SB Nation - Chris Weinke

Kyle Gets Contrary: Why I Don't Like Mike Leach

T Kyle King — Fri, 01 May 2009 01:06:31 -0000

I believe the success of the "Kyle Gets Contrary" series is attested to by the reaction the first two installments have garnered in the blogosphere, so I am moved to go out on a limb in this third installment, in which I part company with the overwhelming majority of college football bloggers. Here goes:

I don’t like Mike Leach.

Oh, I have nothing against him personally; I’ve never met the man, so I cannot comment on his personal character. I have, however, remarked upon the character he plays on the sideline:

I know it’s sacrilege for an active participant in the college football blogosphere to say so, but I don’t particularly care for Mike Leach. I respect him as a coach, and I have no basis for disliking the man personally, but he strikes me as being like those guys in high school who tried to be weird strictly for the sake of being able to brag about how weird they were. That’s the hit I get off of Coach Leach’s public fixation with pirates and his purposeful quirkiness. I don’t mind those attributes in a sportscaster or a blogger, but I don’t particularly need to see a Division I-A head coach let his freak flag fly solely so he can make a production out of celebrating how odd he is. It’s like he’s a sports talk radio host caught in a football coach’s body.

The foregoing assessment, when initially aired last November, drew cogent retorts from fellow SB Nation bloggers Seth C of Double-T Nation and Skin Patrol of Hogs Haven, so I may have been a little rough on Coach Leach over the whole pirate thing (although, really, now is not a good time to be pro-pirate).

Accordingly, I wouldn’t mention this at all, but for the fact that Dr. Saturday recently noted Coach Leach’s latest slam against N.F.L. coaches who dare to disagree with him. Rather than voice his opinion like his mama raised him right, Coach Leach reacts to criticisms of his system and his players by being bratty, condescending, and insulting.

That doesn’t make him refreshingly forthright or amusingly quirky. It just makes him rude.

It also raises the question, "What did Mike Leach ever do that entitles him to talk this way to other coaches?" It was one thing for Steve Spurrier to say "something just happens to them at Georgia" while he was beating the Bulldogs like a bass drum or to say "you can’t spell ‘Citrus’ without U-T" when his Gators’ annual victories over the Volunteers routinely sent Tennessee to the Citrus Bowl; it might be ill-mannered, but it ain’t bragging if you can do it, and the Evil Genius did it (hence the "genius" portion of the formulation).

What in Mike Leach’s resume justifies such childish and churlish demeaning of his coaching coevals, though? Yes, I know, Lubbock was hardly a hotbed of football success prior to his arrival, but it isn’t as though he was Bill Snyder taking over Kansas State, however similar their non-conference scheduling practices may be.

Texas Tech hadn’t had a losing record in any of the seven seasons preceding Coach Leach’s arrival in Lubbock and the Red Raiders had attended five bowl games in that seven-year span. Granted, Spike Dykes’s last four Texas Tech teams lost five games apiece . . . but, then again, Mike Leach’s first four Red Raider clubs all lost at least that many.

Nine years into his tenure in Lubbock, Coach Leach has transformed Texas Tech into an offensive powerhouse, for which he deserves credit. What has he won, though, that has earned him the right to take potshots at N.F.L. coaches who dare to doubt that his players will succeed in a pro-style system?

Is it his 5-4 record in bowl games? Is it his three fourth-place finishes in the Big 12 South, or perhaps the three times his teams have tied for third place in the division? Could it be the five times his Red Raiders have finished at or below .500 in conference play, or maybe his 29-29 record in games played in venues other than Jones AT&T Stadium? Is it perhaps the fact that Mike Leach has guided his teams to the same number of conference title tilts as Lane Kiffin has?

This is not to say that Mike Leach isn’t a good coach; he is a good head coach and an outstanding offensive coordinator (although it is open to debate to what extent Hal Mumme made him rather than the other way around), and he has earned the right to smart off about Texas A&M. Still, actually winning something with your players ought to be a prerequisite to directing scathing put-downs to fellow coaches who doubt whether they would be able to win anything with your players.

I get that bloggers like him because he gives good interview. He doesn’t communicate in coachspeak. That may make him quotable, but it doesn’t make him right. It may, in fact, merely make him a slightly less puffy Eric Cartman. Ere we lavish too much praise on Mike Leach for being such a colorful character, therefore, we should recall the wise words of Crash Davis:

Your shower shoes have fungus on them. You'll never make it to the bigs with fungus on your shower shoes. Think classy, you'll be classy. If you win 20 in the show, you can let the fungus grow back and the press'll think you're colorful. Until you win 20 in the show, however, it means you are a slob.

Mike Leach is a talented coach who has revived, and has revived interest in, Texas Tech football. For that, he is to be applauded. In principle, he even deserves our admiration for being willing to defend his players from what he considers to be unfair criticisms. There is, though, a right way and a wrong way to go about it, and Coach Leach goes about these things the wrong way. You don’t hear Mark Richt ripping N.F.L. coaches who question his quarterbacks’ abilities to succeed in the professional ranks, and Mark Richt has coached two Heisman Trophy winners, the winningest quarterback in Division I-A college football history, and a No. 1 draft pick.

If Mike Leach wins a Big 12 championship, he can mouth off to every coach in the country. Once he can claim honestly to have captured as many conference crowns as Mack Brown, he can rip into his colleagues with willful abandon and the blogosphere will think he’s colorful. Until he improves upon his 2-7 records against both Oklahoma and Texas, however, Mike Leach’s sophomoric tantrums just mean he’s all mouth.

Go ‘Dawgs!

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IId. The McNolan Era (2005-2008)

Florida Danny — Thu, 16 Apr 2009 00:00:14 -0000

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Sorry about the delay in getting this one posted. My computer crashed yesterday because a genius (aka me) let the battery run out, so I had to wait until it fully recharged (aka today) to continue writing up the piece.

Yesterday, in Part 2c of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Donahue regime's picks from 2002-2004 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Donahue's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks, especially when your team sucks.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
I <3 the Pac-10!
BCS or die!

In comparison with the Walsh II and Policy regimes, Donahue didn't make the Policy regime mistake of trading away picks when the team was good (2002), he used Walsh II's strategy of drafting for need on Day 1 when rebuilding, he brought back the Policy regime's affinity for Pac-10 players, and he surpassed both Walsh II and the Policy regime in percentage of picks that came from BCS conferences

In this article, I'll be ending the regime breakdowns with a look at the McNolan era (2005-2008).

After the jump, I'll put the McNolan drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; sum up the regimes; and provide the idiot's guide to McNolan draft strategy...

Here again is the link to my Excel spreadsheet of 49er draft picks in the Salary Cap Era. I realized that some of you probably don't have Excel 2007, so I converted it to be compatible with older versions (and fixed the link in previous posts as well):

49er Draft Picks 1994-2008

IN CONTEXT

In Part 2c, I told you how Donahue didn't hit the home run he needed to with his rebuilding project in the 2004 draft. One additional piece of evidence for this is the fact that, by the very next draft, Donahue's replacements had to rebuild the roster once more through the draft. Therefore, Donahue's 2004 fire sale and draft has to rank among the shortest rebuilding phases of a franchise in the history of sports (and not in a good way). Now, I'm sure you don't need some long-winded description of what the team has done record-wise since 2004, so I'll just get on with the specific needs in each of McNolan's drafts:

2005 Draft - Key Losses: WR Cedrick Wilson (free agency), OL Kyle Kosier (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (career-threatening injury), OL Scott Gragg (free agency), DL John Engelberger (trade), DB Ronnie Heard (free agency), K Todd Peterson (free agency). Weak 2004 Stats: 30^th in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA; 19^th in ST DVOA.¹ Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for QB Jeff Garcia, RB Garrison Hearst, WR Terrell Owens, and DB Zack Bronson; major injuries to QB Tim Rattay, LB Andre Carter, DB Ahmed Plummer. Needs: QB, RB, WR, OL, DL, DB, K, LB depth.

2006 Draft - Key Losses: QB Tim Rattay (trade), RB Kevan Barlow (trade), FB Fred Beasley (free agency), WR Brandon Lloyd (trade), WR Johnnie Morton (released), LB Julian Peterson (free agency), LB Andre Carter (free agency), and DB Ahmed Plummer (career-threatening injury). Weak 2005 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Garcia, Hearst, Owens, and Bronson; major injury to TE Eric Johnson. Needs: FB, WR, LB, DB, QB depth, RB depth, TE depth.

2007 Draft - Key Losses: WR Antonio Bryant (released), TE Eric Johnson (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (free agency), and DB Tony Parrish (released). Weak 2006 Stats: 22^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA; 18^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bronson; OL Larry Allen and DL Bryant Young now in their mid-30s. Needs: WR, DB, ST, TE depth, OL depth, DL depth.

2008 Draft - Key Losses: WR Darrell Jackson (free agency), OL Larry Allen (retirement), OL Justin Smiley (free agency), DL Bryant Young (retirement), DL Marques Douglas (free agency), and LB Derek Smith (free agency). Weak 2007 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bryant; major injuries to QB Alex Smith, OL Jonas Jennings, and LB Manny Lawson. Needs: WR, OL, DL, LB, QB depth.

In preparation for its drafts, McNolan has had to deal with about 7 key losses per offseason, which is fewer than Walsh II (8), but more than Donahue (4) and the Policy regime (4). Interestingly, the course of McNolan's tenure has seen a mixture of his 3 predecessors' draft contexts. The 2005 and 2006 offseasons were Walshian, with about 8 key self-induced, salary-cap-caused losses per season that generally involved kicking dead weight to the curb or trading it for draft picks. The 2007 offseason was Donahue-esque, with only 4 key losses and a team feeling good about itself after a promising season. Finally, 2008 was Policy-like in that there were two retirements to deal with. Overall, I'd say the most similar previous context to McNolan's was the Walsh II era.

I know this is totally off-topic, but, Cedrick Wilson may have made the greatest career decision in the history of the NFL by signing with PIT after the 2004 season. If he stays in SF, he's stuck on a 6-win team for the foreseeable future (at least until he roughed up his ex-girlfriend) catching passes from Rattay, Smith, Ken Dorsey, Cody Pickett, Trent Dilfer, Shaun Hill, and Chris Weinke. Instead, he goes to PIT and wins a ring his first season with the team catching passes from Ben Roethlisberger. Seriously, whatever it was that made him leave the Niners, he needs to bottle and sell it. Can you guys think of any other player in recent years who's lucked out like that?

Anyway, back to the regularly scheduled program. For the sake of comparison, here's how McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup in 2005 and 2006:

Morton (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Wilson
Snyder (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Kosier
OL Eric Heitmann (2002 Donahue draft pick) for Newberry
OL Kwame Harris (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Gragg
Douglas (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Engelberger (after moving Young to 3-4 DE)
DB Mike Adams (2003 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Heard
K Joe Nedney (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Todd Peterson
Smith (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Rattay
RB Frank Gore (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Barlow
FB Moran Norris (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Beasley
Bryant (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Lloyd
WR Arnaz Battle (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Morton
Lawson (2006 McNolan draft pick) for Julian Peterson
LB Brandon Moore (2002 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Carter (after moving him to 4-3 ROLB)
DB Shawntae Spencer (2004 Donahue draft pick) for Plummer (after moving him to LCB)

Adding it all up, McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup with 5 traditional free agents, 4 draft picks, and 6 players originally acquired by Donahue. Comparing this to the previous regimes, McNolan used free agency more than Walsh II and Donahue, but less than Policy; and they had a "holdover rate" of 33.3%, which was smack dab in between Walsh II (16.7%) and Donahue (50.0%).

So there's the context. Hopefully you sense a pattern emerging here: the contexts of McNolan drafts have been a cocktail of issues and solutions having the ingredients of each predecessor; 2 ½ parts Walsh II, 1 part Donahue, and ½ part Policy.

PICKS, PICKS, AND MORE PICKS

From 2005-2008, the 49ers made 35 selections in the NFL draft, which nearly equalled the Walsh II and Donahue rate of 9 picks per season. In 2005 and 2006, the main rebuilding years, McNolan stockpiled picks via all those trades I mentioned earlier; just like Walsh II and Donahue. The past 2 drafts, however, McNolan has tended to trade away picks (you're welcome, NE) rather than stockpile them; just like the Policy regime. Once again, the trend here is for McNolan to be a mixture of all 3 predecessor's strengths and weaknesses.

In terms of McNolan's overall Pro Bowl rate, a Donahue-esque and Walshian 5.7% of its picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers (Gore and LB Patrick Willis). However, its starter rate of 34.3% - which includes OL Chilo Rachal's midseason and DB Dashon Goldson's offseason ascensions - is the worst of the 4 regimes (Policy regime = 41.4%; Walsh II = 48.1%; Donahue = 48.1%). When you remember the differences in context between regimes, you realize that McNolan has been way worse at picking starters than the context-similar Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse than the context-different Policy regime, whose superior teams made it harder for draft picks to crack the starting lineup (i.e., the Policy regime's starter rate is artificially low due to context).

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has continued the Walsh II and Donahue standard of 9 draft picks per season.
McNolan has stockpiled picks when the team sucked, and traded away picks when (they thought) the team was good.
McNolan has been as bad at picking Pro Bowlers as the "unlikely to have Pro Bowlers because the team sucked" Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse at picking starters than the "unlikely to have draft selections start because the team was good" Policy regime.
Overall, McNolan seems to be channeling the good and bad of its 3 predecessors.

DAY ‘N' NIGHT

McNolan has taken exactly 40% of its picks on Day 1 of the draft, and 60% on Day 2. That's almost identical to Walsh II's 41/59 split, which, as I said in Part 2c, was smack dab between the Policy (52/48) and Donahue (33/67) regimes.

Looking at the relative success of its picks by draft day, we find that 64.3% of McNolan's Day 1 picks have become 49er starters, which is, again, right in the middle of the 4 regimes; not as good as Walsh II's (81.8%, which I incorrectly reported as 64.3% in Part 2b), but basically on par with the Policy regime's (60.0%) and Donahue's (55.6%). Remember, though that Walsh II and Donahue are the better comparisons in terms of team context. On Day 2, an abysmal 14.3% of McNolan picks have become 49er starters, easily the worst of the 4 regimes (again, even worse than the starter-unlikely Policy regime). So while McNolan has had pretty standard success on Day 1 in terms of starters, it's been horrible at picking Day 2 starters.

The best example of this dichotomy between Day 1 and Day 2 results is McNolan's initial rebuilding draft in 2005. Here it is:

Rd	Player	Pos	Starter?	Pro Bowl?
1	Alex Smith	QB	Yes	No
2	David Baas	OL	Yes	No
3	Frank Gore	RB	Yes	Yes
3	Adam Snyder	OL	Yes	No
5	Ronald Fields	DL	No	No
5	Rasheed Marshall	WR	No	No
6	Derrick Johnson	DB	No	No
7	Daven Holly	DB	No	No
7	Marcus Maxwell	WR	No	No
7	Patrick Estes	TE	No	No
7	Billy Bajema	TE	Yes	No

Day 1? 4 picks, 4 starters, 1 Pro Bowler. Day 2? 7 picks, 1 starter, 0 Pro Bowlers. Enough said.

With regard to Pro Bowlers, however, the preferred drink is once again "Regime Cocktail." On Day 1, 14.3% of McNolan's picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers, which is slightly worse than the Pro-Bowl-likely Policy regime (20.0%), considerably better than Donahue (0.0%), and slightly better than Walsh II (9.1%). OK, correction: McNolan drinks Regime Cocktail only on Day 1. That's because, it has yet to pick a Day 2 Pro Bowler. Of course, it's not like the other two Pro-Bowl-unlikely regimes (Walsh II = 6.3%; Donahue = 5.3%) were much better at it.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has had a Walshian 40/60 split of picks between Day 1 and Day 2.
McNolan has been worse than Walsh II, but better than Donahue, at picking Day 1 starters.
McNolan has been far less successful than the other 3 regimes at picking Day 2 starters.
McNolan has been more successful than Walsh II and Donahue at picking Day 1 Pro Bowlers, but slightly worse than these two regimes at picking Day 2 Pro Bowlers.

ASSUME THE POSITION

Here's how McNolan has used its 35 picks by position, unit, and draft day:

Pos	Day 1	Day 2	Total
QB	1	0	1
RB	1	1	2
FB	0	0	0
WR	2	5	7
TE	1	2	3
OL	4	1	5
DL	2	5	7
LB	2	1	3
DB	1	6	7
K	0	0	0
P	0	0	0
OFF Total	9	9	18
DEF Total	5	12	17
ST Total	0	0	0
Total	14	21	35

Overall, McNolan has basically split their picks up evenly between units, which is more similar to what the Policy regime and Donahue did than Walsh II's need-induced DEF preference. Also, like Walsh, McNolan hasn't taken any ST players in the draft. Of course, that may have something to do with having Nedney and ROBO-PUNTER on the roster. What's most interesting here, however, is that, although OFF has received equal attention on Days 1 and 2, 70.6% of McNolan's DEF picks have come on Day 2.

The even split of OFF picks between draft days is a little misleading because McNolan was actually Walshian in 2005 and 2006 when it had to replace most of the OFF. Going back to that 2005 draft that I showed earlier, you'll notice that all 4 Day 1 picks were on OFF. This continued in 2006 when they selected TE Vernon Davis in the 1^st round after Johnson suffered a major injury the previous season. Essentially, McNolan followed the Walsh II example of spending Day 1 of rebuilding drafts addressing the most glaring positional needs. This is really eye-opening when you consider that Scot McCloughan claims to be a devout believer in "best player available." Is he full of sh*t or is the focus on need in Day 1 of the 2005 and 2006 drafts just a coincidence? I'll leave you to decide.

DEF, however, is a different animal altogether. From the table, it's clear that the draft day disparity on DEF has been due to an inordinate amount of Day 2 picks being spent on DLs and DBs. The 5 Day 2 DLs were, in order of selection, Ronald Fields, Parys Haralson, Melvin Oliver, Jay Moore, and Joe Cohen; the 6 Day 2 DBs were Derrick Johnson, Daven Holly, Marcus Hudson, Vickiel Vaughn, Goldson, and Tarell Brown. Looking at these lists, you could say that McNolan has gotten worse over time picking Day 2 DLs, whereas it's gotten better over time picking Day 2 DBs. Either way, aside from Haralson and Goldson, that's a pretty mediocre-at-best bunch. So, if you want to know why the DEF has sucked for so long (before Singletary pulled their heads out of their asses), look no further than McNolan mostly waiting until Day 2 to pick DEF players. Couple this with McNolan's aforementioned horrible starter rate on Day 2, and you get one wet, stinking heap of also-ran-ity.

With 71.4% of picks taken on Day 2, WR is another position at which McNolan has focused little Day 1 attention. The two Day 1 WRs were Brandon Williams and Jason Hill, both 3^rd-rounders.

Hopefully, you're starting to see a trend here. McNolan gets credit for using Walsh II's "pick for need on Day 1" and "bites at the apple" strategies. However, it's made the mistake of waiting until Day 2 to take most of their bites at DL, DB, and WR. Perhaps, then, one reason why the Niners haven't been able to get over the mediocre 7-9 hump since 2005 is because their WR, DL, and DB corps are populated with Day 2 picks.

To drive it home, here's one last point about McNolan's (lack of) success wtith DEF picks. On OFF, McNolan's starter rate (44.4%) has been similar to that of the Policy regime (43.8%), Walsh II (50.0%), and Donahue (46.2%). However, the DEF starter rates for the previous 3 regimes were 47.1% for Walsh II, 41.7% for Donahue, and 33.3% for the Policy regime. McNolan's? 23.5%!

All is not lost, however. Unlike Donahue, McNolan seems to have actually learned something about positional picks as its tenure has progressed. Namely, 2 of their 3 picks in 2008 were DEF players. Whether or not DL Kentwan Balmer and DB Reggie Smith pan out in the long run, at least McNolan seems to have noticed that their previous Day 1 picks on DEF have become integral parts of the starting unit. Don't believe me? Here they are: Lawson, Willis, and DL Ray McDonald. So, their results - 2 starters, 1 Pro Bowler, and an emerging pass-rush specialist - were not shabby at all. This suggests that (a) when McNolan commits Day 1 resources to DEF, it's been pretty successful; and (b) the regime seems to have figured this out. So, at the very least, kudos to them for that.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Walsh II, McNolan has focused its Day 1 picks on the most glaring positional needs (when it had to).
McNolan has employed Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy at WR, DL, and DB. However, they've primarily waited until Day 2 to take their bites.
Given their propensity for waiting until Day 2 for DEF picks, it's not surprising that McNolan has been horrible at drafting DEF starters.
Based on 2008, McNolan seems to have learned from their "wait until Day 2 for DEF" mistake.

CONFERENCE ROOM

So far, I've basically told a story about how the McNolan regime's drafts have been a little bit Walsh II, a little bit Donahue, and a little bit Policy; how they've used the good strategies as well as the bad. Basically, not too hot, not too cold; I'll call it "Goldilocks" if you will. The conference breakdown is where that tale ends. There's one regime's lead in particular that McNolan has been happy to follow, and I'm sure you'll easily be able to figure it out. Here's how McNolan's 35 picks shake out by conference: 7 ACC picks, 7 SEC picks, 6 Big 12 picks, 6 Pac-10 picks, 4 Big 10 picks, 1 Big East pick, 1 Conference USA pick, 1 MAC pick, 1 MAII pick, and 1 MWC pick.

BCS anyone? McNolan has taken a Donahue-esque 88.6% of its picks from BCS conferences. I already detailed in Part 2c what I think of this strategy, so you know by now that I don't like it. Now, Scot McCloughan has argued that he takes BCS players because they're (a) less affected by big crowds, (b) more prepared for the NFL, and (c) better team leaders. While all of these may be true in a general sense, the draft isn't about generalities. It's about identifying and acquiring specific talented players. I'm sorry, but when you limit your available talent pool to 6 or 7 college football conferences, you're going to miss the "diamonds in the rough" that teams need to sustain success. Also, McCloughan has made it seem like picking players from BCS conferences is only a Day 1 strategy. The stats say the opposite though: A higher percentage of McNolan's Day 2 picks have come from BCS conferences (90.5%) than have its Day 2 picks (88.6%). Oh, and did I mention that McNolan's first pick ever was a QB from a non-BCS conference (Smith), and that they traded up in 2007 to take an OL from a non-BCS conference (Joe Staley)? That's 2 of McNolan's 4 non-BCS picks being taken with 1^st-round picks. Again, is he BSing us here or is this some kind of smokescreen? It's pretty interesting how a general BCS guy like McCloughan can fall in love so much with specific non-BCS players.

And now, I present a second way in which McNolan's conference preferences are similar to Donahue's: They suck just as bad at picking BCS players despite being so BCS-reliant. Wait, let me correct that. They suck even worse. Here's the evidence:

McNolan
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	10	2	12
No	21	2	23
Total	31	4	35

Donahue
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	12	1	13
No	13	1	14
Total	25	2	27

You'll recall from Part 2c that Donahue's BCS starter rate (48.0%) was worse than Walsh II's (62.5%) even though Donahue was much more BCS-heavy with his picks. Well, even Donahue's sorry BCS starter rate makes him look like a draft maven when compared to McNolan's. That's because, as the table shows, only 32.3% of McNolan's BCS picks have become regular 49er starters! As I said in Part 2c, if you're going to be limiting your talent pool so drastically, you better be good at evaluating the talent you don't ignore. Clearly, McNolan has not been good in this regard, and has been even worse than the guy for which I invented the argument.

Now, I argued in Part 2c that Donahue's preference for BCS players and lack of success in actually picking good ones was borne out of his dispositional laziness and inattention to draft detail. With respect to McNolan, however, I'm sure this hasn't been the case. To its credit, the McNolan regime has been almost pathologically engaged in draft preparation. After all, they coached the Senior Bowl 3 straight seasons, Scot McLoughan was Director of College Scouting for the Seahawks, and Scot's brother, David, now serves in the same capacity for the 49ers. So I'm kind of perplexed as to why, given their affinity for evaluating college talent, McNolan has shied away from non-BCS players. One might argue that it's because of the Alex Smith experience. However, as has been noted, McLoughan remains a big Smith supporter. So what gives here? Please help.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Donahue, almost every player McNolan has drafted has been from a BCS conference.
Despite its BCS-lust, the McNolan regime has had an even worse BCS starter rate than Donahue.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

As I've alluded to throughout this article, the McNolan drafts can be described by one word: Goldilocks. In other words, their porridge hasn't been too hot and it hasn't been too cold; just lukewarm. Here's the evidence:

McNolan's draft contexts have been a mixture of its 3 predecessors' contexts.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's "draft vs. free agency" bias.
McNolan's stockpiled picks in rebuilding drafts ala Walsh II, but also traded away picks in "we feel good about ourselves right now" drafts ala the Policy regime.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's Day1/Day 2 split.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of Day 1 starter and Pro Bowl rate.
McNolan has evenly split their picks between OFF and DEF overall.
McNolan's used Walsh's "bites at the apple" strategy, but only on Day 2.
McNolan's been on par with previous regimes in terms of picking OFF starters.
Though it's made Donahue-esque draft strategy errors, McNolan's either learned from those mistakes or has a more valid reason for why they've made them.

All in all, it sure seems like the McNolan regime has been a mixture of the good and bad of the 3 previous 49er regimes. They rebuilt like Walsh II in 2005 and 2006, but they sat on their laurels like Donahue and the Policy regime in 2007. They draft for need on Day 1 like Walsh II, but, like Donahue, only when they have to. They take a lot of bites at the apple like Walsh, but they wait until Day 2 to do it. You get the picture.

To me, understanding the Goldilocks nature of McNolan drafts helps explain why the 49ers have been stuck in "no better than 7-9" mode for the past 3 seasons. If you draft a propensity of mediocre players, or if you have a bunch of mediocre drafts, you're going to find yourself having a mediocre team. Here, another word comes to mind that has been used - with great comic effect - to describe McNolan: vanilla.

In evaluating the 4 Niner regimes since 1994, something has become very clear to me; something that I didn't fully realize until I got to McNolan. Bill Walsh was the only 49er GM in the past 15 years who went out and tried to be great in the draft. He's the only one who tried to bat 1.000 every time he stepped to the plate. The Policy regime was content to sustain success through free agency, Donahue was content to ride the coattails of Walsh II's drafts, and McNolan has been content to only be great on Day 1. Is it any wonder then that the Walsh II regime was the only one that had an upward win trajectory? Is it a coincidence that Walsh was the only GM to leave the 49ers better off than when he arrived? I mean, the 49ers regressed under the Policy regime and Donahue, and they've stagnated in 7-9 territory under McNolan. After reading my regime breakdowns, do you have any doubt that one important reason for this is because Walsh II's draft strategy differed so drastically from that of McNolan, Donahue, and the Policy regime? In re McNolan, do you think that the "hybrid" defense, not giving Hill the QB job outright, and not firing Nolan after 2007 can be described by any other word except "vanilla?"

Whether it's McSingle nee McNolan or someone else, until the person/people in charge of running the 49ers' drafts stop placing artificial constraints on themselves, and start trying to be great with every pick- by whatever means necessary - I fear the Niners are going to wallow in mediocrity.

Here's a perfect example of what I mean. The Niners need a pass rusher right now more than anything. Go out and draft the best damned pass rusher. If the consensus best pass rusher isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the pass rusher you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the Calfornia Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK pass rusher and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

Another example. Right now, you have an arguable draft bust, a good but ragged-armed journeyman, and a player KC didn't even want as your QBs. Go out and draft the best damned QB. Do whatever it takes. If the consensus best QB isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the QB you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the California Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK QB and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

You know what team drafts like this? The New England Patriots. But that's Part 3, so you'll have to wait until tomorrow to hear the details. For now, here's the idiot's guide to the McNolan regime's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks, but trade away picks when (you think) your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Use Day 2 to take a lot of bites at the apple.
BCS or die!
We're Goldilocks (aka Vanilla McNolan).

So, based on this strategy, as well as some specific draft history trends that you can find in my Excel spreadsheet, here's what (and what not) to expect from the 49ers in the 2009 draft:

Don't expect them to take more than 1 player from a non-BCS conference.
Don't expect them to take a pass rusher, QB, or WR at #10.
Don't expect them to take a RB on Day 1.
Expect them to take a WR or two on Day 2.
Expect them to take an OL on Day 1.
Expect more DEF picks (esp. DLs and DBs) on Day 2 than Day 1.
Don't expect them to take a FB, K, or P.

Remember, this is what I expect them to do or not do based on their history. If they end up going against tendency, it's not because the tendencies were wrongly identified. It's because they did something that was unexpected given their history. And there's no harm in that. It's actually worked once or twice (See Willis, Patrick).

That's it for now. Tomorrow, I'll compare the overall 49er draft strategy since 1994, which I identified in Part 1, to that of the Patriots. TO BE CONTINUED...

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

How much blame would you assign McNolan's drafts for the 49ers continuously being unable to take that next step in recent seasons?

All of the blame

37 votes

Most of the blame

83 votes

Some of the blame

103 votes

None of the blame

9 votes

232 votes | Poll has closed

Real Solutions To The Kansas City Quarterback Problem

Joel Thorman — Mon, 06 Oct 2008 16:51:17 -0000

So, here's the deal. The feelings regarding our quarterback situation are mixed. However, I feel that a majority of folks are looking to make a change and then some of that group wants to make a change NOW.

I'm on record as saying there's nothing we can do to better the quarterback situation now. Trade scenarios, while always an interesting discussion, almost never come to fruition. There's a reason talented quarterbacks never hit the open market.

Below is a list of quarterbacks who are currently free agents. Keeping this list in mind, I want to hear real solutions to the quarterback problem. Pretend as if trading is not an option (because realistically it's probably not). Anyone can say 'Hey it's not working dump 'em all!' But that's not the way it works.

Tell us who you want and WHY. The latter is key. Would any of these players help us now? Do we currently have the best options on staff?

Player Name	Years Experience	2007 Team
Daunte Culpepper	9	Raiders
Bruce Gradkowski	2	Bucs
Tim Hasselbeck	6	Cardinals
Kelly Holcomb	11	Vikings
Jared Lorenzen	3	Giants
Jamie Martin	13	Saints
Craig Nall	6	Packers
Tim Rattay	8	Cardinals
Lester Ricard	1	Jaguars
Brian St. Pierre	7	Jets
Chris Weinke	8	49ers

Don't Bet On It!: Around the S.E.C.

T Kyle King — Wed, 03 Sep 2008 11:00:07 -0000

You can’t say I didn’t warn you. When offering my initial set of Southeastern Conference picks for the season, I issued my usual disclaimer, informing you that I was an awful prognosticator and that you should heed my advice: Don’t Bet On It!

Well, now you know why. I went 8-4 straight up, and that was with a slate chock full of Division I-AA and Sun Belt gimmes, plus my prediction straight out of left field that "Dooley’s Dogs"---that would be Derek Dooley’s Louisiana Tech Bulldogs---would upend the Mississippi State Bulldogs in Ruston. In my defense, though, how could I have foreseen Tennessee coming up short on the West Coast or Clemson choking in a big game? Oh . . . right.

In any case, here are this week’s S.E.C. picks. The Georgia game will be the subject of a separate posting and will not count toward the overall standings (for me, I mean, not for, like, the team). Each of the following games will be played on Saturday, September 6, unless otherwise indicated:

Norfolk State at Kentucky: Let us not mince words here. The Wildcats looked positively awful against Louisville, a reality which was only mildly ameliorated by the fact that the Cardinals looked absolutely atrocious. (I mean that literally. What U. of L. did on that football field was an atrocity. If that Bluegrass battle had occurred between the Hutus and the Tutsis, it would have constituted a war crime.) Out of the suppurating putrescent mass of that game occasionally oozed a defense-like substance which seeped intermittently from the ‘Cats, but the truth of the matter is that Louisville lost a football game and Kentucky merely happened to be on the opposite side of the field when it happened. Even so, though, the Wildcats will win because the general rule applies to Norfolk State: if a team is named "_______ State" and the word in the blank is not, in fact, a state, that team will lose to a B.C.S. conference team, no matter how bad.

As with all rules, there are exceptions.

Arkansas at Louisiana-Monroe: Arkansas at Louisiana-Monroe? Did I read that correctly? What could possibly justify allowing the Warhawks to host the Razorbacks? I mean, aside from the fact that the Hogs needed to score two touchdowns in the final eight minutes to avoid being upset at home by Western Illinois in week one and the fact that U.L.M. beat Alabama last year. Yeah, O.K., I guess the ‘Hawks are entitled to have Arkansas visit their place, where the home team will give the visitors a run for their money before coming up short against the Razorbacks. (Hey, wait a minute . . . I just checked again and it says "@ Louisiana-Monroe" with an asterisk that notes "at Little Rock." Since when is Little Rock at Louisiana-Monroe? Arkansas doesn’t get to count a home game as a road game! What is this . . . the Iron Bowl?)

Tulane at Alabama: Well, this should be a nailbiter . . . in 1937! During the period of history in which we refer to the armed conflict of the late 1910s as "World War I," however, there is little question that the superior maritime motion is the Crimson Tide rather than the Green Wave.

Troy at Louisiana State: With all due respect to the sister states to our immediate left, we here in Georgia like to tell an old joke about the man from Alabama who moved to Mississippi and raised the I.Q. of both states. Well, Tony Franklin may be that guy in reverse, as Auburn’s new offensive coordinator moved from the Trojans to the Plainsmen and worsened the offenses of both teams. Not that the Bayou Bengals needed the help, but the Fighting Tigers will hold Troy fairly well in check. I mean, Troy is just one guy, right?

Well, how do you like that? I made a joke about stupidity when picking an L.S.U. game and I didn’t take a cheap shot at Les Miles. Who ever would have thought it?

Southeastern Louisiana at Mississippi State: I have a theory that, if you were lost in the Pelican State, it would be a waste of time and money for you to purchase a map or stop to ask which way is which. All you have to do is drive until you run into a college and the name of the post-secondary institution will serve as your guide, as the Louisiana university system incorporates into its nomenclature every directional point on the compass. Had Alfred Hitchcock set a thriller in Cajun country, it would have been called "North by Natchitoches." As for the student-athletes from Hammond, they represent the last, best hope for the Western Division Bulldogs to claim victory over a team from Louisiana this season, so M.S.U. will make the most---well, O.K., not quite "the most"; more like "just enough"---of its opportunity.

U.A.B. at Tennessee: The bad news for the Volunteers is that former Big Orange offensive coordinator David Cutcliffe is in Durham. The good news for the Vols is that former Georgia offensive coordinator Neil Callaway is in Birmingham. Although the Blazers played U.T. within a touchdown in 2005, Phillip Fulmer’s crew came back from the Golden State madder than a brood of wet hens---yes, an arrangement of a multitude of hens is a brood---and the only thing for which U.A.B. Volunteered is a whooping.

South Carolina at Vanderbilt (Thursday, September 4): I doubt that you will ever see a worse performance by a team in a 34-0 victory over a B.C.S. conference opponent than that which was given to us as a cruel mockery of football in last Thursday night’s opening outing in Williams-Brice Stadium. I would be tempted to take the Commodores on the basis of home field advantage, were it not for the fact that Vandy has no home field advantage. All they actually have in the Music City is Clemson alumnus Bobby Johnson, who is 89 days away from being named the head coach at his alma mater, where he will succeed Tommy Bowden, who is 88 days away from being fired. Coach Johnson certainly wouldn’t hurt his cause with a second straight win over the Gamecocks, but, for the depleted ‘Dores, that simply isn’t going to happen. The victory will belong to South Carolina as Spurrier’s ‘Cocks beat Vanderbilt’s Johnson. (Sorry. You were thinking it, too.)

Of course, it’s not like they’re some great team or something. They’ve lost four straight games against S.E.C. competition.

Southern Mississippi at Auburn: Only two things cause me hesitation in picking this game. The first is the fact that the Tigers were less than overwhelming in their opener---which, to be fair, LSU Jonno warned me would be the case---and the second is that I heard Brett Favre unretired. If he went back to quarterbacking the Golden Eagles, I’d definitely have to think about picking U.S.M. to register the upset, even if Favre is, like, Chris Weinke old. (Actually, Favre is eleven months younger than me, which is way too old to be playing quarterback anywhere outside your back yard.) Anyway, the War Eagle will win. I hate Auburn.

Ole Miss at Wake Forest: From the bottom all the way up to the top upper portion of the bottom, the Atlantic Coast Conference stinks. Unfortunately, at least for the short term, so do the Rebels. The Demon Deacons represent a step up in weight class for Mississippi from last week’s opponent and I don’t like the Rebs’ chances away from Oxford this early in the season. I can only hope the game is televised in New York, so Rebel Craig can go through the stages of game day, Elisabeth Kubler-Ross-style, while chanting, "Hotty totty, gosh a mighty, is it already fall? Why the heck are we playing the A.C.C.? Is this basketball?" Regrettably, Wake Forest will win.

Miami (Florida) at Florida: The corollary to the rule that you never pick a team called "State" if the other part of its name isn’t actually a state is this: you typically don’t want to pick the part to get the better of the whole. Where the game is between Team X and Team Lesser Included Segment of X, go with Team X. Thus, you choose Georgia over Georgia Southern, Texas over North Texas, and Florida over Miami (Florida).

There are exceptions to that rule, too.

If you disagree with those prognostications---and, surely, you do---you may take comfort from the knowledge that even I know I have no idea what I’m talking about a good 50 per cent of the time, so feel free to discount the foregoing, which is offered for your entertainment and not your edification. In other words . . . Don’t Bet On It!

Coming soon: National Games of Interest.

Go ‘Dawgs!