SB Nation - Terry Glenn

Mike Holmgren's Greatest Managerial Achievement

John Morgan — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 05:45:48 -0000

More photos » by Charlie Riedel - AP

Even in red, a Seahawk.

Mike Holmgren selected Steve Hutchinson 17^th overall in the 2001 NFL Draft, seven picks after selecting Koren Robinson and 23 picks before he selected Ken Lucas. If Robinson could have kept off the bottle, that would have been a hell of a start to a draft. He swapped first round picks with Green Bay for Matt Hasselbeck, drafted Heath Evans, Alex Bannister, and John David Booty's older brother, Josh.

Holmgren built the 2005 offense that weekend. He won the draft. In a draft that produced someday Hall of Fame candidates: Richard Seymour, Drew Brees, LaDainian Tomlinson, Steve Hutchinson, Casey Hampton, Steve Smith, Reggie Wayne and Adrian Wilson, Holmgren won. The Panthers picked Dan Morgan, Kris Jenkins and Steve Smith with their first, second and third round selections, but still Holmgren's was better. He built the unit that would lead Seattle to its first and only Super Bowl.

Well, not quite.

The Bears cut Bobby Engram August 29 and Holmgren signed him August 31. Engram signed a two-year contract that paid him less than $500,000 annually. He was the 101^st highest paid receiver in 2001.

Engram received a 60k raise his second season and took on punt return duties to compensate. He averaged 10.7 yards per return and returned one to the house. That was the season Engram became the darling of Football Outsiders metrics. Targets to Engram ranked 26^th in total value and 13^th in value per target. He was ninth and second in 2003.

Holmgren struggled to fill out a roster and his teams were notoriously thin and talent poor defensively, but man did that man know early 21^st-century offense. He squeezed maximum value from slot receivers. Engram wasn't some schlub. He won the first ever Biletnikof trophy in 1994 and still holds most of Penn State's receiving records. Unlike Deon Butler, Engram wasn't a steady four-year starter with time to burn. Joe Paterno suspended him for the entire 1992 season after he was caught burglarizing an apartment and stealing a stereo with teammate Ricky Sayles. All charges were dropped against Engram after police determined Sayles convinced Engram the two were allowed to take the stereo.

The 1996 draft class included Keyshawn Johnson, Terry Glenn, Eddie Kennison, Marvin Harrison, Eric Moulds, Terrell Owens, Muhsin Muhammad, Amani Toomer and Joe Horn. Engram was the eighth wide receiver selected, behind Johnson, Glenn, Kennison, Harrison, Moulds, Alex Van Dyke, Bryan Still and Muhammad. Engram never broke through with the Bears, struggling to receive for 38 year old Dave Krieg, Eric Kramer, Rick Mirer, Steve Stentstrom, Cade "AIDS" McNown and Shane Matthews, but he was good. Engram ended his career with Chicago with consecutive seasons of over 900 yards receiving before an ACL tear ended his 2000 season.

Holmgren didn't cash in a high pick or find a serviceable safety in the second, the kind of feats any GM can stumble into, he did that thing that separates the best general managers from the merely competent: found freely available talent and turned it into a long term asset.

Engram is a free agent after Kansas City cut him earlier this season. His time with the Chiefs was a tornado-obliterated double wide in a Rolls Royce career. Or maybe an efficient Elise is more Bobby's style. His short stop in the nation's dust mite might and probably will end Engram's fourteen-year career.

But maybe week 17, should the Tennessee Titans be out of it, Seattle can IR Patrick Kerney and sign Engram for one last perfectly-timed, Hasselbeck-to-Engram curl route for eight and the first.

Who Could Replace Ron Turner Next Year

Lester A. Wiltfong Jr. — Thu, 19 Nov 2009 16:00:12 -0000

More photos » by Joe Raymond - AP

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I think most of us Bears fans are resigned to the fact that Lovie Smith isn't going anywhere. Barring a disastrous finish to the 2009 season the Chicago Bears will move forward with Lovie Smith as Head Coach again in 2010. But unless the Bears make a dramatic turnaround and fight their way into the playoffs at least one head will roll. The head most of us would like to see chopped is offensive coordinator Ron Turner, although quarterbacks coach Pep Hamilton might be the scapegoat.

If Turner is jettisoned the Bears will eat the final year of his contract. He signed a one year extension before this year locking him up through the 2010 season. So will the Bears organization take the salary hit? If Turner is fired the Bears will need to chose the next OC carefully, he'll need to be an established offensive mind (no John Shoop types please) with a proven track record in the NFL. If the Bears fire Turner and replace him with an unknown, with thoughts of going cheap, the fan base should revolt and march on Halas Hall. Potentially, this hire could be franchise altering decision.

In this semi-regular series I'll look at possible replacements if Turner is canned. First up a name that has been floated on this very site, but one that I think is highly unlikely, a lot of things must fall into place for him to be available, and that's Charlie Weis.

Would I like to see this hire? Oh. Hell. Yes. But like I said, it's highly unlikely. I think Weis has one of the best offensive minds in football, but his arrogance isn't the best fit at the college game. Reports of his living room demeanor on recruiting trips suggests he's out of his element at Notre Dame as does his so-so record, and I think he may be out of place as a head coach entirely.

But in the NFL and running an offense, he'd be at home. He has the experience, from 1998-2004 he was an NFL offensive coordinator, the first two years with the Jets and the final four in New England. He helped groom Tom Brady into "Tom Brady", so working with Jay Cutler would be appealing to him. Especially if Cutler continues to struggle, Weis could lay claim to "fixing" his career. If you're wondering how he is at developing talent, other than Brady, the following is from his bio on the Notre Dame website;

In Weis' first tenure with the Patriotsfrom 1993-96, he assisted in the development of some of New England's all-time best individual season performances from Coates, Martin and Terry Glenn, respectively. During his first four seasons in New England, he coached three different positions. In 1993 and `94, Weis served as the Patriots' tight ends coach and, in his second season at the position, Coates set an NFL record for receptions by a tight end with 96 and earned his first trip to the Pro Bowl. In `95, Weis coached the Patriots' running backs and was credited with developing Martin, a third-round `95 draft pick, into one of the premier running backs in the NFL. That year, Martin won league rookie-of-the-year honors and set franchise rushing records with 1,487 yards and 14 TDs. In `96, Weis coached the New England receivers, with Glenn leading the team and setting an NFL rookie reception record with 90 catches for 1,132 yards and six TDs.

From 1997 to '99 (with Parcells as head coach and Belichick as assistant head coach), Weis called offensive plays for the New York Jets... In `98, Weis was named the offensive coordinator/wide receivers coach. By season's end, his offense ranked among the greatest in franchise history and led the Jets to their first division title. The team scored 416 points, second-highest total in franchise history (after 419 points in `68) and averaged 357.2 yards per game. It marked the second-best total-offense season average in Jets history (368.5 yards per game in `85). Both of Weis' starting receivers, Johnson (1,131) and Wayne Chrebet (1,083), eclipsed the 1,000-yard receiving plateau for the first time in their careers.

He has 4 Super Bowl rings (1 as a Giant assistant & 3 in N.E.) and would bring instant credibility to the locker room. Name me one offensive player that wouldn't be jacked up to play for him?

Even with the struggles he's had in South Bend, his offense has produced the two greatest passing numbers in school history in ‘05 and ‘06, and in 2008 his offense scored the most points ever at Notre Dame.

It's looking more and more likely that Weis could get the boot from Notre Dame, but will he be looking to jump right back into coaching? More often that not coaches elect to take a year or two off to refresh the batteries. And would he be willing to take on the roll of an OC after being in the spotlight as the head coach?

Weis would bring a lot to the Bears; calling a game, developing a game plan, nurturing talent; three things we haven't seen in Chicago in a long time. So what do you guys think? Could you see a scenario where Charlie Weis will replace Ron Turner?

The NFL Trade Deadline: What to Expect from the Kansas City Chiefs

Chris Thorman — Sat, 17 Oct 2009 18:56:12 -0000

More photos » by Orlin Wagner - AP

Is LB Derrick Johnson on the trading block? (AP Photo/Orlin Wagner)

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The NFL trade deadline is on Tuesday at 4 PM Eastern time. Will the Kansas City Chiefs be involved in any trades?

Maybe to unlikely.

I say that based on the fact that there aren't very many trades in the NFL in general, even as the trade deadline approaches.

To gauge the Chiefs' chances of making a trade and to see what types of players that may be involved, I did what we always do now when we're guessing what the Chiefs are going to do - look back and see what the Patriots did.

I went back to 2001 and pulled out the player for player and the player for picks trades that the New England Patriots made. The Chiefs general manager, Scott Pioli, was the Director of Player Personnel in New England starting in 2001 before becoming the Vice President of Player Personnel in 2002. So, yeah, he had a hand in these trades to say the least.

Before you hit the jump, here are a few observations:

The Patriots made 12 player/player or player/picks trades since 2001
They never made an October trade
The Patriots had some great value trades but also made some trades that completely backfired
They were quick to cut loose players with problems (off the field, contract issues and injuries)
They traded for six players and traded away six players
They never traded away a first round pick for a player

After the jump, I take a look at each of these 12 trades. Let us know what you think about who/if the Chiefs will trade after reading what Pioli did in New England for the last 8 seasons.

2002

Pioli got: Green Bay's 2002 4th round pick (117th overall) and conditional 2003 draft pick

Pioli gave up: WR Terry Glenn

March 8th

Glenn was in his sixth season and coming off a 2001 season where he only played four games. Bill Belichick deactivated Glenn for most of the '01 season for off the field problems. Glenn played the 2003 season in Green Bay before being shipped off to Dallas.

Pioli got: Buffalo's 2003 1st round pick

Pioli gave up: QB Drew Bledsoe

April 21st

Bledsoe was also in his sixth season when he was traded from New England. I don't want to get too detailed with this trade since we all know the circumstances. Bledsoe injured; Tom Brady comes in; The world loves Tom Brady.

2003

Pioli got: Houston's 5th round pick (154th overall)

Pioli gave up: T Greg Randall

March 6th

Randall was originally drafted by the Patriots in the 4th round of the 2000 draft and played a backup right tackle role for them. Not a bad drop off in trade value after three years - only one round.

Pioli got: New Orlean's 3rd round pick (81st overall), 7th round pick (239th overall) and the Saints 4th round pick in the 2004 draft (113th overall)

Pioli gave up: S Tebucky Jones

April 14th

Jones was drafted by the Patriots in the first round of the 1998 draft. He was franchised in 2003, which accounts for the high number of draft picks that the Pats received from the Saints.

Jones returned to the Pats in 2006 and just recently was in the news because he is suing the Patriots for malpractice essentially.

Pioli got: NT Ted Washington (from Chicago)

Pioli gave up: 2004 4th round pick (104th overall)

August 19th

If you run the 3-4, you need a nose tackle. And there aren't a lot of guys who are well-suited as Washington to do that. Washington was in his 12th year in the NFL when this trade happened and he only played one season for the Patriots.

Pioli got: G Jamil Soriano (From Chicago)

Pioli gave up: Conditional draft pick

August 26th

Not much to read into this trade. Soriano was in and off the Patriots practice squad in the 2003 season after giving up a conditional pick to get him from the Bears. He was signed by the Bears as an undrafted college free agent.

2004

Pioli got: RB Corey Dillon (From Bengals)

Pioli gave up: 2nd round pick (56th overall)

April 19th

After seven seasons with the Bengals, Dillon came to New England and rushed for over 1,600 yards in the 2004 season. He would play two more seasons in New England before retiring.

2005

Pioli got: CB Duane Starks (from Cardinals) and Arizona's 5th round pick (145th overall)

Pioli gave up: 3rd round pick (95th overall) and 5th round pick (168th overall)

March 4th

Essentially giving up a 3rd round pick for Starks, the Patriots released him after just one season. He was the 10th overall pick in the 1998 NFL draft and only played in seven games for the Pats. He was put on injured reserve after a shoulder injury.

2006

Pioli got: DL Johnathan Sullivan

Pioli gave up: WR Bethel Johnson

June 6th

Johnson was a 2nd round pick by the Patriots in 2003. The Patriots decided to trade the disappointing receiver for what would be an even bigger disappointment - Johnathan Sullivan. He was the 6th overall pick in the 2003 draft but was arrested on drug charges just weeks after signing with the Pats.

The Patriots released Sullivan the following October. He didn't play a snap for New England.

Pioli got: Seahawks' 2007 1st round pick (24th overall)

Pioli gave up: WR Deion Branch

September 11th

Branch was drafted with the final pick in the second round by the Patriots in 2002. After being named the Super Bowl MVP in 2005, the Pats pulled the wool over the eyes of the Seahawks and traded Branch away for...a first round pick. Branch and the Patriots were having contract issues and as the pattern shows, the Patriots ditched their problem player.

This trade should be made literally every time it is offered to a team.

2007

Pioli got: WR Wes Welker

Pioli gave up: 2nd round pick (60th overall) and 7th round pick (238th overall)

March 5th

Welker had played three NFL seasons when he came to New England. He would play in every game over the next two seasons, catching 112 and 111 passes respectively. I consider this a good trade by the Patriots because of their plethora of draft picks at the time and the fact that Welker so clearly fit their system.

Pioli got: WR Randy Moss (from Oakland)

Pioli gave up: 4th round pick (110th overall)

April 29th

We all know about this trade too. Moss to New England. Brady to Moss. All year long.

2009

Pioli got: QB Matt Cassel and LB Mike Vrabel

Pioli gave up: 2nd round pick (34th overall)

February 28th

Even though the jury is still out on this trade, I think it's safe to say that at the time it was a great value for what we got.

Chime in with your thoughts in the comment section.

Which players do you think are on the trading block based on Pioli's trade history?

Poll

Will the Chiefs make a trade before the Tuesday trade deadline?

Yes

246 votes

No

254 votes

Maybe

100 votes

600 votes | Poll has closed

Denver Broncos 20 - New England Patriots 17 - Final Game Notes

John Bena — Mon, 12 Oct 2009 14:39:57 -0000

More photos » by Chris Schneider - AP

2 months ago: Denver Broncos' Matt Prater (5) celebrates with teammates after kicking a 41-yard field goal in overtime to defeat the New England Patriots 20-17 in an NFL football game Sunday, Oct. 11, 2009, in Denver. (AP Photo/Chris Schneider)

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BRONCOS START 5-0

The Denver Broncos held the Boston Patriots scoreless after halftime and rallied for a 20-17 overtime victory to improve to 5-0 on the season for the fifth time in franchise history and first time in 11 seasons.

5-0 STARTS IN BRONCOS HISTORY

Year	Started	Final Record	Postseason
1977	6-0	12-2	Super Bowl XII
1986	6-0	11-5	Super Bowl XXI
1997	6-0	12-4	Super Bowl XXXII (W)
1998	13-0	14-2	Super Bowl XXXIII (W)
2009	5-0	?	?

BRONCOS HALT IMPRESSIVE STREAK

The Broncos beat the Patriots despite losing the turnover battle (1 takeaway, 2 giveaways), snapping Boston’s 53-game winning streak when forcing more turnovers than its opponent. The Patriots had not lost a game when winning the turnover battle since the 2002 season.

ROYAL MAKES 100th CAREER RECEPTION

With his 8-yard reception in the first quarter, WR Eddie Royal became the seventh player in NFL history to reach 100 career receptions in 20 games or less. The second-year wide receiver, who finished with the second-most catches in league history by a rookie (91) in 2008, ties WR Terry Glenn, TE Keith Jackson, TE Jeremy Shockey and TE Kellen Winslow II for the third-fastest player to reach 100 career receptions (20 games). He has 109 receptions for 1,120 yards in his career.

FASTEST TO 100 CAREER RECEPTIONS, NFL HISTORY

	Player	Pos.	Games
1.	Anquan Boldin	WR	16
2.	Reggie Bush	RB	19
3.	Eddie Royal	WR	20
	Terry Glenn	WR	20
	Keith Jackson	TE	20
	Jeremy Shockey	TE	20
	Kellen Winslow II	TE	20

MARSHALL FINDS THE END ZONE FOR THIRD CONSECUTIVE GAME

WR Brandon Marshall, who finished with a season-high eight catches for 64 yards and two touchdowns, has scored in each of Denver’s last three games. It marks the second time in his career Marshall has scored in three consecutive games. The fourth-year wide receiver had a touchdown reception in his first three starts in 2008.

His four touchdowns in the past three weeks mark the highest scoring total in a three-game stretch for Marshall’s career.

His eight catches are the most since he recorded 10 receptions vs. Buffalo on Dec. 21, 2008.

ORTON SETS CAREER MARKS

QB Kyle Orton, who completed 35-of-48 (72.9%) passes for 330 yards to go along with two touchdowns and one interception (96.7 rating), recorded his second 300-yard passing game of his career and came within four yards of tying his personal-best mark of 334 yards set at Detroit (10/5/08) last season when he was a member of the Chicago Bears.

His 48 pass attempts and 72.9% completion percentage both set career marks.

Orton had his string of 173 passing attempts without an interception broken when Patriots WR Randy Moss came up with Denver’s Hail Mary attempt on the final play of the first half. The streak, which dated to last season when Orton played for Chicago, was the longest active streak in the NFL and the longest streak by a Broncos player since QB Jake Plummer went 229 pass attempts without throwing an interception in a 10-game span in 2005.

ORTON IMPRESSIVE IN FOURTH QUARTER

With Denver’s 98-yard game-tying touchdown drive in the fourth quarter, Orton has now led a touchdown drive of 67 yards or more in the fourth quarter in four of Denver’s five games this season. Orton, who entered the game first in the AFC and second in the NFL with a 144.7 fourth-quarter passer rating, completed 8-of-13 passes for 78 yards and a touchdown in the final quarter.

This season, Orton has completed 25-of-36 passes for 440 yards with three touchdowns and no interceptions (138.7 rating) in the fourth quarter.

MORENO LOGS FIRST CAREER START

Rookie RB Knowshon Moreno made his first NFL start against the Patriots and finished with 21 rushes for 88 yards (4.2 avg.) and four receptions for 36 yards. Moreno leads the club as well as all NFL rookies with 81 carries and 337 rushing yards in 2009.

DENVER’S DEFENSE STRONG ON THIRD DOWNS

The Broncos held Boston to 0-of-7 on third downs in the second half, marking the third consecutive week the club has held its opponent without a third down conversion in the second half (Dallas was 0-for-7 last week and Oakland was 0-of-5 in Week 3).

Denver’s opponents are a combined 2-of-31 on third downs in the second half this season.

PRATER BOOTS GAME WINNER

K Matt Prater kicked a 41-yard field goal in overtime to send Denver to its fifth-straight win to start the 2009 season. It marked the first game-winning field goal of his career for Prater, who was named AFC Special Teams Player of the Month for September.

MISCELLANEOUS GAME NOTES

Denver has scored 69 of its 99 points this season after its opponent’s last score of the game...
The Patriots, who won the opening coin toss and deferred to the second half, had won 18 straight contests when winning the coin toss to start the game...
Orton improved to 18-2 (.900) as a starter at home in his career—the best active mark in the league and the best mark since the 1970 NFL merger (min. 15 home starts)... P Brett Kern had a 64-yard punt in the first quarter that tied a career long.

Dallas By the Numbers -- Offense

Rafael Vela — Wed, 16 Sep 2009 00:15:09 -0000

More photos » by Chris O'Meara - AP

Tony Romo beat the rush in week one. (AP Photo/Chris O'Meara)

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Week One Stats for the Offense

QB	Net Att.	Net Yards	YPA	Scs. %	TDs	Exp. Pass.*	Bad Dec. %
Tony Romo	27	344	12.7	59.3	3	7	3.7

(*Explosive plays are runs of over 12 yards and passes of over 16 yards.)

Not a bad opening line, but first week stats are always misleading. Let's wait until October before we begin to draw any conclusions.

Wide Receivers

Player	Net Att.	Net Yds.	YPA	Scs. %	Exp. Plays.
Roy Williams	7	86	12.3	42.9.	1
Jason Witten	7	71	10.1	71.4	3
Patrick Crayton	6	136	22.7	66.7	2
Miles Austin	2	42	21.0	50.0	1
Martellus Bennett	2	13	6.5	50.0	-
Tashard Choice	2	5	2.5	50.0	-
Marion Barber	-	-	-	-	-
Deon Anderson	1	0	0	0.0	-

Again, it's too early to take too much from YPAs, but let's examine the passing blend. Note how the distribution for the top two receivers and Patrick Crayton are nearly identical. This is the most balanced blend since Witten, T.O. and Terry Glenn were dividing up the bigger slices of the passing pie in '06.

Note also that for all the speculation of throwing more to the backs, Jason Garrett and Tony Romo threw only twice to the backs and only two were designed throws. Garrett likes to call shots down the field and Romo is a downfield passer. That won't likely change.

Running Backs

Player	Att.	Rush Yds.	YPA	Exp. Plays
Marion Barber	14	79	5.6	1
Felix Jones	6	23	3.8	1
Tashard Choice	2	10	5.0	-

Runs left: 8 att., 36 yds.,4.5 YPA
Runs middle: 9 att., 57 yds., 6.3 YPA
Runs right: 6 att., 22 yds., 3.7 YPA

The preliminary pattern appeared to be alternating series by Barber and Jones, with Choice taking third down duties. Then, Jones appeared to injure his leg when he was flipped on a kickoff return early in the 2nd quarter and the carries went almost all to Barber at that point.

Let's hope Felix' bruise isn't a serious one. He had a 19 yard dash in his first two carries and appears to be the explosive play machine who teased us last year.

Of note was the run mix: one third of the Cowboys runs were counters and Dallas again ran draws very effectively. The Cowboys called only one wide run, probably because Jones was hurt early.

Cowboys Q&A with Football Outsiders

Dave Halprin — Sat, 15 Aug 2009 00:00:12 -0000

You guys know Football Outsiders, at least most of you do. They produce all those funky, cool new stats that break down players into ways we didn't even think about a decade ago. Each year they produce a book called Football Outsiders Almanac 2009, which has chapters on all the NFL teams and even college stuff (available in PDF format). They sent me a copy and agreed to answer some questions about the Cowboys. If you're interested, you can get the book here.

Blogging The Boys: Last year, a lot of the Cowboys problems were blamed on injuries. According to your stats, we were in the middle of the pack in terms of team-health last year, so it must be a case of guys with no ready backup getting injured?

The rest below...

Football Outsiders: Well, not all injuries are created equal. Losing Terry Glenn for a season, for example, had far less of an impact than losing Tony Romo for four games, because quarterback injuries affect a team far more than wide receiver injuries, and the team had a far better replacement for Glenn (Patrick Crayton) than it did for Romo.

Because of the way the Cowboys are built, there are certain players that they simply just cannot lose and play the same way without. Romo is one of them. Flozell Adams, arguably, would be another. Jay Ratliff (who himself only got a chance to play after Jason Ferguson went down) and DeMarcus Ware are unquestionably two more. The team can handle, say, an injury to Marion Barber because they have the depth at running back and a good run-blocking offensive line up front.

BTB: The difference between the defensive performances in 2008 when Terence Newman was injured or out of games, compared to when he was healthy in the last part of the season, is remarkable. Is Newman one of the key components the Cowboys must have healthy in the secondary? More so than other players?

FO: It absolutely was; the Cowboys' pass defense was 24th in the league in DVOA while Newman was alternately hobbled and sidelined by a groin injury from Weeks 1-9. (For the uninitiated, DVOA is our core metric that measures performance against the league average for each play after accounting for the down, distance, situation, and the quality of the opposition; the Cowboys' pass defense DVOA over those weeks was 12.7%, meaning that they were 12.7% worse than a league-average team against pass plays during that timeframe.)

Once Newman came back, though, their pass defense immediately became the second-best in football, with a -12.6% DVOA. (Since you want to allow fewer yards or points than the league average, a negative DVOA is a good thing for the defense.) That was also borne out in Newman's individual metrics; he was astoundingly bad before the surgery, particularly in the first Redskins game, but was an elite corner after returning.

I'd probably add Newman to that list of "irreplaceable" guys above. There's talent in the backfield with Orlando Scandrick and Mike Jenkins (especially Scandrick, who was really fun to watch develop last year), but I think that even the most ardent of Cowboys fans would agree that neither of them are ready to be a #1 corner. Losing Newman -- or failing to have him at 100 percent -- would definitely have a dramatic impact on the team.

BTB: I've brought this up before, but without actual statistical evidence - Tony Romo is a slow-starter in games, but finishes strong. What did your stats say about this?

FO: This is exactly the sort of thing we can test for. Here's Tony Romo's quarter-by-quarter DVOA a year ago:

First: -8.8%
Second: 20.5%
Third: 11.6%
Fourth: 57.1%

(He also had a -394.7% DVOA for the three times he dropped back in overtime.)

Most quarterbacks actually get worse as the game goes along; the league average DVOA for all other quarterbacks was 8.0% in the first quarter, 10.2% in the second quarter, 3.7% in the third quarter, and -1.7% in the fourth.

The difference was even more remarkable a year ago; Romo's first quarter DVOA in 2007 was -31.5%! His fourth quarter DVOA was only 14.3%, so he didn't show the huge late-game split that we saw in 2008, but his second quarter DVOA was 35.7%, and his third quarter DVOA was a very impressive 77.6%. He also had a -21.6% DVOA in the first quarter of games in 2006.

So, to answer your question, the data supports the idea that Romo's a slow starter. As to why that is? Hard to say. My educated guess is that Romo's a player who thrives when he's improvising; I think he's the best at the league at scrambling and making throws on broken plays or off of broken routes. As the game goes on, quarterbacks naturally get a feel for the sort of coverages they're seeing and the way that defenders are playing their receivers. The more snaps Romo gets in a game, the better he knows an opposing defense.

BTB: One big concern for the Cowboys has been the play of the offensive line which we thought was inconsistent and erratic last year. What do your stats say about the Dallas offensive line?

FO: I think that Cowboys fans might have been spoiled by a healthy, effective line in 2006 and 2007. Dallas had arguably the best offensive line in football in '07, and their five starting linemen managed to make it to 158 of 160 games; only Andre Gurode missed two games, and even then, those were the last two games of the 2007 season and had no bearing on the team's playoff status.

Injuries are a part of the game, though, and it's extremely hard for an offensive line to suit up year-after-year without seeing guys get healthy. The Giants have been lucky enough to see their five guys make it onto the field for every regular season snap in each of the last two seasons, and that level of continuity and reliability goes a long way in building their offense -- if you remember how poorly backup tackle Kevin Boothe played against the Cowboys last year when Kareem McKenzie went down, you know how just losing one player could have a huge impact on that team.

Obviously, last year, that changed. Losing Kyle Kosier for virtually the entire season had a huge impact on the team, even though he was arguably their least important lineman. Montrae Holland was no replacement, and Cory Proctor was disappointing.

By our metrics, the line wasn't that much worse. We use a stat called Adjusted Line Yards to try and separate the yardage gained by a running back on a given play from that of the yards created by the team's offensive linemen. By that metric, the Cowboys were 14th in both 2007 and 2008. Their Adjusted Sack Rate -- which considers a team's sacks allowed after adjusting for passes thrown and the quality of the defenses they faced -- went from seventh in the league to 13th, but some of that has to do with Brad Johnson and the eight sacks he took on only 78 attempts.

I don't know about the inconsistency, but the best way to ensure consistency is to have your five best guys lining up for every game. If the Cowboys can make that happen, I think the consistency issues will solve themselves.

BTB: Tell us what you can about the Cowboys special teams units and how they might improve in 2009?

FO: Well, one place they probably won't improve is on field goals and extra points. Nick Folk had a great year, adding 7.9 points above what an average kicker would have provided, the second-best total in the league. Unfortunately, we tend to find that performance on field goals from year-to-year is highly random; last year's number two kicker was Jeff Reed, who was league-average this year.

What is consistent, though, is a team's performance on kickoffs, and Dallas has been below-average each of the last two years. That's mostly on Folk; his kickoffs have been far below league average, while the kick coverage was slightly worse than league average. We estimate that the Cowboys lost 7.46 points of field position on kickoffs and kickoff returns against them.

Of course, they weren't good on punts or punt returns, either. Our estimates have Mat McBriar as -6.16 points below league average, with most of that coming due to below-average distances (relative to where he punted and the league averages) and the failed punt against the Cardinals that ended his season, while Sam Paulescu only cost the team 1.26 points, with most of that coming on return length. The less said about the team's returns, the better; no one came out looking good in those units.

Bringing in David Buehler should help; Buehler's no slouch on return units as a former linebacker, and he's got a stronger leg than Folk. He should be Folk's long-term replacement at kicker.

The team will also adjust from using a four-man wedge now that the league's banned wedges of more than two players. That should inspire them to re-think their special teams scheme, and replacing veterans like Keith Davis with draft picks like Victor Butler and Jason Williams should create opportunities for hungry players to earn spots on the roster. That should help their special teams improve some in 2009.

Thanks to Football Outsiders for taking the time to answer the questions. You can check the book out here.

Cowboys Draft '09 -- Looking for a Bargain-Rate Boldin

Rafael Vela — Thu, 23 Apr 2009 06:00:55 -0000

The Dallas Cowboys have stocked the wide receiver position with veterans the past several years. Terry Glenn and Terrell Owens have played the lion's share of downs on the flanks of Dallas' offense. When Dallas has developed young receivers, they have come from the late rounds (Patrick Crayton, 7th round) or the undrafted free agent ranks -- Miles Austin and Sam Hurd.

Now that Glenn and Owens have both departed, it appears the Cowboys may use high picks on receivers for the first time since 2002, when Antonio Bryant was selected in the second round.

I say picks, as in plural, because the team has already used its first round pick on Roy Williams. Rumors in recent days have raised Ohio State wideout Brian Robiske and Georgia receiver Mohamed Massaquoi as options at the 51st and 69th picks.

At the same time, Arizona's shopping of Anquan Boldin has produced a degree of buyer's remorse; some Cowboys fans have wished out loud the team could rescind the Williams deal and obtain Boldin instead. A comparison of both veterans suggests that the Cowboys got the right veteran, in spite of Williams' dismal December. It also suggests that Dallas may be trying to get their own version of Boldin, only in a younger, more cap-friendly form.

Not All Big Name Receivers' Games are Created Equal

The Football Scientist K.C. Joyner has again done us the favor of supplying '08 metrics in advance of his upcoming Scientific Football 2009, which allows us to compare how the Cardinals have used Boldin in recent years and how the Lions and Cowboys have used Williams.

Joyner charts the number of times teams throw at receivers and the results of each toss. He then thin slices his basic numbers in a variety of ways. For our purposes, it's important to look at routes by depth. Joyner breaks down pass distance as follows: short pass attempts are any catches made from 1-10 yards beyond the line of scrimmage. These are the smoke routes, flanker screens, quick hitches and the like; intermediate passes are thrown between 11-19 yards from the line of scrimmage; deep passes are made more than 20 yards downfield and bombs are made more than 30 yards up the field.

For this article, I'm going to combine deep passes and bombs as the category "deep passes." Joyner creates further shorthand by combining all the intermediate and deep passes to contrast "vertical" attempts from short passes.

With these categories, lets compare Roy Williams and Anquan Boldin's lines for 2005 through 2008, by depth. First, Williams:

Year	# Short	# Inter.	# Deep	% Short	% Vert.
Williams '05	41	21	26	46%	54%
Williams '06	46	61	43	31%	69%
Williams '07	48	33	20	48%	52%
Williams '08	41		*	49%	51%

*(I don't have the intermediate vs. deep breakdowns for '08, but they add up to 42 vertical attempts.)

Williams has fairly consistent route breakdowns. Except for his monster '06, where he put up career numbers for Mike Martz and was used as a down-the-field weapon 69% of the time, he has been targeted roughly 52% of the time on vertical routes. He makes roughly half his catches short and half long.

Let's now take a look at Boldin's numbers, and to further the comparison, let's put his teammate Larry Fitzgerald's numbers up as well:

Year	# Short	# Inter.	# Deep	% Short	% Vert.
Boldin '05	101	34	30	61%	39%
Boldin '06	85	39	20	59%	41%
Boldin '07	63	21	9	68%	32%
Boldin '08	96		*	77%	23%

*(I don't have the intermediate/deep splits but Boldin had 29 vertical attempts in '08,)

Larry Fitzgerald, '05-'07

Year	# Short	# Inter.	# Deep	% Short	% Vert.
Fitzgerald '05	78	42	35	50%	50%
Fitzgerald '06	57	32	21	52%	48%
Fitzgerald '07	64	64	28	41%	59%

Notice the progression in Boldin and in Fitzgerald's combined games since '05. They had the same rough number of intermediate and deep attempts in '05 and '06, but the last two seasons a definite division of labor has emerged -- Fitzgerald has become the clear deep threat, upping his vertical percentage to 59% in '07.

Boldin, meanwhile, has seen his vertical attempts percentage cut almost in half. Last year more than three quarters of his attempts were made within ten yards of the line of scrimmage. Fitz stretches the field, and Boldin does his damage against linebackers and safeties underneath.

This does not tell us if Boldin is showing early signs of decline. Todd Haley called a lot fewer deep passes for Boldin in '07 and '08 but it remains unclear if he has lost some of his deep capability. Furthermore, these breakdowns run the risk of diminishing Boldin's production. He's the king of yards after the catch, and I still put him in the top-15 at his position. But it's clear that Boldin now plays the short game, almost exclusively.

Turning back to Boldin vs. Williams, it appears Dallas obtained the veteran who has consistently played the deeper game.

It also appears that the game Boldin currently plays for Arizona matches the player profiles Massaquoi and Robiske offer. Both fit the Cowboys big-receiver templates: Massaquoi is 6'1", 210 lbs. and Robiske measures 6'3", 209 lbs. Both get high marks for route running and intelligence. Robiske, in particular, excels against zone coverage. He had no reservations about working the middle of the field in college.

If Dallas takes one of these receivers, they'll be looking for Boldin-like play for a very un-Boldin like price: the Cardinals has rankled management with his desire for a contract similar to teammate Fitzgerald's $10 million-per-year deal.

Last year's 51st overall pick, Oklahoma receiver Malcolm Kelly, signed a four-year, $3.36 million deal with the Redskins.

In other words, a receiver picked at 51 would cost roughly 10% of what Boldin wants. If Dallas does in fact draft one of these guys and he provides 75 to 80% of a typical Boldin year, the Cowboys will get value.

WIth rookies, especially wideouts, that's the biggest of ifs.

The Art (and Science) of Drafting: IV. 49er vs. Patriot Regimes in the Salary Cap Era

Florida Danny — Wed, 22 Apr 2009 23:17:03 -0000

In Part 3 of this series, I compared the 49ers' overall draft strategy in the Salary Cap Era to that of the Patriots. Obviously, the problem with my analysis in Part 3 is the same one we encountered in Part 1. Namely, evaluating 15 years worth of picks, whether for SF or NE, and comparing two teams with respect to those picks, is akin to putting apples and oranges (i.e., different regimes and team contexts) into one basket and then comparing that basket to one containing bananas and grapes. So Part 3, in reality, was just a way of uncovering general differences between the Niners and Patriots that might explain their overall differences in winning percentage and playoff success.

The better analysis is to look at specific regimes under similar contexts. Because we're technically still in the McNolan regime until the 2009 draft, it's probably of most interest for you (and I) to see how McNolan compares to specific Patriot regimes. Beginning with the 1994 draft, there have been 3 such regimes:

Bill Parcells, 1994-1996
Bobby Grier, 1997-1999
Scott Pioli, 2000-2008

As I mentioned during the introduction to Part 3, it turns out that NE has had overall team contexts similar to those of SF. All that's different are the dates on the calendar. Specifically, Parcells was the Bill Walsh I of NE, transforming a hapless franchise into a consistent contender. Grier was a combination of Policy and Donahue in that he unwound the pristine ball of yarn spun by Parcells. Finally, Pioli was a mixture of Walsh II and McNolan. He was charged with returning a once-proud franchise to its winning ways.

So the question is, "Which of the 3 NE regimes has McNolan been most similar to regarding draft strategy?"

But before I move on, I need to make one additional regime distinction. Further inspection of the Pioli regime makes you realize that it has actually encompassed two different team contexts, i.e., it's 2 different regimes rolled into 1. Pioli's drafts from 2000-2003 were of the dynasty-building variety, whereas his drafts from 2004-2008 were of the dynasty-sustaining variety. As my discussion of the Policy and Donahue regimes vis-à-vis the Walsh regime suggested, rebuilding drafts look a lot different than sustaining drafts. So when attempting to compare McNolan to the NE regimes, we have to consider Pioli as having had 2 different regimes (Pioli I & Pioli II) from 2000-2008. In other words, my question above revises to, "Which of the 4 NE regimes has McNolan been most similar to regarding draft strategy?"

To refresh your memory, here is the McNolan draft strategy I detailed in Part 2d of this series:

Stockpile picks when your team sucks, but trade away picks when (you think) your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Use Day 2 to take a lot of bites at the apple.
BCS or die!
We're Goldilocks (aka Vanilla McNolan).

After the jump, I'll compare McNolan's draft strategy from 2005-2008 to 1 of the 4 Patriot regimes of the Patriots. Keep reading to find out which one. The lucky winner might surprise you...

OVERALL REGIME COMPARISON

My preparation for this article put me in one of those pesky scientific situations wherein you expect one result and get an entirely different one. Anyone who does research of any kind always has to guard against what's called "confirmation bias," which, as the name implies, is the tendency to cherry-pick evidence or construct your research in a way that confirms what you were hoping to find in the first place. Plenty of researchers fall into this trap - especially when money and professional prestige are at stake - which actually is antithetical to the scientific method. The whole point of top-down research is to develop a hypothesis and try to prove it wrong, not right.

With that said, I was fully expecting that, given its mediocre record since 2005, McNolan's drafts would be somewhere in the middle between the least successful Patriot regime (Grier) and the most successful (Pioli). Also, given the disparity in team success despite similar contexts, I was expecting there to be a vast difference between the McNolan and Pioli I drafts. Needless to say, this wasn't the case.

Here is a table showing the differences in various draft categories between McNolan and the other regimes that have drafted for SF and NE in the Salary Cap Era:

	DIFFERENCES WITH MCNOLAN
CATEGORY	POLICY	WALSH II	DONAHUE	PARCELLS	GRIER	PIOLI I	PIOLI II
Picks per Round
Picks per Day
Picks per Position
Picks per Unit
Picks per Conference	✓	✓✓		✓	✓
BCS Rate	✓	✓✓✓✓		✓			✓✓
Starter Rate
Pro Bowl Rate	✓✓			✓
Picks per Unit on Day 1		✓✓✓		✓
Picks per Unit on Day 2				✓	✓
BCS Rate on Day 1					✓
BCS Rate on Day 2	✓✓✓	✓✓✓✓		✓✓	✓✓✓		✓✓
Starter Rate on Day 1
Starter Rate on Day 2			✓✓✓		✓
Pro Bowl Rate on Day 1
Pro Bowl Rate on Day 2	✓✓✓					✓
BCS Rate on OFF		✓✓					✓
BCS Rate on DEF	✓✓	✓✓✓
Starter Rate on OFF
Starter Rate on DEF		✓		✓✓
Pro Bowl Rate on OFF
Pro Bowl Rate on DEF	✓			✓
Starter Rate from Non-BCS				✓	✓✓
Starter Rate from BCS		✓✓✓		✓
Pro Bowl Rate from Non-BCS	✓
Pro Bowl Rate from BCS				✓✓
✓	4	1	0	8	4	1	1
✓✓	2	2	0	3	1	0	2
✓✓✓	2	3	1	0	1	0	0
✓✓✓✓	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Total ✓s	14	22	3	14	9	1	5

Each check mark (✓) indicates a statistical difference between McNolan and a given regime with respect to a given category. The number of check marks indicates the size of the statistical difference:

✓ = There's an 80% likelihood that the regime's drafts were statistically different.
✓✓ = There's a 90% likelihood that the regime's drafts were statistically different.
✓✓✓ = There's a 95% likelihood that the regime's drafts were statistically different.
✓✓✓✓ = There's a 99% likelihood that the regime's drafts were statistically different.

Looking at the totals for the 49er regimes, it's pretty depressing that (a) McNolan has been least similar to Walsh II, (b) McNolan has been most similar to Donahue, and (c) the only statistical difference between McNolan and Donahue is that Donahue was actually better at finding starters on Day 2 (Donahue = 29.6%; McNolan = 8.6%). Stewardess, can you please get me a barf bag?

Looking at the totals for the Patriot regimes, however, paints an entirely different picture. In this case, it turns out that McNolan has actually been most similar to the rebuilding half of the Pioli regime (i.e., Pioli I); to an even larger extent than McNolan's similarity to Donahue. Of the 26 categories, the only area in which McNolan has differed from Pioli I has been the latter's relative effectiveness in finding Pro Bowlers on Day 2, which we all know by now is a little skewed because of the better team having a built-in advantage for getting players selected to the Pro Bowl.

Some of you might notice that there seems to be an "era trend." The Policy regime and Parcells were equally different from McNolan, and they happened to be drafting during the same period of time (the beginning of the Salary Cap and Free Agency Eras). Also, McNolan has been most similar to Donahue and Pioli (both I and II), who happen to be the closest in proximity with respect to draft years. However, I'd caution against this interpretation because, as the table shows, Walsh II and Pioli I were polar opposites with respect to their McNolan differences despite overlapping draft years (Walsh = 1999-2001; Pioli I = 2000-2003) and similar draft contexts (i.e., rebuilding). And if you're wondering whether this discrepancy is due to the fact that Walsh II focused on rebuilding the DEF, whereas Pioli I and McNolan focused on rebuilding the OFF, just look at the table categories involving team units: only 4 of Walsh II's 22 check marks are due to unit differences with McNolan. This means that the unit-adjusted difference for Walsh II is 18 check marks, which is still the largest of all regimes, and dwarfs Pioli II's 1-check-mark McNolan difference.

So, the moral of the table is that, despite my (and probably your) expectations to the contrary, McNolan's drafts have actually been most similar to Pioli I's. Given this result, I'll be using the rest of the article to compare McNolan's draft strategy to Pioli's. Odds are, of course, that their draft strategies are quite similar. However, there might be specific areas in which the 2 regimes have differed, with these differences shedding light on the answer to our now-more-important question, "Why was Pioli I so much more successful than McNolan despite being so similar in the draft?" I'm sure you've already developed an opinion or two.

PIOLI I IN CONTEXT

When Bill Belichick hired Pioli in time for the 2000 draft, the Patriots had seen a Donahue-esque decline in team wins during the previous 3 seasons. Although they didn't exactly nosedive like Donahue's, the Patriot win totals during Grier's tenure nevertheless got worse each season (10 in 1997, 9 in 1998, and 8 in 1999). Essentially, just like Donahue's squandering of Walsh II's success, Grier squandered Parcells' success. And just like McNolan was charged with cleaning up Donahue's mess, Pioli I was charged with cleaning up Grier's mess.

I've already told you that Pioli I focused primarily on rebuilding the NE OFF - and with good reason. Below are the specific contexts of each NE draft during the Pioli I regime:

2000 Draft - Key Losses: RB Terry Allen (free agency), WR Shawn Jefferson (free agency), TE Ben Coates (free agency), OL Heath Irwin (free agency), OL Zefross Moss (released), and DB Steve Israel (free agency). Weak 1999 Stats: 22^nd in OFF DVOA.¹ Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found a worthy replacement for RB Robert Edwards; major injury to LB Ted Johnson. Needs: RB, WR, TE, OL, DB, LB depth.

2001 Draft - Key Losses: FB Tony Carter (free agency), OL Bruce Armstrong (retirement), DL Chad Eaton (free agency), and LB Chris Slade (free agency). Weak 2000 Stats: 20^th in OFF DVOA; 20^th in DEF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for RB Robert Edwards and TE Ben Coates; Ted Johnson missed 3 games with minor injury; DB Otis Smith now 35 years old. Needs: RB, FB, TE, OL, DL, LB, DB depth.

2002 Draft - Key Losses: QB Drew Bledsoe (trade), WR Terry Glenn (trade), TE Rod Rutledge (free agency) and DL Brandon Mitchell (free agency). Weak 2001 Stats: -3.7% (14^th) OFF DVOA. Lingering Issues: Still hadn't found worthy replacements for RB Robert Edwards and TE Ben Coates; DL Willie McGinest missed 5 games with minor injury; Otis Smith now 36 years old. Needs: RB, WR, TE, DL, QB depth, DB depth.

2003 Draft - Key Losses: FB Marc Edwards (free agency) and DB Tebucky Jones (trade). Weak 2002 Stats: None. Lingering Issues: Major injury to Otis Smith, who is now 37 years old; DL Anthony Pleasant and LB Roman Phifer now 34 years old. Needs: FB, DB, DL depth, LB depth.

In this case, the specific needs accurately reflect the general: NE primarily needed to rebuild the OFF. However, looking at these draft contexts, our first difference emerges. Namely, Pioli I had to replace 4 starters per draft, whereas McNolan had to replace about 7 starters per draft. Media accounts of both regimes (here and here) invoked the proverbial "out with the old, in with the new" theme. Looking back, it's more accurate to say that McNolan had much more old and new to take out and bring in, respectively.

So how did Pioli I replace their 16 departed starters? Here's how:

RB Kevin Faulk (1999 Grier pick) for Allen
WR Troy Brown (1993 Parcells pick) for Jefferson
Rutledge (1998 Grier pick) for Coates
OL Joe Andruzzi (2000 Pioli I free agent signing) for Irwin
OL Grant Williams (2000 Pioli I free agent signing) for Moss
Otis Smith (2000 Pioli I free agent signing) for Israel
Marc Edwards (2001 Pioli free agent signing) for Carter
OL Matt Light (2001 Pioli pick) for Armstrong
DL Anthony Pleasant (2000 Pioli I free agent signing) and DL Bobby Hamilton (2000 Pioli I free agent signing) for Eaton (after switching to a 4-3 defense)
LB Mike Vrabel (2001 Pioli I free agent signing) for Slade
QB Tom Brady (2000 Pioli I pick) for Bledsoe
WR David Patten (2001 Pioli I free agent signing) for Glenn
TE Christian Fauria (2002 Pioli I free agent signing) for Rutledge
Hamilton for Mitchell (after moving him from DE to DT)
TE Daniel Graham (2002 Pioli I pick) for Marc Edwards (after switching to a 2-TE offense)
DB Eugene Wilson (2003 Pioli I pick) for Tebucky Jones

Adding it all up, Pioli I rebuilt the starting lineup with 9 traditional free agents, 4 draft picks, and 3 players originally acquired by previous regimes. As compared to McNolan's first two drafts, which required a similar 15 replacements, Pioli I used free agency nearly twice as much, and had a holdover rate (20.0%) that was half as large. Therefore, we've found a second difference between the two regimes: Pioli I liked free agency and cleaned house more.

Now, let's move on to the point-by-point draft strategy comparison. Again, although McNolan and Pioli I drafts are similar, there are nevertheless important differences.

STRATEGY #1

Stockpile picks when your team sucks,

but trade away picks when (you think) your team is good.

As I reported in Part 2d, McNolan has had 35 picks in its 4 drafts. In comparison, Pioli I had 36 picks in its 4 drafts; very similar indeed. So, the way to evaluate this strategy is to compare the two regimes' draft picks by year after matching up the number of draft picks at identical junctures during their respective regimes. The table below shows McNolan's and Pioli's pick totals during their first, second, third, and fourth drafts:

Remember that Pioli I drafts followed seasons with 5 wins (1999), 8 wins (2000), 11 wins (2001), and 9 wins (2002). Regarding number of draft picks, Pioli I's totals did seem to ebb and flow with team wins. Indeed, Pioli I's number of draft picks was lowest in Year 3, which followed an 11-5, Super-Bowl-winning 2001 season. Where a difference emerges relates to my placement of "(you think)" in the McNolan strategy. In true Vanilla McNolan form, SF had only 6 picks in Year 4 presumably because they thought the disastrous 2007 season was a mere aberration; the Niners were actually good in McNolan's mind, only requiring a new OC and a few draft picks to return to their 7-9 "glory" of 2006.

Contrast this with the much-more-realistic Pioli I approach. That regime only got rid of picks after winning the Super Bowl. Furthermore, they returned to the "stockpile picks" approach after a winning season. In other words, what I see here is Pioli I having a much higher threshold than McNolan for "your team is good." It seems that McNolan viewed a 5-11 season as only requiring some roster- and assistant-coach-tweaking, whereas Pioli I responded to a 9-7 season by amassing 10 picks in the 2003 draft. I guess the easiest way to put this is that, to Pioli I, 9 wins meant "we suck," but, to McNolan, 5 wins means "we're good."

STRATEGY #2

Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.

OK, so I just established that "when your team sucks" meant "less than 10 wins" to Pioli I. Therefore, let's look at Day 1 of NE's 2000, 2001, and 2003 drafts. Referring back to the team needs I detailed earlier, the 2000 draft required Pioli to fix the OFF; specifically, RB, WR, TE, and OL. Their Day 1 picks? An OL (Round 2) and a RB (Round 3). In fact, their first 4 picks were an OL, a RB, an OL (Round 4), and a TE (Round 5). Not to mention that they stumbled upon a certain unassuming, jelly-legged QB from the University of Michigan in Round 6. Of course, that was luck more than anything attributable to Pioli I, but it's still worth mentioning. Anyway, addressing needs on Day 1 in 2000? Check.

In 2001, most of the needs were still on OFF. The positions they took on Day 1 of that draft were DL (Round 1), OL (Round 2), and DB (Round 3). So, did Pioli I address needs on Day 1 in 2001? No. One thing I will say though is that, if you're not going to address needs on Day 1, it helps to draft a Pro Bowl DE (Richard Seymour) and a Pro Bowl LT (Light) with your top two picks, and then snag your 2002 starter at RT (Kenyatta Jones) with your first pick on Day 2.

In 2003, the needs shifted to DEF because of advancing age and increasing proneness to injury. Specifically, NE needed to replace a starting DB, and needed depth at DL and LB. What did they take during Day 1 of the 2003 draft? Round 1: a DL. Round 2: a DB. Round 3: a WR. And just for good measure, they took another DL in Round 4. Addressing needs? Check.

Last question: "Did Pioli I also draft for need on Day 1 of the 2002 draft, i.e., when NE was good?" Even in their Super-Bowl-winning season of 2001, NE was still a below-average offensive team (See above OFF DVOA). At the very least, their 14^th-ranked OFF was worse than their above-average DEF (DVOA = -6.3%). Therefore, their needs were on OFF. So what did Pioli I do on Day 1 in 2002? He took a TE in Round 1 and a WR in Round 2, and then, for good measure, took a QB with NE's first pick of Day 2. Addressing needs? Check.

So, taken together, Pioli I seems to have been very similar to McNolan regarding the draft strategy of interest in this section.

STRATEGY #3

Use Day 2 to take a lot of bites at the apple.

My identification of this McNolan strategy in Part 4 was based on its tendency to take a lot of WRs, DLs, and DBs on Day 2. In addition, I argued that their reliance on Day 2 talent at these positions might be one reason why they haven't found many good ones. Hey, but at least they're trying.

From the table showing regime differences that I presented at the beginning of this article, you can already surmise that Pioli I didn't differ from McNolan with respect to team units on Day 2. Therefore, there's no general trend. It's still useful to look at the specific position-by-position draft day totals, as well as the actual unit-by-unit results. Here's the relevant table:

Pos	Day 1	Day 2	Total
QB	0	3	3
RB	1	2	3
FB	0	0	0
WR	2	1	3
TE	1	4	5
OL	2	3	5
DL	2	5	7
LB	0	3	3
DB	2	4	6
K	0	1	1
P	0	0	0
OFF Total	6	13	19
DEF Total	4	12	16
ST Total	0	1	1
Total	10	26	36

From this table, it's clear that Pioli I didn't have a unit bias between draft days: he split his picks 60/40 between OFF and DEF on Day 1, and basically split them 50/50 on Day 2. Nevertheless, there are two (albeit shaky) pieces of evidence of a Day 2 "bites at the apple" strategy having been used by Pioli I. First, they sure had a lot of picks on Day 2, meaning that they were taking a lot of bites at the apple all over the field. Of course, it makes you wonder how NE won a championship during Pioli I with all that Day 2 talent on the roster. Oh yeah, I forgot. Two words: free agency. OK, well, 5 words: free agency and Tom Brady. Second, you might recall from Part 2d that McNolan has had 21 picks on Day 2 in their 4 drafts, i.e., 5 fewer than Piol I. So how did Pioli I use those extra picks? How about at those needs on OFF? Specifically, Pioli I used 4 of the 5 extra Day 2 picks on OFF (and the 5^th on a K), while taking the exact same number of DEF picks on Day 2 as McNolan.

So, in general, I'd say the differences between McNolan and Pioli I are pretty subtle with respect to this strategy, if they exist at all. One thing I will add, though, is that, unlike McNolan, Pioli I found 3 Pro Bowlers at need positions on Day 2: Brady, OL Dan Koppen, and DB Asante Samuel. Indeed, the table of regime differences shows that Day 2 Pro Bowl rate was the only category in which a regime difference actually emerged between McNolan and Pioli I. In this sense, I suppose it was a good thing that NE had 15 Day 2 picks - almost 2 extra per round than normal - in the 2000 and 2003 drafts.

STRATEGY #4

BCS or die!

This one's a pretty easy nut to crack. Pioli I used 28 of his 36 picks on players from BCS conferences, which is pretty similar to McNolan using 31 of 35 on such players. The only slight difference between the two regimes - certainly not large enough to be statistically significant - has been with respect to draft days. Whereas their Day 1 BCS rates were pretty similar, Pioli's Day 2 BCS rate (23.1%) was more than double McNolan's (9.5%). Again, this difference isn't statistically significant, but it is a practically important difference nevertheless.

STRATEGY #5

We're Goldilocks (aka Vanilla McNolan).

As this strategy is more about attitude than statistics, it's not surprising that this is where McNolan and Pioli I seem to differ the most. Remember that my Goldilocks argument was based on the fact that McNolan has had perennial needs that it continues to leave unaddressed (i.e., pass rusher and QB). Essentially, once McNolan thinks it has addressed a position in the draft, say, by taking Alex Smith with their 1^st pick, it doesn't feel an urgent requirement to reassess whether, perhaps, they adequately addressed the need. Pioli I was the exact opposite in this regard.

The dirty secret about NE's 2000 draft is that it was pretty (site decorum) bad. Their 2^nd-round pick, OL Adrian Klemm was a certified bust. Their 3^rd-round pick, Redmond, was basically a strikeout swinging. Their 4^th-round pick, OL Greg Randall, only ended up being a regular starter for 1 season. Of their remaining 7 picks, all Pioli I got out of them in terms of starters and/or Pro Bowlers was Brady; granted, he certainly makes up for the rest of the Day 2 garbage. Essentially, only the Policy regime's 1995 and 1997 drafts are in the same solar system in terms of being bad from top-to-bottom.

The difference, though, is that Pioli I realized really quickly the enormity of his 2000 disaster. After failing with his OL picks in 2000, he took another 2 OL with his first 4 picks in 2001. After failing with his DL picks in 2000, he took a DL with his first pick in 2001. This trend continued in subsequent drafts, as Pioli I took a TE with his first pick in 2002 after missing on 2 TEs in the previous 2 drafts. You get the idea. The point here is that there seems to have been an honest reassessment of previous draft failures at need positions. In essence, you don't just wait for a pick to be what you thought he would be. Rather, you quickly say, "he sucks," and address the need again immediately.

The second example of Pioli I not being "vanilla" is something I mentioned earlier. Namely, he didn't settle for mediocrity after NE went 9-7 in 2002. Rather, that 2003 draft ended up being what took the Patriots to the next level, allowing them to escape the mire of mediocrity. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. With their first 6 picks, NE found 4 starters (DL Ty Warren, Eugene Wilson, Samuel, and Koppen), the latter 2 of which made the Pro Bowl with NE. And what did the Patriots do in 2003 and 2004? They won two championships, of course. So the point here is that, whereas McNolan looked at a 5-win team and made a few changes to get back to 7-9, Pioli I looked at a 9-7 team and made a whole host of changes to get back to the Super Bowl. If this isn't the difference between vanilla and mint chocolate chip, I don't know what is.

Here's one last thing about this. Although I'm focusing on Pioli I here, his commitment to excellence (rather than mediocrity) is an identifiable trait because of how consistently he's acted on it. Specifically, not settling for mediocrity continued well into the Pioli II regime of 2004-2008. Here are a few examples:

He amassed 10 picks in the 2006 draft after a Divisional Round exit in 2005.
Despite being minutes away from reaching another Super Bowl in 2006, he traded for WR Randy Moss and signed WR Wes Welker after realizing that NE's mediocre WRs were holding them back.
He realized that a certain Bay Area team was not as good as they thought they were, and traded NE's late-1^st-round pick in 2007 in exchange for that team's earlier 4^th-round pick and sure-to-be-earlier 1^st-round pick in 2008. All this trade produced was NE having the #7 pick in the draft coming off of an undefeated regular season.

This last example was the difference between vanilla and mint chocolate chip in a nut shell.

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

To wrap things up, below is a table summarizing ways in which Pioli I's draft strategy was similar to and different from McNolan's:

MCNOLAN STRATEGY	PIOLI I SIMILAR?
Stockpile picks when your team sucks, but trade away picks when (you think) your team is good.
Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
Use Day 2 to take a lot of bites at the apple.
BCS or die!
We're Goldilocks (aka Vanilla McNolan).	X

As I said during the introduction, what I found out in my regime comparisons was not what I expected. The first thing that surprised me was that McNolan and Pioli I have been pretty similar. More accurately, though, I was shocked that McNolan's drafts have been most similar to a regime that won 10 more games and 1 more Super Bowl in the same context and period of time. This revelation implied an unexpected finding that was even more shocking to me. Namely, that NE's success during Pioli - and Pioli II for that matter - was minimally attributable to their draft success. Rather, from a personnel perspective, NE won in 2001 for 2 reasons:

Tom Brady
Free agency

Although this is certainly arguable, I'm sure the vast majority of you - and a plurality of Patriot fans - would agree that there is no Patriot dynasty without NE discovering what NFL Network deemed the greatest "diamond in the rough" in NFL draft history. It's pretty clear that their other draft picks in 2000 were pretty useless, so it stands to reason that, without Brady, NE's upset over the Rams in Super Bowl XXXVI never happens (p.s. I'm ignoring the Tuck Rule here). Same goes for all those free agent acquisitions following the 1999 and 2000 seasons.

Where the draft has helped NE the most has been in sustaining their success past 2001. Without that 2003 draft supplementing a few free agent acquisitions (e.g., DB Rodney Harrison), I'm pretty sure the Patriots don't win rings in 2003 and 2004.

The bottom line is that, whether through free agency or the draft, NE hasn't sat on its laurels and accepted mediocrity. Basically, 9-7 has meant "we suck." That is the lesson that Donahue never learned, and it seems to be the modus operandi for McNolan thus far. Simply put, Pioli I was mint chocolate chip, not vanilla.

So, based on everything I've discussed in this article, here's the way forward for our beloved 49ers if they truly want to emulate NE's recent success:

Solidify the QB position once and for all. If that means hiring a shaman to do a good-luck "diamond in the rough" dance, so be it.
Use free agency a little more, and perhaps replace Director of Pro Personnel Tom Gamble, who only seems to target false hopes (e.g., WR Bryant Johnson, OL Jonas Jennings, DL Justin Smith, and LB Tully Banta-Cain) and old fogies (e.g., FB Moran Norris, WR Isaac Bruce, OL Larry Allen, OL Marvel Smith, LB Takeo Spikes, DB Walt Harris, and DB Michael Lewis).
Quit being vanilla! Honestly reassess your failures, and correct them immediately. Don't think a 5-win team only requires a little nibbling around the edges. Hell, as it relates to this year, the same goes for a 7-win team.

That's it for the series. I hope you enjoyed it, and thanks for sticking around through 7 (lengthy) parts. At the very least, I hope you learned a couple of things about 49er draft history that can be assimilated into your opinions of current and past 49er regimes.

¹ DVOA statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.

Poll

Assuming that McCloughan, Singletary, and Jed will be around for the foreseeable future, which of the following adjustments is MOST necessary for the Niners to become a consistent winner ala the Patriots?

Solidifying the QB position

97 votes

Getting better at free agency

44 votes

Stop living in la-la-land thinking this mediocre team is actually good

73 votes

214 votes | Poll has closed

Injuries causing uncertainty for the Dallas Cowboys

Dave Halprin — Fri, 29 Aug 2008 16:17:58 -0000

A couple things to preface this post. I haven’t really watched the Dallas Cowboys game against the Vikings last night in detail; I did try to keep up watching online on a tiny screen but not enough to really comment on how guys played. I do have it on Tivo though and will be going through it this afternoon specifically watching the bubble players and will post on that later. Last night, a lot of my attention was focused on this. The other thing I’d like to say is thanks to Brandon for posting the open threads and a game recap last night while I indulged my other football passion.

OK, on to the game. One play I did see last night that I wish I’d never seen was the injury to Sam Hurd. Are you kidding? Another receiver down for the Cowboys. We need to wait on the MRI results before speculating but even that might not tell the whole story, it could take a while to really know.

Hurd, who will have an MRI exam on Friday, seemed confident he could return in time for the Sept. 7 season opener in Cleveland with proper rest and treatment. But team doctors project that he'll be doubtful for the game due to the lingering nature of a high ankle sprain, which involves the ligaments connecting the tibia and fibia on the lower leg. Generally that type of injury requires a week of evaluation before an accurate timetable can be set.

Now, I’ve taken some flak for suggesting we can’t roll into the season with just T.O., Crayton and Hurd because we’d be one injury away from playing some totally untested guys in a real role on offense. I’ve suggested that a veteran will be signed at some point but with the top three healthy, we might wait until we get past the first game so we wouldn’t guarantee the salary for the year. But now with Hurd down, and everyone expecting he won’t be available next Sunday - except for Hurd himself – I feel even stronger about this. Jerry Jones expresses the opposite view, but I have to wonder if he’s playing poker.

"We want people on the field with [Tony] Romo that Romo's been throwing to," Jones said. "We won't have anybody out there that has not been on the team trying to move the ball against Cleveland."

If you take that statement as the truth, then it looks like Mike Jefferson and/or Danny Amendola are going to get a baptism by fire next week as they participate in a real NFL game, a game that counts in the standings and kicks off the Cowboys run at a Super Bowl. I’m sorry, but I’m just not comfortable with that. It’s been suggested that we have enough weapons on offense to get away with it and that some of the other guys like Felix Jones or maybe Martellus Bennett can be used in ways to minimize the impact. That may be what Jason Garrett has in mind but even those guys are untested and are rookies who need time to grow into their roles – that includes El Gato. I realize we still have Jason Witten, so we still have three WR-quality guys we can play. But it’s a real gamble to me, injuries in that game would really hamstring us and rookie mistakes could cost us. WR is one of the easier roles to integrate quickly, especially if the receiver has any familarity with the coordinator's offense and terminology.

I won't beat this subject to death, because without knowing if any decent WR gets cut from another team, it’s hard to debate the specifics of the issue. But there is one WR out there who is available.

When asked if he planned to contact [Terry] Glenn, Jones was non-committal.

"I'm going to keep that to myself, one way or the other," Jones said.

Interesting.

One thing I will be watching closely when I review the game is the play of our offensive line, especially the guys in the left guard competition. I feel just like Wade:

"It's hard to evaluate the inside blockers until we look at the tape," Phillips said. "Once we get the tape, I think we'll have a better feel how each of those guys played."

With the trade for Montrae Holland, we have 11 linemen for 10 spots on the roster; somebody is going when we make the last roster cut. It’s not going to be one of the starting five and it won’t be Doug Free or Montrae Holland. That leaves Pat McQuistan, Joe Berger, Cory Procter and James Marten. I won’t hazard a final guess until I watch the tape, but my early money is on Marten.

Could we be adding another player to the roster? It will be tough to do with all the injury problems but It could help us on our special teams.

When asked if the Cowboys would be interested in making an effort to re-sign [Keith] Davis, Cowboys owner Jerry Jones said, "We haven't - we'll get into that tomorrow and see. It has everything to do with the kind of pressure we have on our 53-man roster."