SB Nation - Shaun Alexander

Matt Hasselbeck Slings to Deon Butler for 32 and Game Winning Field Goal Range

John Morgan — Mon, 07 Dec 2009 01:15:19 -0000

More photos » by Elaine Thompson - AP

Matt Hasselbeck's pass to Deion Branch bent like a curveball and sought like a missile.

The NFL Draft is designed to assist weaker teams and create parity. Bad teams get better players and become better teams. The very worst teams can pick any player to help rebuild their franchise around. That intent has been disputed by research conducted by Massey and Thaler. Common wisdom is that rookies are overpaid and the strict salary structure punishes bad teams by awarding them potentially crippling investments.

Two things are true: High salaries in the top ten punish bad teams by increasing how much is risked. The best players are usually drafted early.

The San Francisco 49ers started eight picks selected in the top fifty: Alex Smith (1), Vernon Davis (6), Michael Crabtree (10), Patrick Willis (11), Manny Lawson (22), Joe Staley (28), David Bass (33) and Chilo Rachal (38). It took a lot of ass football to assemble that cast. If not for the 90s Niners spilling into the early 2000s, San Francisco would have a dog in the race for worst team of the new millennium.

Smith looked like a competent if unsexy quarterback. Dilfer with a better arm. He's 25.

Davis ran a 4.38 forty. Match him against Aaron Curry on a crossing route and Curry is probably going to get burned.

Crabtree is athletic and explosive and-Oh shit! Lawyer Milloy!

I won't continue fawning. My point is that Seattle beat a better team than itself today. It beat a younger team with far greater resources invested in that youth. It beat that team because the 49ers are better than Seattle, but not significantly.

Josh Wilson was the best all around cornerback playing today. He is a fiend against the wide receiver screen, aware and responsive to his surroundings like a Shaolin Monk. Wilson isn't a stride-for-stride, Asomugha-like shutdown corner. He's a zone corner, but a hell of a zone corner, and drafted to play in a zone scheme. He was supposed to be Ronde. He's supposed to bury the screen, intercept the bounce, jump the route and find the fumble and fly.

Brandon Mebane is an incredible machine. He's a backloaded piston; a battering ram shaped like candy corn. The day Mebane synced to NFL snap counts he became a great young defensive tackle. Mebane is quick, powerful and hard to block. Seattle doesn't need Suh to showcase Mebane, just someone better than Rocky Bernard, Colin Cole, Craig Terrill and the whole sick crew. Like, motile matter -- ambulatory would be an upgrade.

Jordan Babineaux is a young, cheap and functional free safety.

Tim Ruskell never did rebuild but he added some talent while the core rotted. Seattle's next GM inherits a heck of a fine position. I hope he realizes it.

. . .

Two years ago I faced the Shaun Alexander dilemma. Alexander was no longer a good running back. On his best days rushing, he was still a liability as a receiver and pass blocker. But he was beloved even by we who hated watching him. I never feared a miraculous recovery disproving all my theories. I cringed because others saw a miraculous recovery every time he rushed for five.

Hasselbeck isn't there. Quarterbacks do not fall like running backs fall. Losing a little arm strength is not like losing the first gear that got you the job. Hasselbeck can toss a nice pass when he needs. The bender over the defender to Deion Branch was indefensible pass at its best. He threw another high-arcing bomb to Branch that Branch lost behind the defender. It was pretty for a second. Real pretty.

Unlike seeing Shaun sprinting for fourteen, I never cringed seeing Hasselbeck spark to life. It was thrilling. Hasselbeck was never a great quarterback. Well, screw that. Matt Hasselbeck is one of the greatest quarterbacks to ever play American football. Any quarterback that's made a Pro Bowl can claim that. Hasselbeck is not Manning or within the discussion. He's not Fouts or Unitas or Tarkenton or Marino or-

But HE's THE BEST GODDAMN QUARTERBACK WE'VE EVER HAD!!

Game ball guy. I hope you find a team to make your last few millions in the league with. And I hope that team is not the Seattle Seahawks.

The Rise and Fall of Tim Ruskell: The Steve Hutchinson Saga

John Morgan — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 01:24:51 -0000

More photos » by Tom Olmscheid - AP

Tim Ruskell wanted Steve Hutchinson, but John Abraham and Julian Peterson too. Attempting to sign all three, he was caught with his hand in the pickle jar.

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Shaun Alexander and Steve Hutchinson were free agents. Both were 28. Hutch had completed his five-year rookie contract, and, if re-signed, his cap cost could double. Alexander was already expensive. The Seahawks had franchised him in 2004. Seattle could have signed both players, and attempted to, but would have tied up much of their available cap. Tim Ruskell was aggressively targeting Julian Peterson and John Abraham. He wanted Hutch, but he wanted to improve the Seahawks too. Signing Alexander tied up $5.9 million against the cap.

Hutch expected offensive tackle money. The market for guards was soft. Hutchinson was the fifth highest paid offensive guard in 2005, but cost only $3.5 million against the cap. Even Larry Allen, the league's highest paid guard, only cost $6.5 million. Only three guards total cost more than $5 million against the cap.

Running backs were much more expensive. Eight cost more than five million against the cap in 2005, and Edgerrin James cost over $9 million. The league perceived running back to be a premium position, on par with wide receiver, offensive tackle and cornerback. If Seattle put the franchise tag on Hutchinson, his salary would reflect the salaries of all offensive linemen and not just guards. The Lions placed the tag on Jeff Backus in 2006. His base salary was $6.98 million. If Seattle franchised Hutchinson, it would have had $25 million in cap room dedicated to Hutch, Alexander, Walter Jones and Matt Hasselbeck.

Ruskell did something he has done many times since: Let the market to set a player's value. Placing the transition tag on Hutchinson allowed him to negotiate with other teams and Seattle the right to match. It avoided guaranteeing Hutchinson $6.98 million, and, in Ruskell's eyes, enabled negotiations towards a long-term contract. Ruskell was willing to spend big to retain his Pro Bowl guard. His hope was he wouldn't have to. His hope was that he could sign Hutchinson, but structure his contract so that Seattle could still sign Peterson, Abraham or both.

Early March, and shortly after the league ratified a new collective bargaining agreement, Minnesota offered Hutchinson the largest contract in league history for an offensive guard. It was a bold move made audacious by a now notorious poison pill clause. The clause stipulated that if Hutchinson was not his team's highest paid offensive lineman at any time after the first year, that his entire contract was guaranteed.

If Seattle wanted to match Minnesota's offer, it would not only need to match the Vikings unprecedented offer, it would be forced to guarantee Hutchinson's entire salary. Peyton Manning was the league's most expensive player and his contract guaranteed only $34.5 million. Matching Minnesota meant guaranteeing Hutchinson a staggering $49 million. Hutch would cost $13 million against the cap in 2006, forcing Seattle to forget Peterson and Abraham. Ruskell, supported by Paul Tagliabue and the NFL, contested the poison-pill clause, even restructured Walter Jones contract, but arbiter Stephen Burbank ruled in the Vikings favor. Seattle would either ruin their cap or let Hutchinson walk.

The deadline passed midnight of March 20, 2006, and Steve Hutchinson became a Minnesota Viking. Tim Ruskell fell on the wrong side of history. He attempted to make his Super Bowl losing team a Super Bowl winner. Instead, he lost an irreplaceable piece, alienated his coach, and began the Seahawks slow burn towards rebuilding.

The Future of Matt Hasselbeck is the Future of the Seattle Seahawks, Pt. 2

John Morgan — Tue, 01 Dec 2009 03:26:51 -0000

More photos » by Ted S. Warren - AP

John Carlson, Justin Forsett, Deon Butler and Max Unger form the existing core of offensive talent that Seattle can build around. Chris Spencer, Rob Sims and Sean Locklear could be retained too. If Seattle begins its move towards the offense of the future, McBow and Sparkly New Skill Position Player will join this core in 2010.

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There is no third-year wide receiver rule and no single path a quarterback takes to competence. The Seattle Seahawks could employ any strategy this offseason and still not start a competent quarterback in 2010, 2011 and 2012. If it sticks with Matt Hasselbeck, it will commit itself to Hasselbeck's decline phase, starting him in his age 35, 36 and 37 year-old seasons. For perspective, a quarterback performs at 83.2% of total capacity at 34, but historically, that capacity drops to 76.8, 69.9 and 62.9% from 35 to 37. The Seahawks could attempt to offset that decline through building a better team.

Whoever drafts Hasselbeck's replacement, whoever that replacement is, and however that replacement is integrated into the offense, the Seahawks will most likely decline as a passing offense in 2010. Old quarterbacks lose ability in chunks. Young quarterbacks gain ability in leaps. The two cross paths sometime around an old quarterback's age 36 season and a young quarterback's age 24 season.

Hasselbeck will turn 35 next season. Seattle can retain him through the end of his contract while simultaneously adding the quarterback of the future. Hasselbeck would be the presumed starter and presumably better than his young replacement, help transition Seattle towards its future, and potentially resurrect his own career, should he desire.

That's why I dub this the "Graceful Exit Plan." Seattle could draft a quarterback in the top ten, but is less likely to with Hasselbeck under contract and costing $10 million against the cap. In the last ten drafts, two quarterbacks have been selected in the top ten five times. In the last twenty drafts, two quarterbacks have been selected in the top ten ten times. It's difficult to project a draft so early in the process, but it is likely Jimmy Clausen will join Sam Bradford, Colt McCoy, Tim Tebow, Tony Pike, Dan LeFevour and Sean Canfield atop this year's quarterback class.

Clausen is the most likely top-ten pick. The impact of keeping Hasselbeck is that Seattle is unlikely to select a quarterback within the top ten, and therefore we will assume Clausen is unlikely, Bradford could likewise be unlikely, but the remaining five will be available. The remaining five represent the most likely pool of replacements for Hasselbeck.

Canfield's age is not publically listed, Rotoworld lists him at 108, but he is a senior now and graduated from high school early to attend spring drills. It's most likely that Canfield is 22, and like most of the rest of his class, will be a 23 to 24 year-old rookie.

It's ridiculous to discuss a quarterback prospect's upside. Every legitimate prospect is capable of making Canton or selling Cadillacs in five years. Likewise, the age guidelines presented by Pro Football Reference evidence that quarterback development is initially about experience. The greatest single delta is between age 21 and age 22, when a quarterback jumps 22.2%, and the second greatest is between 22 and 23, when a quarterback jumps 18.5%. Most 22 year old quarterbacks are rookies. All 21 year old quarterbacks rookies. After the sophomore sprint growth is more gradual.

The Plan Might Be Enacted Thus:

Hasselbeck is a lame duck. The media loves to pick on such situations and tease out whatever controversy possible. The ownership, management and Hasselbeck must agree to bury the subject and unite behind a common plan. That starts the day after the draft, when the team provides a unified front: Hasselbeck is the starter, but his drafted replacement, the future.

If Greg Knapp is still Seattle's offensive coordinator, Seattle's pick will most reflect his personal preferences in a quarterback. Tim Ruskell has deferred to his coaching staff, sometimes smartly, and sometimes, like when re-signing Shaun Alexander, stupidly. It will reflect Knapp's system and Ruskell's eye for talent. Let's quickly vet potential candidates.

Knapp Approved:

McCoy

Tebow

LeFevour

Canfield

Ruskell Approved:

McCoy

Tebow

Tebow could fall off Knapp's list and Canfield appear on Ruskell's. The most likely candidate is McCoy. He fits Knapp's system and passes Ruskell's standards. Tebow is the second most likely candidate and then maybe Canfield. I'll run with Tebow and McCoy, because the two are similar types and would be built around in a similar fashion.

We'll assume Seattle's spends its first overall pick on McBow. Seattle would not likely spend additional early picks on the offensive line. Knapp would protect the quarterback by moving the pocket, establishing the run and extending the short passing attack. It would want a top receiver to pair with T.J. Houshmandzadeh, replace or eventually replace Nate Burleson (2010 is voidable), grow with McBow and one day power the McSeaBow's offense. Or, should that talent be unavailable, an elite running back prospect to lead Seattle's developing committee of backs.

Knapp likes speed and Ruskell likes polish. The two might settle on Brandon LaFell. Many players are faster than Lafell, but few are more polished. Lafell does not satisfy Knapp's desire for speed, but he can be a deep threat. He's a big player, known for his blocking ability, that passes Ruskell's standards and can fit within Knapp's system.

If Seattle retains or re-signs Burleson, or postpones its need at wide receiver, it could address its defense or add a running back. The one thing it will not likely do is invest heavily into its offensive line. Another GM might.

Seattle will face a difficult free agency before it reaches the draft. Retaining Hasselbeck means a major chunk of its salary cap is invested into a player very unlikely to contribute to its future. It could cut Patrick Kerney and Walter Jones, either, but it would be hard pressed to retain all three. It must cut someone or be dragged down by sunk cost.

That period will determine who Seattle targets in the draft, but skill position and defense should populate their prime targets.

How it Works: Seattle's coaching staff and executives buy themselves a stay of execution. Emphasis is on the future and Seattle's existing offense is culled for talent. One of Chris Spencer and Rob Sims will join Deon Butler, Max Unger, Justin Forsett, John Carlson, McBow and Sparkly New Skill Position Player to form Seattle's offensive core going forward.

McBow starts for most of the preseason and subs if Hasselbeck is injured or grossly ineffective. Hasselbeck endures his victory lap with statesman-like aplomb and tutors his young understudy, to whatever undetermined effect. Seattle is not a true contender in 2010, but it could contend for the NFC West. The defense gels and Seattle's young offense shows flashes.

How it Fails: If Seattle cannot sooth Hasselbeck but feels compelled to retain him, it will struggle to keep the media hounds at bay. Management accepts 2010 as a season spent towards its future, but the media exploits the fanbase's impatience, growing dissatisfaction and entitlement, and not so subtly splits the franchise between Hasselbeck and management; The past and the future; winning and the losing it takes to win again.

McBow struggles in the preseason and is stuck behind Mike Teel or Seneca Wallace on Seattle's depth chart. The offense, built to be cheap and good, versus expensive and dominating, like the Seahawks of yore, is cheap and bad. The defense does not pick up the slack. The Seahawks spiral towards their third straight losing season, a little older, and further wedged between a full rebuild and mediocrity.

The Rise and Fall of Tim Ruskell: 2005

John Morgan — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 23:49:56 -0000

More photos » by Mark Duncan - AP

Joe Jurevicius was cut by the Tampa Bay Bucs March 1, 2005. Tim Ruskell signed him to a one-year contract later that month. He was Seattle's most valuable target in 2005, catching ten touchdowns and leading Seahawks wide receivers in DVOA. Darrell Jackson missed ten games that season.

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Tim Ruskell was announced as Seattle's new general manager of football operations February 23, 2005. He inherited a good team, a team that had made the playoffs in each of the prior two seasons, and a team with a winning record in four of Mike Holmgren's six seasons as head coach. He inherited a franchise quarterback turning 30, Matt Hasselbeck, two hall of fame talents on the offensive line, Steven Hutchinson and Walter Jones, a great running back in his prime, a good young cornerback, a three-tech, an oft-injured one-tech, a pair of system correct wide receivers and two controversial young safeties. A year later, the team Ruskell inherited represented the National Football Conference in Super Bowl XL.

Rumors notwithstanding, Ruskell's contract is up after the season. Seattle was 4-12 in 2008 and is 4-7 so far in 2009. His job is in the balance.

Seattle ranked 16^th in DVOA in 2004. It ranked 9^th in 2003 and 18^th in 2002. It had a below average defense in all three seasons. Ruskell was brought in to fix Seattle's defense. He built his reputation under Rich McKay and the Bucaneers dominant Tampa 2 defense was his living resume. The 2004 team finished 21^st in total defensive DVOA, 17^th in passing DVOA and 30^th in rushing DVOA. Pro Football Reference provides the starting defense in 2004 and the starting defense in 2005.

Seattle finished 15^th in defensive DVOA in 2005. It was worse against the pass, fading to 24^th, but better against the run, 5^th overall. The team did not make a sudden leap as is often described. It did improve significantly and through a significantly remade roster. The front seven was gutted. Rookies Lofa Tatupu, Leroy Hill, and free agent acquisitions Chuck Darby, Bryce Fisher and Jamie Sharper all started eight or more games.

All but Sharper started for Seattle in its two playoffs wins preceding the Super Bowl. Seattle allowed under 300 yards to the 10^th ranked, Washington, and 14^th ranked, Carolina, team offenses. It smothered the Redskins. Shaun Alexander missed most of the game, and Seattle lacked the rushing attack that defined it. The Seahawks dropped five fumbles and lost three, forced no interceptions and lost the turnover battle three to one. But it held the ninth ranked Redskins rushing attack to 59 yards on 25 attempts. The Redskins had only three rushing first downs, and were 0-2 in red zone efficiency.

Seattle hired Tim Ruskell to remake the defense and he did. The Seahawks won their first playoff game in 20 years because of that defense. It then blew out the Carolina Panthers, powered by three interceptions, a forced fumble, its trademark rushing attack and sound execution in every phase, by every unit.

Seattle lost Super Bowl XL, but was not outplayed. Ruskell was the toast of the NFL. He was hired to remake the defense and did, and his remade defense was critical for the greatest run in Seahawks history. Ruskell also scored on offense. He signed Joe Jurevicius and Jurevicius was Seattle's most valuable target, keeping the pass game afloat after Darrell Jackson missed ten games.

Ruskell was unimpeachable. He was the pulse of the organization and the face of its future. The Seahawks success lifted all boats. Mike Holmgren was venerated after a controversial start to his career. John Marshall stepped in for Ray Rhodes, who had suffered a stroke in September of 2005, and his defense looked young and promising. Fringe players like Jordan Babineaux had earned a following among a resurgent fanbase. Matt Hasselbeck was in the discussion of best quarterbacks in football. Shaun Alexander was the league's MVP. Walter Jones and Steve Hutchinson formed the best left side in football. The spectre that haunted Seattle, the Seahawks could not win in the playoffs, was exorcised. It had won and decisively.

It finished the season Super Bowl losers. It was a team in decline.

The Future of Matt Hasselbeck is the Future of the Seattle Seahawks, Pt. 1

John Morgan — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 23:47:55 -0000

More photos » by Jeff Wheeler - AP

Every plan has risk. Investing in Matt Hasselbeck is the quickest path towards competing again. It also risks the longest, most painful path towards competing again.

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Last post for a few days. Enjoy the holiday if you celebrate. I know I can't count my blessings with every bone in a newborn baby's body.

This is the first in a multipart series examining how Seattle can determine its future by determining its quarterback of the future. The second part should be up on black Friday.

The Matt Hasselbeck Plan

A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away, Matt Hasselbeck started the season 25 of 36 for 279 yards. He wasn't well ahead or living on RAC. He wasn't Admiral Checkdown commanding the Y-wings to martyr themselves against the turrets of the opposing defense's Death Star. Hasselbeck was a capable quarterback, leading his team back from his own blunders to a shutout slaying of the St. Louis Rams.

Then Hasselbeck dropped his deflector shields and threw himself bodily down the 49ers exhaust shaft and towards the team's reactor core. He was stopped short by Patrick Willis' superlaser elbow smash.

Everything that has followed has sucked. Broken down Hasselbeck is not much more valuable than General Sack-Himself, Seneca Wallace. Hasselbeck has had broken ribs, and still suffers from a throwing-shoulder injury of unknown origin. The injuries, we must conclude, have taken their toll.

When Shaun Alexander slowed, his decline was inexorable. The smartest, most skilled back in the world can not overcome zero burst and swampfooted cutting ability. Hasselbeck and his fans are enduring a more complicated but no less painful decline. Unlike Alexander, Hasselbeck is not cooked, done, debilitated and embarrassing himself.

Matt Hasselbeck could recover and be a good quarterback again. His marginal arm strength is likely to decline, but not so badly he can no longer make his bread and butter mid-range throws. Hasselbeck can not do that today, but when he's healthy, he can.

In this plan, Seattle accepts what it has and does not have at quarterback. It sticks with Hasselbeck and attempts to build itself around what he can do. It improves the line and run game to keep Hasselbeck healthy and keep Hasselbeck viable when he is inevitably injured. Tim Ruskell continues to build the defense towards elite.

The plan might be enacted thus:

Rework and extend Hasselbeck's contract in the offseason. This will free immediate cap dollars and preempt a quarterback controversy.

Cut Patrick Kerney and Walter Jones.

Be players in free agency and in the trade market. Target undervalued backs from teams with depth, and attempt to buy elite free agents like Julius Peppers, Elvis Dumervil, Carlos Rogers and Richard Seymour. Seattle is no longer an attractive destination for players that want to win, but Paul Allen's money is no less green.

Approach the draft from a best talent available standpoint, but understand the need for talent at offensive line, running back and potentially wide receiver.

Tap Mike Teel as the long term replacement, or acquire young talent to contest him for the position.

How it works: Hasselbeck regains arm strength as his health improves, but, more importantly, Hasselbeck the signal caller comes to fore as Hasselbeck the quarterback recedes. The team builds around Hasselbeck's intelligence at the position and compensates for his deteriorating tools.

The Seahawks continue to redefine themselves as a defense-minded team. It doesn't panic and pour resources into the offense, attempting to remake an elite offense around a quarterback not capable of helming such an attack, but buttresses the offense and improves and stabilizes the offensive line. The Seahawks young talent gels, perhaps pushed over the top by a Peppers, Berry or Dunlap, and begins a run of dominance over a still very weak NFC West. If things break right, one February night in the coming decade, Robert dies of joy. We spread his ashes accross Qwest hiding our barely stifled smiles.

How it fails: Hasselbeck is never fully free of routine football abuse and therefore never free of debilitating injuries. The team invests in Matt Hasselbeck's skills and leadership and get Trent Green, Jake Delhomme, Mark Brunell, etc: A once very good quarterback at his body's end. The discord on offense prevents major gains by a talented defense, or, what gains are made, are wasted because of the Seahawks untenably bad offense.

Having invested in Hasselbeck and otherwise ignored the quarterback position, the team is stuck between stations, improving on defense as the offense crumbles--seasons away from any chance of renewal. Seattle spends its coming seasons betwixt good and bad, often settling into mediocre, but never a true contender. The upshot: The Seahawks can't collapse enough to rebuild.

Redskins' Coach Watch: Mike Holmgren Is Not Our Guy

KevinE — Thu, 05 Nov 2009 14:06:14 -0000

Field Gulls advise to stay away from Holmgren. Image via blogs.suntimes.com

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With Jim Zorn's fate sealed, the Redskins have already begun the hunt for a new head coach (and possibly GM). Since the Redskins front office has proven they have little skill or patience in selecting a leader not named Joe Gibbs, I've taken on the task to educate myself and anyone that cares about the strengths and weaknesses of the available candidates. We'll cover 3 main topics:

1.) Coach's reason for leaving their previous team
2.) Coach's relationship with the players
3.) Coach's ability to evaluate talent

First up is Mike Holmgren, and I'd like to thank John from the extremely popular and well versed SB Nation site, Field Gulls, for answering my Holmgren/Seahawks' related questions. In my final question, John gives a compelling argument of why the Redskins should stay away from Holmgren.

Hogs Haven: What were Holmgren's reasons for leaving? Seemed like he just wanted to retire, but he hasn't even been out of the NFL one year now he wants to coach again, preferably "an East coast team" as he said. Seems a little bizarre.

This is a somewhat controversial subject. Mike Holmgren announced he would retire after the 2008 season in January of 2008. Shortly thereafter, Tim Ruskell and Tod Leiweke announced that Jim Lawrence Mora would be the next coach of the Seattle Seahawks. Speculation is that Holmgren did not like that. Murmurs were that Holmgren wanted to return, but when asked Holmgren recited his stock "I promised Kathy I would take a year off and that's what I plan to do." Holmgren still hungers for football. He hated the way he went out both as a GM and a head coach and believes he has something to prove.

Hogs Haven: Holmgren would most likely assume the GM role as well. How would you rate his draft skills? At a quick glance, he seems to be almost perfect for the first 2 rounds. Dating back to the 2005 draft, everyone selected in the 1st two rounds is still on the roster, and dating back to 2000, he has picked a ton of winners (Hutchinson, Alexander, Trufant, Hamlin, Tatupa). From round 3-9, things get real dicey.

Holmgren was the GM from 1999 to 2002. He made two of the most important trades in team history: He traded a 10th overall and third round pick to Green Bay for Matt Hasselbeck, the 17th overall pick and a seventh round pick. Holmgren also traded Joey Galloway to Dallas for their 2000 and 2001 first round picks. He built the offense that led Seattle to Super Bowl XL. Holmgren had very little knack for defensive talent. His major achievement on defense was drafting Rocky Bernard, though selecting Ken Lucas in the second proved modestly successful too. Holmgren also failed at detail work. He could spot great offensive talent like Steve Hutchinson and mid-round systems players like Darrell Jackson, but his rosters lacked depth.

Hogs Haven: A lot of people would argue Holmgren played in easy division all those years, which explained the good record, but the inability to win the big games. There were a lot of NFC playoff losses. If you were Dan Snyder, would you have any hesitations making Holmgren your GM/Head coach?

If I were Dan Snyder I would have hesitations going to the dentist. I think Snyder wants a front for his machinations and that Holmgren is far too ambitious, proud and respected to be that.

Holmgren was perfectly respectable in the playoffs. He led the 2005 Seahawks to the Super Bowl and won Wild Card games in 2006 and 2007.

Hogs Haven: Any other thoughts I may have missed?

Sure. No team should want Mike Holmgren to be their coach or GM. There's a mystique that follows legendary figures and fans can fall into the trap of thinking that with the celebrity comes the success. Holmgren has a mind for offense and an eye for offensive talent, but many of the ways he forged his career with are outdated. He does not believe in the shotgun and very was resistant to implementing it in Seattle. He loathes trick plays and is conservative to a fault. Holmgren is loyal to a fault. He is stubborn. He decided in 2007 that announcing the team had abandoned the run was preferable to benching a clearly broken down Shaun Alexander. Mike Holmgren was a great NFL coach. His eye for and ability to develop quarterback talent is legendary. But Mike Holmgren is not still a great coach and hiring him would no more bring Washington Holmgren's offensive success than hiring Bill Cowher would make the Skins the Steelers.

Well damn. That is not a ringing endorsement.

Dan Snyder, as we all know too well, loves the big names. It gives the false illusion to season ticket holders that their investment is safe. As many people have echoed on this site, the hiring process should begin with a GM, not a coach. The Redskins have invested two years in the West Coast Offense, and my fear is that they are looking to plug a WCO coach first.

Next up...Jon Gruden, Russ Grimm, and Mike Shanahan.

Poll

Are you For or Against the hiring of Mile Holmgren as the Redskins next coach and GM?

Auditing the Seahawks Roster: Running Back

John Morgan — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 00:09:38 -0000

More photos » by Elaine Thompson - AP

Jones exhibiting his 4.51 speed.

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I have audited Seattle at left tackle, left guard and center. I have spoken extensively on Ray Willis and Max Unger, though less on Unger since he has become a pro. Today I want to talk about Seattle's running back situation.

Seattle has been without a superstar rusher since Shaun Alexander broke down. Teams that experience great success with a superstar rusher often think they need a superstar rusher to be successful. Seattle does not have a hallowed history, but running back is one position it has done well. The great Seahawks rushers have names any football fan knows: Shaun Alexander, Curt Warner and Chris Warren were all great rushers. Ricky Watters was a great back that spent a few late career years here. John L. Williams was a great running fullback.

Mike Holmgren had Alexander, Chuck Knox, Warner, and Tom Flores and Dennis Erickson shared Warren, though neither did spit with him. Jim Mora has Julius Jones, Justin Forsett and Edgerrin James. Jones, Force and James will never be spoken of with Alexander or even Warren, but does it matter?

The running game lost its grasp over the NFL before I was born. The modern NFL is a quarterback's league. The leading rushers of recent Super Bowl winners have been mostly late round picks like Willie Parker, Brandon Jacobs and Terrell Davis; and talented retreads like Michael Pittman, Corey Dillon and Antowain Smith. Davis was a superstar in his short time, so the point is not about effectiveness. Most Super Bowl winning teams have had an effective run game.

The point is that Super Bowl winning teams have not typically invested heavily into their running back position itself. Seattle is on that track. Jones is 28. The Seahawks signed him to a cheap contract after he was run out of Dallas. Jones is Seattle's primary running back. He is a good pass blocker and can receive. It's been a long time since he looked like a good rusher, but it's been a long time since he could look like a good rusher. The 2008 Seahawks collapsed. The 2009 Seahawks await their starting line to take the field together.

Stats are a red herring and even tape can be difficult to decipher. How do we separate the line from the back? Here is an attempt.

Julius Jones was draft 43^rd overall in the 2004 draft. He was the fifth running back selected. Jones ran a slow 4.51 at the Combine despite being a speed back at Notre Dame. There he set records returning kicks and punts. Jones does seem field fast, but his raw speed argues he can not lose significant speed before he is no longer a viable NFL running back.

If Jones is slowing down, you would expect it to show in his stats, but Jones' rushing and receiving longs are comparable to his career rushing and receiving longs. He doesn't look slow in the open field, he just isn't reaching the open field very often anymore.

Another thing that could slow Jones or make him less agile or easier to tackle is performance decline related to injuries. Jones has been very healthy for a back. His most significant injury was a broken scapula his rookie season. His next most significant injury was a high ankle sprain suffered in 2005. Since then, Jones has been healthy, avoiding major injuries and mostly avoiding nagging injuries.

Jones doesn't seem slower and he doesn't seem hobbled by injuries. He has developed a reputation as an unremarkable back and maybe he is. But Jones blocks well, receives well and is one the cheapest starting running backs in the NFL. His brother Thomas fits the same profile and was passed around the league before he landed on a contender. Thomas Jones has never been a remarkable rusher, but he stayed healthy, kept his speed and does the little things well. No one would argue if Thomas could be the lead rusher on a Super Bowl winning team - he was a Rex Grossman away from being just that in 2006.

So C.J. Spiller is awesome, Jahvid Best is hype, Jonathan Dwyer is big, and some of the kids are likely to crash the party, but are any of them the piece that pushes Seattle closer to a championship? I don't think so. I think Seattle could do it with Jones. And if it can do it with Jones and Jones is cheap, why spend precious resources to replace him?

Auditing the Seahawks Roster: Left Guard

John Morgan — Wed, 21 Oct 2009 00:05:22 -0000

Seattle needs better everything at guard. It is neither top heavy with talent nor deep with potential. It has one player with good potential that does not fit the scheme well and a host of generic offensive linemen and project players.

Rob Sims: Once upon a time, Rob Sims was probably the worst player you heard too much of. Mike Holmgren was never satisfied with Sims. Maybe it was holdover hostility for Ruskell losing Steve Hutchinson. Maybe Sims wasn't matched for Holmgren's demanding system of pull blocks. Maybe Sims was a more convenient target than Shaun Alexander. It seems almost implausible now, but many who followed the Seahawks, perhaps Holmgren believed it too, thought Sims was holding back Alexander in 2007.

I may have gotten too caught up defending Sims. I do not think I ever overstated his abilities, but rather I might have been too conservative for fear I would rile the Alexander partisans. You don't want to fight a battle on multiple fronts if you can avoid it, and to me defending Sims was auxiliary to identifying how awful Alexander had become.

Then Sims lost all of 2008. The debate was shelved. Talk ran to whether Julius Jones was fair, middling, mediocre or average. Mike Wahle showed us what good feet, good experience and a pair of arms hanging from zip ties could do - and could not do.

So it was with a bit of surprise that I saw Sims not just returning, returning to form or developing this season, but actually kicking ass. Sims was beginning to pair the steadiness and forgetability he had displayed as a pass blocker with mobility, lock down ability and dominance as a run blocker.

Then he got hurt again.

Sims is a restricted free agent this offseason. It could or should be a no brainer to retain him, but I am not sure it will be. Though Sims played tackle for part of his college career, and though Sims has good in-line quickness and straight line speed, he is not the prototypical, athletic-but-undersized zone lineman. He isn't tripping over his own feet anymore like he did in 2007, but he's not pulling out and commanding a position the way Wahle did in 2008, either.

This is a position Seattle can get better at. I've often thought of Sims as a right guard, regardless of where he played at Ohio State. But this isn't a position Seattle must upgrade to succeed. Sims is young, developing, a good pass blocker and, for at least one more season, cheap.

Mansfield Wrotto: Steve Vallos started over Wrotto last Sunday. Mr. Wrotto, say hello to Mr. Atkins.

Steve Vallos: Vallos has earned his stripes as the utility offensive lineman fans absolutely cringe at, "real" fans speak of in glowing coach speak, and real fans know is an interchangeable company man that will be cut and promoted to line coach the day he gets hurt, expensive or says "No."

"Vallos! Grab me that ShamWow, Matt needs to put his helmet on and it's sticking."

A Familiar Face At Lambeau Field

Mitchell_M — Tue, 20 Oct 2009 00:57:02 -0000

Green Bay's running difficulties have been somewhat overlooked this season. But more than a few people (myself included) have voiced their concern with the team's prospects running the football, especially in the red zone. Some members of this faction place the blame on Ryan Grant and DeShawn Wynn, who have been the primary running backs. These people want to see Wynn gone and Grant take a lesser role with the offense. The problem here is that there is no suitable replacement.

These people should be pleased to learn that the team brought in a few free agent running backs for a workout today. They are Dominic Rhodes, recently cut by the Buffalo Bills...and Ahman Green.

Yes, Ahman Green.

Green's departure from the team back in 2007 was non-descript despite his status as one of the better running backs in franchise history. Between 2000 and 2004, Green was an outstanding offensive threat, registering five straight seasons of 1,000+ yards, 40+ receptions, and 8+ total touchdowns. He was the rare back who could be a workhorse on the ground and on flat routes, combining power running with enough burst to break off monster gains.

Then the injuries piled up and turned him into a shell of his former self. Basically, it's what happened to Shaun Alexander before, what's happening to LaDanian Tomlinson now, and what might eventually happen to Adrian Peterson. Running backs hit 30 and start getting hurt and eventually become backups for younger versions of themselves. It's one of the few constants in the NFL.

Still, Green's track record, apparent recovery from his various ailments, and history with the franchise make him an intriguing prospect. After all, one of his best attributes has been his vision, which is something you don't lose until you hit old age in real life. Perhaps he can better avoid hitting his teammate's names on the backs of their jerseys while he keeps Grant fresher and (presumably) more able to produce effectively.

Personally, I doubt that Green would be able to contribute very much, if at all. This may sound good to those of you who doubt Ryan Grant's ability to execute basic run plays without running into the backs of his blockers, but this is no different than when the team worked out Levi Jones a few weeks ago. The team is simply kicking the tires on a couple of veterans to see if they could potentially fill an emergency role if players on the current roster got hurt.

The Offensive Line Part 3: The Healthy Year

John Morgan — Mon, 19 Oct 2009 18:51:01 -0000

More photos » by Elaine Thompson - AP

Players like Matt Hasselbeck make but also create hard decisions. He has been undoubtedly Seattle's greatest quarterback ever, but when is too soon to prepare for the future? And how can you win when you know the player you acquire is not likely better than Hasselbeck's past?

Browse more photos »

Steve Hutchinson is an amazing talent. Seattle wasn't building a line of amazing talents. Chris Gray was sagging, Walter Jones in decline, Sean Locklear as serviceable as ever and Chris Spencer and Rob Sims still getting their feet wet. But it had a healthy line. Jones missed one game, the only game missed by Seattle's starting five, and he missed that game as a precaution. It's not well remembered today, but Seattle's 2007 offense was good, even with Shaun Alexander. It was a twelth ranked offense and a 9^th ranked passing offense. The run game was solid outside of Alexander. Maurice Morris had his best season as a pro.

Seattle was healthy in 2007 and other than right guard, it did not seem to have pressing needs at offensive line. Jones was writing the book on modern dominance at left tackle and his historic peers at the position commonly played into their mid- to late-thirties. Sims and Spencer were the subject of Mike Holmgen's scorn, but neither player played that bad, and both were still very young at a position that historically peaks late.

The big flub happened in 2006 and hurt Seattle in the 2007 draft. Tim Ruskell traded the Seahawks first round pick for Deion Branch and then signed him to a six-year, $39 million. He desperately wanted out from Darrell Jacksons's contract, could not retain Joe Jurevicius after Vicious signed for less to play for his hometown Browns, had no interest in keeping Jeremy Stevens, was about to lose Bobby Engram to Graves Disease, and had signed Nate Burleson as a inexpensive project wide receiver and return man. Burleson has fulfilled both roles well. He has cost Seattle $2, $3.5 and $4 million against the cap his first three seasons.

Ruskell saw the Seahawks a contender and didn't see a better opportunity to add a wide receiver. He may have reached a bit, but the enormity of his decision is overblown. Late first round picks are seldom superstars and often outright busts. Had Seattle switched Branch for a generic, late-first round receiver, that receiver would have underperformed the disappointing Branch. It could have used that pick elsewhere however. It could have drafted Ben Grubbs, Arron Sears or Justin Blalock. All three have been solid, though Sears career may be over after a frightening concussion.

This marks the point where we can first say Ruskell was deemphasizing the offensive line. He didn't add significant talent in a significantly talented class, opting instead to draft project player, Mansfield Wrotto, in the fourth. The team made a run at Kris Dielman, but when Dielman frowned at Seattle's weather and went home to San Diego to sign for less, the Seahawks didn't have a plan ‘B'. Its good health at offensive line may have hidden a rotting foundation. Chris Gray started 16 but arguably shouldn't have started one. Excepting Jones, it wasn't very talented, and the youth movement Ruskell started with Spencer, Willis and Sims, was not added to or challenged. Tom Ashworth and Floyd Womack were still primary depth and the most promising successor to Jones was Locklear.

The year that Ruskell's plan was its most effective was also the year Ruskell's plan looked most ominous. Seattle didn't land one of that free agent class's big name guards and didn't acquire talent that could start in a pinch. Had the same injuries occurred that year as have this, Seattle was thinner and weaker and more likely to collapse with Tom Ashworth, Mansfield Wrotto and Steve Vallos thrust into action than even Kyle Williams, modern Wrotto and modern Vallos.

But it didn't and line depth didn't seem like such an awful big deal in 2007. What line could look good blocking Shaun Alexander? It had young parts, an ageless veteran and a defense that was starting to look like the future of the team.