SB Nation - Ken Dorsey

Cleveland Browns All-Decade Team: Vote on the Quarterbacks

Chris Pokorny — Sat, 19 Dec 2009 05:51:21 -0000

One of the popular themes going around as the year 2010 approaches is the creation of "all-decade lists." Rather than just creating a list myself, I'm going to allow the Dawgs By Nature community decide who should be on the Browns all-decade team. When all of the positions are voted for, I will post the compiled list along with my own comments of who I would've selected.

Today, we start with the quarterback position, which I've narrowed down to five candidates. For all positions, the candidates will be listed roughly in chronological order. Also, I've made it that in order to be considered, the player must have accrued at least 16 games (a full season's) worth of playing time. That's why someone like Brady Quinn is not on this list as a candidate, but if you are vehemently opposed to such a thing, explain why in the comments section.

Quarterbacks

1. TIM COUCH (2000-2004)

After being taken with the first pick of the 1999 draft, Couch was the Browns' starting quarterback for a good portion of the first half of the decade. Overall, he received more playing time than any other Browns quarterback of the decade. His statistics were average for a first-round pick -- he threw for 49 touchdowns and 54 interceptions.

The thing I loved about Couch was his ability to lead a comeback. Case in point -- during the Browns only playoff season since returning to the league, the team was down 17-14 to Jacksonville in Week 14 of the 2002 season. With only 1:25 left to play, Couch was intercepted and the Jaguars tacked on another field goal. Couch got a chance at a Hail Mary and delivered it to Quincy Morgan as time expired. Two games later, Couch, on the road against the Ravens, engineered a 92-yard drive and threw a 1-yard touchdown pass to Mark Campbell with 29 seconds remaining. The Browns won 14-13. Earlier in that season, Couch had tremendous comebacks against the Titans and the Jets as well.

Couch accomplished what he did with a decent ensemble cast, but no real stars or an offensive line surrounding him. The negative moment in his career came when fans were getting more excited to see Kelly Holcomb at quarterback instead. After getting injured against the Ravens on October 6, 2002, it appeared as though some fans were cheering that he was injured. After the game, Couch was emotionally upset and lashed out at the reaction of the fans.

2. KELLY HOLCOMB (2001-2004)

Here's the man who inadvertently led to (partially) the downfall of Couch's reign in Cleveland. Holcomb was known for his ability to step into a situation and light it up. When I say "light it up," I really mean it -- he didn't just put up ordinary numbers. Take a look at two of his most memorable games.

First, during the 2002 campaign, he started the opener against the Chiefs (the Dwayne Rudd game). In that game, Holcomb threw for 326 yards and 3 touchdowns in a 40-39 loss. He fought hard in the playoff game against the Steelers too, another spot start, when he threw for 429 yards, 3 touchdowns, and 1 interception.

When given the opportunity to start over Couch the following season though, Holcomb fell flat. He had zero spark in his first two games, and suffered an injury after the third game (a contest in which he came from behind to win). Besides one blowout game against the Arizona Cardinals, Holcomb never really proved he was anything more than a veteran backup quarterback.

Holcomb did have one more "spot start" type of success -- the 58-48 shootout loss to the Cincinnati Bengals in 2004, a game in which he threw for 413 yards, 5 touchdowns, and 2 interceptions.

3. CHARLIE FRYE (2005-2007)

Expectations were probably set a little too high for the third-round quarterback, and it showed on the field with Frye's poor touchdown (14) to interception (23) ratio. The thing that separates Frye from the other quarterbacks we've had was his mobility. In 21 games, Frye rushed for 276 yards and four touchdowns. Those aren't Michael Vick numbers, but they were certainly Frye's best asset.

Frye should've used that asset more often to assist him in the passing game. I still have to believe the coaching staff instructed Frye to be a pocket passer, because as effective as Frye was when rolling out, he hardly did it towards the end of his career with the Browns. Maybe the coaches just didn't want him to roll out to the sideline and then throw the ball back toward the middle of the field idiotically.

For those who aren't aware, Frye will be starting for the Oakland Raiders this week.

4. DEREK ANDERSON (2006-2009)

That's right -- we're already at our final quarterback, Derek Anderson. There clearly aren't any Peyton Manning's to choose from on this list.

It's really kind of tough to decide how Anderson should be ranked in terms of making the all-decade team. One one hand, he by far had the best single season of any Browns quarterback in the decade back in 2007, when he threw for 3,787 yards, 29 touchdowns, and 19 interceptions en route to a Pro Bowl.

Even during that good season though, the bad decisions were still always evident. His completion percentage is below 60 percent, and he doesn't have any touch on his throws. When expectations were high in 2008, Anderson laid an egg besides the memorable Monday Nighter against the defending Super Bowl Champion New York Giants. This season, it's unfathomable to believe Anderson was ever given the distinguished notation of a Pro Bowler, since his completion percentage in 6 games is a mere 42.9% to go along with 2 touchdowns and 9 interceptions.

Was Anderson's one "wowing" season good enough to overcome the other ones?

COMPARABLE STATISTICS

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Quarterback	Games	Comp %	Yards	TD	INT
Tim Couch	47	60.98%	8,684	49	54
Kelly Holcomb*	24	63.45%	3,867	29	22
Charlie Frye	21	62.54%	3,490	14	23
Derek Anderson	37	52.91%	6,876	45	44

*Includes playoff game against the Steelers.

OTHER QUARTERBACKS

These quarterbacks played for the Browns during the decade but are not up for consideration in the poll due to their lack of tenure with the team. If you'd still like to comment on them, or if you believe one of them should be the all-decade quarterback instead, sound off in the comments section. (Note: I am not listing quarterbacks with less than three games played).

Doug Pederson (2000, 11 games)
Luke McCown (2004, 5 games)
Jeff Garcia (2004, 11 games)
Trent Dilfer (2005, 11 games)
Ken Dorsey (2006-2008, 5 games)
Brady Quinn (2007-2009, 13 games)

DECISION TIME

Now it's time to cast your vote in the poll below, and then go ahead and explain your choice in the comments section. The next position we'll do is running back, but save the discussion on that position for a later date.

Please be aware that the considerations do not include the 1999 comeback season.

Poll

Who do you think is the Browns' All-Decade Quarterback?

Houston Texans At Arizona Cardinals: Know Thy Enemy Edition Part One

Pyromnc — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 17:39:37 -0000

More photos » by Phil Coale - AP

6 months ago: FILE - In this Nov. 6, 2005, file photo, Houston Texans receiver Andre Johnson makes a catch in front of Jacksonville Jaguars defender Kenny Wright during an NFL football game in Jacksonville, Fla. Johnson knows he won't be remembered as one of the game's best unless he can help the Texans to not just their first playoff appearance, but to a championship. (AP Photo/Phil Coale, File)

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In week three, the Arizona Cardinals played absolutely horrible on both offense and defense. To their credit, they were playing a very good Indianapolis Colts team who's offense has been one of the best for the past several years. Their defense has also been one of the best against the pass, in part because of their pass rush. In week five the Cardinals will face more of that with the Houston Texans coming to town, who have a very good offense and a pretty good pass rush. One of the players that will have to be watched and game planned around, is wide receiver Andre Johnson.

Andre Johnson is a product of the University of Miami where he was a standout wide receiver. Johnson was red shirted his first year, and did not get much playing time in his freshman season just catching three passes for 57 yards and one touchdown. His sophomore year is when he started to breakout, catching 37 passes for 682 yards that went for 10 touchdowns. That same season Johnson would help his team win the Rose Bowl, and would end up being Co-MVP with quarterback Ken Dorsey. In that game Johnson caught seven passes for 199 yards (28.4 ypc) and also had two touchdowns. In Johnson's final season, his junior year, he would have his best season catching 48 passes for 1038 yards (21.6 ypc) and 9 touchdowns. Johnson would leave Miami as one of their best receivers ever, ranking fifth in overall receiving yards (1,831) and tied for third with 20 touchdown catches.

After such a successful college career, Johnson was rewarded by being drafted with the third overall pick in the 2003 draft by the Houston Texans. There wasn't much fall-off from his college career, as Johnson has been one of the best receivers in football, and has been considered by some to be the best in football right now. Over his seven year career he has had over 506 catches for 6715 yards (13.3 ypc) and 35 touchdowns. He has been one of the bright spots of a team that hasn't been all that successful in it's short history.

The Cardinals will have to worry about how Johnson can beat them. He can beat you with his size 6-3 225 pounds. He can beat you with his speed, 4.41 40-yard dash time. As a testament to his speed, he was a college track and field star where he won the 60 meter dash with a 6.83 time, and won the 100 meter dash with a 10.29 time. Johnson is the complete package when it comes to his position.

If the Arizona Cardinals want to win this game they will have to figure out their coverage problems and stop Johnson from scoring. That will be a daunting task considering the past two games, opposing team's top receivers burnt our defensive backs. Who ever lines up across from him, whether it's Dominique Rodgers-Cromartie or Bryant McFadden, they'll have to be more physical and can't attempt to cheat to get a pick. They will have to play nearly perfect. Thoughts?

Post-Game Thread: Browns Remain Clueless, Lose 34-3 to Ravens

Chris Pokorny — Sun, 27 Sep 2009 20:29:08 -0000

More photos » by Gail Burton - AP

Ah crap, I got picked AGAIN!

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I thought we were a pathetic-looking team last year when Ken Dorsey was under center. What we've seen the past three weeks shows that this team is clearly trying to top that.

Overall, it was as bad of a football game as you could get. What little signs of life we saw from the defense over the first two weeks of the season was removed this week. Returning were the missed tackles, the wide open throws over the middle after little pressure, and the lack of an ability to capitalize on third-and-long situations.

On offense, Brady Quinn still didn't have any idea what to do in the offense and was benched at half-time for Derek Anderson, because there is nothing funner in the NFL than an 0-3 team having a quarterback controversy after having supposedly "resolved" the situation heading into Week 1.

Which quarterback gives us the best chance to win? Right now, it's probably Anderson. He looked foolish for throwing three interceptions, but even he would not have made some of those throws if we hadn't been down by so many points in the first place. He at least showed the willingness to move the ball down the field. I'd rather take the chance of getting picked off than conceding in a sack and punt every single possession.

Look at the bright side of things -- at least we're not the only team in the 0-3 boat. The Tennessee Titans, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, St. Louis Rams, and Kansas City Chiefs are among the winless teams.

I'll have my full analysis of the game in a day or so.

Cleveland Browns Training Camp Report: Day 12 - Two Days from Gameday

Chris Pokorny — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 02:36:37 -0000

The Browns offense is ready to take on the Green Bay Packers this Saturday.

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If you look around at other media sources, they are referring to practices one day later than I am, which probably takes into account an off day. I guess you can look at it that way, but to me, I am meaning "Day" to be synonymous with "Practice". I might end up jumping to something like "Day 15" the next time the Browns practice just to stay in line with the media; I'll have to see.

The Browns had their final practice before facing the Green Bay Packers this Saturday. Eric Mangini held a rare session without pads, as the team prepped for the Favre-less Packers.

TRAINING CAMP REPORT - DAY 12 (8/13/09)

No Sweat for Braylon: After sitting out one practice, WR Braylon Edwards returned to the field and was ready to go. He will play in this Saturday's contest against the Packers. Also returning to action were WR Lance Leggett and RB James Davis.

Which QB will start against the Packers? Probably not the guy in the middle, but maybe the guy on the left or the right.

Anderson Strikes: In the two-minute drill, Anderson hit WR Mike Furrey for a 50-yard touchdown despite the fact that DB Corey Ivy had solid coverage. Prior to the pass, Anderson had reportedly missed a wide open TE Robert Royal after he had beaten S Brodney Pool.
Quinn, Not So Much: In Brady Quinn's shot at the two-minute offense, his drive only lasted four plays. After a short incompletion to TE Martin Rucker, he threw two incompletions that weren't great throws to WR Brian Robiskie. He couldn't covert the fourth down when his deep pass to WR Jordan Norwood fell incomplete.
Edge to Anderson? If you look at Dawg Scooper, Brady Quinn had the best day statistically, tossing two touchdowns while Derek Anderson and Brett Ratliff each tossed three picks. However, you have to consider that those stats were combined from a variety of different drills. Eric Mangini would not announce which quarterback would start in Green Bay, but if today's walkthrough was any indication, it'll be Anderson since he was working with the No. 1 offense.
Can't Wait to Hear Bernie: The best thing about the Browns preseason isn't the game itself. It's the opportunity to hear former Cleveland QB Bernie Kosar in the play-by-play booth. He doesn't have Ken Dorsey to spew his love for this year, so I wonder which quarterback he'll decide to favor. Kosar attended the team's practice Thursday, the first time he's done so this camp.

Ryan Pontbriand looks lonely.

Phil Dawson Lifts Spirits: Mangini put it all on K Phil Dawson to end practice. If Dawson was able to connect on a 50-yard field goal, the team would have the night off from meetings. Dawson connected, springing cheers from his teammates.
Defensive Props in Secondary: Among the defensive players who stood out Thursday were S Brodney Pool and CB Coye Francies, according to Dawg Scooper. Pool had two interceptions and was contributing all over the field, while Francies picked off an end zone pass intended for Braylon Edwards.
Down Day for Cribbs: After strong practices left and right, WR Joshua Cribbs finally lagged behind. A few passes went off of his hands, with at least two of them being intercepted by the defense.
97 Yard Touchdown: Two days ago, Brett Ratliff made headlines by getting some reps with the first team. Yesterday, he made headlines for having his "spike" pass bounce off a player's shoe and into the air for an interception. Thursday, he had another play that stood out: after WR Brian Robiskie beat his man, Ratliff launched the ball about 60 yards in air from his own 3-yard line. Robiskie caught it and ran the distance for about a 97-yard touchdown.
Walking Wounded: Missing practice were DT Shaun Rogers, LB David Bowens, RB Jerome Harrison, TE John Madsen, and WR David Patten. With Bowens out, Alex Hall and Titus Brown received more reps. He is still a longshot, but Brown has received a lot of praise in camp, including again today from the powers that be over at the OBR. Rogers was reportedly just getting some rest.
Trickery? I'm not sure on the details of the play, but Rapid Reports says that DB Mike Adams intercepted a halfback option pass. My guess would be that...maybe Noah Herron threw it? Just don't tell me that it's Lawrence Vickers, please.
Side Note: For those who missed it, QB Michael Vick has signed with the Philadelphia Eagles.

The team is off Friday before their preseason game Saturday. Be sure to tune into Dawgs By Nature on Friday though, as we'll have a nice little interview up with the guys over at Football Outsiders.

Thursday's Links/Camp Sources

Training camp report: 8/13 (Dawg Scooper, Wolf)
Thursday camp notes (Orange and Brown Report, Greetham)
Dawson the hero (Akron Beacon Journal, Ridenour)
Berea Report: No call at QB (Orange and Brown Report, Greetham)

Butch Davis Talks About Recruiting Portis, Moss, and Sean Taylor (Part II)

KevinE — Thu, 06 Aug 2009 07:21:26 -0000

via cdn2.sbnation.com

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In Part I in of our conversation with Coach Butch Davis, I really got a feel for how coaches can relate to players and be effective. Coach Davis happened to recruit 3 players during his tenure in Miami, which have become DEAR to Redskins Nation: Clinton Portis, Santana Moss and Sean Taylor.

HH: Can you talk about recruiting Clinton Portis? What was his personality like back then?

Clinton was an unbelievable story. The tape we were watching on Clinton we were actually watching the Quarterback on his football team. Late one Monday night early in the season it was like the first of September, it was Clinton's Senior year. The game by accident we picked up to watch the quarterback, Clinton was absolutely spectacular. Kickoff returns for touchdowns. Everytime he touched the ball. I remember one particular sequence he scored a touchdown... it was a long run, a 67-yard run and there was a penalty and they brought it back. They handed him the ball the very next play, and he did exactly the same thing. It was like immediately, "Get on the phone. Find out who this guy is. Do we have any kind of opportunity to recruit him?" We were fortunate with him being right there in Gainesville. For whatever reason, the Univ of Florida wasn't interested. We went full out trying to recruit him. He was a great player in college and a phenomenal player on the next level.

HH: And Santana Moss?

Santana was a totally different story. He was the biggest secret maybe in the country. We all knew in South Florida what a phenomenal kid that he was. Charismatic. Great personality. He had outstanding track times. He played with a great high school football team at Carol City, but they hardly ever threw the ball. This stat won't be 100% accurate, but he had something like 8-10-12-15 catches. Like maybe one a game. He was in a 3-point stance and blocking down field. Talking about somebody flying totally under the radar. Immediately when he got on our football team, we knew that he was special. He was a difference maker. He might be the most electrifying punt returner that I've certainly ever had the opportunity to be around. There were so many ways he could hurt a defense. Stretch em deep. Great hands. Run after catches. Electrifying. You could do all the reverses with him. We were blessed to have both of those kids on our football team.

HH: You left there right as Sean Taylor was getting there. Were you involved at all in recruiting him?

When I recruited Sean, my son went to the same school as Sean. So, I was over at Gulliver a lot picking up my son and wathing him practice. I'll never forget the year we recruited Sean, he scored 5 TDs in the championship game as the RB. That was one of the things [people don't realize in games]. They see an interception by Sean Taylor in college and the NFL and they didn't realize they just threw the ball up to one of the country's best RBs. At the time we had Willis Maghee, Clinton Portis, Najeh Davenport. We had a host of RBs..it was just more prudent to put him at safety.

HH: When I interviewed Coach Larry Coker on the phone, he had mentioned he recruited Sean.

Well, I was the head coach when Sean was there. I left the week before they all signed. Kellon Winslow Jr, Antrel Rolle. All those guys. That was quite a class.

HH: Man...I bet that 2001 Miami team could have beat the bottom third of the NFL that year.

I don't know about that but they were pretty gifted. When you go to training camp if you would, please say hello to Clinton and Santana, I'd appreciate it.

OK, so the 2001 Miami roster, which won the National Championship, included: Willis McGahee, Najeh Davenport, Andre Johnson, Antrel Rolle, Ed Reed, Sean Taylor, Clinton Portis, Philip Buchanon, Frank Gore, Rocky McIntosh, Vince Wilfork, Bryant McKinnie, Kellen Winslow, Jeremy Shockey, and Jerome McDougle. Ken Dorsey was the QB for this championship team, but wow, what a squad.

Tennessee Titans Morning Links: The Miami Sound Machine Is Not Going To Take This Lying Down Edition

August West — Thu, 18 Jun 2009 13:38:55 -0000

More photos » by Mark Humphrey - AP

Does VY already have grey in his beard? Imagine what it'll look like when he's not just the most talkative clipboard jockey in the league. (AP Photo/Mark Humphrey)

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Tony Brown may be shifting to the right side of the line and filling big Albert's old position, The impetus for the move seems to be that Jones and Haye are both more comfortable on the left side.

Also, Jim Wyatt has this note in that same story, which may interest some locals:

Extras needed: ESPN needs extras to appear in a Monday Night Football video with Hank Williams Jr., and Gloria Estefan. It will be shot Monday and Tuesday at the Parthenon in Centennial Park. On Monday, 250 extras are needed for an interior scene to be shot between 2 and 8 p.m. On Tuesday 500 extras are needed for an exterior scene to be shot between 7 p.m. and 2 a.m. Start times are the check-in times.

Extras must be 18 or older with a valid driver's license or identification, and must wear club/concert attire or an NFL jersey and pants. No other logos will be allowed.

The video is scheduled to debut on the regular-season premiere of MNF on Sept. 14.

Gloria Estefan? Way to play to your fanbase, NFL.

Vince Young talks about why he's been so talkative lately.

Keith Bulluck reminded Terry McCormick that VY is still respected in the Titans' locker room, both as a player and a friend.

Paul Kuharsky gets all teary-eyed visiting the building which used to serve as the Oilers' headquarters.

DeMarcus Faggins has never played for a playoff team, and he's looking forward to changing that this year.

It's looking like J.P. Losman, who wasn't re-signd by the Bills, could be the first notable addition to the up-start UFL. The league is hoping to add former NFL back-ups and college star Ken Dorsey as well.

Now that the slower period of the off-season is upon us your help in finding out of the way Titans stories is more important than ever. If you have a link you'd like to submit for tomorrow's Morning Links email me at mcmaugustwest@gmail.com! (Be sure to include your commenting handle so I can give you glowing, semi-anonymous credit.)

Clemens Is There for Sanchez

John B — Sat, 06 Jun 2009 13:03:51 -0000

More photos » by Mark Duncan - AP

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Kellen Clemens has taken the high road according to Newsday and is looking to help Mark Sanchez in any way he can.

Kellen Clemens and Mark Sanchez will do everything possible to win the job as the Jets' starting quarterback, with one notable exception: As competitive as they will be on the field, both will do everything possible to support one another during their duel for the No. 1 spot.

You read right.

Barring a dramatic change of heart from either player, this will be as respectful a competition as you could ever envision. This despite the fact that anger and disappointment occasionally bubble to the surface for Clemens, the presumptive starter before the Jets pulled off the blockbuster draft-day trade for Sanchez.

Call it Clemens' version of paying it forward, a lesson learned from former teammate Chad Pennington.

This says a lot about Kellen's character. It also shows that Chad Pennington's advice went beyond play on the field. It constituted conducting oneself in the locker room and around teammates. This kind of selflessness shows incredible leadership, and there does not seem to be much doubt it is genuine.

It will help Clemens stay in the league for a while. Teams covet veterans who do not mind taking young players under their wing. Look at Ken Dorsey, a player with very limited physical ability. The Browns kept him for years because they loved the way he would serve as a secondary coach for their young quarterbacks. Clemens is literally ten times the player Dorsey is.

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IId. The McNolan Era (2005-2008)

Florida Danny — Thu, 16 Apr 2009 00:00:14 -0000

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Sorry about the delay in getting this one posted. My computer crashed yesterday because a genius (aka me) let the battery run out, so I had to wait until it fully recharged (aka today) to continue writing up the piece.

Yesterday, in Part 2c of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Donahue regime's picks from 2002-2004 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Donahue's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks, especially when your team sucks.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
I <3 the Pac-10!
BCS or die!

In comparison with the Walsh II and Policy regimes, Donahue didn't make the Policy regime mistake of trading away picks when the team was good (2002), he used Walsh II's strategy of drafting for need on Day 1 when rebuilding, he brought back the Policy regime's affinity for Pac-10 players, and he surpassed both Walsh II and the Policy regime in percentage of picks that came from BCS conferences

In this article, I'll be ending the regime breakdowns with a look at the McNolan era (2005-2008).

After the jump, I'll put the McNolan drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; sum up the regimes; and provide the idiot's guide to McNolan draft strategy...

Here again is the link to my Excel spreadsheet of 49er draft picks in the Salary Cap Era. I realized that some of you probably don't have Excel 2007, so I converted it to be compatible with older versions (and fixed the link in previous posts as well):

49er Draft Picks 1994-2008

IN CONTEXT

In Part 2c, I told you how Donahue didn't hit the home run he needed to with his rebuilding project in the 2004 draft. One additional piece of evidence for this is the fact that, by the very next draft, Donahue's replacements had to rebuild the roster once more through the draft. Therefore, Donahue's 2004 fire sale and draft has to rank among the shortest rebuilding phases of a franchise in the history of sports (and not in a good way). Now, I'm sure you don't need some long-winded description of what the team has done record-wise since 2004, so I'll just get on with the specific needs in each of McNolan's drafts:

2005 Draft - Key Losses: WR Cedrick Wilson (free agency), OL Kyle Kosier (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (career-threatening injury), OL Scott Gragg (free agency), DL John Engelberger (trade), DB Ronnie Heard (free agency), K Todd Peterson (free agency). Weak 2004 Stats: 30^th in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA; 19^th in ST DVOA.¹ Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for QB Jeff Garcia, RB Garrison Hearst, WR Terrell Owens, and DB Zack Bronson; major injuries to QB Tim Rattay, LB Andre Carter, DB Ahmed Plummer. Needs: QB, RB, WR, OL, DL, DB, K, LB depth.

2006 Draft - Key Losses: QB Tim Rattay (trade), RB Kevan Barlow (trade), FB Fred Beasley (free agency), WR Brandon Lloyd (trade), WR Johnnie Morton (released), LB Julian Peterson (free agency), LB Andre Carter (free agency), and DB Ahmed Plummer (career-threatening injury). Weak 2005 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 31^st in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Garcia, Hearst, Owens, and Bronson; major injury to TE Eric Johnson. Needs: FB, WR, LB, DB, QB depth, RB depth, TE depth.

2007 Draft - Key Losses: WR Antonio Bryant (released), TE Eric Johnson (free agency), OL Jeremy Newberry (free agency), and DB Tony Parrish (released). Weak 2006 Stats: 22^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA; 18^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bronson; OL Larry Allen and DL Bryant Young now in their mid-30s. Needs: WR, DB, ST, TE depth, OL depth, DL depth.

2008 Draft - Key Losses: WR Darrell Jackson (free agency), OL Larry Allen (retirement), OL Justin Smiley (free agency), DL Bryant Young (retirement), DL Marques Douglas (free agency), and LB Derek Smith (free agency). Weak 2007 Stats: 32^nd in OFF DVOA; 28^th in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for Owens and Bryant; major injuries to QB Alex Smith, OL Jonas Jennings, and LB Manny Lawson. Needs: WR, OL, DL, LB, QB depth.

In preparation for its drafts, McNolan has had to deal with about 7 key losses per offseason, which is fewer than Walsh II (8), but more than Donahue (4) and the Policy regime (4). Interestingly, the course of McNolan's tenure has seen a mixture of his 3 predecessors' draft contexts. The 2005 and 2006 offseasons were Walshian, with about 8 key self-induced, salary-cap-caused losses per season that generally involved kicking dead weight to the curb or trading it for draft picks. The 2007 offseason was Donahue-esque, with only 4 key losses and a team feeling good about itself after a promising season. Finally, 2008 was Policy-like in that there were two retirements to deal with. Overall, I'd say the most similar previous context to McNolan's was the Walsh II era.

I know this is totally off-topic, but, Cedrick Wilson may have made the greatest career decision in the history of the NFL by signing with PIT after the 2004 season. If he stays in SF, he's stuck on a 6-win team for the foreseeable future (at least until he roughed up his ex-girlfriend) catching passes from Rattay, Smith, Ken Dorsey, Cody Pickett, Trent Dilfer, Shaun Hill, and Chris Weinke. Instead, he goes to PIT and wins a ring his first season with the team catching passes from Ben Roethlisberger. Seriously, whatever it was that made him leave the Niners, he needs to bottle and sell it. Can you guys think of any other player in recent years who's lucked out like that?

Anyway, back to the regularly scheduled program. For the sake of comparison, here's how McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup in 2005 and 2006:

Morton (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Wilson
Snyder (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Kosier
OL Eric Heitmann (2002 Donahue draft pick) for Newberry
OL Kwame Harris (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Gragg
Douglas (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Engelberger (after moving Young to 3-4 DE)
DB Mike Adams (2003 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Heard
K Joe Nedney (2005 McNolan free agent signing) for Todd Peterson
Smith (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Rattay
RB Frank Gore (2005 McNolan draft pick) for Barlow
FB Moran Norris (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Beasley
Bryant (2006 McNolan free agent signing) for Lloyd
WR Arnaz Battle (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Morton
Lawson (2006 McNolan draft pick) for Julian Peterson
LB Brandon Moore (2002 Donahue undrafted free agent signing) for Carter (after moving him to 4-3 ROLB)
DB Shawntae Spencer (2004 Donahue draft pick) for Plummer (after moving him to LCB)

Adding it all up, McNolan rebuilt the starting lineup with 5 traditional free agents, 4 draft picks, and 6 players originally acquired by Donahue. Comparing this to the previous regimes, McNolan used free agency more than Walsh II and Donahue, but less than Policy; and they had a "holdover rate" of 33.3%, which was smack dab in between Walsh II (16.7%) and Donahue (50.0%).

So there's the context. Hopefully you sense a pattern emerging here: the contexts of McNolan drafts have been a cocktail of issues and solutions having the ingredients of each predecessor; 2 ½ parts Walsh II, 1 part Donahue, and ½ part Policy.

PICKS, PICKS, AND MORE PICKS

From 2005-2008, the 49ers made 35 selections in the NFL draft, which nearly equalled the Walsh II and Donahue rate of 9 picks per season. In 2005 and 2006, the main rebuilding years, McNolan stockpiled picks via all those trades I mentioned earlier; just like Walsh II and Donahue. The past 2 drafts, however, McNolan has tended to trade away picks (you're welcome, NE) rather than stockpile them; just like the Policy regime. Once again, the trend here is for McNolan to be a mixture of all 3 predecessor's strengths and weaknesses.

In terms of McNolan's overall Pro Bowl rate, a Donahue-esque and Walshian 5.7% of its picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers (Gore and LB Patrick Willis). However, its starter rate of 34.3% - which includes OL Chilo Rachal's midseason and DB Dashon Goldson's offseason ascensions - is the worst of the 4 regimes (Policy regime = 41.4%; Walsh II = 48.1%; Donahue = 48.1%). When you remember the differences in context between regimes, you realize that McNolan has been way worse at picking starters than the context-similar Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse than the context-different Policy regime, whose superior teams made it harder for draft picks to crack the starting lineup (i.e., the Policy regime's starter rate is artificially low due to context).

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has continued the Walsh II and Donahue standard of 9 draft picks per season.
McNolan has stockpiled picks when the team sucked, and traded away picks when (they thought) the team was good.
McNolan has been as bad at picking Pro Bowlers as the "unlikely to have Pro Bowlers because the team sucked" Walsh II and Donahue regimes, and even worse at picking starters than the "unlikely to have draft selections start because the team was good" Policy regime.
Overall, McNolan seems to be channeling the good and bad of its 3 predecessors.

DAY ‘N' NIGHT

McNolan has taken exactly 40% of its picks on Day 1 of the draft, and 60% on Day 2. That's almost identical to Walsh II's 41/59 split, which, as I said in Part 2c, was smack dab between the Policy (52/48) and Donahue (33/67) regimes.

Looking at the relative success of its picks by draft day, we find that 64.3% of McNolan's Day 1 picks have become 49er starters, which is, again, right in the middle of the 4 regimes; not as good as Walsh II's (81.8%, which I incorrectly reported as 64.3% in Part 2b), but basically on par with the Policy regime's (60.0%) and Donahue's (55.6%). Remember, though that Walsh II and Donahue are the better comparisons in terms of team context. On Day 2, an abysmal 14.3% of McNolan picks have become 49er starters, easily the worst of the 4 regimes (again, even worse than the starter-unlikely Policy regime). So while McNolan has had pretty standard success on Day 1 in terms of starters, it's been horrible at picking Day 2 starters.

The best example of this dichotomy between Day 1 and Day 2 results is McNolan's initial rebuilding draft in 2005. Here it is:

Rd	Player	Pos	Starter?	Pro Bowl?
1	Alex Smith	QB	Yes	No
2	David Baas	OL	Yes	No
3	Frank Gore	RB	Yes	Yes
3	Adam Snyder	OL	Yes	No
5	Ronald Fields	DL	No	No
5	Rasheed Marshall	WR	No	No
6	Derrick Johnson	DB	No	No
7	Daven Holly	DB	No	No
7	Marcus Maxwell	WR	No	No
7	Patrick Estes	TE	No	No
7	Billy Bajema	TE	Yes	No

Day 1? 4 picks, 4 starters, 1 Pro Bowler. Day 2? 7 picks, 1 starter, 0 Pro Bowlers. Enough said.

With regard to Pro Bowlers, however, the preferred drink is once again "Regime Cocktail." On Day 1, 14.3% of McNolan's picks have become 49er Pro Bowlers, which is slightly worse than the Pro-Bowl-likely Policy regime (20.0%), considerably better than Donahue (0.0%), and slightly better than Walsh II (9.1%). OK, correction: McNolan drinks Regime Cocktail only on Day 1. That's because, it has yet to pick a Day 2 Pro Bowler. Of course, it's not like the other two Pro-Bowl-unlikely regimes (Walsh II = 6.3%; Donahue = 5.3%) were much better at it.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

McNolan has had a Walshian 40/60 split of picks between Day 1 and Day 2.
McNolan has been worse than Walsh II, but better than Donahue, at picking Day 1 starters.
McNolan has been far less successful than the other 3 regimes at picking Day 2 starters.
McNolan has been more successful than Walsh II and Donahue at picking Day 1 Pro Bowlers, but slightly worse than these two regimes at picking Day 2 Pro Bowlers.

ASSUME THE POSITION

Here's how McNolan has used its 35 picks by position, unit, and draft day:

Pos	Day 1	Day 2	Total
QB	1	0	1
RB	1	1	2
FB	0	0	0
WR	2	5	7
TE	1	2	3
OL	4	1	5
DL	2	5	7
LB	2	1	3
DB	1	6	7
K	0	0	0
P	0	0	0
OFF Total	9	9	18
DEF Total	5	12	17
ST Total	0	0	0
Total	14	21	35

Overall, McNolan has basically split their picks up evenly between units, which is more similar to what the Policy regime and Donahue did than Walsh II's need-induced DEF preference. Also, like Walsh, McNolan hasn't taken any ST players in the draft. Of course, that may have something to do with having Nedney and ROBO-PUNTER on the roster. What's most interesting here, however, is that, although OFF has received equal attention on Days 1 and 2, 70.6% of McNolan's DEF picks have come on Day 2.

The even split of OFF picks between draft days is a little misleading because McNolan was actually Walshian in 2005 and 2006 when it had to replace most of the OFF. Going back to that 2005 draft that I showed earlier, you'll notice that all 4 Day 1 picks were on OFF. This continued in 2006 when they selected TE Vernon Davis in the 1^st round after Johnson suffered a major injury the previous season. Essentially, McNolan followed the Walsh II example of spending Day 1 of rebuilding drafts addressing the most glaring positional needs. This is really eye-opening when you consider that Scot McCloughan claims to be a devout believer in "best player available." Is he full of sh*t or is the focus on need in Day 1 of the 2005 and 2006 drafts just a coincidence? I'll leave you to decide.

DEF, however, is a different animal altogether. From the table, it's clear that the draft day disparity on DEF has been due to an inordinate amount of Day 2 picks being spent on DLs and DBs. The 5 Day 2 DLs were, in order of selection, Ronald Fields, Parys Haralson, Melvin Oliver, Jay Moore, and Joe Cohen; the 6 Day 2 DBs were Derrick Johnson, Daven Holly, Marcus Hudson, Vickiel Vaughn, Goldson, and Tarell Brown. Looking at these lists, you could say that McNolan has gotten worse over time picking Day 2 DLs, whereas it's gotten better over time picking Day 2 DBs. Either way, aside from Haralson and Goldson, that's a pretty mediocre-at-best bunch. So, if you want to know why the DEF has sucked for so long (before Singletary pulled their heads out of their asses), look no further than McNolan mostly waiting until Day 2 to pick DEF players. Couple this with McNolan's aforementioned horrible starter rate on Day 2, and you get one wet, stinking heap of also-ran-ity.

With 71.4% of picks taken on Day 2, WR is another position at which McNolan has focused little Day 1 attention. The two Day 1 WRs were Brandon Williams and Jason Hill, both 3^rd-rounders.

Hopefully, you're starting to see a trend here. McNolan gets credit for using Walsh II's "pick for need on Day 1" and "bites at the apple" strategies. However, it's made the mistake of waiting until Day 2 to take most of their bites at DL, DB, and WR. Perhaps, then, one reason why the Niners haven't been able to get over the mediocre 7-9 hump since 2005 is because their WR, DL, and DB corps are populated with Day 2 picks.

To drive it home, here's one last point about McNolan's (lack of) success wtith DEF picks. On OFF, McNolan's starter rate (44.4%) has been similar to that of the Policy regime (43.8%), Walsh II (50.0%), and Donahue (46.2%). However, the DEF starter rates for the previous 3 regimes were 47.1% for Walsh II, 41.7% for Donahue, and 33.3% for the Policy regime. McNolan's? 23.5%!

All is not lost, however. Unlike Donahue, McNolan seems to have actually learned something about positional picks as its tenure has progressed. Namely, 2 of their 3 picks in 2008 were DEF players. Whether or not DL Kentwan Balmer and DB Reggie Smith pan out in the long run, at least McNolan seems to have noticed that their previous Day 1 picks on DEF have become integral parts of the starting unit. Don't believe me? Here they are: Lawson, Willis, and DL Ray McDonald. So, their results - 2 starters, 1 Pro Bowler, and an emerging pass-rush specialist - were not shabby at all. This suggests that (a) when McNolan commits Day 1 resources to DEF, it's been pretty successful; and (b) the regime seems to have figured this out. So, at the very least, kudos to them for that.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Walsh II, McNolan has focused its Day 1 picks on the most glaring positional needs (when it had to).
McNolan has employed Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy at WR, DL, and DB. However, they've primarily waited until Day 2 to take their bites.
Given their propensity for waiting until Day 2 for DEF picks, it's not surprising that McNolan has been horrible at drafting DEF starters.
Based on 2008, McNolan seems to have learned from their "wait until Day 2 for DEF" mistake.

CONFERENCE ROOM

So far, I've basically told a story about how the McNolan regime's drafts have been a little bit Walsh II, a little bit Donahue, and a little bit Policy; how they've used the good strategies as well as the bad. Basically, not too hot, not too cold; I'll call it "Goldilocks" if you will. The conference breakdown is where that tale ends. There's one regime's lead in particular that McNolan has been happy to follow, and I'm sure you'll easily be able to figure it out. Here's how McNolan's 35 picks shake out by conference: 7 ACC picks, 7 SEC picks, 6 Big 12 picks, 6 Pac-10 picks, 4 Big 10 picks, 1 Big East pick, 1 Conference USA pick, 1 MAC pick, 1 MAII pick, and 1 MWC pick.

BCS anyone? McNolan has taken a Donahue-esque 88.6% of its picks from BCS conferences. I already detailed in Part 2c what I think of this strategy, so you know by now that I don't like it. Now, Scot McCloughan has argued that he takes BCS players because they're (a) less affected by big crowds, (b) more prepared for the NFL, and (c) better team leaders. While all of these may be true in a general sense, the draft isn't about generalities. It's about identifying and acquiring specific talented players. I'm sorry, but when you limit your available talent pool to 6 or 7 college football conferences, you're going to miss the "diamonds in the rough" that teams need to sustain success. Also, McCloughan has made it seem like picking players from BCS conferences is only a Day 1 strategy. The stats say the opposite though: A higher percentage of McNolan's Day 2 picks have come from BCS conferences (90.5%) than have its Day 2 picks (88.6%). Oh, and did I mention that McNolan's first pick ever was a QB from a non-BCS conference (Smith), and that they traded up in 2007 to take an OL from a non-BCS conference (Joe Staley)? That's 2 of McNolan's 4 non-BCS picks being taken with 1^st-round picks. Again, is he BSing us here or is this some kind of smokescreen? It's pretty interesting how a general BCS guy like McCloughan can fall in love so much with specific non-BCS players.

And now, I present a second way in which McNolan's conference preferences are similar to Donahue's: They suck just as bad at picking BCS players despite being so BCS-reliant. Wait, let me correct that. They suck even worse. Here's the evidence:

McNolan
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	10	2	12
No	21	2	23
Total	31	4	35

Donahue
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	12	1	13
No	13	1	14
Total	25	2	27

You'll recall from Part 2c that Donahue's BCS starter rate (48.0%) was worse than Walsh II's (62.5%) even though Donahue was much more BCS-heavy with his picks. Well, even Donahue's sorry BCS starter rate makes him look like a draft maven when compared to McNolan's. That's because, as the table shows, only 32.3% of McNolan's BCS picks have become regular 49er starters! As I said in Part 2c, if you're going to be limiting your talent pool so drastically, you better be good at evaluating the talent you don't ignore. Clearly, McNolan has not been good in this regard, and has been even worse than the guy for which I invented the argument.

Now, I argued in Part 2c that Donahue's preference for BCS players and lack of success in actually picking good ones was borne out of his dispositional laziness and inattention to draft detail. With respect to McNolan, however, I'm sure this hasn't been the case. To its credit, the McNolan regime has been almost pathologically engaged in draft preparation. After all, they coached the Senior Bowl 3 straight seasons, Scot McLoughan was Director of College Scouting for the Seahawks, and Scot's brother, David, now serves in the same capacity for the 49ers. So I'm kind of perplexed as to why, given their affinity for evaluating college talent, McNolan has shied away from non-BCS players. One might argue that it's because of the Alex Smith experience. However, as has been noted, McLoughan remains a big Smith supporter. So what gives here? Please help.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Donahue, almost every player McNolan has drafted has been from a BCS conference.
Despite its BCS-lust, the McNolan regime has had an even worse BCS starter rate than Donahue.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

As I've alluded to throughout this article, the McNolan drafts can be described by one word: Goldilocks. In other words, their porridge hasn't been too hot and it hasn't been too cold; just lukewarm. Here's the evidence:

McNolan's draft contexts have been a mixture of its 3 predecessors' contexts.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's "draft vs. free agency" bias.
McNolan's stockpiled picks in rebuilding drafts ala Walsh II, but also traded away picks in "we feel good about ourselves right now" drafts ala the Policy regime.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of a 49er regime's Day1/Day 2 split.
McNolan's been right in the middle in terms of Day 1 starter and Pro Bowl rate.
McNolan has evenly split their picks between OFF and DEF overall.
McNolan's used Walsh's "bites at the apple" strategy, but only on Day 2.
McNolan's been on par with previous regimes in terms of picking OFF starters.
Though it's made Donahue-esque draft strategy errors, McNolan's either learned from those mistakes or has a more valid reason for why they've made them.

All in all, it sure seems like the McNolan regime has been a mixture of the good and bad of the 3 previous 49er regimes. They rebuilt like Walsh II in 2005 and 2006, but they sat on their laurels like Donahue and the Policy regime in 2007. They draft for need on Day 1 like Walsh II, but, like Donahue, only when they have to. They take a lot of bites at the apple like Walsh, but they wait until Day 2 to do it. You get the picture.

To me, understanding the Goldilocks nature of McNolan drafts helps explain why the 49ers have been stuck in "no better than 7-9" mode for the past 3 seasons. If you draft a propensity of mediocre players, or if you have a bunch of mediocre drafts, you're going to find yourself having a mediocre team. Here, another word comes to mind that has been used - with great comic effect - to describe McNolan: vanilla.

In evaluating the 4 Niner regimes since 1994, something has become very clear to me; something that I didn't fully realize until I got to McNolan. Bill Walsh was the only 49er GM in the past 15 years who went out and tried to be great in the draft. He's the only one who tried to bat 1.000 every time he stepped to the plate. The Policy regime was content to sustain success through free agency, Donahue was content to ride the coattails of Walsh II's drafts, and McNolan has been content to only be great on Day 1. Is it any wonder then that the Walsh II regime was the only one that had an upward win trajectory? Is it a coincidence that Walsh was the only GM to leave the 49ers better off than when he arrived? I mean, the 49ers regressed under the Policy regime and Donahue, and they've stagnated in 7-9 territory under McNolan. After reading my regime breakdowns, do you have any doubt that one important reason for this is because Walsh II's draft strategy differed so drastically from that of McNolan, Donahue, and the Policy regime? In re McNolan, do you think that the "hybrid" defense, not giving Hill the QB job outright, and not firing Nolan after 2007 can be described by any other word except "vanilla?"

Whether it's McSingle nee McNolan or someone else, until the person/people in charge of running the 49ers' drafts stop placing artificial constraints on themselves, and start trying to be great with every pick- by whatever means necessary - I fear the Niners are going to wallow in mediocrity.

Here's a perfect example of what I mean. The Niners need a pass rusher right now more than anything. Go out and draft the best damned pass rusher. If the consensus best pass rusher isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the pass rusher you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the Calfornia Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK pass rusher and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

Another example. Right now, you have an arguable draft bust, a good but ragged-armed journeyman, and a player KC didn't even want as your QBs. Go out and draft the best damned QB. Do whatever it takes. If the consensus best QB isn't the one you've identified as the best, then trade down for value and get the guy you want. If the QB you think is going to be great played at (site decorum) Directional University in the California Penal League, take him anyway. Just don't sit back and wait to draft some OK QB and hope he turns out to be good with a little coaching! Address the (site decorum) need already! In other words, try to be great!

You know what team drafts like this? The New England Patriots. But that's Part 3, so you'll have to wait until tomorrow to hear the details. For now, here's the idiot's guide to the McNolan regime's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks, but trade away picks when (you think) your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Use Day 2 to take a lot of bites at the apple.
BCS or die!
We're Goldilocks (aka Vanilla McNolan).

So, based on this strategy, as well as some specific draft history trends that you can find in my Excel spreadsheet, here's what (and what not) to expect from the 49ers in the 2009 draft:

Don't expect them to take more than 1 player from a non-BCS conference.
Don't expect them to take a pass rusher, QB, or WR at #10.
Don't expect them to take a RB on Day 1.
Expect them to take a WR or two on Day 2.
Expect them to take an OL on Day 1.
Expect more DEF picks (esp. DLs and DBs) on Day 2 than Day 1.
Don't expect them to take a FB, K, or P.

Remember, this is what I expect them to do or not do based on their history. If they end up going against tendency, it's not because the tendencies were wrongly identified. It's because they did something that was unexpected given their history. And there's no harm in that. It's actually worked once or twice (See Willis, Patrick).

That's it for now. Tomorrow, I'll compare the overall 49er draft strategy since 1994, which I identified in Part 1, to that of the Patriots. TO BE CONTINUED...

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

How much blame would you assign McNolan's drafts for the 49ers continuously being unable to take that next step in recent seasons?

All of the blame

37 votes

Most of the blame

83 votes

Some of the blame

103 votes

None of the blame

9 votes

232 votes | Poll has closed

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IIc. The Donahue Era (2002-2004)

Florida Danny — Tue, 14 Apr 2009 14:00:14 -0000

Yesterday, in Part 2b of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Walsh II regime's picks from 1999-2001 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Walsh II's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
This is the pros, not college. There's no need to dominate your neighborhood.
Focus Day 2 on non-BCS players because even one diamond in the rough more than makes up for several lumps of coal.

And, in comparison, here was the Policy regime's draft strategy that I detailed in Part 2a:

Draft picks are commodities best used for moving up.
Once you've addressed positional needs in free agency, there's no need to focus on them in the draft.
Dominate the neighborhood (i.e., take Pac-10 players and those near Youngstown, OH).
There's plenty of talent outside the BCS conferences, but wait until Day 2 to acquire it.

So basically, the main differences between the two regimes were (a) Walsh II used the draft to rebuild the roster, whereas the Policy regime used the draft to tinker around the edges of the roster; (b) Walsh II drafted for need (esp. on Day 1), whereas the Policy regime didn't; and (c) Walsh II didn't have a geographical bias, whereas the Policy regime did. As I said in Part 2b, difference (a) is no doubt due, in some part, to differences in context. Nevertheless, it's still a difference worth noting, and it's overshadowed by differences (b) and (c), which have nothing to do with context.

I bring up both of these draft strategies because they can serve as opposite ends of a draft strategy continuum going forward. In other words, because they're such polar opposites, we can use them as draft strategy templates with which to describe the Donahue and McNolan strategies. Speaking of Donahue, his regime's drafts are the topic of this article.

After the jump, I'll put the Donahue drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; and provide the idiot's guide to Donahue draft strategy...

Here again is the link to my Excel spreadsheet of 49er draft picks in the Salary Cap Era:

49er Draft Picks 1994-2008

IN CONTEXT

Fans of a certain age might remember Dion's song, "The Wanderer." Well, from 2002-2004, Donahue apparently remade the song in his image and called it, "The Squanderer." Probably the easiest way to describe this is in a graph:

As shown, team wins peaked in the last year of Walsh II and began its decline in the first year of Donahue. That's a pretty stark display of how Donahue squandered Walsh II's success, and is much more vivid than anything I could say in writing.

The obvious questions here are, "Why the complete turnaround?" and, "What did Donahue do to precipitate it?" Well, knowing the specific contexts of each Donahue is probably a good place to start:

2002 Draft - Key Losses: OL Ray Brown (free agency) and DB Lance Schulters (free agency). Weak 2001 Stats: 20^th in ST DVOA.¹ Lingering Issues: None. Needs: OL, DB, ST.

2003 Draft - Key Losses: DL Dana Stubblefield (free agency) and DL Chike Okeafor (free agency). Weak 2002 Stats: Dropped to 18^th in DEF DVOA; 26^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Major injuries to OL Dave Fiore and DB Zack Bronson; half of the OFF at least 30 years old. Needs: DL, ST, OFF depth, DEF depth.

2004 Draft - Key Losses: QB Jeff Garcia (free agency), RB Garrison Hearst (free agency), WR Terrell Owens (trade), WR Tai Streets (free agency), OL Derrick Deese (free agency), OL Ron Stone (free agency), DL Travis Kirschke (free agency), and DB Zack Bronson (free agency). Weak 2003 Stats: 19^th in DEF DVOA; 28^th in ST DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't replaced Stubblefield; Starting OLs missed 18 total games with minor injuries. Needs: QB, RB, WR, OL, DL, DB, ST.

Looking only at 2002 and 2003, it sure seems like Walsh II set Donahue up pretty well for the future, seeing as how Donahue had to deal with 6 fewer key losses per offseason in preparation for his first two drafts. Basically, Donahue could do whatever his heart desired with his 2002 and 2003 draft picks. This certainly wasn't the case, however, with respect to the 2004 draft, after Donahue blew up the roster in a Walsh-esque salary cap purge.

So with respect to evaluating Donahue's drafts we have an interesting context to consider. He had even fewer needs in the first two drafts than the Policy regime did back in the halcyon days of 49er teams past. However, his final draft was Walsh-like in that he was tasked with a self-induced roster overhaul. Therefore, for the first two drafts, we need to see whether Donahue was sitting back on his laurels in a Policy-channeling-Nero sort of way; whereas for the 2004 draft, we need to see whether he (successfully) attacked the draft in a Walshian sense.

Before breaking things down, it's useful to detail how Donahue replaced all of those starters in 2004 so we can get a handle on his "draft vs. free agency" slant. The comparison with Walsh II is very straightforward here because both were handcuffed by the salary cap. In other words, they both had the same constraints when considering whether or not to address certain needs in free agency. So without further ado, here are Donahue's 2004 replacements along with the method via which they were acquired:

QB Tim Rattay (2000 Walsh II draft pick) for Garcia
RB Kevan Barlow (2001 Walsh II draft pick) for Hearst
WR Brandon Lloyd (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Owens
WR Cedrick Wilson (2001 Walsh II draft pick) for Streets
OL Kyle Kosier (2002 Donahue draft pick) and OL Kwame Harris (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Deese
OL Justin Smiley (2004 Donahue draft pick) and Kosier for Stone
DL Anthony Adams (2003 Donahue draft pick) for Kirschke
DB Ronnie Heard (2000 Walsh undrafted free agent signing) for Bronson

As you can see, none of the replacements were acquired via traditional free agency; very Walshian indeed. However, before we start applauding Donahue as a draft maven, notice that there was an even split between how many replacements were Walsh II leftovers and how many were of Donahue's making. Namely, Donahue's 50.0% "holdover help rate" is considerably higher than Walsh II's 16.7%. In other words, Donahue had a lot more help with replacing starters in 2004 than Walsh II did while in a similar predicament from 1999-2001. Of course, this says nothing about how Donahue handled the 4 starters he had to replace in 2002 and 2003 or about how many of his draft picks ever became 49er starters.

So there's the context. For his first two drafts, Donahue was in an even better position (thanks to Walsh II) than the 12-wins-per-season Policy regime from a need perspective. Essentially, he had none. In contrast, Donahue's 2004 draft found the team in a predicament similar to what Walsh II dealt with from 1999-2001. He had to turn over the roster through the draft due, in part, to the fact that he was constrained in free agency by salary cap woes. But here's a thought: Perhaps Donahue didn't "find" himself in the 2004 predicament. Maybe 2004 was the result of his own draft failures in 2002 and 2003. Just maybe, rather than being an innocent bystander vis-à-vis circumstances that lead to the 2004 fire sale, what if he was instead a catalyst of his own misfortune? In other words, what if these two different contexts (need-light heaven and need-heavy hell) are not mutually exclusive? For the answers to these questions, we need to break down Donahue's drafts.

PICKS, PICKS, AND MORE PICKS

From 2002-2004, the 49ers made 27 selections in the NFL draft, which works out to 9 picks per season. Once again, that was very Walshian of Donahue. Given how Walshian this amount of picks was, you might think that Donahue followed the "trade away picks when good, and acquire picks when bad" strategy of his two predecessors, such that he had more picks in the 2004 rebuilding draft than he did in the "happy days are here again" 2002 and 2003 drafts. Interestingly, this wasn't the case: Donahue had the same number of picks in 2002 (10) as he did in 2004, and he had the full repertoire of 7 picks in 2003. So, all in all, Donahue seemed to learn the lesson of Policy regime failure: Don't ignore the draft just because you're winning.

With respect to Donahue's starter and Pro Bowl rates, he was, again, very Walshian. He had the same exact starter rate (48.1%) and a similarly poor Pro Bowl rate (3.7% vs. 7.4%). Based on these stats, and given the similarity in winning percentages between the two regimes, we can come to the same conclusion about Donahue's general draft success that we did regarding Walsh II. Namely, he wasn't necessarily any better or worse than his predecessor(s).

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Donahue was eerily Walshian with respect to the number of draft picks he had and how successful those picks were overall.
Donahue stockpiled picks; even when the 49ers were good.
After you account for differences in context, the Donahue, Walsh II, and Policy regimes were pretty much equals when it came to drafting 49er starters and Pro Bowler.

DAY ‘N' NIGHT

The first difference we see between Donahue and his predecessors is related to the percentage of draft picks they had on each draft day. Specifically, whereas Policy had a 52/48 split and Walsh had a 41/59 split between draft days (which I incorrectly reported as more like 50/50 yesterday), Donahue made only 33.3% of his selections on Day 1. Part of this had to do with draft day trades in 2002 and 2004, but it was also due to compensatory selections that were awarded by the NFL (which can't be traded), and having to forfeit a Day 1 pick in 2002 thanks to Policy Era salary cap shenanigans. Either way, Donahue's draft day disparity was nowhere more evident than in the 2002 draft, when only 2 of his 10 selections came on Day 1. Perhaps if he had a few more Day 1 picks that year, maybe he wouldn't have found himself in the sorry situation that was the 2004 offseason? Hmmm.

Looking at the relative success of their Day 1 and Day 2 picks, we find that Donahue was slightly worse than Walsh II at picking starters on Day 1 (55.6% vs. 64.3%), and slightly better than Walsh II at picking starters on Day 2 (44.4% vs. 30.8%). With respect to Pro Bowlers, Donahue failed to pick one on Day 1 (Walsh II = 9.1%) and was as (un)successful as Walsh II at picking them on Day 2 (5.3% vs. 6.3%). Given the similarities in team context between the Donahue and Walsh II eras, we can conclude that they weren't all that different in draft day success except for, perhaps, Donahue's Pro Bowl swing-and-miss on Day 1.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Donahue had far more picks on Day 2 than Day 1; unlike the Policy regime and Walsh II.
Donahue was similar to Walsh II (and the Policy regime) with respect to drafting 49er starters and Pro Bowlers on a given draft day.

ASSUME THE POSITION

I established earlier that Donahue didn't really have any glaring positional needs in 2002 and 2003, and that he had a veritable sh*t-ton of them in 2004. But for the sake of comparison, here's how Donahue's Day 1 and Day 2 picks break down by team unit:

Unit	Day 1	Day 2	Total
OFF	4	9	13
DEF	5	7	12
ST	0	2	2
Total	9	18	27

As the table shows, Donahue was more Policy-esque (i.e., evenly split) than Walshian in terms of the positional breakdown by draft day. Of course, this is to be expected given that his first two drafts were ones in which he didn't have to address any glaring positional needs. He basically had "draft freedom," and he divided that freedom equally between OFF and DEF.

Donahue's 2004 draft was a different story altogether, with replacing over half of their starting OFF becoming a distinct Niner priority. As I said earlier, Donahue luckily had 10 picks in the 2004 draft. So how did he use them? Well, let's just say he must not have read the team needs like you and I just did. Specifically, Donahue drafted only 4 OFF players in 2004: 2 WRs, 1 OL, and 1 QB. I'll give him credit for taking 3 of these 4 OFF players on Day 1, which I argued in Part 2b is a good idea. However, I do have one gigantic bone to pick in re addressing needs during the 2004 draft.

Donahue waited until the 6^th round to take his lone QB draft pick despite Garcia's release having left the team with two 7^th-round QBs and a 5th-round QB on their roster. Keep in mind, here, that 2004 is now considered one of the best QB draft classes of the past 30 years (thanks to the Big 3), and that Donahue traded down twice in the 1^st round. I can only assume that Donahue tried (and failed) to trade up for Ben Roethlisberger. But once he realized he wasn't getting Roethlisberger at Pick 16 (or earlier), how does he not take a QB before the 7^th round? I want to be clear here. This is not about results: Donahue was right to trade down after the top 3 QBs were off the board, and odds are that if he had taken a QB before the 7^th round, that QB wouldn't have panned out. It's about effort. Given how Walshian other aspects of Donahue's draft strategy were, I sure wish he would have employed Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy with respect to QBs.

One more thing I'll say about (lack of) QB bites at the apple is that Donahue took 3 QBs from 2002-2004: 1 (Brandon Doman) was selected in the 5^th round, and 2 (Ken Dorsey and Cody Pickett) were selected in the 7^th round. This is certainly not a serious attempt to solidify the QB position long-term. Perhaps if he would have been more serious in 2002 and 2003 about it, he wouldn't have found himself in the 2004 predicament.

Here are two final observations I'll make about Donahue's position picks. First, he took as many Ps in 2004 as he did QBs or OLs. Granted, he drafted ROBO-PUNTER (aka Andy Lee), but what is he doing drafting a P when he has half of a starting lineup to replace? Also, when you have Hearst playing on a bionic ankle at RB in 2002 and 2003, how do you take 0 RBs in 3 drafts? Sure, Barlow showed potential; but not even 1 RB in 3 drafts? Not even for depth? Pure madness. And I haven't even mentioned the fact that he actually took a K in the 4^th round of the 2002 draft.

Now, in terms of draft success, here's how Donahue compared to Walsh II at the positions I identified earlier as needs over the course of their respective tenures:

Donahue
Starter	QB	RB	WR	OL	DL	DB	Total
Y	0	0	2	4	2	3	11
N	3	0	2	0	3	2	10
Total	3	0	4	4	5	5	21

Walsh II
Starter?	RB	OL	DB	Total
Yes	3	3	2	8
No	3	2	4	9
Total	6	5	6	17

Once again, Donahue can be described as Walshian here, and he was actually super-Walshian with his OL picks.

So far I've seemed to suggest that Donahue had more in common with Walsh than Policy when it came to drafting. If that's really the case, we still haven't figured out why the team regressed so precipitously during Donahue's tenure, and why it seems he left the franchise in such a bad situation after 2004. Well, the first clue has entirely to do with the 2004 draft. Here it is:

Rd	Player	Pos	Starter?	Pro Bowl?
1	Rashaun Woods	WR	No	No
2	Justin Smiley	OL	Yes	No
2	Shawntae Spencer	DB	Yes	No
3	Derrick Hamilton	WR	No	No
4	Isaac Sopoaga	DL	Yes	No
4	Richard Seigler	LB	No	No
6	Andy Lee	P	Yes	Yes
6	Keith Lewis	DB	Yes	No
7	Cody Pickett	QB	No	No
7	Christian Ferrara	DL	No	No

You might say, "Well, he got 4 starters and his lone Pro Bowler out of that draft. That's not so bad!" Remember the context though. He had just lost 8 starters in a fire sale, 4 of which had been Pro Bowlers during their 49er careers. This was no time for an OK result. Donahue needed a draft like Walsh's 2000 effort: one that totally revitalizes the team, and sets it up for a division championship in the near future. Unfortunately for Niner fans, Donahue's 2004 draft was just OK; not an A+, not an F, just a C.1^st-round pick? A bust. 3^rd-round pick? A bust. 4^th-round picks? A miss and a DE/DT tweener who spent 4 seasons trying to find a position. 6^th-round? These guys have contributed a lot, except only on ST. 7^th-round? Nevermind. So basically, although he had the chance to pull a Walsh II with 10 picks, Donahue instead only drafted 2 players (both 2^nd-rounders) that could be considered to have had a perennial positive impact on the OFF or DEF starting lineups. A Walsh-circa-2000 this draft was not. It's no wonder then that SF has yet to recover from the 2003 fire sale.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like Walsh II, Donahue focused his Day 1 picks on the most glaring positional needs (when he had to).
Donahue seemed to sit on his laurels when the team had few needs. He didn't draft any RBs despite having a bionic starter, he didn't draft a QB before the 5^th round despite having a geriatric starter and 7^th-round backups, and he actually chose a K in the 4^th round.
Donahue didn't use Walsh II's "bites at the apple" strategy.
Donahue had a just-OK draft in 2004 when he needed to have a great one.

CONFERENCE ROOM

By far, the biggest difference between Donahue and his predecessors was with respect to the conferences from which he drafted his players. Before elaborating further, here's how Donahue's 27 picks shake out by conference:6 Pac-10 picks, 6 Big East picks, 5 SEC picks, 4 Big 10 picks, 2 Big 12 picks, 1 ACC pick, 1 Division 1 Independent pick, 1 MWC pick, and 1 WAC pick.

The difference I'm talking about was not related to "dominating your neighborhood." On this count, Donahue revived the Policy regime's preference for Pac-10 players. Between his ties to UCLA, his permanent SoCal home, and his (infrequent) trips to Santa Clara, Donahue had to have watched a lot of Pac-10 football.

Rather, the difference I speak of is Donahue's near-perfect BCS rate. Specifically, 92.6% of his draft picks came from BCS conferences. This rate was well above the Policy regime's (79.7%), and dwarfed Walsh II's (59.3%). Now, I'm going to speculate here about what Donahue's clear preference for BCS players might mean, so feel free to provide opposing viewpoints in the comments section.

To me, Donahue's BCS rate was just another indicator of his lackadaisical work ethic, something that 49er fans and media have accused him of since 2002. Exhibit A: His BCS rate. It sure doesn't take much work to pick players from the conferences with mega-million-dollar broadcast contracts, i.e., the conferences whose games can be found from August to January simply by turning on a TV set. Exhibit B: The 2 non-BCS conferences represented in Donahue picks, the MWC and WAC. First, MWC and WAC teams are in close proximity to California and - I don't live out there so correct me if I'm wrong on this - they have games that are broadcast locally in parts of California. Second, if you look at Jeff Sagarin's conference ratings from 2002-2004 (here, here, and here), you find that the MWC was the top-rated non-BCS conference all 3 years, and that the WAC was the 4^th-, 4^th-, and 3^rd-highest rated non-BCS conference in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively. In other words, he wasn't exactly digging into the diamond mines with the 2 non-BCS picks he did make. Exhibit C: His preference for working from home in LA. This one's been well-documented, so there's no need for me to elaborate further.

Finally, Exhibit D: He wasn't any good at it. Here are two tables comparing Donahue's success on BCS picks with Walsh II's:

Donahue
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	12	1	13
No	13	1	14
Total	25	2	27

Walsh II
Starter?	BCS	Non-BCS	Total
Yes	10	3	13
No	6	8	14
Total	16	11	27

Wait a second. Donahue, the BCS-phile, was actually worse than Walsh II, the non-BCS-phile, at picking starters from BCS conferences? Apparently so: Walsh II had a 62.5% starter rate for BCS picks, whereas Donahue's was only 48.0%. Look, if you're going to be lazy, and if you're going to limit your talent pool so drastically as to have a draft strategy that says, "BCS or die," you better be darn good at it. "Darn good at it" Donahue was not. Despite it being just as easy for a Donahue pick to start as it was for a Walsh II pick to start (given their similar 3-year winning percentages), Donahue was as good as the flip of a coin at picking BCS starters.

This begs the question, "Why did he continue to ignore non-BCS players even though he kept missing with his BCS picks?" Surely, if he noticed the trend, and wasn't lazy, he might have shifted strategies midstream. He didn't, and I think it's because he was, in fact, uninterested in those mundane college scouting details that Walsh was so fond of. In other words, as much as Donahue tried to be a Walsh draft clone, he didn't possess the underlying quality that made Walsh successful: attention to detail.

So there's my take on the second piece of the "What did Donahue have to do with the 49ers' steep decline?" puzzle. Answer: laziness. Although his drafts were Walshian in several respects, Donahue simply didn't work hard enough to find those "diamonds in the rough" that are vital for sustaining NFL success. What's worse, he failed to adjust after this lack of success became painfully evident. In the words of Einstein, "The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." As I said, that's just my educated guess based on some statistical (and journalistic) evidence. Take it for what it is, and feel free to offer an opposing viewpoint in the comments section.

Bottom line - Here's what I think are the main things to take away from this section:

Like the Policy regime, Donahue took a relatively large percentage of players from the Pac-10.
Almost every player Donahue drafted was from a BCS conference.
Even Donahue's rare non-BCS picks came from the best and most-watched mid-majors.
Despite Donahue's BCS-lust, he could have flipped a coin and been just as successful with his BCS picks.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

I began this article by wondering if Donahue's 2002-2004 drafts had anything to do with the decline in 49er wins over the course of his tenure (and beyond). Initial signs pointed to "they didn't."

He stockpiled picks just like Walsh II, even though he could have just as easily repeated the Policy regime mistake of trading them away when the team is good.
Like Walsh II, he didn't over-utilize free agency to replace starters.
He had a similar overall starter and Pro Bowler rate to Walsh II's.
Like Walsh II, he focused his Day 1 picks on need positions when the team context dictated it.
He was as good as or better than Walsh II at picking starters at need positions.

Alas, however, the devil is in the details. Sometimes, even though it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and talks like a duck, it's still not a duck. Similarly, even though Donahue was Walsh II's doppelganger in many respects, he made two fatal errors that were anything but Walshian. First, he had a C-grade 2004 draft when an A+ draft was necessary to rebuild the roster. Second, he limited his available talent pool - rather than expanding it like Walsh did - by relying so heavily on the overexposed (and easily scouted) BCS conferences.

The 49ers are still paying for it to this very day. And it's too bad given the tutelage Donahue enjoyed as Walsh's understudy. All I know is that, if he would have taken more notes in class, he migh have gotten that A+ draft in 2004. So, based on everything I've said in this article, here's the idiot's guide to the Donahue regime's draft strategy:

Stockpile picks, even when your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Dominate the neighborhood.
BCS or die!

That's it for now. Later today, I'll break down the McNolan drafts (2005-2008), compare them to the 3 regimes I've discussed so far, and give a heads-up on the draft strategy you might see in a couple of weeks. TO BE CONTINUED...

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

How much blame would you assign Terry Donahue's draft failures for causing the 49ers' current streak of 6 straight losing seasons?

All of the blame

60 votes

Most of the blame

132 votes

Some of the blame

83 votes

None of the blame

6 votes

281 votes | Poll has closed

Gold Star for Mangini's and Kokinis' First Transactions

Chris Pokorny — Wed, 11 Feb 2009 17:30:53 -0000

As most of you know by now, the Cleveland Browns released several players on Monday. Monday was the first day that teams were allowed to start disposing of their players, and Eric Mangini and George Kokinis made moves towards improving the future of this team. In other words, they didn't get it "wrong".

QB Ken Dorsey: After his performance at the end of the season, I don't think anybody would argue against Dorsey's release (except for Bernie Kosar, perhaps). He was only considered a mentor to Brady Quinn at first, but I think we're past the point of mentoring for him now.
QB Bruce Gradkowski: He had a limited amount of time to show what he was capable of. Unfortunately for Bruce, he failed miserably.

OL Eric Young: These type of guys come and go, with their only real chance of hanging on being if the head coaching position remains consistent.
LB Antwan Peek: By far, this is the toughest cut to brush off, but it was a necessary one. Peek has been plagued by injuries almost more than Courtney Brown was. On top of that, Peek was never a Pro Bowl caliber player in the first place. This cut also means that focusing on OLB in the draft and in free agency remains a high priority, since the chances of Willie McGinest being retained are not too strong.
CB Terry Cousin: The veteran defensive back definitely underachieved last year, as he was not the answer we had hoped for when DB Daven Holly went down. It's good to see Mangini dump him, considering he did take a crack at veteran DB Ty Law last season.
K Jason Reda: Who knows; you might see him back in training camp.
P Mike Dragosavich

SB Nation is in the process of compiling the most complete and accurate list of free agents in the NFL, as many sites have outdated or inaccurate reports. When that becomes available, I'll post it for everybody to see and discuss.