SB Nation User Blog: David Golebiewski

This Time Around, Giants Play It Smart on Free Agent Pitching Market

David Golebiewski — Sun, 28 Dec 2008 11:18:24 -0000

Wading into the free agent pitching waters is just about the most treacherous activity that a team can undertake. There are certainly some bargains to be had, but the history of lengthy, exorbitantly-priced contracts for the most coveted arms on the market is mixed at best.

By definition, a free agent has accumulated at least six years of service time at the major league level, meaning that his days of making less than his fair market value are over. Add in the injury and attrition rates for pitchers and the uncertainty of projecting player performance more than a few years out, and you have a recipe for some expensive mistakes.

To get an idea of the return on investment that clubs have been getting from free agent hurlers, let's take a look at the pitchers who received multi-year deals during the 2006/2007 offseason and how their level of performance stacks up to their salary.

To do this, we can calculate a pitcher's Wins Above Replacement (WAR) and then convert that to a salary figure. For the purposes of this article, I'm going to utilize the scale used at FanGraphs: one free agent WAR was valued at $4.1M in 2007 and 4.5M in 2008. Salary information was obtained either from MLB.com or Cot's Baseball Contracts. The player's real salary earned will be called "actual salary" while the player's salary based on their performance will be called "earned salary." For Japanese players, I have decided to pro-rate the posting fees. For instance, Boston paid about $51.11M to acquire the rights to Daisuke Matsuzaka and sign him for six years. I will assign an additional $8.52M per year on top of Matsuzaka's salary (51.11 divided by 6).

2006/2007

Miguel Batista: 3 years, $25 million

2007 actual salary: $5.5M

2007 WAR: 1.69 (4.1M per win) = $6.93M earned

2008 actual salary: $9M

2008 WAR: -0.93 WAR (4.5M per win) = -$4.19M earned

TOTAL: $14.5M actual salary, $2.74M earned salary, -$11.76M

Adam Eaton: 3 years, $24.5 million

2007 actual salary: $6.9M

2007 WAR: -1.01 WAR (4.1M per win) = -$4.14M earned

2008 actual salary: $7.64M

2008 WAR: 0.25 WAR (4.5M per win) = $1.13M earned

TOTAL: $14.54 actual salary, -$3.01M earned, -$17.55M

Kei Igawa: 5 years, $20 million

2007 actual salary: $4M

2007 WAR: -0.65 WAR (4.1M per win) = -$2.67M earned

2008 actual salary: $4M

2008 WAR: 0.1 WAR (4.5M per win) $0.45M earned

PLUS $5.2M post fee X 2 = $10.4M

TOTAL: $8M actual salary (+10.4M post) = $18.4M, -$2.22 earned salary, -$20.62M

Ted Lilly: 4 years, $40 million

2007 actual salary: $5M

2007 WAR: 2.56 WAR (4.1M per win) = $10.5M earned

2008 actual salary: $7M

2008 WAR: 1.98 WAR (4.5M per win) = $8.91M earned

TOTAL: $12M actual salary, $19.41 earned salary, +$7.41M

Jason Marquis: 3 years, $21 million

2007 actual salary: $4.75M

2007 WAR: 0.69 WAR (4.1M per win) = $2.83M earned

2008 actual salary: $6.38M

2008 WAR: 1.47 WAR (4.5M per win) = $6.62M earned

TOTAL: $11.13M actual salary, $9.45M earned, -$1.68M

Daisuke Matsuzaka: 6 years, $52M

2007 actual salary: $6M

2007 WAR: 2.39 WAR (4.1M per win) = $9.8M earned

2008 actual salary: $8M

2008 WAR: 2.54 WAR (4.5M per win) = $11.43M earned

PLUS $8.52M post X 2 = $17.04M

TOTAL: $14M actual salary (+17.04M post) = $31.04M, $21.23M earned, -$9.81M

Gil Meche: 5 years, $55M

2007 actual salary: $7M

2007 WAR: 2.95 WAR (4.1M per win) = $12.1M earned

2008 actual salary: $11M

2008 WAR: 3.86 WAR (4.5M per win) = $17.37M earned

TOTAL: $18M actual salary, $29.47M earned, +11.47M

Jamie Moyer: 2 years, $11.5M

2007 actual salary: $6M

2007 WAR: 0.8 WAR (4.1M per win) = $3.2M earned

2008 actual salary: $5.5M (with innings-based incentives)

2008 WAR: 2.15 WAR (4.5M per win) = $9.68M earned

TOTAL: $11.5M actual salary, $12.88M earned, +1.38M

Vicente Padilla: 3 years, $33.75 million

2007 actual salary: $9M

2007 WAR: 0.32 WAR (4.1M per win) = $1.31M earned

2008 actual salary: $11M

2008 WAR: 0.67 WAR (4.5M per win) = $3.01M earned

TOTAL: $20M actual salary, $4.32M earned, -$15.68M

Jason Schmidt: 3 years, $47 million

2007 actual salary: $12.5M

2007 WAR: 0.06 WAR (4.1M per win) $246K earned

2008 actual salary: $12M

2008 WAR: DNP

TOTAL: $24.5M actual salary, $246K earned, -$24.254M

Jeff Suppan: 4 years, $42 million

2007 actual salary: $6M

2007 WAR: 1.96 WAR (4.1M per win) = $8.04M earned

2008 actual salary: $8M

2008 WAR: -0.3 WAR (4.5M per win) = -$1.35M earned

TOTAL: $14M actual salary, $6.69M earned, -$7.31M

Woody Williams: 2 years, $12.5 million

2007 actual salary: $6M

2007 WAR: -0.61 WAR (4.1M per win) = -$2.62M

2008 actual salary: $6.5M

2008 WAR: DNP

TOTAL: $12.5M actual salary, -$2.62M earned, -$15.12M

Barry Zito: 7 years, $126 million

2007 actual salary: $10M

2007 WAR: 1.05 WAR (4.1M per win) = $4.31M earned

2008 actual salary: $14.5M

2008 WAR: 1.26 WAR (4.5M per win) = $5.67M earned

TOTAL: $24.5M actual salary, $9.98M earned, -$14.52M

2006/2007 FA TOTALS: $226.1M spent thus far, $108.57M earned, - $117.53M

Average return on investment: 48% of fair market value (collectively, teams got less than half of their expected return on free agent starting pitchers signed to multi-year contracts during the 2006/2007 offseason: $108.57M earned/ $226.1M actually paid out)

The 2006/2007 offseason may have been a particularly poor crop ( it will only get worse once the back-loaded portion of some of these pacts kick in), and far fewer multi-year deals were handed out last offseason. Perhaps teams started to get the picture that dishing out huge dollar amounts to the Jeff Suppans and Vicente Padillas of the world is a pretty bad idea; those sorts of players constitute marginal upgrades relative to the additional cash that must be spent.

Plenty of teams got burned during the '06-'07 offseason, when money was handed out like water. But no team was scorched as badly as the San Francisco Giants, who dished out unfathomable amounts of cash to Barry Zito, despite his modest peripherals. While GM Brian Sabean and the Giants will have to live with the consequences of that colossal contract for the next five seasons, it does at least appear as though San Francisco's front office has learned its lesson.

Consider San Francisco's recent signing of Randy Johnson. Johnson is 45 years of age, but he remains one of the more effective starters in the National League. Though he no longer pumps mid-90's gas, The Big Unit still managed to punch out 8.46 batters per nine innings in 2008, with just 2.15 BB/9. His 3.76 Fielding Independent ERA (FIP) ranked 16th among National League starters.

Randy Johnson

#51 / Pitcher / Arizona Diamondbacks

Height: 6-10

Weight: 225

Bats: R

Throws: L

Born: Sep 10, 1963

	W-L	G	GS	CG	SHO	SV	BS	IP	H	R	ER	HR	BB	K	ERA	WHIP
2008 - Randy Johnson	11-10	30	30	2	0	0	0	184.0	184	92	80	24	44	173	3.91	1.24

In 2009, the Marcel projection system forecasts Johnson to toss 170 innings with a 4.11 FIP. That projection was made before Johnson, a flyball pitcher, shifted from Arizona's Chase Field to AT&T Park. Let's knock his FIP down to an even four. In 170 innings, Johnson would surrender about 75.6 runs (4 FIP/9 X170 IP). A replacement-level starter, with a FIP of 5.50, would surrender about 91.2 runs in 150 innings. We'll cap the replacement-level starter's innings at 150 on the assumption that such an ineffective pitcher would not be kept on the mound beyond that point. The additional 20-inning gap will be filled by a replacement-level reliever, with a 4.75 FIP. The replacement-level reliever would give up about 10.6 runs. So, combined, we have..

Randy Johnson: 75.6 runs allowed in 170 IP

Replacement-Level Starter: 91.2 runs allowed in 150 IP

RL reliever: 10.6 runs allowed in 20 IP

Overall, the replacement level starter and reliever would surrender 101.8 runs. Subtracting that number from Johnson's 75.6 runs allowed, we find that Johnson projects to be about 26.2 runs above replacement level. Using the concept that 10 runs equals a win, Johnson is valued at 2.62 Wins Above Replacement (WAR). You'll recall that one WAR was valued at about $4.5 million last offseason. There had been a rate of inflation from one season to the next of about 10% over the past few years, but that trend does not seem to be continuing thus far. Let's say there's a little more than 5% inflation from last offseason's WAR figure, making our new going rate for one WAR about $4.8M.

That would make Johnson's contribution worth about $12.6 million. The Giants managed to snag The Big Unit for 1 year at just $8 million, meaning the surplus value of the deal (the amount that Johnson's level of performance exceeds his actual salary) projects to be about $4.6 million.

Major league clubs (excluding the Yankees, who are basically on their own revenue curve) seem to have changed the way in which multi-year contracts are handed out to starters. A higher degree of caution is being used after the '06-'07 spending spree that left many with a financial hangover- according to MLB.com's free-agent tracker, only two starters who were true free agents were given multi-year contracts last winter (Hiroki Kuroda and Carlos Silva).

The Giants are certainly an example of this trend. After handing over Fort Knox to Zito, they made a much less expensive, lower-risk signing in Johnson. Granted, there are some inherent risks with a guy in his mid-40's with knee and back issues, but much of that risk is negated by the fact that he's only under contract for one season. San Francisco figures to get one of the better starters in the league for less than he's worth in 2009, with none of the gambling associated with a long-term commitment.

A Journalism student at Duquesne University, David Golebiewski is a contributing writer for Driveline Mechanics, Fan Graphs and Inside Edge Scouting Services. Contact David via email at golebie1029@duq.edu or judidave87@msn.com

Pitch F/X Profile: Jon Lester

David Golebiewski — Tue, 23 Dec 2008 21:51:24 -0000

Jon Lester

#31 / Pitcher / Boston Red Sox

Height: 6-2

Weight: 190

Bats: L

Throws: L

Born: Jan 07, 1984

A World Series-clinching win. A successful battle against non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. A no-hitter. Red Sox southpaw Jon Lester has already compiled a career's worth of accomplishments, and he's only going on 25.

A second-round selection out of Tacoma, Washington in the 2002 amateur draft, Lester quickly established himself as one of the most promising arms in Boston's farm system. After a solid full-season debut as a 19 year-old at Low-A Augusta in 2003, (106 IP, 6 K/9, 3.7 BB/9), the sturdy lefty punched out over a batter per inning in the High-A Florida State League in 2004 and the AA Eastern League in 2005. His control needed refinement (as evidenced by his 4.8 BB/9 at AAA Pawtucket in 2006), but he made his Fenway debut in the summer of '06 and appeared poised to infuse the Red Sox rotation with a home-grown ace to complement trade acquisition Josh Beckett.

Something far more serious took precedent, however, as Lester was diagnosed with a rare form of a blood cancer in September of that season. While he would spend the better part of the 2007 campaign regaining strength, Lester tossed 63 innings for the Sox and capped off the year on the highest of notes, pitching 5 and 2/3 scoreless innings in the series-winning game against the Colorado Rockies.

	W-L	G	GS	CG	SHO	SV	BS	IP	H	R	ER	HR	BB	K	ERA	WHIP
2008 - Jon Lester	16-6	33	33	2	2	0	0	210.1	202	78	75	14	66	152	3.21	1.27

While his 2008 season got off to a rocky start (22/23 K/BB in April), Lester quickly righted the ship, culminating with a nine-strikeout, no-hit masterpiece against the Kansas City Royals on May 19th. Despite having pitched just 163 combined innings in 2007, Lester appeared to get stronger as the year progressed: from June onward, he posted a 103/30 K/BB ratio in 134.1 innings. So, Lester seems like he's making good on the lofty expectations bestowed upon him prior to his health problems. But how is he doing it? To find that out, let's take a look at Lester's Pitch F/X data.

The chart above shows the vertical and horizontal movement (in inches) that Lester got on his pitches in 2008, relative to a pitch thrown without spin. The X axis shows the amount of horizontal movement on Lester's pitches, while the Y axis shows the amount of vertical movement on the pitches. The chart is from the view of the catcher, so pitches with a negative horizontal (X axis) value are tailing in on a right-handed hitter. Pitches with a low vertical (Y axis) value are moving down in the strike zone; the lower the Y value, the more downward movement the pitch has.

The 6-2, 190 pounder appears to possess a five-pitch mix: a fastball, cutter, curveball, changeup and slider.

However, it's inaccurate to call Lester a five-pitch hurler. Lester's heater, thrown at an average of 92.1 MPH, has a very wide range both in terms of horizontal and vertical movement. With 6.03 inches of tailing action in on lefties and 7.77 inches of vertical movement, Lester's fastball has the velocity of a four-seam fastball and the motion in on the hands of lefties that one might expect from a two-seamer.

Initially, this pattern confused me. But after doing a little research, I found out that what we're seeing on Lester's chart is actually the combination of a four-seam and one-seam fastball. That's right, one-seam. Lester throws an offshoot of a sinker, gripped in an unusual manner along just one seam of the baseball. While the Pitch F/X data did not discern between the two pitches in terms of classification, the chart shows two distinct clusters, with the four-seamers in the upper right hand of the graph and the one-seamers below them and showing more horizontal movement. Lester's use of the one-seamer may also explain a pretty big uptick in his groundball percentage. Lester induced a worm-burner 47.5% of the time in 2008, up from 40.6% in 2006 and 34.4% in 2007.

For the sake of accuracy, I decided to slice Lester's fastballs into two categories, using a cutoff of 5 inches of vertical movement to differentiate between the four-seamers and one-seamers (the average sinker has about 4.7 inches of vertical movement). It's admittedly arbitrary, but it's a way to better define Lester's two fastballs. Here's an updated, more comprehensive chart of Lester's pitches:

That's more like it. Now, we can see the difference between Lester's four-seamer and one-seamer.

Now that we have separated the fastballs, they look more like they should in terms of speed and movement. A four-seam fastball is thrown with the most direct application of force, meaning that backspin is imparted on the baseball. Consequently, four-seamers are thrown at a higher velocity, with more vertical movement and less horizontal break. This is the pitch that is sometimes called a "rising" fastball. While that's impossible and would defy the laws of gravity, the four-seamer "drops" less in relation to other pitches, giving it the illusion of rise. Lester's four-seamer was thrown at an average of 92.3 MPH, with 5.51 inches of tailing action in on lefties and 8.73 inches of vertical movement. He utilized the pitch 47.3% of the time, more often to southpaws than right-handers.

In contrast, the two-seamer (one-seamer in Lester's case) displays more side-to-side action, with sinking movement coming at the expense of some speed. Lester broke out his one-seamer 11% of the time in 2008. The 91.1 MPH hybrid sinker had 3.62 inches of vertical movement and generated plenty of running action in on the hands of southpaws (8.25 inches), higher than the 7.6 major league average.

Lester used his two fastballs a fair amount against right-handed batters (a combined 53.9% of the time), but he really delivered the heat versus fellow southpaws (72.4%). With the ability to change eye levels with his fastballs, Lester eviscerated lefties this past season. Left-handers turned into Tony Pena Jr. versus Jon, batting a feeble .217/.269/.302.

While classified as a curveball, Lester's 76.1 MPH breaker is a sweeping, slurvy pitch. Lester's curve broke away from lefties (in to righties) an average of -5.12 inches (remember, a negative horizontal number means the pitch is breaking in toward a righty), while also dropping -5.14 inches in the zone more than a pitch thrown without spin would. With nearly two more inches of "drop" than the average curve (-3.3) and a big speed differential in comparison to his fastballs, Lester's slurvy offering has the look of a dynamite pitch. He wasn't shy about breaking out the curve against hitters of either hand: lefties saw the pitch 15% of the time, with righties getting the hook on 16.8% of their total pitches.

If a guy with six different pitches can be said to have a bread-and-butter offering, then Lester's cutter fits that description. Thrown 20% of the time overall, the 88.6 MPH pitch bored in on the hands of righties (-1.1 inches). Right-handers saw the pitch about twice as often (22.8%) as southpaws (11.5%).

Let's put that into perspective for a moment. The pitcher's mound is 60 feet, 6 inches from home plate. Adjusting for the stride of the pitcher and the hitter having to make contact with the ball a little out in front, the distance between pitcher and hitter is roughly 53.5 feet. From that distance, Lester's 92.3 MPH four-seam fastball will arrive in .39520 seconds. His cutter will arrive in .41171 seconds. A right-handed batter has .0165 additional seconds to decipher whether a four-seam fastball is going to tail away from him or a cutter is going to jam him inside; the difference in horizontal movement between the pitches is 6.61 inches, well over half a foot. Ted Williams was fond of saying that hitting a baseball is the toughest feat in sports. It's pretty difficult to argue with The Greatest Hitter Who Ever Lived on that one.

Lester also tosses in an occasional changeup and slider, though neither offering figures prominently into his pitch selection. He tossed in an 83.4 MPH change just 3.7% of the time. The changeup sort of takes the middle ground between his four-seamer and one-seamer, tailing 8.46 inches away from righties and possessing 7.05 inches of vertical movement. The slider was incorporated even more rarely, on just 1.3% of Lester's total pitches. His slider seems like a pitch that could mess up the hitter's timing: thrown at an average speed of 83.1 MPH, the slider features -3.9 inches of horizontal movement and 0.24 inches of vertical break. In comparison to his curve, Lester's slide piece is thrown about 7 MPH faster, with less sweeping action and vertical drop. A batter looking for Lester's big curve could end up surprised by the slider.

Suffice it to say, Jon Lester is well-equipped to remain one of the better starters in the American League. With two different fastballs, a devastating cutter and a sweeping curve, Lester can locate his pitches to all four quadrants of the strike zone. If there is a concern with Jon, it's that his workload increased by a whopping 74 innings between 2007 and 2008. The consequences of that increase remain to be seen. But, if Lester remains healthy, don't be surprised if makes a serious run at the Cy Young Award in 2009.

What's Oliver Perez Worth?

David Golebiewski — Fri, 12 Dec 2008 19:35:22 -0000

Oliver Perez

#46 / Pitcher / New York Mets

Height: 6-3

Weight: 215

Bats: L

Throws: L

Born: Aug 15, 1981

Oliver Perez has been around the majors so long that it's easy to forget that he is still a relatively young man. The Culiacan, Mexico native made his big league debut all the way back in 2002 as a 20 year-old for the San Diego Padres, and enters free agency as a rare commodity: a lefty starter with a few years to go before his 30th birthday.

With the other young southpaw on the market, C.C. Sabathia, becoming Yankee property, attention now turns to the second tier of free agent starters which Perez is a part of. Perez's agent, Scott Boras, has been in full-fledged spin mode with the 27 year-old, going so far as to liken him to a young Sandy Koufax. While that comparison is, um, interesting, this seems like a good time so separate hyperbole from fact. Let's take a stab at calculating Perez's fair market value.

The method used here is pretty much the same one used in evaluating the Yankees' decision to not offer arbitration to Andy Pettitte, with one alteration. As an astute reader, hazel, pointed out, The $5.5 million per Win Above Replacement (WAR) figure I used looks a little high, given the way that the free agent market has played out. That figure assumed a 10% inflation is player salary, which had been the norm over the past few offseasons. However, that inflation has not come to fruition. To adjust for this, I'm going to use last offseason's rate of $5 million per WAR.

	W-L	G	GS	CG	SHO	SV	BS	IP	H	R	ER	HR	BB	K	ERA	WHIP
2008 - Oliver Perez	10-7	34	34	0	0	0	0	194.0	167	100	91	24	105	180	4.22	1.40

In 2009, Marcel projects Perez to throw 175 innings with a 4.52 Fielding Independent ERA (FIP). FIP is a better barometer of pitching skill than ERA, as it evaluates hurlers based on their strikeouts, walks and home runs allowed.

A replacement level starter would post a 5.50 FIP. However, a replacement level starter would be unlikely to throw 175 innings due to his ineffectiveness, so we'll cap his innings total at 150 innings. The additional 25 innings will be given to a replacement level reliever (4.50 FIP). Using these parameters, we can evaluate Perez's value relative to a replacement level starter:

Perez

4.52 FIP/9 = .502 X 175 (projected innings total) = 87.9 runs allowed

Replacement Level Starter

RL starter 5.50 FIP/9 = .611 X 150 = 91.7 runs allowed

RL Reliever 4.50 FIP/9= .528 X 25 = 12.5 runs allowed

Total: 104.2 runs allowed

Subtracting the replacement level 104.2 from Perez's 87.9, we find that Perez projects to be 16.3 runs above replacement. One win is considered about 10 runs, so Perez will be worth about 1.6 Wins Above Replacement if he meets his Marcel projection. Using the guideline that a free agent WAR is valued at about $5 million, Perez's fair market value comes in at $8.15 million per season. Assuming Perez maintains a similar level of performance over the next few seasons, here's what a long-term, market value deal would look like:

3 Years/ $24.45M

4 Years/ $32.6M

5 Years/ $40.75M

The amount could actually be a little less, as some feel that a 10% discount is given by the player in exchange for long-term financial security. That would lower the values to 3/$22M, 4/$29.3M and 5/$36.7M.

Boras has apparently floated the idea of a five-year, $70M deal for Perez, but it would take a team either A.) desperate to land a starter after missing out on Sabtahia, Lowe, Burnett et al or B.) extremely optimistic about Perez's chances of improvement in the future to offer such a contract. To be worth that $14M a year, Perez would have to post 2.8 WAR, well above his current projection. Maybe Perez does make those necessary strides, but currently, the numbers just don't add up.

Will the Yankees Regret Not Offering Arbitration to Pettitte?

David Golebiewski — Sun, 07 Dec 2008 21:03:30 -0000

Prior to the 2007 season, prodigal son Andy Pettitte returned to the New York Yankees. A product of the now defunct draft-and-follow process all the way back in 1991, Pettitte made his Bronx debut in 1995. He proceeded to post an ERA+ at least 10 percent better than the league average in six of nine seasons during his first tenure with the Yankees, before taking his act to Houston for three years. Upon returning to the Bombers, Pettitte compiled another impressive season in 2007 (110 ERA+) before seemingly declining this past year, with an ERA+ below the league average for the first time in his career (98 ERA+).

A free agent at season's end, Pettitte nonetheless qualified for Type A Free agent status, meaning that the Yankees were essentially faced with the following choices. They could have:

1.) Offered Pettitte arbitration, ensuring that they would receive 2 compensation draft picks should he sign with another club. Should Pettitte accept arbitration, he would receive a salary somewhere in the range of his 2008 compensation ($16 million).

or the scenario that they did pick:

2.) Decline to offer Pettitte arbitration. The Yankees are reportedly still negotiating with Pettitte, hoping to bring him back at a reduced salary level. However, should Pettitte decide to sign elsewhere, the Yankees receive no draft pick compensation for his departure.

The deep-pocketed organization has been panned by Baseball Prospectus' Joe Sheehan, among others, for declining to offer Pettitte and Bobby Abreu arbitration. Sheehan summed up his frustration with the situation:

"Two days ago, the Yankees had assets in Abreu and Pettitte that could have been considered short-term investments with minimal risk and fairly certain benefit (were they to rejoin the club), or long-term investments with more risk and uncertain benefit, but higher upside (were they to become draft picks). Now, they have nothing. How a team with the cash reserves of the Yankees can make a choice like that is inexplicable, and recalls the decision to forego the services of Carlos Beltran three years ago, a decision also motivated by short-term cash concerns."

By declining to offer Pettitte arbitration, the Yankees seemingly came to the conclusion that Pettitte is not worth the $16M or so he would have made if he decided to accept arbitration.

Luckily, there are a number of methods now available to evaluate player salary. By converting Pettitte's pitching numbers into a runs above replacement level figure, we can get an estimate of what Pettitte will be worth in 2009. For those who aren't familiar with the concept, replacement level is essentially the theoretical level of performance of a freely-available player who could be acquired for the major-league minimum salary. As Eric Seidman and others have pointed out, replacement-level for starting pitchers is set at a 5.50 Fielding Independent ERA (FIP ERA). FIP ERA is calculated using just a player's strikeout, walk and home run totals, thus evaluating pitchers based more on their controllable skills.

While Pettitte's 4.54 ERA looks pretty ordinary, he had some pretty terrible luck on balls put in play. Pettitte's Batting Average on Balls in Play (BABIP) was a Sistine Chapel-high .339, the product of leaky defense behind him. In a write-up I completed for Fan Graphs, I found that Jason Giambi, Robinson Cano, Derek Jeter and Bobby Abreu all rated as lackluster with the leather. Per Defensive Efficiency (which measures the percentage of balls put in play that are converted into outs), the Yankees rated just 25th in the majors.

Removing poor luck from his line, it becomes apparent that Pettitte was his customarily productive self in 2008. His 3.71 FIP ERA was actually his best mark since 2005, and the Marcel projection system forecasts Pettitte to post a 3.98 FIP ERA in 183 innings pitched in 2009.

Using that projection and our replacement-level standard for starting pitchers (5.50), we can figure out how many runs above replacement Pettitte projects to post in 2009.

If Pettitte posts a 3.98 FIP ERA in 183 innings, he will surrender about 81 runs:

3.98 FIP ERA / 9 = .442 X 183 innings = 80.92 runs.

A replacement-level starter, due to his lack of effectiveness, would be unlikely to pitch 183 innings. So, what we'll do is cap our replacement-level starter's innings at 150, with the additional 33 innings going to a replacement-level reliever (4.50 FIP ERA):

RL starter: 5.50 FIP ERA/9 = .611 X 150 innings = 91.6 runs

RL reliever: 4.50 FIP ERA/9= .5 X 33 innings = 16.5 runs

Combined, the replacement-level pitchers would surrender about 109 runs.

Subtracting the replacement-level 109 runs from Pettitte's 81 runs, we find that Andy is 28 runs above replacement. 10 runs is considered to be worth one win, so Pettitte is projected to be 2.8 wins above replacement.

So, now we know how many wins above replacement level Pettitte projects to be, but we need to figure out just how much 1 WAR is valued on the free agent market. Using Dave Cameron's research, we find that a free agent win above replacement was worth between $4.5 and $5 million last offseason. Adjusting for salary inflation (which has been about 10% per year in recent seasons), a free agent win above replacement projects to be worth about $5.5 million. Now, we simply have to take Pettitte's WAR total and multiply by the going rate for WAR:

2.8 WAR(5.5M)= $15.4 million

Pettitte projects to be worth just about every penny of what he would have made through arbitration. Did the Yankees undervalue Pettitte's talent level? It's possible. It's also possible that the club thinks that they can play "hardball" with Pettitte and win. In other words, the Yankees may think that Pettitte does not wish to sign with another organization (thus negating the compensation picks), and feel as though he will end up conceding and signing for less than $16 million.

If that happens, all is well that ends well. But if Pettitte takes his game elsewhere, the Yankees will have missed out on the opportunity to either bring back a productive starter worth his salary for one year or select two solid prospects in next year's draft. Was it worth the gamble? Stay tuned.

Pitch F/X Profile: Morrow's first start

David Golebiewski — Sun, 07 Sep 2008 10:47:30 -0000

The Seattle Mariners have made plenty of capricious decisions over the past few years. Without even getting into the debacle that is the major league roster, the M's have shown a tendency to expedite players through the minor league system, zooming them past levels that the players are probably not yet equipped to handle. Brandon Morrow is one such example of this trend.

The 5th overall selection out of Cal in 2006, Morrow scarcely saw minor league action before being pigeonholed in the Seattle bullpen for the better part of the past two seasons. Morrow missed plenty of bats during his rookie season in 2007 (9.38 K/9), but his control (7.11 BB/9) and pitch selection (80 % fastballs) suggested that he would have been better served accumulating innings in the minor leagues. Morrow's walk rate is much improved in '08 (3.65 BB/9), and with the starting rotation a train wreck outside of Felix Hernandez (the M's rank 23rd in SNLVAR), the team recently decided to move Morrow into the starting rotation.

In his first major league start, Morrow lasted 7 and 2/3 innings against the Yankees, striking out 8 batters and surrendering just 1 hit and 1 earned run while flirting with a no-hitter. How did Morrow subdue the Bombers? Let's take a look at his Pitch F/X data from the start to find out.

The chart above shows the vertical and horizontal movement (in inches) that Morrow got on his pitches against the Yankees, relative to a pitch thrown without spin. The X axis shows the amount of horizontal movement on Morrow's pitches, while the Y axis shows the amount of vertical movement on the pitches. The chart is from the view of the catcher, so pitches with a negative horizontal (X axis) value are tailing in on a righthanded hitter. Pitches with a low vertical (Y axis) value are moving down in the strike zone; the lower the Y value, the more downward movement the pitch has.

Type MPH X(In.) Z(In.) %Thrown

FB 95.7 -2.68 10 58.5 (62/106)

CH 83.75 -6.39 4.55 15.1 (16/106)

SL 86.5 2.44 0.65 15.1 (16/106)

CB 83.4 2.08 -7.88 11.3 (12/106)

Type is the type of pitch thrown. FB=fastball, CH=Changeup, SL=Slider, CB=Curveball . MPH is the average initial velocity of the pitch. X is the amount of horizontal movement on the pitch. Remember, a negative X value means the pitch is moving toward a righthanded batter. Z is the amount of vertical movement on the pitch. The lower the Z value, the more downward movement on the pitch.

Fastball-centric as a reliever, Morrow actually showed something of an egalitarian approach during his start against the Yankees. In addition to his heater, Morrow mixed in a good amount of changeups, sliders and curveballs.

Morrow's fastball has long been his calling card, and he lit up the radar guns at an average initial velocity of 95.7 MPH. As you would expect with a 4-seam pitch thrown at that speed, Morrow's heater has little horizontal (tailing) action but it does have above-average vertical movement (10 inches, compared to the 9.78 league average). Morrow also held his velocity pretty well throughout his first start

Morrow's average FB speed by inning:

1st: 96.8 2nd: 96.8 3rd: 96 4th: 94.4 5th: 95 6th: 95.8 7th: 95.8 8th: 94.9

That's pretty impressive for a guy used to airing it out for one inning at a time. Morrow was probably aided in this regard by his willingness to throw his offspeed pitches as well; he wasn't relying too heavily on his fastball.

With a big speed differential between his fastball and changeup (11.95 MPH), fading action (3.71 more inches of horizontal movement than his fastball) and plenty of "dropping" action (4.55 Z, compared to 10 on the heater), Morrow's changeup has the look of an extremely promising pitch. If Morrow can master the arm speed and action of the pitch, one could imagine the goofy swings opposing hitters would make on the changeup. Imagine gearing up to hit 96 MPH cheese, and instead getting an 84 MPH change that drops off the table and away from you. That's nasty.

Morrow also incorporated a hard slider (86.5 MPH) that showed a decent amount of movement away from right-handed batters. He managed to keep the pitch out of the fat part of the plate, and the pitch looks like it could be a solid weapon against righties.

The Cal product really dropped the hammer in this game, showing a curveball with a ton of vertical drop (-7.88 Z). and just about a much horizontal movement (2.08 X) as his slider. Notice how the curve and slider are at about the same place on the chart horizontally? With similar horizontal movement but drastically different vertical movement, Morrow's slider and curve work in nearly the same way that a fastball and changeup do. Morrow's curve mirrors his slider by breaking away from right-handers, but the pitch breaks down in the zone over seven inches further! In effect, Morrow's curve is a changeup to his slider.

While viewing this data, it is important to keep in mind that this was but one start, and thus the sample sizes are not as ideal as one would like. However, it is safe to say that Morrow showed a diverse and effective repertoire against the Yankees. In a season where little has gone right, Seattle fans can at least take solace in knowing that Morrow has the tools to succeed as a major league starter.

A Journalism student at Duquesne University, David Golebiewski is a contributing writer for Driveline Mechanics and Inside Edge Scouting Services. Contact David via email at david@drivelinemechanics.com or golebie1029@duq.edu