriots. TO BE CONTINUED...

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

How much blame would you assign McNolan's drafts for the 49ers continuously being unable to take that next step in recent seasons?

All of the blame

37 votes

Most of the blame

83 votes

Some of the blame

103 votes

None of the blame

9 votes

232 votes | Poll has closed

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IIb. The Walsh II Era (1999-2001)

Florida Danny — Mon, 13 Apr 2009 18:00:12 -0000

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Happy belated Easter everyone. Sorry for the delay on getting this one posted, but there's just a ridiculous amount of info to sift through. Hopefully the article's worth the wait. Also, just wanted to let you know that I'll be posting my review of the Donahue Era drafts later today.

In Part 2a of my 49er draft history review, I broke down the Policy regime's picks from 1994-1998 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of the Policy regime's draft strategy:

Draft picks are commodities best used for moving up in the draft.
Once you've addressed positional needs in free agency, there's no need to focus on them in the draft.
Dominate the neighborhood (i.e., take Pac-10 players and those near Youngstown, OH).
There's plenty of talent outside the BCS conferences, but wait until Day 2 to acquire it.

As I said at the end of Part 2a, the Policy regime's use of draft picks can be considered a form of negligence. Despite having glaring needs at RB, OL, and DB that were brought on by aging starters, retirements, and free agent defections, they chose to trade away a lot of picks and use the remaining ones on "wants" rather than "needs." To me, this was an insanity that didn't end until Bill Walsh returned to the organization in time to run the 1999 draft.

To say that draft strategy changed under Walsh would be an understatement. Today, I'll detail why.

After the jump, I'll put the Walsh drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; and provide the idiot's guide to Walsh draft strategy...

Here again is the link to my Excel spreadsheet of 49er draft picks in the Salary Cap Era:

49er Draft Picks 1994-2008

IN CONTEXT

On this Easter holiday, I think it's fitting to be discussing the Walsh II Era (1999-2001), which can accurately be called "The Resurrection." The dynasty died in 1998, and three days (ok, years) later it was born again thanks to the second coming of Bill Walsh: the Niners went from 4 wins in 1999 to 6 wins in 2000 to 12 wins in 2001. To fans, this seemed like a familiar tale, what with the similar progression that took place during Walsh's previous 49er messiah incarnation (2 wins in 1979; 6 wins in 1980; 13 wins in 1981). Put in that context, the 49er drafts from 1999-2001 have to be labeled a success, right? Well, stay tuned. First, here's more contextual detail:

1999 Draft - Key Losses: RB Garrison Hearst (career-threatening injury), FB Marc Edwards (trade), OL Kevin Gogan (trade), OL Kirk Scrafford (retirement), DL Roy Barker (trade), DL Chris Doleman (retirement), DB Merton Hanks (free agency). Weak 1998 Stats: Dropped from 1^st to 15^th in DEF DVOA; 26^th in ST DVOA.¹ Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found a worthy replacement for TE Brent Jones or CB Rod Woodson; major injury to DL Bryant Young; starting QB Steve Young, WR Jerry Rice, and OL Ray Brown all over 35 years old. Needs: RB, FB, TE, OL, DL, DB, ST, QB depth, WR depth, OL depth.

2000 Draft - Key Losses: Steve Young (retirement), OL Chris Dalman (retirement), DL Gabe Wilkins (released), LB Lee Woodall (free agency), DB Darnell Walker (free agency), DB Mark McMillan (free agency), DB Tim McDonald (retirement). Weak 1999Stats: 18^th in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA; 31^st in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found a worthy replacement for Jones, Barker, Doleman, Woodson or CB Marquez Pope; Rice and Brown were now 37 years old. Needs: TE, DL, LB, DB, ST, QB depth, WR depth, OL depth.

2001 Draft - Key Losses: RB Charlie Garner (free agency), Rice (free agency), TE Greg Clark (released), DL Anthony Pleasant (free agency), DL Brenston Buckner (free agency), DL Junior Bryant (career-threatening injury); LB Jeff Posey (free agency), LB Ken Norton (retirement), LB Winfred Tubbs (released), and K Wade Richey (free agency). Weak 2000 Stats: 28^th in DEF DVOA; 22^nd in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found a worthy replacement for Jones and Barker; Brown was now 38 years old. Needs: RB, TE, DL, LB, K, ST, WR depth, OL depth.

In terms of specific needs, DEF and ST were definitely the priority given the stats and player departures. However, taking a broader perspective on these draft needs, you notice that, as compared to the Policy Era, there were a lot more of them. Beginning with Policy's last draft and continuing through the Walsh regime, the 49ers needed players at every position. Indeed, in comparison with the 19 key offseason losses from 1994-1998 - or about 4 per offseason - there were 24 key offseason losses from 1999-2001 - or 8 per season. Essentially, Walsh was tasked with cleaning up after Policy's free agent extravaganza and draft neglect, and therefore spent most of his 2^nd stay in SF separating the wheat from the chaff on the 49ers' roster, whether through cutting players, letting them walk in free agency, "gently" forcing them into retirement, or trading them for draft picks.

Another thing you notice from 1999-2001 is the return of Walsh's signature move: unceremoniously showing old-timers the door at their first sign of performance deterioration. What Joe Montana, Ronnie Lott, and others experienced during Walsh's first go-round in SF, Steve Young and Rice experienced during his second. Remember, both Young and Rice wanted to continue playing even though everyone (except them) knew that they were a shadow of their former self (in Rice's case) or couldn't stay healthy anymore (in Young's case).

OK, so we know that Walsh II (correctly) got rid of a lot of players. But how did he acquire their replacements? Well, of the departed players I listed above (and there were a lot of them), here's how they were replaced via traditional free agency:

Garner replaced Hearst
Wilkins replaced Doleman
OL Scott Gragg replaced Dalman (after moving OL Jeremy Newberry permanently to C)
DL Dana Stubblefield replaced Buckner
LB Derek Smith replaced Norton
K Jose Cortez replaced Richey

Now, before you assume that the other 18 were all replaced with Walsh II draft picks, here are 4 other starters who were replaced during Walsh II's tenure with free agents originally signed by Policy:

OL Dave Fiore (undrafted free agent) replaced Scrafford
Posey (undrafted free agent) replaced Barker and Woodall (after being moved to LB)
DB Zack Bronson (undrafted free agent) replaced Hanks
Buckner replaced Bryant

And finally, here is 1 replacement that Walsh II made by signing an undrafted free agent:

QB Jeff Garcia replaced Young

Let's digest that for a moment. Out of 24 starters that left the team during the offseason of each draft, Walsh II only replaced 6 of them with free agents from other teams. How's that for doing a 180 from the Policy regime's ...um...policy?

So there's the context. In preparation for his drafts, Walsh II had to deal with a ton of holes on both sides of the ball - but especially on DEF and ST - not a lot of help from Policy Era free agent holdovers, and no room under the salary cap to sign his own free agents. Solution? The draft of course.

PICKS, PICKS, AND MORE PICKS

From 1999-2001, the 49ers made 27 selections in the NFL draft, which works out to 9 picks per season. In comparison to the previous regime, Walsh II had nearly as many picks in 3 drafts as the Policy regime did in 5. Given that each team is allotted 1 pick for each of the draft's 7 rounds, this difference means that Walsh II had 6 more picks than he was supposed to, whereas Policy had 6 less. Why? The aforementioned context.

With respect to Walsh II's and the Policy regime's starter and Pro Bowl rate, conclusions again require context. Specifically, Walsh's starter rate was 48.1%, whereas the Policy regime's was 41.4%. Taking into account the fact that it was just a tad bit tougher for a player to start on those stellar teams from 1994-1998 than it has been since 1999, it's more accurate of a comparison if we count only those Policy regime picks that initially became starters during the Policy regime (i.e., when the team was good). Making this adjustment, the Policy regime's starter rate drops to 31.0%. So the question becomes, "Is the difference between 48.1% (Walsh II's starter rate) and 31.0% (the Policy regime's adjusted starter rate) bigger than or smaller than the difference in how good the teams were?" In other words, "How much of that 17.1% difference in starter rates is due to Walsh being a better drafter, and how much is due simply to the fact that it was easier to start after 1998?"

Well, one unbelievable crude way to answer this is by comparing the Niners' winning percentage from 1994-1998 to that of the 5 seasons afterwards as a measure of the difference between how good the teams were during those eras. From 1994-1998, the 49ers had a 76.3% winning percentage, whereas they've had a 40.0% winning percentage since 1998. Therefore, using this crude measurement, the Niners were 36.3% better from 1994-1998. Applying this to our question (and again, this is unbelievably unsophisticated statistically speaking) it was something like 36.3% easier for a draft pick to start after 1998 than it was from 1994-1998. Based on this difference, you might conclude that the 17.1% difference in starter rates for Walsh II and the Policy regime is more than made up for by the fact that it was harder for players to start during the Policy years. Nevertheless, as I don't by any means think we're using top-notch statistical methodology here, I'd just conservatively say that Walsh II wasn't necessarily better at drafting starters even though his starter rate was higher.

The same analysis can be done with Pro Bowl rate. 20.7% of the Policy regime's picks became 49er Pro Bowlers, and that adjusts down to 10.4% when you consider only those draft picks that made the Pro Bowl from 1994-1998. Walsh's Pro Bowl rate, in contrast, was 7.4%. Given that better teams get more players chosen to the Pro Bowl, we can crudely applying the winning percentage stats above as measure of "how easy it was to make the Pro Bowl." Doing so, you might conclude that the 3.0% or so difference in Pro Bowl rate was more than made up for by the fact that it was harder to make the Pro Bowl after 1998. Again, though, I'd just conclude that Policy wasn't necessarily better at drafting Pro Bowlers even though his Pro Bowl rate was higher.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Walsh had 27 picks in 3 drafts, an amount nearly equal to what the Policy regime had in 5 drafts.
After you account for differences in context, Walsh II and the Policy regime were pretty much equals when it came to drafting 49er starters and Pro Bowlers.

DAY ‘N' NIGHT

Based on what I said in the last section, one might be tempted to guess that Policy subtracted picks by trading up in the draft, whereas Walsh II added picks by trading down. Surprisingly, though, this wasn't actually the case. Of the Policy regime's 29 picks, 51.9% of them were on Day 1, whereas a nearly identical 51.7% of Walsh II's picks were on Day 1.

Looking at the relative success of their Day 1 and Day 2 picks, we find that Walsh II (64.3%) and the Policy regime (60.0%) were pretty much equally effective at finding starters on Day 1, whereas Walsh II (30.8%) was slightly better than the Policy regime (21.4%) on Day 2. With respect to Pro Bowlers, Walsh II (Day 1 = 9.1%; Day 2 = 6.3%) was considerably worse than the Policy regime (Day 1 = 20.0%; Day 2 = 21.4%). However, once again, we run into that pesky context problem here: Walsh's acumen for finding starters on Day 2 might have been because it was easier for a Day 2 pick to crack the starting lineup after 1998, and the Policy regime's acumen for finding Pro Bowlers on both draft days might have been because it was easier for any 49er in general to make the Pro Bowl before 1999.

However, all is not lost. One way we can avoid the above-applied statistical gymnastics is by examining differences within each regime in starter and Pro Bowl draft picks. In other words, instead of comparing, for instance, Day 1 success of Walsh drafts to Day 1 success of Policy regime drafts, we can compare, for instance, Day 1 success of Walsh drafts to Day 2 success of Walsh drafts, because, if one regime was better than the other, that superiority is likely to cut across draft days regardless of the "team goodness" context in which the picks were made.

Doing this within regime comparison, the stats say, once and for all, that the two regimes didn't differ that much: the Policy regime picked 75.0% of their drafted starters on Day 1 and 25.0% on Day 2, whereas Walsh II picked 69.2% on Day 1 and 30.8% on Day 2. In terms of Pro Bowlers, the stats say the same: both regimes had a 50/50 split of Pro Bowlers between draft days. In other words, keeping the pick context constant (i.e., looking at success within regimes), both regimes picked 3 times as many starters, and an equal percentage of Pro Bowlers, on Day 1 as they did on Day 2. If either regime were objectively better at drafting, whether overall or by round, the difference would have shown up in this within-regime comparison (e.g., if Walsh had a 5-to-1 Day 1/Day 2 ratio for starters, whereas the Policy regime only had a 2-to-1 Day 1/Day 2 starter ratio, then Walsh would be an objectively better Day 1 drafter). So, any way we look at it, we can't really conclude that one draft regime was more successful than the other with respect to starters and Pro Bowlers.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Although Walsh II made a lot of trades to acquire draft picks, he still ended up with an even spread between Day 1 and Day 2.
When you control for context, Walsh II and the Policy regime drafted similar percentages of their total number of starters and Pro Bowlers on a given draft day, aka they're equals.

ASSUME THE POSITION

One conclusion we can make about differences between the two draft regimes has to do with the positions on which they focused their Day 1 and Day 2 picks. On Day 1, Walsh II used 81.8% of his picks on DEF, whereas the Policy regime used 60.0% of their picks on OFF. In raw terms, Walsh II used only 2 of his Day 1 picks on OFF. Can you name them? If you said QB Giovanni Carmazzi and RB Kevan Barlow, you win the no-prize. The point of this, though, is not to give a pop quiz or remind you of an epic draft fail like Gio. Rather, it's to show that Walsh II actually made picks according to need. The Niners' needs were predominately on DEF, and he spent practically all of Day 1 for 3 consecutive drafts picking DEF players. Contrast this with the Policy regime, who basically gave the Italian salute to their positional needs.

Yeah, about those positional needs. Here's what Walsh II did with his 27 picks from 1999-2001: he used 17 on DEF, 10 on OFF, and 0 on ST. By position, he took 6 DLs, 6 DBs, 5 LBs, 3 RBs, 2 QBs, 2 WRs, and 1 OL. Relating these numbers back to team needs, TE Eric Johnson replaced Clark, DL John Engelberger replaced Doleman, DL Andre Carter replaced Pleasant, LB Julian Peterson replaced Posey, LB Jeff Ulbrich replaced Tubbs, DB Ahmed Plummer replaced Walker, and DB Jason Webster replaced McMillan. The obvious thing to notice here is that Walsh II drafted over half of the starting defense that went 12-4 in 2001, but only 1 starter on offense. Again, context is everything here: if you need to rebuild a defense, then actually rebuild it; don't instead go taking players at "want" positions ala the Policy regime.

Speaking of success, here's how Walsh II and the Policy regime compared with respect to drafting starters at "need" positions:

Policy
Starter?	RB	OL	DB	Total
Yes	0	1	2	3
No	1	3	1	5
Total	1	4	3	8

Walsh II
Starter?	DL	LB	DB	Total
Yes	3	3	2	8
No	3	2	4	9
Total	6	5	6	17

On the surface, these tables again suggest that Walsh II (47.1%) and the Policy regime (37.5%) were equals when it came to drafting starters. However, what's important here are not the percentages, but the totals. Walsh drafted over twice as many players at need positions, and, low and behold, drafted over twice as many starters at those positions. This is another example of that "bites of the apple" argument I've made previously.

And just to drive the point home, here's a look at Day 1 of Walsh II's 2000 draft:

Rd	Player	Pos	Starter?	Pro Bowl?
1	Julian Peterson	LB	Yes	Yes
1	Ahmed Plummer	DB	Yes	No
2	John Engelberger	DL	Yes	No
2	Jason Webster	DB	Yes	No
3	Giovanni Carmazzi	QB	No	No
3	Jeff Ulbrich	LB	Yes	No

How's that for addressing positional needs on Day 1? Out of 5 DEF picks, Walsh II batted 1.000, picking 5 starters: 2 at LB, 2 at DB, and 1 at DL. That's practically half of the starting DEF on the 12-4 2001 team right there. Sure, he screwed up his lone OFF Day 1 pick, but he had Garcia entrenched as the QB starter at that time. Therefore, Gio was more of a "want" pick (i.e., for depth) in the grand scheme of things. Besides, when you hit on 5 players at need positions, who cares that you missed on 1 player at a "want" position? After all, no one (not even Walsh) is perfect.

Herein lies the main lesson when comparing Walsh II's drafts with those of the Policy regime: focus your Day 1 picks on need positions. Taking more bites at the apple softens the blow when you miss. I mean, who can look at that Day 1 in 2000 and say, "Taking Gio set the franchise back for years?" In contrast, focusing your Day 1 on players at "want" positions (ala the Policy regime) sets the franchise back doubly when you miss. Not only did you pick a bust; you failed to fill needs in the process. That's why people look back at the Policy regime's 1995 and 1997 drafts and say, "With so few picks to work with, taking JJ Stokes and Jim Druckenmiller set the franchise back for years!"

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Unlike the Policy regime, Walsh II focused his Day 1 picks on the most glaring positional needs.
Walsh drafted twice as many starters, Pro Bowlers, and players overall at need positions as the Policy regime.

CONFERENCE ROOM

Another clear way that Walsh II differed from the Policy regime was related to the conferences from which they drafted their players. Here's how Walsh II's 27 picks shake out by conference: 5 SEC picks, 4 Big 10 picks, 3 Big East picks, 3 WAC picks, 2 Pac-10 picks, 2 Division I Independent picks, 1 Big 12 pick, 1 Atlantic 10 pick, 1 Big Sky pick, 1 Conference USA pick, 1 Ivy League pick, 1 OVC pick, 1 SAC pick, and 1 Southern pick.

A couple of things jump out from this list. First, unlike those of the Policy regime (and the 49ers overall), Walsh II's picks were not, shall we say, homegrown. The Pac-10 was represented by less than 10% of Walsh II's picks, as opposed to the 17% or so of Policy's (and the 49ers' overall) picks. Also, 2 of the top 3 conferences represented in Walsh II picks did not play a majority of their games a hop, skip, and a jump from DeBartolo country (i.e., Youngstown, OH). The second thing that jumps out is actually nothing, literally: the ACC is absent. That's right, Walsh II took 0 players from ACC schools.

Now, where things get really interesting is in the BCS breakdown. As compared to the 75.9% BCS rate of the Policy regime and the 79.7% BCS rate of the 49ers overall, Walsh II used only 59.3% of his picks on players from BCS conferences. In other words, he didn't shy away from taking players from smaller schools. On the contrary, he embraced it.

Walsh II's fondness for taking non-BCS players might suggest that he was particularly adept at it from a results perspective. Interestingly enough, though, the opposite was actually the case. Of his 11 non-BCS picks, only 27.3% became Niner starters, and none made the Pro Bowl. In contrast, 62.5% of his BCS picks became Niner starters, and 12.5% made the Pro Bowl. So Walsh II was actually better at picking BCS players than non-BCS players. Furthermore, when you compare his starter and Pro Bowl rates for BCS and non-BCS players, you find that Walsh II was more successful than the BCS-heavy Policy regime when it came to picking BCS players, but less successful than the non-BCS-phobic Policy regime in terms of picking non-BCS players. So it turns out that, whereas the Policy regime probably should have drafted more non-BCS players, Walsh II probably should have drafted more BCS players.

Walsh II didn't follow the 80% rule of overall 49er draft strategy when it came to positions, which isn't surprising given his overall BCS rate of 59.3%. His preference for non-BCS players was especially evident in his QB and OL picks, positions at which he didn't select a single BCS player. The lone position at which he reached an 80% BCS rate was LB. When combining positional BCS rates by team unit, we find that Walsh II preferred BCS players on DEF (64.7%) more than he did on OFF (50.0%). Of course, this is to be expected given that he took more DEF players overall.

The next question to address is, "When did Walsh II make his non-BCS picks?" Here's a table showing the number of BCS and non-BCS players that he selected on each day of the draft:

BCS?	Day 1	Day 2	Total
Yes	9	7	16
No	2	9	11
Total	11	16	27

Converting these numbers into percentages, 18.2% of Walsh II's Day 1 picks came from non-BCS conferences, whereas 56.3% of his Day 2 picks came from non-BCS conferences. In one sense, this is expected given that a tripling of the non-BCS rate from Day 1 to Day 2 is standard for the 49ers overall in the Salary Cap Era. However, what's most interesting here is that, on Day 2, Walsh actually picked more non-BCS players than BCS players.

So given that Walsh II wasn't that good at picking starters from non-BCS conferences, and that he picked an inordinate amount of non-BCS players on Day 2, you'd expect that his starter rate for Day 2 non-BCS picks was atrocious. The tables below provide the evidence:

BCS Picks
Starter?	Day 1	Day 2	Total
Yes	8	2	10
No	1	5	6
Total	9	7	16

Non-BCS Picks
Starter?	Day 1	Day 2	Total
Yes	1	2	3
No	1	7	8
Total	2	9	11

Based on the second table, we'd conclude that, yes, Walsh II was horrible at taking Day 2 non-BCS players. But, then again, he was almost as bad taking Day 2 BCS players. What's important to recognize, though, is the discrepancy between these Day 2 non-BCS results and his Day 1 BCS results. Namely, he was nearly perfect at picking players from BCS conferences on Day 1, and nearly imperfect (or whatever the polar opposite of perfect is) at picking players from non-BCS conferences on Day 2. Going back to my earlier discussion, the moral here is that we as 49er fans don't care (or even remember) that Walsh II sucked so bad on small-school fliers because (a) he waited until Day 2 to take them, and (b) he hit on so many Day 1 BCS picks.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Walsh II did not have a preference for players from conferences that were close to home.
Walsh II was less inclined than the Policy regime (and the 49ers overall) towards players from BCS conferences.
Walsh II waited until Day 2 to take non-BCS players, and he actually took more non-BCS players than BCS players on Day 2.
Despite having a higher non-BCS rate than the Policy regime, Walsh II was actually less successful with his non-BCS picks.
Despite having a lower BCS rate than the Policy regime, Walsh II was actually more successful with his BCS picks.
Walsh was highly successful on Day 1 BCS picks, and highly unsuccessful with Day 2 non-BCS picks. But, then again, no one cares or even remembers.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

In this article, I've identified a few stark contrasts between the philosophies of Walsh II and the Policy regime as they relate to the draft. First, Walsh II was far more inclined than the Policy regime to take advantage of the draft. It's obviously up for debate whether this was borne out of free will (i.e., because he preferred the draft to free agency) or determinism (i.e., because he was handcuffed by the salary cap). Whatever the reason, it's clear that the context of the situation (i.e., needing to rebuild the roster from scratch) and Walsh's previous experience (i.e., rebuilding the roster through the draft during Walsh I) made the draft more likely than free agency as an organizational focus.

Second, Walsh II's approach to the draft was not bound by geographical proximity or bias toward "big time" college football. Perhaps this was due to previous experiences like the one that resulted in an unheralded, yet highly successful, G.O.A.T. from Mississippi Valley State University. Or perhaps Walsh's approach was based on his desire to always be one step ahead of the competition, even with respect to the mundane details of college scouting. In short, Walsh thought outside the box. When he arrived in 1979, he thought outside the box and revolutionized offensive football. In his second incarnation as 49er savior, he focused on the draft while most other GMs - including his predecessor - were smitten with the advent of free agency.

If I had to come up with one criticism of Walsh II's drafts, it's that - like me in my fantasy football drafts -he was almost too much in love with finding "diamonds in the rough." Even though it might be contrary to the previous paragraph, I think - like my affinity for young, backup RBs behind an old NFL starter (ala Chris Perry ca. 2005) - he might have gone overboard with his affinity for non-BCS players. Given his success with BCS picks, he might have had an even better draft record from 1999-2001 had he chosen a few more of them on Day 2. But, even here, the negatives of a poor success rate with Day 2 non-BCS picks are mitigated by the fact that they were taken on Day 2, because, generally speaking, fans remember the Druckenmillers and Stokes of 49er draft history (i.e., Day 1 carriages that turned into pumpkins) more than we remember the Tyrone Hopsons and Menson Holloways (i.e., Day 2 lumps of coal that never became diamonds).

The final distinction between Walsh II and the Policy regime is also related to draft days, and also plays a major role in how fans look back at their respective drafts. Namely, Walsh II used Day 1 on glaring positional needs (of which there were many), whereas the Policy regime did not. There's a longstanding debate about draft strategy that is basically framed as "need vs. best player available." Some have even entered a third dog into the fight named "best player available at a position of need." Really, though, if you're drafting for need, aren't you going to take the best player available at that position? It kind of renders your draft board useless if not. Anyway, based on the long-term draft results of Walsh II and the Policy regime, I'm thinking that the evidence supports drafting for need. I'm going to get into this more with respect to the McNolan regime vis-à-vis DL Kentwan Balmer, but suffice it to say that Walsh's success on Day 1 of his drafts provides a pretty strong argument in favor of drafting for need, especially in the context of a talent-starved roster.

So, based on everything I've said in this article, here's the idiot's guide to Walsh II regime's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
This is the pros, not college. There's no need to dominate your neighborhood.
Focus Day 2 on non-BCS players because even one diamond in the rough more than makes up for several lumps of coal.

That's it for now. Later today, I'll break down the vomit-inducing Donahue drafts (2002-2004). TO BE CONTINUED...

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

Which of these do you consider the better strategy on Day 1 of the draft?

Drafting the best player available at a need position

146 votes

Drafting the best player available regardless of position

125 votes

271 votes | Poll has closed

Arizona Cardinals at SF 49ers: A Look at the Key Match-Ups (Part Deux)

cgolden — Thu, 04 Sep 2008 12:09:34 -0000

After getting the ball rolling with four key match-ups yesterday, Fooch, at Niners Nation, and myself sit down and look at the final four match-ups facing the Arizona Cardinals and San Francisco 49ers. These were a bit tougher for me but let me know what you think:

Matchup #5: 49ers Defensive front 7 vs. Cardinals OL (rushing)

Fooch: Advantage: 49ers - While the Cardinals performed well in rushing against the 49ers, the 49ers front 7 has been dramatically improved. The addition of Justin Smith at OLB and defensive end gives the team a nasty presence now that Bryant Young is retired. Manny Lawson played in the opener, but was out for the second SF-AZ matchup and he is an integral part of their run defense. Patrick Willis has a full year under his belt and should only improve. The one drawback is that Aubrayo Franklin is consistently getting pushed around at the nose tackle position, making it more difficult for the linebackers to make plays. However, the 49ers will be able to rotate enough guys into the defensive line to cover for that deficiency. While Michael Lewis plays strong safety, he is excellent in the running game and provides some second level support to the linebackers if they miss a tackle.

CG: Advantage: Cardinals - The Cardinals actually ran the ball decently against the Niners last year totaling 257 yards on 62 carries last year just over 4.1 yards per carry, which is better than they did against the rest of the league. They've also worked tirelessly this offseason to improve the running game and are even going to incorporate some zone blocking schemes to better suit Edgerrin James' running style. The Niners run defense took some shots last year and ended up ranking 22nd in the league but they only allowed 3.8 yards per attempt. With the Niners front seven being fresh and the Cardinals offensive line looking solid so far, I'd really like to call this match-up a 'push,' but I won't take the easy way out. I'll give the Cardinals a slight edge with the one-two punch of James and Hightower.

Match-up #6: Cardinals defensive front 7 vs. 49ers OL (rushing)

Fooch: Advantage: 49ers - I will be honest and admit I don't know a whole heck of a lot about the Cardinals. The injuries to the defensive line are certainly not something you want when you're facing a running back like Frank Gore. Gore has slimmed down as he expects to carry a Marshall Faulk type of rushing/receiving role. The 49ers offensive line was a weakness for much of last year, but Gore was still able to surpass 1,100 rushing yards. The line has gotten younger and healthier and while Gore may not reach his 2007 goal of 2,000 yards, he will be the engine of this offense. I'd expect the 2007 offensive line issues to be an anomaly and the 2006 excellence to return.

CG: Advantage: 49ers - The Cardinals defense might have had some faults in 2007 but the front seven was solid against the run. They gave up less than 100 yards per game and finished 9th in league in run defense, but they do have some question marks heading into Sunday. The biggest question mark is at the biggest position in a 3-4 defense, nose tackle. Gabe Watson, last years starter, has already been ruled out for the game and primary backup Alan Branch is questionable at best right now. He hasn't practiced since injuring his ankle in the final preseason game and he'll have to get healthier if he wants to suit up against the Niners. That leaves the nose tackle position to veteran Bryan Robinson, who was signed in the offseason to backup the nose and defensive end positions. He's a consummate professional but he's not a true nose tackle and if he has to play the entire game, he could get pushed around pretty badly by the fourth quarter. If he's the only nose tackle that's available, I'd expect them to go with more four man fronts to try and give him some help. I'd love to take the Cardinals here but there are too many question marks at this point to vote against Frank Gore, who's averaged 4.5 yards per carry against the Cardinals throughout his career.

The final two match-ups after the jump.....

Match-up #7: Cardinals return team vs. 49ers return coverage

Fooch: Advantage: Even - That's a bit of a copout, but after excellent return coverage in 2007, the preseason saw the 49ers give up a long return in 3 of the 4 exhibitions. While that is a pretty small sample size, it certainly created some worries in myself and other 49ers fans. However, one of the key special teamers, Michael Robinson, was out for the first three games after knee surgery. Additionally, Jeff Ulbrich, a special teans standout was starting at inside linebacker for the
preseason. However, Robinson is back and healthy, while Ulbrich may see a decrease in regular playing time due to the addition of Takeo Spikes. Spikes and Ulbrich are splitting the inside linebacker role, which means more special teams time for Ulbrich. Andy Lee set a record for most punts insie the 20 last season but part of that was due to all the time on the field. If he can maintain his net punt average, the 49ers special teams should be fine.

CG: Advantage 49ers - The Niners were pretty good covering kicks in 2007 (22.3 yards per KO return) but they only recorded 4 touch backs all season so Steve Breaston and JJ Arrington will get some chances to make plays. On punts though the Niners' Andy Lee is one of the best and they only allowed 7.6 yards per punt return. This is an interesting match-up because the Cardinals are better returning punts than kickoffs so it's somewhat of a strength on strength duel. Steve Breaston ranked second in league in total return yards in 2007 and he took a punt back for a touchdown. JJ Arrington has looked better returning kicks in the preseason and could see an increased role in that department as Breaston gets integrated into the base offense. Looking at the big picture, I'd have to go with the Niners considering the kicking abilities of Andy Lee and Joe Nedney. Breaston is an above average punt returner but Lee is pretty good at neutralizing return men.

Match-up #8: 49ers return team vs. Cardinals return coverage

Fooch: Advantage: 49ers - After relying on Maurice Hicks and Arnaz Battle, the 49ers signed a dedicated return man in Allen Rossum. Rossum is #2 all-time for combined kick and punt return yards. Of course, that means he's starting to get up there in age, as he's now 32. However, he showed some spark in the preseason with a return for a touchdown. Aside from Rossum, the 49ers are that rare team that will occasionally use a tight end, in their case Delanie Walker. Walker played wide receiver in college and has impressive speed for a converted tight end. The 49ers have had decent return men, but they always seemed to be missing that game-breaker that could change the momentum within a few seconds. Rossum showed a tendency to avoid fair catches and while I like the big-play instinct, it could also lead to turnovers or poor field position. If you can shorten the field by 10 or 20 yards consistently, you're offense will look considerably better.

CG: Advantage: 49ers - The Cardinals had issues bottling up returners last season and so far through four preseason games, they look to have the same problems. Neil Rackers is a very good kick off guy sending 17 kickoffs into the end zone for touch backs in 2007, but when opponents did return kicks they averaged 23.2 yards per return. Their punt coverage was even worse allowing 13.1 yards per return (31st in the league) and it could be even worse this year considering that Dirk Johnson hasn't been all that impressive during training camp or preseason, although he does punt it out of bounds pretty often (which will kill a return game). Allen Rossum doesn't strike much fear any more but he's still somewhat dangerous returning kickoffs. Regardless of who's returning kicks, I can't in good conscious give the Cardinals a 'thumbs-up' in any match-up that involves Neil Rackers and Dirk Johnson.

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Well that's it sports fans. What do you think? Was I too hard on the Cardinals? Any other match-ups that your looking forward to seeing?