SB Nation - Darrell Jackson

Nate Burleson, Mike Holmgren and John Morgan Walk into an Interview

John Morgan — Wed, 16 Dec 2009 00:01:11 -0000

Mike Holmgren will make a decision before Christmas. His choice is between the Cleveland Browns, who have expressed interest, and the Seattle Seahawks, who are assumed to be interested.

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Nate Burleson suffered a high ankle sprain during Sunday's game against the Houston Texans. Seattle initially signed Burleson to a poison pill contract comparable to Steve Hutchinson's. It was a sandbox moment for Tim Ruskell. A chance to kick down the kid's castle that had kicked down his. Seattle later restructured that contract and included a voidable year in 2010.

There's a lot to like about Burleson. If he recovers like many/most athletes post-ACL replacement, he should improve his agility into next year, and be 99% the player he was before the injury by 2010. That lost agility is conspicuous on returns, and, recently, during an end-around attempt against the Texans. Burleson lacks the ability to run angles and curves at a high speed like DeSean Jackson, Percy Harvin, Josh Morgan and, once upon a time, Nate Burleson. Burleson should recover some bendy-quicks, but not enough to be re-signed.

What he'll gain back through recovery will soon thereafter be lost because of age. Burleson turns 29 August of 2010. He's hardly old, be he is old enough to be mismatched with a rebuilding team. He also isn't very good.

Burleson rewards you with flash and kills you with details. He is notorious for quitting routes, deeking blocks and alternating good grabs with maddening drops. Before Greg Knapp, Burleson was an overpriced second receiver poorly fit to Mike Holmgren's system. Burleson appears better fit to Knapp's looser style, but he isn't producing at a much higher level. Despite an increase in targets and a resulting increase in yards, Burleson is still pretty close to a league average receiver.

The short-term impact of the injury is an opening for Deion Branch and Deon Butler. Branch has been phased out this season. It is difficult to be sure if Branch is worse or just less involved. He said before the season started that his knee would never be the same. As routine as ligament replacement is in the modern NFL, some players still do not respond well to the procedure, and it's possible Branch left something on the operating table.

Butler is more interesting, both because he is younger and faster, and because he is free of the controversial origin story. He also might not be much of a prospect. He's built like DeSean Jackson but plays like Darrell Jackson, and though he is quick into and out of his short cuts, it's difficult to see Butler making a career snatching passes in traffic; taking tackles like Bobby Engram.

The other news of the day involves retired head coach Mike Holmgren. Cleveland is hosting Holmgren and attempting to entice him into taking on a head of football operations position. It's a good fit for Holmgren. The team has a young, talented offensive line, a headcase quarterback with SnapOn tools, some young defensive talent and a lot of cap space and draft picks to invest towards a rebuild. Despite inferior leadership, the Browns are closer to contention than Seattle, and farther along in their rebuild. Brady Quinn is a presumptive bust, but a young 25. Hasselbeck did not make a regular season start until he was 26. Brett Favre was having his first great season as a pro at 25. He commemorated his age-24 season with a league worst 24 picks. The idea of a quarterback guru might be farcical, but Browns owner Randy Lerner didn't earn his fortune with smart business decisions. He inherited it from his father.

Holmgren has announced he wants to decide his destination before Christmas. That puts pressure on the Seahawks organization, or is intended to. It's entirely possible Seattle has no interest in Holmgren. I do not think that Holmgren was or will be a terrible GM, but that's a pretty low standard for expectations. I still hold out hope that the Seahawks can hire the NFL's first Billy Beane-like executive. There are numerous angles a smart strategist could exploit in the NFL. A savvy, young, creative and ambitious general manager could free Seattle from the orthodox approach of systems and windows and trend-following, and build the Seahawks into next decade's Red Sox.

Shoot, I'll volunteer myself and promise a return to the playoffs by 2011. I've made a lifetime out of irreverence. I'm sure it reads as ludicrous boasting by an armchair GM, but I am equally sure an outsider not indoctrinated in the league's procedures and methods could hand some of these good old boys their ass. And though it won't be me, I do hope it is somebody, somebody that's not Bill Polian's, by way of Rich McKay, by way of Ozzie Newsome, regional scout and Director of Doing Things the Same Way They've Always Been Done.

The Rise and Fall of Tim Ruskell: 2005

John Morgan — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 23:49:56 -0000

More photos » by Mark Duncan - AP

Joe Jurevicius was cut by the Tampa Bay Bucs March 1, 2005. Tim Ruskell signed him to a one-year contract later that month. He was Seattle's most valuable target in 2005, catching ten touchdowns and leading Seahawks wide receivers in DVOA. Darrell Jackson missed ten games that season.

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Tim Ruskell was announced as Seattle's new general manager of football operations February 23, 2005. He inherited a good team, a team that had made the playoffs in each of the prior two seasons, and a team with a winning record in four of Mike Holmgren's six seasons as head coach. He inherited a franchise quarterback turning 30, Matt Hasselbeck, two hall of fame talents on the offensive line, Steven Hutchinson and Walter Jones, a great running back in his prime, a good young cornerback, a three-tech, an oft-injured one-tech, a pair of system correct wide receivers and two controversial young safeties. A year later, the team Ruskell inherited represented the National Football Conference in Super Bowl XL.

Rumors notwithstanding, Ruskell's contract is up after the season. Seattle was 4-12 in 2008 and is 4-7 so far in 2009. His job is in the balance.

Seattle ranked 16^th in DVOA in 2004. It ranked 9^th in 2003 and 18^th in 2002. It had a below average defense in all three seasons. Ruskell was brought in to fix Seattle's defense. He built his reputation under Rich McKay and the Bucaneers dominant Tampa 2 defense was his living resume. The 2004 team finished 21^st in total defensive DVOA, 17^th in passing DVOA and 30^th in rushing DVOA. Pro Football Reference provides the starting defense in 2004 and the starting defense in 2005.

Seattle finished 15^th in defensive DVOA in 2005. It was worse against the pass, fading to 24^th, but better against the run, 5^th overall. The team did not make a sudden leap as is often described. It did improve significantly and through a significantly remade roster. The front seven was gutted. Rookies Lofa Tatupu, Leroy Hill, and free agent acquisitions Chuck Darby, Bryce Fisher and Jamie Sharper all started eight or more games.

All but Sharper started for Seattle in its two playoffs wins preceding the Super Bowl. Seattle allowed under 300 yards to the 10^th ranked, Washington, and 14^th ranked, Carolina, team offenses. It smothered the Redskins. Shaun Alexander missed most of the game, and Seattle lacked the rushing attack that defined it. The Seahawks dropped five fumbles and lost three, forced no interceptions and lost the turnover battle three to one. But it held the ninth ranked Redskins rushing attack to 59 yards on 25 attempts. The Redskins had only three rushing first downs, and were 0-2 in red zone efficiency.

Seattle hired Tim Ruskell to remake the defense and he did. The Seahawks won their first playoff game in 20 years because of that defense. It then blew out the Carolina Panthers, powered by three interceptions, a forced fumble, its trademark rushing attack and sound execution in every phase, by every unit.

Seattle lost Super Bowl XL, but was not outplayed. Ruskell was the toast of the NFL. He was hired to remake the defense and did, and his remade defense was critical for the greatest run in Seahawks history. Ruskell also scored on offense. He signed Joe Jurevicius and Jurevicius was Seattle's most valuable target, keeping the pass game afloat after Darrell Jackson missed ten games.

Ruskell was unimpeachable. He was the pulse of the organization and the face of its future. The Seahawks success lifted all boats. Mike Holmgren was venerated after a controversial start to his career. John Marshall stepped in for Ray Rhodes, who had suffered a stroke in September of 2005, and his defense looked young and promising. Fringe players like Jordan Babineaux had earned a following among a resurgent fanbase. Matt Hasselbeck was in the discussion of best quarterbacks in football. Shaun Alexander was the league's MVP. Walter Jones and Steve Hutchinson formed the best left side in football. The spectre that haunted Seattle, the Seahawks could not win in the playoffs, was exorcised. It had won and decisively.

It finished the season Super Bowl losers. It was a team in decline.

Notes from Seattle Seahawks Training Camp, Part 2

John Morgan — Thu, 13 Aug 2009 20:07:21 -0000

Justin Forsett was more involved in pass drills than last season. Greg Knapp likes to run play-action and then pass to his running backs and his running backs should all be able to catch. Forsett was especially active out of shotgun formations. That foreshadows his early role with the team this season: third-down back. Force has good hands, and his redirect is clean, but his routes are elementary if not unrefined. So it was nice to seem him run a play-action out of shotgun and then curl into the flat. Expect to see that play in the season, and given his skill-set, it could be a winner for Seattle.
Devin Moore attacks the edges. Seattle was attacking the edges a great deal in Monday's training camp. Moore is destined to start on Seattle's practice squad and if and when he ever breaks the roster, he looks exclusively like an edge and outside rusher. He broke an arm tackle in practice.
John Carlson motioned out of split backs and to tight end.
Aaron Curry ruled pass rush drills. He has great acceleration, size and pass rush technique. He will be a factor on blitzes if Seattle blitzes him both off the edge and between the tackles. It's the latter he looks potentially excellent at. In one drill, he ran past Owen Schmitt. Minutes later, the two collided with a resounding "crack".
Seattle executed a successful screen pass to the right side. Expect Julius Jones to be regularly targeted on screen passes.
Jordan Kent is two steps from being good. He has good hands and tracks the ball well. His athleticism is a given. He loses focus in traffic and can be knocked off his route. I hate to drop a noun that has connotations of manliness or the lack thereof, but Kent needs toughness. Kent needs to accept football is a hitting sport and thrive in it.
Curry slapped around Forsett in pass rush drills. It exhilarated a very ugly part of the soul like a good medieval stoning.
Heater looks like he can blitz. See if Seattle blitzes David Hawthorne on Saturday. Hawthorne is designated a middle linebacker, but I think he has the best skill-set to replace Leroy Hill in a pinch. He burst through the backfield on a run play and closed on Duckett, but it was a bad angle and even a man who relishes contact like Hawthorne can't take down a larger man with a step, angling the other direction. It would have taken a legendary arm-tackler like Rey Lewis to sink Duckett for a loss.
The player that broke Kent's concentration in traffic? Kelly Jennings. I expect Jennings to start for Marcus Trufant for as long as Trufant is out.
Michael Bumpus is the antipode of Jordan Kent.
On back to back plays, Brandon Mebane tore through Rob Sims. On the second he completed a pincers attack with Darryl Tapp. Matt Hasselbeck was the unlucky recipient of both.
Ben Obomanu came back to a pass that was otherwise in traffic. That's not a skill I've seen much from Obomanu and so it was encouraging.
Jordan Babineaux sacked Seneca Wallace on a safety blitz. Seattle was frequently blitzed its DBs.
That revealed Ray Willis's continued weakness against the edge rush. If only we had a young, skilled, developing and cheap tight end that could help chip edge rushers and minimize Willis' one damning weakness. Then Willis would be a two-ton, pneumatic clobbering machine. If only.
Michael Bennett suddenly appeared and played football. Consistency is a term rightfully lampooned, but if we can unpin our grammar rodeo ribbons for a second, I think we all know what coach's mean contextually when they say "consistency". And that's a player that fights every snap.
I saw Aaron Curry play end.
Not much info on Max Unger, but Mebane bent him like wheat in the wind and then dropped him entirely. Unger, so polished, so good at football, is learning so many positions that he might be a bit slow getting up to speed.
Darryl Tapp had the sweetest move of training camp. In team drills, he exploded towards Kyle Williams, got Williams backpedaling, then dropped his shoulders, did this freaky bob-weave, lulled Williams into a trance and exploded again through and past Williams for a sack. Let it be known now that if Seattle fails to re-sign Tapp, I will summon a plague on Renton's first born.
Mr. Raw is likely Seattle's starting right guard. Mansfield Wrotto is raw like unfinished, and raw like, nasty, hardcore and sanguinary. He defused Craig Terrill's spin move and then effortlessly slid Terrill wide. If this is a sign of development as a pass protector - Oh and it is - Wrotto could be fulfilling the talent that got him drafted. Somewhere Darrell Jackson picks his foot-long goatee.
Sims contained Mebane. Mebane was auditioning a spin move.
Red Bryant doubled-over Mansfield Wrotto the wrong way. Wrotto is hugely powerful and has great leverage. Bryant is another species.
Nick Reed put an inside move on Williams and slid past him. He also showed a good swim move. Unger matched skill with Reed and won.
After practice and across the field I saw Derek Walker head down, two helmets in each hand, slumping towards the VMAC. Walker has been so impressive to me, but I don't think he is getting recognition from the coaches. So I said to Walker "stick with it, you're doing good out there." He looked surprised.

The Deion Branch Trade Three Years Later

John Morgan — Tue, 07 Jul 2009 20:46:40 -0000

More photos » by Ted S. Warren - AP

Fans expected Deion Branch to be great and he hasn't been, but however disappointing, Branch has fulfilled Tim Ruskell's reasons for trading for him.

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It's indisputable that Tim Ruskell's trade for Deion Branch has been a disappointment. What remains unexplored is if the trade should be a disappointment. Branch hasn't been great and a first round pick seems like a steep price, but is it really? If Seattle had instead drafted Branch with that pick instead of trading for Branch, what would the expected return be?

Using the model provided by Advanced NFL Stats, we can make a reasonable guess. Branch would have been the fourth wide receiver drafted. The fourth wide receiver drafted's career averages about 530 yards per season and 4.7 seasons starting. Branch has averaged 599 yards per season over 32 starts and 33 games played. That 33 is of a possible 46. Branch was traded on September 11, 2006 and not capable of playing until week three. Depending on how you figure it, Branch has either been Seattle's primary starter for two seasons or for three seasons with time lost due to injury.

The other matter is the contract. Branch received a six-year, $39 million dollar contract to sign with Seattle. That has made him one of the top ten most expensive wide receivers in football the last two seasons. Branch has not played like a top-ten receiver, and even among those just paid like top-ten receivers, he's a clear step behind even Bernard Berrian. Seattle hasn't really suffered the cap hit. They've been active in free agency and not too strapped to sign a player they want. Branch's contract could have forced Seattle to unload Peterson and draft Curry, or could have taken Seattle out of the Chris Canty race and forced them to sign Colin Cole, and those are real consequences that hurt, but they are also hypothetical. They assume Seattle filled Branch's position some other way and that other way was much cheaper. And that might be stretch. 2007's free agent class was weak and even Kevin Curtis cleaned up signing a six-year, $32 million contract.

Ruskell traded Seattle's first round pick and signed Branch to a mega-contract because he thought he was signing a number one wide receiver. Maybe. Maybe Ruskell traded Seattle's first round pick and signed Branch to a mega-contract because he thought Branch was better and would be better sooner than a wide receiver Seattle could take in the 2007 draft. He thought Seattle had the cap space and that Branch was better than any other wide receiver available in the 2007 free agent class. Except for arguably Kevin Curtis, he was. And Ruskell thought Seattle needed that wide receiver to contribute in 2006 and needed that wide receiver to make Darrell Jackson expendable in 2007. If that's the case, and I think that is the case, then the Branch deal, if by no means a smash, has been a success.

Anthony Gonzalez and Wide Reciever Stats, Part 2

shake n bake — Mon, 22 Jun 2009 00:56:14 -0000

I explained how Catch% and YPR are very important tools for evaluating WRs and showed Anthony Gonzalez's success in both in part 1. Now I'll expand on the relationship between the two, and what it can tell us about WR performance.

YPR isn't a perfect measure of how deep a WR is catching the ball. A 15 yard pass could be a pass caught 3 yards deep and run for 12 more yards, or it could be a pass caught 15 yards deep with no YAC, or anything between. Since not all WRs are equally good at running after the catch, and certain routes allow for different amounts of YAC, YPR isn't the best measure of how deep a WR is catching the ball.

Luckily some places WR YAC is kept, allowing a calculation of the average depth a WR caught the ball. This should be the best measure of WR usage available without going through play by play.

There were 168 player-seasons with 50+ targets the last two years. Among these 168 their AirYPR and Catch% had a r squared value (the percent of the variance in Catch% accounted for by AirYPR) of .16 , meaning that 16% of the variation in catch% can be accounted for by YPR. That is a small correlation, but it is significant, especially when considering that it doesn't account for WR skill, defense ability or QB skill. The average depth a WR catches the ball at, accounts for 16% of the variation in the percent of the time he catches the ball. To relate this level of relatedness, this is a similar correlation to team wins vs Offensive Yards Per Carry and team wins vs team penalties (or more accurately, since the correlation for penalties is negative, team losses and penalties).

Just like committing penalties is a significant factor is losing games and running for a good YPC is related to winning, a WRs AirYPR is related to his Catch%.

So there's a solid relation between the two. Now the useful part. Mgrex03 lent me a hand to use a logarithmic regression instead of the a straight linear one I used before. Average AirAPR was 9.18 and average catch% was 58.8%. Combining these two with the logarithmic regression gives a formula for the catch% of an average receiver for a given AirYPR. We can compare this to the WRs actual catch% for a measure of how well a WR catches the football.

It's not an overall metric of WRs because YAC is excluded. A WR's job breaks down into Getting Open, Catching the Football and Running after the Catch. This covers none of the run after, pretty much all of the catching and some elements of getting open (more room to catch raising catch%). As a alternative to the rate stat, there's Receptions over Average, the WR's receptions minus (the expected catch% for his AirYPR muliplied by his targets). Giving how many more or less catches the player had compared to what would be expected for an average WR with the player's number of targets.

And now the results

Full spreadsheet here (download)

Top 10 Catch% over average

Player	Targets	C% over Average
Ike Hilliard 08	58	+17.8%
Anthony Gonzalez 07	51	+16.2%
Jabar Gaffney 07	50	+13.1%
Gonzalez 08	57	+12.4%
Andre Johnson 07	86	+12.3%
Steve Breaston 08	113	+10.6%
Josh Reed 08	79	+10.3%
Bobby Engram 07	134	+10.3%
Wes Welker 07	145	+10.3%
Reggie Wayne 07	156	+10.3%

Bottom 10 Catch% over Average

Player	Targets	C% over Average
Marty Booker 07	105	-11.7%
Jerry Porter 07	102	-12.1%
Ted Ginn Jr. 08	71	-13.6%
Darrell Jackson 07	104	-14.5%
Drew Bennett 07	73	-14.8%
Justin McCareins 08	73	-14.9%
Braylon Edwards 08	138	-15.2%
Keary Colbert 07	69	-15.6%
Roy Williams 08	82	-16.0%
Brad Smith 07	67	-16.5%

Top 10 Receptions over Average

Player	Targets	Rec over Average
Andre Johnson 08	170	+16.4
Wayne 07	156	+16.0
Welker 07	145	+15.0
Engram 07	134	+13.9
Breaston 08	113	+12.0
Colston 07	144	+11.8
Randy Moss 07	160	+10.8
Royal 08	129	+10.7
Mason08	58	+10.6
Andre Johnson 07	150	+10.6

Bottom 10 Receptions over Average

Player	Targets	Rec over Average
Keary Colbert	69	-10.4
Arnaz Battle 07	104	-10.8
Drew Bennett	73	-10.8
Justin McCariens 08	73	-10.8
Brad Smith	67	-11.1
Marty Booker 07	105	-12.3
Jerry Porter 07	102	-12.3
Roy Williams 08	82	-13.1
Darrell Jackson 07	104	-15.1
Braylon Edwards 08	138	-21.0

Grading Draft Grades (a look at the 2008 NFL Draft evaluations)

Douglas A. Lee — Tue, 28 Apr 2009 17:30:10 -0000

More photos » by Ed Andrieski - AP

The national football pundits think the Broncos were crazy to draft cornerback Alphonso Smith after signing several veteran defensive-backs in free agency.

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As I mentioned yesterday, we as football fans LOVE to read draft grades. It provides validation on so many levels - if we are pleased with our team's draft, we enjoy the confirmation of a positive grade from Mel Kiper or Clark Judge. On the other hand, a negative review from Dr. Z or Todd McShay obviously means they have no clue what they're talking about.

Of course, the same applies to those of us who dislike our own team's results - although a glowing draft grade may temper our feelings a bit, a negative one will just send our blood boiling - "The Broncos totally screwed up the draft - I was saying it all weekend. Peter King says the same thing, so obviously I WAS RIGHT!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"

This is something we've all been guilty of at some point in our Denver Broncos fandom. Some of us (Styg, HT) probably outgrew reading draft grades by age 11. For the rest of us, it's taken a little bit longer, if it's even happened for everyone (it hasn't). Look, it's understandable - these guys are paid to write about professional football; they eat, drink, talk, walk and sleep football. So, they must know what's best for the Denver Broncos, right?

In 2009, the reaction so far has been thus: those of us who love the Broncos' draft (like me, admittedly), point to the Broncos' reluctance to stray from their board, and their preference to select who they perceived to be the best player remaining at each point in the draft.

Others are infuriated by Denver's failure to emerge with more than end Robert Ayers for the defense's front seven. They see the Broncos' free-agent signings of running backs Correll Buckhalter, J.J. Arrington and LaMont Jordan, combined with the selection of Knowshon Moreno at #12 and their eyes bulge. Next, they consider the free-agent acquisitions of defensive backs Brian Dawkins, Renaldo Hill and Andre' Goodman, and they are perplexed by the decision to choose Alphonso Smith, Darcel McBath and David Bruton this weekend.

Look, if you feel this way, you certainly are not alone. If you prefer validation for your opinion rather than my counter-argument, you need look no further than...

Clark Judge of CBS

I'm sorry, but after one draft I have no confidence Denver knows what it's doing. All I know is that I would like to be there when Denver owner Pat Bowlen asks Josh McDaniels why it was such a good idea to spend Bowlen's money on free agents J.J. Arrington, Correll Buckhalter and LaMont Jordan when the Broncos would use their first pick on running back Knowshon Moreno.

John Clayton of ESPN

Denver rookie head coach Josh McDaniels doesn't have a grasp on how to build a team. He signed three running backs in free agency and drafted another (Knowshon Moreno). And then he sent Denver's first-round choice in 2010 to Seattle for this year's 37th overall choice, which he used to pick cornerback Alphonso Smith. That's bizarre. Mike Shanahan must be laughing at that one.

Woody Paige of the Denver Post

And what about running backs Correll Buckhalter, La-Mont Jordan, J.J. Arrington and last year's RB du jour, Ryan Torain? Peyton Hillis, 2008's leading rusher, has gone to fullback, and possibly gone. Are those running backs as disposable as diapers?

What do you think? Did the Broncos unnecessarily draft a WR last year when they took Eddie Royal? Want that choice back?

Now, here's the problem I see. Aside from Woody (who spends more time examining the national picture due to his Around the Horn responsibilities), we're talking about guys who are paid to cover the entire NFL. Quite frankly, they don't have the time or the energy to truly understand each team's needs. I don't expect them to, because were I in their shoes I couldn't do better. I believe that every MHR regular (staff, readers, everyone!) knows more about the Broncos, their roster makeup and their needs than the guys I just cited. We just have more time to devote to our beloved Broncos.

Where's my proof? Well, how about this - let's take a look at what some of the other national "experts" said about the Broncos' 2008 Draft. Just to recap, Denver added wide receivers Keary Colbert and Darrell Jackson through free agency, yet still decided to draft Eddie Royal with their second-round pick. Sound familiar? Other folks saw the Broncos' defensive problems and figured they HAD to go defense in round one. Well, here was the reaction nationally...

Larry Weisman of USA Today

GRADE: D+

Denver Broncos: Happy times when need and the right player coincide. Ryan Clady can eventually step in at LT, where the Broncos lost 11-year veteran Matt Lepsis to retirement. WR Eddie Royal helps on punt returns and gives Denver wiggle room with Brandon Marshall, a question mark because of an arm injury. But why draft Royal after signing veterans Darrell Jackson and Keary Colbert and Brandon Stokley before that? Lot of money is being tied up in this position.

Patrick Luo of NFL Draft Site
Denver Broncos: (D) Ryan Clady, Eddie Royal, Kory Lichensteiger, Jack Williams, Ryan Torain, Carlton Powell, Spencer Larsen, Joshua Barrett, Peyton Hillis.

Outside the picks of Ryan Clady and Petyon Hillis, the Broncos’ draft was horrible. Javon Walker left so a receiver needed to be drafted. But was Royal really the best you could do? Malcolm Kelly, Limas Sweed, and DeSean Jackson are all on the board. Lichensteiger is an interesting pick because he’s not the best center and the Broncos don’t have an immediate need for center. Not to mention he’s a reach in the 4th round. Jack Williams was a big reach in the 4th round, and same goes for Torain in the 5th. I hope the Denver scouting teams knows something I don’t because their draft was pretty bad.

SportzNutz.com
Ryan Clady can eventually step in at LT, where the Broncos lost 11-year veteran Matt Lepsis to retirement. The key word though is eventually, and Lepsis is already gone. But the real head scratcher is why draft Royal this high after signing veterans Darrell Jackson and Keary Colbert and Brandon Stokley before that? Going to be running some 6 receiver sets?

Paul Zimmerman (Dr. Z) of SI
Denver Broncos: Mike Shanahan feels that establishing the run (tackle Ryan Clady drafted first) is more important than stopping it, which the Broncos couldn't do last year, and far be it from me to second guess him. How about first guess?

How about this guy? Wanna give him back?

So, would anyone out there like to give back Ryan Clady and Eddie Royal? Would the Broncos have enough wide receivers today had Mike Shanahan and Co. not selected Royal? For what it's worth, there were two defensive linemen selected in the first round after Clady's choice in 2008 - Lawrence Jackson to Seattle at #28 and Kentwan Balmer to San Francisco at #29. Jackson and Balmer combined last year to make 36 total tackles and 2 sacks. Please raise your hand if you'd prefer either of those players over Ryan Clady.

What bothers me most about the 2009 evaluations above is this: guys like Clayton and Judge make it sound like Josh McDaniels and Brian Xanders signed J.J. Arrington, Correll Buckhalter and LaMont Jordan to play running back, with the future knowledge that they were about to draft Knowshon Moreno at #12 on Saturday. Really? Sure sounded to me like Denver would've happily taken B.J. Raji, were he available. That's not how the chips fell.

What's my point here? Honestly, you and I know more about the Broncos' needs than the guys insisting on TV and across the internet that Denver didn't need another running back or defensive back. More importantly, Josh McDaniels and Brian Xanders know more in that department than all of us combined. So sure, go ahead and read the post-Draft report cards. I did, and not just for the sake of Horse Tracks. I'm interested to see what people think, just like I always have been. It's just that now, I take in these grades with a grain of salt big enough to cover the Invesco playing field.

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IId. The McNolan Era (2005-2008)

Florida Danny — Thu, 16 Apr 2009 00:00:14 -0000

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Sorry about the delay in getting this one posted. My computer crashed yesterday because a genius (aka me) let the battery run out, so I had to wait until it fully recharged (aka today) to continue writing up the piece.

Yesterday, in Part 2c of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Donahue regime's picks from 2002-2004 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Donahue's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks, especially when your team sucks.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
I <3 the Pac-10!
BCS or die!

In comparison with the Walsh II and Policy regimes, Donahue didn't make the Policy regime mistake of trading away picks when the team was good (2002), he used Walsh II's strategy of drafting for need on Day 1 when rebuilding, he brought back the Policy regime's affinity for Pac-10 players, and he surpassed both Walsh II and the Policy regime in percentage of picks that came from BCS conferences

In this article, I'll be ending the regime breakdowns with a look at the McNolan era (2005-2008).

After the jump, I'll put the McNolan drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; sum up the regimes; and provide the idiot's guide to McNolan draft strategy...

Here again is the link to my Excel spreadsheet of 49er draft picks in the Salary Cap Era. I realized that some of you probably don't have Excel 2007, so I converted it to be compatible with older versions (and fixed the link in previous posts as well):

49er Draft Picks 1994-2008

IN CONTEXT

In Part 2c, I told you how Donahue didn't hit the home run he needed to with his rebuilding project in the 2004 draft. One additional piece of evidence for this is the fact that, by the very next draft, Donahue's replacements had to rebuild the roster once more through the draft. Therefore, Donahue's 2004 fire sale and draft has to rank among the shortest rebuilding phases of a franchise in the history of sports (and not in a good way). Now, I'm sure you don't need some long-winded description of what the team has done record-wise since 2004, so I'll just get on with the specific needs in each of McNolan's drafts:

2005 Draft - Key Losses: WR Cedrick Wilson (free agency), OL Kyle Kosier (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (career-threatening injury), OL Scott Gragg (free agency), DL John Engelberger (trade), DB Ronnie Heard (free agency), K Todd Peterson (free agency). Weak 2004 Stats: 30^th in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA; 19^th in ST DVOA.¹ Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for QB Jeff Garcia, RB Garrison Hearst, WR Terrell Owens, and DB Zack Bronson; major injuries to QB Tim Rattay, LB Andre Carter, DB Ahmed Plummer. Needs: QB, RB, WR, OL, DL, DB, K, LB depth.

2006 Draft - Key Losses: QB Tim Rattay (trade), RB Kevan Barlow (trade), FB Fred Beasley (free agency), WR Brandon Lloyd (trade), WR Johnnie Morton (released), LB Julian Peterson (free agency), LB Andre Carter (free agency), and DB Ahmed Plummer (career-threatening injury). Weak 2005 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Garcia, Hearst, Owens, and Bronson; major injury to TE Eric Johnson. Needs: FB, WR, LB, DB, QB depth, RB depth, TE depth.

2007 Draft - Key Losses: WR Antonio Bryant (released), TE Eric Johnson (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (free agency), and DB Tony Parrish (released). Weak 2006 Stats: 22^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA; 18^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bronson; OL Larry Allen and DL Bryant Young now in their mid-30s. Needs: WR, DB, ST, TE depth, OL depth, DL depth.

2008 Draft - Key Losses: WR Darrell Jackson (free agency), OL Larry Allen (retirement), OL Justin Smiley (free agency), DL Bryant Young (retirement), DL Marques Douglas (free agency), and LB Derek Smith (free agency). Weak 2007 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bryant; major injuries to QB Alex Smith, OL Jonas Jennings, and LB Manny Lawson. Needs: WR, OL, DL, LB, QB depth.

In preparation for its drafts, McNolan has had to deal with about 7 key losses per offseason, which is fewer than Walsh II (8), but more than Donahue (4) and the Policy regime (4). Interestingly, the course of McNolan's tenure has seen a mixture of his 3 predecessors' draft contexts. The 2005 and 2006 offseasons were Walshian, with about 8 key self-induced, salary-cap-caused losses per season that generally involved kicking dead weight to the curb or trading it for draft picks. The 2007 offseason was Donahue-esque, with only 4 key losses and a team feeling good about itself after a promising season. Finally, 2008 was Policy-like in that there were two retirements to deal with. Overall, I'd say the most similar previous context to McNolan's was the Walsh II era.

I know this is totally off-topic, but, Cedrick Wilson may have made the greatest career decision in the history of the NFL by signing with PIT after the 2004 season. If he stays in SF, he's stuck on a 6-win team for the foreseeable future (at least until he roughed up his ex-girlfriend) catching passes from Rattay, Smith, Ken Dorsey, Cody Pickett, Trent Dilfer, Shaun Hill, and Chris Weinke. Instead, he goes to PIT and wins a ring his first season with the team catching passes from Ben Roethlisberger. Seriously, whatever it was that made him leave the Niners, he needs to bottle and sell it. Can you guys think of any other player in recent years who's lucked out like that?

Anyway, back to the regularly scheduled program. For the sake of comparison, here's how McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup in 2005 and 2006:

Morton (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Wilson
Snyder (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Kosier
OL Eric Heitmann (2002 Donahue draft pick) for Newberry
OL Kwame Harris (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Gragg
Douglas (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Engelberger (after moving Young to 3-4 DE)
DB Mike Adams (2003 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Heard
K Joe Nedney (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Todd Peterson
Smith (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Rattay
RB Frank Gore (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Barlow
FB Moran Norris (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Beasley
Bryant (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Lloyd
WR Arnaz Battle (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Morton
Lawson (2006 McNolan draft pick) for Julian Peterson
LB Brandon Moore (2002 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Carter (after moving him to 4-3 ROLB)
DB Shawntae Spencer (2004 Donahue draft pick) for Plummer (after moving him to LCB)

Adding it all up, McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup with 5 traditional free agents, 4 draft picks, and 6 players originally acquired by Donahue. Comparing this to the previous regimes, McNolan used free agency more than Walsh II and Donahue, but less than Policy; and they had a "holdover rate" of 33.3%, which was smack dab in between Walsh II (16.7%) and Donahue (50.0%).

So there's the context. Hopefully you sense a pattern emerging here: the contexts of McNolan drafts have been a cocktail of issues and solutions having the ingredients of each predecessor; 2 ½ parts Walsh II, 1 part Donahue, and ½ part Policy.

PICKS, PICKS, AND MORE PICKS

From 2005-2008, the 49ers made 35 selections in the NFL draft, which nearly equalled the Walsh II and Donahue rate of 9 picks per season. In 2005 and 2006, the main rebuilding years, McNolan stockpiled picks via all those trades I mentioned earlier; just like Walsh II and Donahue. The past 2 drafts, however, McNolan has tended to trade away picks (you're welcome, NE) rather than stockpile them; just like the Policy regime. Once again, the trend here is for McNolan to be a mixture of all 3 predecessor's strengths and weaknesses.

In terms of McNolan's overall Pro Bowl rate, a Donahue-esque and Walshian 5.7% of its picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers (Gore and LB Patrick Willis). However, its starter rate of 34.3% - which includes OL Chilo Rachal's midseason and DB Dashon Goldson's offseason ascensions - is the worst of the 4 regimes (Policy regime = 41.4%; Walsh II = 48.1%; Donahue = 48.1%). When you remember the differences in context between regimes, you realize that McNolan has been way worse at picking starters than the context-similar Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse than the context-different Policy regime, whose superior teams made it harder for draft picks to crack the starting lineup (i.e., the Policy regime's starter rate is artificially low due to context).

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has continued the Walsh II and Donahue standard of 9 draft picks per season.
McNolan has stockpiled picks when the team sucked, and traded away picks when (they thought) the team was good.
McNolan has been as bad at picking Pro Bowlers as the "unlikely to have Pro Bowlers because the team sucked" Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse at picking starters than the "unlikely to have draft selections start because the team was good" Policy regime.
Overall, McNolan seems to be channeling the good and bad of its 3 predecessors.

DAY ‘N' NIGHT

McNolan has taken exactly 40% of its picks on Day 1 of the draft, and 60% on Day 2. That's almost identical to Walsh II's 41/59 split, which, as I said in Part 2c, was smack dab between the Policy (52/48) and Donahue (33/67) regimes.

Looking at the relative success of its picks by draft day, we find that 64.3% of McNolan's Day 1 picks have become 49er starters, which is, again, right in the middle of the 4 regimes; not as good as Walsh II's (81.8%, which I incorrectly reported as 64.3% in Part 2b), but basically on par with the Policy regime's (60.0%) and Donahue's (55.6%). Remember, though that Walsh II and Donahue are the better comparisons in terms of team context. On Day 2, an abysmal 14.3% of McNolan picks have become 49er starters, easily the worst of the 4 regimes (again, even worse than the starter-unlikely Policy regime). So while McNolan has had pretty standard success on Day 1 in terms of starters, it's been horrible at picking Day 2 starters.

The best example of this dichotomy between Day 1 and Day 2 results is McNolan's initial rebuilding draft in 2005. Here it is:

Rd	Player	Pos	Starter?	Pro Bowl?
1	Alex Smith	QB	Yes	No
2	David Baas	OL	Yes	No
3	Frank Gore	RB	Yes	Yes
3	Adam Snyder	OL	Yes	No
5	Ronald Fields	DL	No	No
5	Rasheed Marshall	WR	No	No
6	Derrick Johnson	DB	No	No
7	Daven Holly	DB	No	No
7	Marcus Maxwell	WR	No	No
7	Patrick Estes	TE	No	No
7	Billy Bajema	TE	Yes	No

Day 1? 4 picks, 4 starters, 1 Pro Bowler. Day 2? 7 picks, 1 starter, 0 Pro Bowlers. Enough said.

With regard to Pro Bowlers, however, the preferred drink is once again "Regime Cocktail." On Day 1, 14.3% of McNolan's picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers, which is slightly worse than the Pro-Bowl-likely Policy regime (20.0%), considerably better than Donahue (0.0%), and slightly better than Walsh II (9.1%). OK, correction: McNolan drinks Regime Cocktail only on Day 1. That's because, it has yet to pick a Day 2 Pro Bowler. Of course, it's not like the other two Pro-Bowl-unlikely regimes (Walsh II = 6.3%; Donahue = 5.3%) were much better at it.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has had a Walshian 40/60 split of picks between Day 1 and Day 2.
McNolan has been worse than Walsh II, but better than Donahue, at picking Day 1 starters.
McNolan has been far less successful than the other 3 regimes at picking Day 2 starters.
McNolan has been more successful than Walsh II and Donahue at picking Day 1 Pro Bowlers, but slightly worse than these two regimes at picking Day 2 Pro Bowlers.

ASSUME THE POSITION

Here's how McNolan has used its 35 picks by position, unit, and draft day:

Pos	Day 1	Day 2	Total
QB	1	0	1
RB	1	1	2
FB	0	0	0
WR	2	5	7
TE	1	2	3
OL	4	1	5
DL	2	5	7
LB	2	1	3
DB	1	6	7
K	0	0	0
P	0	0	0
OFF Total	9	9	18
DEF Total	5	12	17
ST Total	0	0	0
Total	14	21	35

Overall, McNolan has basically split their picks up evenly between units, which is more similar to what the Policy regime and Donahue did than Walsh II's need-induced DEF preference. Also, like Walsh, McNolan hasn't taken any ST players in the draft. Of course, that may have something to do with having Nedney and ROBO-PUNTER on the roster. What's most interesting here, however, is that, although OFF has received equal attention on Days 1 and 2, 70.6% of McNolan's DEF picks have come on Day 2.

The even split of OFF picks between draft days is a little misleading because McNolan was actually Walshian in 2005 and 2006 when it had to replace most of the OFF. Going back to that 2005 draft that I showed earlier, you'll notice that all 4 Day 1 picks were on OFF. This continued in 2006 when they selected TE Vernon Davis in the 1^st round after Johnson suffered a major injury the previous season. Essentially, McNolan followed the Walsh II example of spending Day 1 of rebuilding drafts addressing the most glaring positional needs. This is really eye-opening when you consider that Scot McCloughan claims to be a devout believer in "best player available." Is he full of sh*t or is the focus on need in Day 1 of the 2005 and 2006 drafts just a coincidence? I'll leave you to decide.

DEF, however, is a different animal altogether. From the table, it's clear that the draft day disparity on DEF has been due to an inordinate amount of Day 2 picks being spent on DLs and DBs. The 5 Day 2 DLs were, in order of selection, Ronald Fields, Parys Haralson, Melvin Oliver, Jay Moore, and Joe Cohen; the 6 Day 2 DBs were Derrick Johnson, Daven Holly, Marcus Hudson, Vickiel Vaughn, Goldson, and Tarell Brown. Looking at these lists, you could say that McNolan has gotten worse over time picking Day 2 DLs, whereas it's gotten better over time picking Day 2 DBs. Either way, aside from Haralson and Goldson, that's a pretty mediocre-at-best bunch. So, if you want to know why the DEF has sucked for so long (before Singletary pulled their heads out of their asses), look no further than McNolan mostly waiting until Day 2 to pick DEF players. Couple this with McNolan's aforementioned horrible starter rate on Day 2, and you get one wet, stinking heap of also-ran-ity.

With 71.4% of picks taken on Day 2, WR is another position at which McNolan has focused little Day 1 attention. The two Day 1 WRs were Brandon Williams and Jason Hill, both 3^rd-rounders.

Hopefully, you're starting to see a trend here. McNolan gets credit for using Walsh II's "pick for need on Day 1" and "bites at the apple" strategies. However, it's made the mistake of waiting until Day 2 to take most of their bites at DL, DB, and WR. Perhaps, then, one reason why the Niners haven't been able to get over the mediocre 7-9 hump since 2005 is because their WR, DL, and DB corps are populated with Day 2 picks.

To drive it home, here's one last point about McNolan's (lack of) success wtith DEF picks. On OFF, McNolan's starter rate (44.4%) has been similar to that of the Policy regime (43.8%), Walsh II (50.0%), and Donahue (46.2%). However, the DEF starter rates for the previous 3 regimes were 47.1% for Walsh II, 41.7% for Donahue, and 33.3% for the Policy regime. McNolan's? 23.5%!

All is not lost, however. Unlike Donahue, McNolan seems to have actually learned something about positional picks as its tenure has progressed. Namely, 2 of their 3 picks in 2008 were DEF players. Whether or not DL Kentwan Balmer and DB Reggie Smith pan out in the long run, at least McNolan seems to have noticed that their previous Day 1 picks on DEF have become integral parts of the starting unit. Don't believe me? Here they are: Lawson, Willis, and DL Ray McDonald. So, their results - 2 starters, 1 Pro Bowler, and an emerging pass-rush specialist - were not shabby at all. This suggests that (a) when McNolan commits Day 1 resources to DEF, it's been pretty successful; and (b) the regime seems to have figured this out. So, at the very least, kudos to them for that.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Walsh II, McNolan has focused its Day 1 picks on the most glaring positional needs (when it had to).
McNolan has employed Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy at WR, DL, and DB. However, they've primarily waited until Day 2 to take their bites.
Given their propensity for waiting until Day 2 for DEF picks, it's not surprising that McNolan has been horrible at drafting DEF starters.
Based on 2008, McNolan seems to have learned from their "wait until Day 2 for DEF" mistake.

CONFERENCE ROOM

So far, I've basically told a story about how the McNolan regime's drafts have been a little bit Walsh II, a little bit Donahue, and a little bit Policy; how they've used the good strategies as well as the bad. Basically, not too hot, not too cold; I'll call it "Goldilocks" if you will. The conference breakdown is where that tale ends. There's one regime's lead in particular that McNolan has been happy to follow, and I'm sure you'll easily be able to figure it out. Here's how McNolan's 35 picks shake out by conference: 7 ACC picks, 7 SEC picks, 6 Big 12 picks, 6 Pac-10 picks, 4 Big 10 picks, 1 Big East pick, 1 Conference USA pick, 1 MAC pick, 1 MAII pick, and 1 MWC pick.

BCS anyone? McNolan has taken a Donahue-esque 88.6% of its picks from BCS conferences. I already detailed in Part 2c what I think of this strategy, so you know by now that I don't like it. Now, Scot McCloughan has argued that he takes BCS players because they're (a) less affected by big crowds, (b) more prepared for the NFL, and (c) better team leaders. While all of these may be true in a general sense, the draft isn't about generalities. It's about identifying and acquiring specific talented players. I'm sorry, but when you limit your available talent pool to 6 or 7 college football conferences, you're going to miss the "diamonds in the rough" that teams need to sustain success. Also, McCloughan has made it seem like picking players from BCS conferences is only a Day 1 strategy. The stats say the opposite though: A higher percentage of McNolan's Day 2 picks have come from BCS conferences (90.5%) than have its Day 2 picks (88.6%). Oh, and did I mention that McNolan's first pick ever was a QB from a non-BCS conference (Smith), and that they traded up in 2007 to take an OL from a non-BCS conference (Joe Staley)? That's 2 of McNolan's 4 non-BCS picks being taken with 1^st-round picks. Again, is he BSing us here or is this some kind of smokescreen? It's pretty interesting how a general BCS guy like McCloughan can fall in love so much with specific non-BCS players.

And now, I present a second way in which McNolan's conference preferences are similar to Donahue's: They suck just as bad at picking BCS players despite being so BCS-reliant. Wait, let me correct that. They suck even worse. Here's the evidence:

McNolan
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	10	2	12
No	21	2	23
Total	31	4	35

Donahue
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	12	1	13
No	13	1	14
Total	25	2	27

You'll recall from Part 2c that Donahue's BCS starter rate (48.0%) was worse than Walsh II's (62.5%) even though Donahue was much more BCS-heavy with his picks. Well, even Donahue's sorry BCS starter rate makes him look like a draft maven when compared to McNolan's. That's because, as the table shows, only 32.3% of McNolan's BCS picks have become regular 49er starters! As I said in Part 2c, if you're going to be limiting your talent pool so drastically, you better be good at evaluating the talent you don't ignore. Clearly, McNolan has not been good in this regard, and has been even worse than the guy for which I invented the argument.

Now, I argued in Part 2c that Donahue's preference for BCS players and lack of success in actually picking good ones was borne out of his dispositional laziness and inattention to draft detail. With respect to McNolan, however, I'm sure this hasn't been the case. To its credit, the McNolan regime has been almost pathologically engaged in draft preparation. After all, they coached the Senior Bowl 3 straight seasons, Scot McLoughan was Director of College Scouting for the Seahawks, and Scot's brother, David, now serves in the same capacity for the 49ers. So I'm kind of perplexed as to why, given their affinity for evaluating college talent, McNolan has shied away from non-BCS players. One might argue that it's because of the Alex Smith experience. However, as has been noted, McLoughan remains a big Smith supporter. So what gives here? Please help.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Donahue, almost every player McNolan has drafted has been from a BCS conference.
Despite its BCS-lust, the McNolan regime has had an even worse BCS starter rate than Donahue.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

As I've alluded to throughout this article, the McNolan drafts can be described by one word: Goldilocks. In other words, their porridge hasn't been too hot and it hasn't been too cold; just lukewarm. Here's the evidence:

McNolan's draft contexts have been a mixture of its 3 predecessors' contexts.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's "draft vs. free agency" bias.
McNolan's stockpiled picks in rebuilding drafts ala Walsh II, but also traded away picks in "we feel good about ourselves right now" drafts ala the Policy regime.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's Day1/Day 2 split.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of Day 1 starter and Pro Bowl rate.
McNolan has evenly split their picks between OFF and DEF overall.
McNolan's used Walsh's "bites at the apple" strategy, but only on Day 2.
McNolan's been on par with previous regimes in terms of picking OFF starters.
Though it's made Donahue-esque draft strategy errors, McNolan's either learned from those mistakes or has a more valid reason for why they've made them.

All in all, it sure seems like the McNolan regime has been a mixture of the good and bad of the 3 previous 49er regimes. They rebuilt like Walsh II in 2005 and 2006, but they sat on their laurels like Donahue and the Policy regime in 2007. They draft for need on Day 1 like Walsh II, but, like Donahue, only when they have to. They take a lot of bites at the apple like Walsh, but they wait until Day 2 to do it. You get the picture.

To me, understanding the Goldilocks nature of McNolan drafts helps explain why the 49ers have been stuck in "no better than 7-9" mode for the past 3 seasons. If you draft a propensity of mediocre players, or if you have a bunch of mediocre drafts, you're going to find yourself having a mediocre team. Here, another word comes to mind that has been used - with great comic effect - to describe McNolan: vanilla.

In evaluating the 4 Niner regimes since 1994, something has become very clear to me; something that I didn't fully realize until I got to McNolan. Bill Walsh was the only 49er GM in the past 15 years who went out and tried to be great in the draft. He's the only one who tried to bat 1.000 every time he stepped to the plate. The Policy regime was content to sustain success through free agency, Donahue was content to ride the coattails of Walsh II's drafts, and McNolan has been content to only be great on Day 1. Is it any wonder then that the Walsh II regime was the only one that had an upward win trajectory? Is it a coincidence that Walsh was the only GM to leave the 49ers better off than when he arrived? I mean, the 49ers regressed under the Policy regime and Donahue, and they've stagnated in 7-9 territory under McNolan. After reading my regime breakdowns, do you have any doubt that one important reason for this is because Walsh II's draft strategy differed so drastically from that of McNolan, Donahue, and the Policy regime? In re McNolan, do you think that the "hybrid" defense, not giving Hill the QB job outright, and not firing Nolan after 2007 can be described by any other word except "vanilla?"

Whether it's McSingle nee McNolan or someone else, until the person/people in charge of running the 49ers' drafts stop placing artificial constraints on themselves, and start trying to be great with every pick- by whatever means necessary - I fear the Niners are going to wallow in mediocrity.

Here's a perfect example of what I mean. The Niners need a pass rusher right now more than anything. Go out and draft the best damned pass rusher. If the consensus best pass rusher isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the pass rusher you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the Calfornia Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK pass rusher and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

Another example. Right now, you have an arguable draft bust, a good but ragged-armed journeyman, and a player KC didn't even want as your QBs. Go out and draft the best damned QB. Do whatever it takes. If the consensus best QB isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the QB you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the California Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK QB and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

You know what team drafts like this? The New England Patriots. But that's Part 3, so you'll have to wait until tomorrow to hear the details. For now, here's the idiot's guide to the McNolan regime's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks, but trade away picks when (you think) your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Use Day 2 to take a lot of bites at the apple.
BCS or die!
We're Goldilocks (aka Vanilla McNolan).

So, based on this strategy, as well as some specific draft history trends that you can find in my Excel spreadsheet, here's what (and what not) to expect from the 49ers in the 2009 draft:

Don't expect them to take more than 1 player from a non-BCS conference.
Don't expect them to take a pass rusher, QB, or WR at #10.
Don't expect them to take a RB on Day 1.
Expect them to take a WR or two on Day 2.
Expect them to take an OL on Day 1.
Expect more DEF picks (esp. DLs and DBs) on Day 2 than Day 1.
Don't expect them to take a FB, K, or P.

Remember, this is what I expect them to do or not do based on their history. If they end up going against tendency, it's not because the tendencies were wrongly identified. It's because they did something that was unexpected given their history. And there's no harm in that. It's actually worked once or twice (See Willis, Patrick).

That's it for now. Tomorrow, I'll compare the overall 49er draft strategy since 1994, which I identified in Part 1, to that of the Patriots. TO BE CONTINUED...

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

How much blame would you assign McNolan's drafts for the 49ers continuously being unable to take that next step in recent seasons?

All of the blame

37 votes

Most of the blame

83 votes

Some of the blame

103 votes

None of the blame

9 votes

232 votes | Poll has closed

Breaking down the Bengals wide receivers

Kirkendall — Sat, 14 Feb 2009 16:54:24 -0000

First and foremost, I wanted to do a "Flashback" story in mid-December 2007 that referenced a post by PFT.

A league source tells us that there is growing animosity in the Bengals locker room toward receivers Chad Johnson and T.J. Houshmandzadeh.

Per the source, both are yelling "all the time" at quarterback Carson Palmer, but coach Marvin Lewis doesn't say or do anything about it. Players are also upset that the two receivers are trying to "run the team."

The situation reminds us of the latter days of the Denny Green era in Minnesota, where receivers Cris Carter and Randy Moss were berating quarterback Daunte Culpepper and operating under a separate set of rules.

Now, truth be told, nothing came of it. And one has to consider that PFT is partially rumor, partially truth, all based on sources that either written in newspapers or unnamed in PFT's circle. Still, when it happened, you had to admit that there's a possibility of truth; not easily tossed aside for blind denials. Both receivers are extremely emotional, and if the team, or one of the players, isn't doing what they believe should be done to win, then you had to consider this partially true. My reason for saying partially true is because it wasn't followed up, nor confirmed.

I wrote before the 2008 NFL Draft that "A scenario does exist that the Bengals could lose their their three best wide receivers that combined for 69 receiving touchdowns since 2005 -- 80% of Palmer's 86 passing touchdowns." This was when Henry was dealing with his last (or latest) legal issue, Chad Johnson during his campaign to get traded and T.J. Houshmandzadeh the final season of his contract.

Fast forward to now. We can adjust the presumption to commit that Henry will be with the Bengals in 2009, and there's a strong argument for Johnson returning, save for Drew Rosenhaus' manipulating letter-writing skills.

All things being known, we can preview the position to look like this before free agency in two weeks.

Chad Johnson
Chris Henry
Andre Caldwell
Jerome Simpson
Antonio Chatman
Mario Urrutia
Maurice Purify

Glenn Holt is a restricted free agent, and until he's signed, you have to consider that the Bengals may not offer him a deal.

It's not the most experienced list, and there's noise that's both legit and very loud about Jerome Simpson's potential based on anti-Mike Brown arguments. Henry has the physical attributes to be a hellva receiver, but not the mental fortitude to even be the team's number two. Andre Caldwell seems likely to be the team's best option in the slot and Antonio Chatman, when (lack of) durability isn't sucking his playing time dry, has shown to be effective enough to warrant playing time. Urrutia and Purify were on the team's practice squad in 2008 and it has to be assumed, without including the unexpected, that they won't break into the 53-man roster.

In truth, it's a weaker roster without Houshmandzadeh -- that much is way too obvious. However, there's also unknowns with several guys that could surprise us in 2009. The truth of the matter is, this is the wide receiver group heading into next season.

Considering the Bengals could go after a wide receiver in the draft (not the first two rounds for sure based on deeper needs), or after free agents with a list that includes:

Bryant	Antonio	Buccaneers	UFA
Clayton	Michael	Buccaneers	UFA
Colbert	Keary	Lions	UFA
Copper	Terrance	Ravens	UFA
Engram	Bobby	Seahawks	UFA
Gaffney	Jabar	Patriots	UFA
Hall	Dante	Rams	UFA
Hankton	Cortez	Buccaneers	UFA
Henderson	Devery	Saints	UFA
Houshmandzadeh	T.J.	Bengals	UFA
Jackson	Darrell	Broncos	UFA
Jenkins	Justin	Bills	UFA
Johnson	Bryant	49ers	UFA
Jones	Brandon	Titans	UFA
Lloyd	Brandon	Bears	UFA
Looker	Dane	Rams	UFA
McCareins	Justin	Titans	UFA
McDonald	Shaun	Lions	UFA
Morant	Johnnie	Raiders	UFA
Robinson	Koren	Seahawks	UFA
Roby	Courtney	Saints	UFA
Shepherd	Edell	Broncos	UFA
Toomer	Amani	Giants	UFA
Washington	Nate	Steelers	UFA
Williams	Reggie	Jaguars	UFA
Anderson	David	Texans	RFA
Austin	Miles	Cowboys	RFA
Baskett	Hank	Eagles	RFA
Bodiford	Shaun	Packers	RFA
Floyd	Malcom	Chargers	RFA
Holt	Glenn	Bengals	RFA
Hurd	Sam	Cowboys	RFA
Moore	Lance	Saints	RFA
Webb	Jeff	Chiefs	RFA
Wright	Wallace	Jets	RFA

Are you comfortable with our roster of wide receivers as it is with a few gaps to fill? Should the Bengals address the position in the draft or free agency or both?

Unexplored Options At Reciever For Bears

ifuwannacrownem — Tue, 10 Feb 2009 15:45:37 -0000

Almost every starter on every position on the Bears is up for debate, even at running back, where it's not a question of the starter, but more a question of depth. But the Bears one undeniable, consensual need would be at wide receiver. The Bears receiving corps was the Achilles heel of 2008, much like how the offensive line and running game were in 2007 (much like how our quarterbacking has been since the forward pass was invented).

So ensues the dilemma. Lloyd will most likely be shown the Halas Hall exit this offseason, and it wouldn't be a shock if Booker followed him out. Davis will be used almost exclusively on special teams, Hester's role will most likely (or hopefully, for that matter) decrease, and Jerry Angelo and Co. will begin the hunt for their new number one wideout. The question remains, can they find one this season? Even if they do, can he become the focus of the offense?

Even the premiere catchers in the league can hit a slump. It can last one quarter, one game, or even an entire season. For example, the top six receivers who led the league in dropped catches for the 2008 season (in order): Braylon Edwards (16), Dwayne Bowe (13), Brandon Marshall (12), Terrell Owens (10), Calvin Johnson and Roddy White (9 apiece). The effort Larry Fitzgerald put together this year has left us, dare I say, punch-drunk. Plain and simple; having a clear-cut #1 does not translate into victories (see Lions 2008) or scoring a plethora of points (see Browns 2008).

You can't put all your eggs in one basket. A consistent offense will most always start up front. A good quarterback will never stare down his intended target. A good receiver will hold on to the football. A good coordinator will call plays that will keep the defense honest (and not the fullback dive). All of these things are essential for the Bears to do what they are built to do; punch teams in the mouth by running the ball. An offense can't do that when they are constantly facing eight-man fronts.

I forgot about the list. Well, enough ranting. Here it is.

The best wideout on the market this offseason is T.J. Houshmandzadeh. There's also the rumblings that the Cards might shop Anquan Boldin, the same with the Rams and Torry Holt, and the Cowboys releasing Terrell Owens. There are however, other guys that will be on the market that may not be number one guys but are still better than what we have.

There are teams out there that have kept their silence, but willing nevertheless to give up their receivers for the right deal.

Here's how we'll break it down. Free agents first, trades second. I'll spare everyone the usual suspects and I'm not getting into draft prospects until after the combine.

Free agents

Bryant Johnson- 6'3" (6th year), San Francisco 49ers

Remember last year when Bryant Johnson was on the free agent market? Remember how Bear forums were flooded with pleas for the Bears to pursue him? Remember how depressing it was to find out he signed with the 49ers? Well, it's a new year and the Bears have a second chance. Bryant once again will be on the market for the second straight year. Like Jenkins, Johnson was also a first rounder who never got a legit opportunity. In 2003, fellow rookie Anquan Boldin was the go-to guy, Freddie Jones was the Y option, which dropped Johnson into the slot role. Then the Cards drafted you-know-who in 2004. Johnson may not be a number one, but he can make up the absence of Bernard Berrian. He's a got speed and he's as big as a tight end, a nice target for Orton and an even better compliment for Hester.

Darrell Jackson- 5'11" (9th year), Denver Broncos

Brandon Marshall, Eddie Royal, Brandon Stokley, and Daniel Graham; the primary reasons why Darrell Jackson caught only 12 balls in 2008. In Seattle, Jackson had three 1,000 yard seasons and averaged 65 catches a season. However, he's had the a case of the RD's as of late (RD stands for ridiculous drops, and ironically, they're also Rashied Davis' initials). At this point, he can be a temporary option at starter while the Bears mold a rookie for that spot.

Honorable Mention:

Malcom Floyd - Good hands, and frickin' tall.

Mark Clayton - He would by my first option, but he's a restricted free agent.

Amani Toomer - Age is a factor, but dependable and plays through injuries

Reggie Williams - Caught a career-high ten TD's in 2007. Great size.

Potential trades

Laveranues Coles- 5'11" (9th year), New York Jets

Coles is obviously not a happy man in the Big Apple. Last offseason, he griped about his contract situation, and then came the revelation of him not wanting to play with Brett Favre. LC has been labeled as a selfish, "give me the ball first" type of player, but he's also known as a humble locker room leader. No doubt if he's the former of the two, he'll be a happy man in Chicago, especially if Favre returns. A round two or even three pick should be enough to get him considering the Jets won't lose any sleep with Jerricho Cotchery and Chansi Stuckey still on board.

Hines Ward-6'0" (11th year), Pittsburgh Steelers

This may seem like a very slim possibility, but in retrospect, this trade is more likely for several different reasons. Hines has been banged up as of late, most notably the knee injury he sustained in the AFC championship game against the Ravens. Now a report says he's considering offseason surgery. If he goes through with it, it will be his second straight offseason surgery.

After winning the Super Bowl, it's most likely when Tomlin cleans house, he'll be considering cutting ties with Ward, who will be entering the final year of his contract. Chances are it was on his mind last year when he drafted Limas Sweed. Even at 32, adding Hines Ward to the Bears roster could spark a fire on this offense given his reputation. It would also reunite him with current WR coach Darryl Drake, who possibly could become the Bears offensive coordinator.

Greg Jennings or Donald Driver- Green Bay Packers

If Ted Thompson and Mike McCarthy feel that their defense is undermanned for Dom Capers 3-4 scheme, they might shop Jennings or Driver to free up cap room to make a major offseason acquisition. Driver would make the most sense, given his age. The Pack has too much depth at this position for it to really hurt their offense. Both are legit number ones.

Other Options

Braylon Edwards, Cleveland Browns- Does Eric Mangini have to trade a dude? Maybe so. Edwards has been dropping as many hints that he wants out of Cleveland, as much as the amount of passes he dropped in the regular season, which was sixteen. Then again, that was the amount of touchdowns he caught in 2007.

Mark Bradley Kansas City Chiefs- BRING BACK BRADLEY, BRING BACK BRADLEY,BRING BACK BRADLEY!!! (I'm being serious)

Convert Greg Olsen and Matt Forte Into Wideout

Grab Terry Glenn out of the rehab clinic.

Two Words: Usain Bolt

San Francisco 49ers @ New York Giants: A Prospector's Guide

Fooch — Wed, 15 Oct 2008 10:00:06 -0000

vs.

First off, thanks to grantmp for the suggestion of "A Prospector's Guide." It fits in well with our Golden Nuggets links when they're rolled out.

The 49ers travel to New York to face the defending Super Bowl Champion Giants in what will be the 27th regular season contest between the two teams, dating back to 1952. The regular season series is tied at 13-13, but the two teams also have a storied history during postseason play, with the 49ers holding a 4-3 advantage over the Giants. Head Coach Mike Nolan’s ties to the Giants organization run deep, having served as the team’s defensive coordinator from 1993-96. His father, Dick, played nine seasons for the Giants (1954-57, 1959-61).

The upcoming game marks the second consecutive year that the 49ers have made the trip to New York. Last year, the 49ers fell to the Giants, 33-15, after New York scored 24 of its points on four San Francisco turnovers.

San Francisco is looking to snap a three-game losing streak after falling to the Philadelphia Eagles, 40-26, last week. San Francisco held a 26-17 lead heading into the fourth quarter, but three turnovers in the ﬁnal quarter proved costly. RB Frank Gore rushed for 101 yards on 19 carries with one touchdown, marking his second 100-yard rushing game this season. He now has scored a touchdown in ﬁ ve-of-six games this year. TE Vernon Davis caught a season-high six passes for 75 yards, including a career-long 57-yard reception. LB Takeo Spikes posted an interception for the third straight game.

After the jump, we've got a recap of the last season's matchup, along with some facts and stats about the teams...

LAST MATCHUP
Giants 33 - 49ers 15
The San Francisco 49ers fell to a 2-4 season record after a 33-15 loss to the New York Giants at Giants Stadium. The Giants scored 24 of their 33 points on four 49ers turnovers. Three of San Francisco’s turnovers occurred inside their own 30-yard line. The other turnover happened when QB Trent Dilfer lost a fumble on an eight-yard sack by DE Osi Umenyiora after the 49ers reached the Giants 15-yard line early in the third quarter. Umenyiora scooped up the loose ball and raced 75 yards untouched for a touchdown.

After falling to a 19-7 halftime deﬁcit, the 49ers took the second half kickoff and appeared to have things in place to get back into the game. A 47-yard pass from Dilfer to WR Ashley Lelie got the 49ers into Giants territory. The team reached the Giants 15-yard line before suffering their most costly turnover of the game to end the scoring threat on the Umenyiora sack play.

The Giants opened the game with a 13-play, 86-yard drive that was culminated with a four-yard touchdown pass from QB Eli Manning to WR Amani Toomer. The 49ers caught a break when the Giants missed the extra point attempt. The Giants moved the ball with ease on their next possession to the San Francisco 20-yard line before LB Derek Smith intercepted a deﬂected pass to end a Giants drive. The 49ers responded by moving to the Giants 18-yard line where RB Frank Gore converted a fourth-and-one situation to set up a 17-yard touchdown pass from Dilfer to WR Arnaz Battle. PK Joe Nedney’s successful extra point attempt gave the 49ers a 7-6 lead early in the second quarter.

The 49ers turned the ball over on the ﬁrst play of each of their next two drives, leading to ten points for a 16-7 Giants lead. Dilfer and Gore fumbled the exchange on a handoff on a play from the San Francisco 30-yard line, and the Giants took over and scored a touchdown for a 13-7 lead. Then on the next series, Dilfer was intercepted, positioning the Giants for a ﬁeld goal and a 16-7 advantage. The Giants were backed to their own 11-yard line with 1:35 to play in the ﬁrst half when Manning and Toomer connected for a 24-yard gain to get to midﬁeld. The Giants moved to the San Francisco 21-yard line with 21 seconds to play to set up a field goal and a 19-7 halftime lead.

The Giants extended their lead to 26-7 on the fumble return early in the third. The 49ers had another scoring chance after FB Moran Norris blocked a Giants punt out of the end zone for a safety, but the 49ers failed to capitalize on the ensuing series following the free kick. The 49ers ﬁrst drive of the fourth quarter ended when Dilfer’s pass was intercepted by the Giants at the San Francisco 33-yard line, setting up a two-yard touchdown pass from Manning to TE Jeremy Shockey for a 33-9 lead. San Francisco added another touchdown on a one-yard throw from Dilfer to WR Darrell Jackson with 16 seconds to play for a 33-15 ﬁnal.

2008 Statistics

49ers (rank)		Giants (rank)
23.5 (t-12th)	Points Per Game	28.2 (t-5th)
307.2 (19th)	Total Offense Per Game	419.4 (1st)
113.7 (17th)	Rushing Yards Per Game	181.2 (1st)
193.5 (19th)	Net Passing Yards Per Game	238.2 (9th)
28:36 (23rd)	Possession Average	32:14 (3rd)
27.8 (28th)	Opp. Points Per Game	16.8 (5th)
350.2 (26th)	Opp. Total Offense Per Game	279.6 (6th)
124.2 (22nd)	Opp. Rushing YPG	94.4 (12th)
226.0 (20th)	Opp. Net Passing YPG	185.2 (9th)
-5 (t-30th)	Turnover Differential	-2 (t-21st)