It took 81 minutes but finally a team may have exposed a small chink in the Miami Heat armor. After dismantling the Dallas Mavericks on Sunday, the Heat were picking apart the Boston Celtics, leading 90-79 in a game not nearly as close as the score would indicate.

Boston had stayed in the game with torrid three-point shooting from Ray Allen and Keyon Dooling (who finished a combined 10-14 from downtown), and an aggressive Rajon Rondo who drove primarily to score. One of Rondo’s perceived flaws from seasons past was that he tended to be too unselfish at times, with the pass being his first, second and third options when Boston needed more scoring punch. He finished with 15 field goal attempts only eight times during the regular season last year, only tallied more than 15 attempts three times, and didn‘t get to double digit free throws in the regular season.

Well, Rondo went 7-15 from the field against Miami, and 7-11 from the stripe on the heels of his 11-19 field goal shooting, 9-12 free throw shooting performance against the New York Knicks in Boston’s opener. With Paul Pierce and Jeff Green injured, and with the rest of Boston’s roster relatively light on creative shot-making outside of Allen and Kevin Garnett, Rondo clearly understands that he needs to be more of a scorer to put points on the board in Pierce’s absence.

However, while Boston’s offense generated a respectable 107 offensive rating against the Heat, Miami’s new "blitzkrieg" offense overwhelmed the Celtics as the Heat shot an absurd 32-48 until the 2:42 mark of the third quarter. The Heat were criticized for relying too heavily on isolations and screen/rolls for Wade and James, but a bigger reason for Miami’s relatively stagnant offense last year was their tempo.

Consider the Heat’s first seven minutes of the game. The Heat ran 14 halfcourt possessions that consisted of:

• A LeBron corner isolation against Sasha Pavlovic resulting in a made jumper.
• A LeBron post up of Marquis Daniels off a duck-in, resulting in a foul and two made free throws.
• Four Wade isolations on Allen resulting in two of three made field goals, plus one of two free throws for five points. All his shots were from the mid-range on in.
• A Wade isolation on Dooling leading to a blow by and made layup.
• A Wade post up on Daniels that went through Wade’s hands.
• Three Bosh isolations against Jermaine O’Neal leading to a layup, an airball, and one of two free throws.
• A Bosh made three in early offense.
• A Mario Chalmers made catch-and-shoot three after back screening for LeBron.
• A staggered screen/roll for Chalmers leading to a Joel Anthony layup against an ineffective baseline rotation by Sasha Pavlovic.

That’s a total of 22 points in 14 possessions, though 11 of the plays ended in one-on-one moves by the Big Three. You’ll notice far fewer screen/rolls to prevent Boston from trapping, and less of a reliance on the off-ball corner screens the Heat relied on primarily last season, but the offense was effective for Miami’s offense when simply running one-on-one plays. What was the caveat? All but three of those possessions ended with the shot clock in double digits. Miami attacked faster, got into its offense faster, and instead of running perfunctory actions that accomplished little before being forced to attack against a short clock, Miami trimmed the offensive fat running quick-hitters that attacked before Boston could get set. And we haven’t discussed how potent they were in transition.

Miami was only really slowed down when the Celtics switched to a zone late in the third quarter, completely turning the Miami offense on its heels. Gone were the quick attacks, and gone were the abilities for the Big Three to attack in space. Miami had to move the ball to move the zone, the Celtics had their eyes fixed on Miami’s perimeter players allowing them to swarm and defend without fouling, and driving lanes for the Big Three were rarely open.

Charting possessions against the zone, we see a much different spread of how the Heat attacked possessions.

• LeBron posted up Rondo once but missed a fadeaway with the Celtic defense converging on him.
• LeBron isolated Keyon Dooling at the top, but a pass to a cutter was deflected by Dooling for a turnover.
• LeBron cut to the middle but Wade’s pass was over his head.
• LeBron missed a catch-and-shoot jumper.
• LeBron drove before the zone could set up and hit a layup.
• Wade isolated Dooling twice and Brandon Bass once, missing three jumpers.
• Wade drove quickly against the zone and hit a runner.
• Wade drove away from a Bosh screen and missed a runner.
• A Wade/Bosh screen/roll led to a Norris Cole missed jumper.
• Bosh either rolled or cut (the cameras didn’t catch the full play coming out of a timeout) and sank a layup.
• Shane Battier missed a pindown three.
• Norris Cole had five catch-and-shoots, or catch-pull-and-shoots and hit three jumpers.
• Cole drove against the zone and missed both his attempts, plus Haslem missed a putback.
• A Cole/Haslem screen/roll led to a missed runner.
• Udonis Haslem cut twice leading to a pair of unsuccessful possessions.
• Haslem also missed a catch-and-shoot.

Tally up the plays and the Heat scored only 12 points on 24 zone possessions, an awful ratio. Also, only half of the possessions ended with Wade, James, or Bosh making the deciding play of the possession. While Cole responded with several big shots down the stretch, having the Big Three play a small offensive role is a success for the defense. The zone forced the Heat to use more shot clock with 11 possessions ending with the shot clock in single digits.

Finally, the zone kept Wade, Bosh, and James off the line. The trio combined for 23 free throws in the game—none on a zone possession.

Here’s a look at how the Heat operated against man-to-man versus zone.

The Heat bring the ball out with four players above the free throw line. Bosh is at the strong elbow, Chalmers the top of the key, and Anthony the weak elbow.

Anthony moves way out beyond the three point line while Chalmers cuts off him to the weak corner. Bosh opens at the top of the key. Notice how the action draws Garnett away from the play, leaving Boston’s backcourt responsible for rotations to the paint.

Bosh spins to the middle of the paint, Boston is spread too far to provide adequate help, and O’Neal fouls Bosh. He stepped to the line and made 1-2 free throws. Notice how much time came off the clock: two seconds. Here's the play full speed:

Next, we see Wade bring the ball up after a make.

Wade is just bringing the ball up, but he makes a move to Allen’s right.

Wade then crosses over and attacks the basket. Chris Wilcox sees what’s happening and tries to rotate, but he’s on the other side of the paint.

Wilcox meets Wade under the basket, which is far too deep.

In typical Wade fashion, he makes the basket and winds up on the floor. Again, notice the shot clock. There are still 16 seconds left. If Wade doesn’t like his chances, he can pull out and the Heat can set up a play. By attacking quickly though, he puts extreme pressure on opposing bigs to be constantly in position to help, even after a made basket. Here's the play at full speed:

Meanwhile, contrast that to how the Heat attacked the zone.

LeBron sees the zone and immediately looks to center the ball.

The ball ends up swung to Battier without a lot of movement on Miami’s end.

Battier centers the ball, Haslem cuts through, while LeBron flashes to the middle. After Battier dribbles to the center, he passes to Cole on the wing. The ball hasn’t crossed the three-point line yet.

LeBron flashes to the strong elbow but Rondo is shaded over preventing an entry pass. Should LeBron catch a pass, he’ll be surrounded by at least four Celtics.

Another perimeter pass to Battier. The ball hasn’t touched LeBron’s hands since he made the first pass to trigger the set, and the ball hasn’t crossed the three-point line.

Battier skips the ball to Haslem in the corner and cuts through. The dribble-drive and post up game of LeBron has been neutralized by the zone.

Haslem kicks the ball out to Cole. The shot clock is now in single digits and the Heat haven’t gotten into any action which can see them attack the basket.

LeBron pops out to receive a pass while Battier drifts behind a Haslem down screen for a three-pointer.

Battier IS open for the shot, but the zone takes the air out of the ball for Miami, keeps the ball out of the paint, and uses up clock. Most importantly, it forces somebody other than LeBron to beat them which on this play…

…does not happen as Battier's three is short. Here's the video.

This set had only one member of the Big Three on the court. However, with multiple stars, the effects were similar.

Bosh swings the ball to the right wing and cuts through the paint.

A pass to Battier centers the ball as Wade flashes in the middle.

Battier swings it back to Cole, but the pass to Wade in the middle is cut off.

The ball gets swung to Bosh. He looks like he wants to make a one-on-one move against Bass, but Wade flashes to the strong side clogging the area. Bosh kicks the ball back out. Bosh skips the ball across the court and follows by flashing to the strong side. Wade replaces on the weak side, while Battier will do the same basket cut and weak side fan he did in the first clip. Cole can’t get the ball to Bosh, the shot clock is in single digits, and the Heat still haven’t performed any sort of meaningful attacking action.

Cole kicks it to Wade who is open for a split second. However, Wade doesn’t want to attempt a spot-up three.

He tries to drive left on Dooling, but big bad Brandon Bass has the baseline cut off. Battier is open in the corner if Wade chooses.

Instead of making the pass, Wade gets impatient and attempts everybody’s most efficient shot—the contested step back jumper a foot inside the three-point arc. There are five seconds on the shot clock and Wade is kept out of the paint.

While Wade can make some spectacular shots, this attempt misses and there are nobody but Celtics there to collect the rebound. Here's the full clip:

The Heat could have tried to simply shoot the Celtics out of the zone, but it isn’t in Battier’s nature to attempt quick threes, and if Wade and LeBron are attempting long contested jump shots, the defense has succeeded. James Jones perhaps could have shot the Celtics out of their zone, but he had all sorts of trouble defending Allen on his baseline curls.

Instead, with the Celtics fielding five fluid defenders, choking off the paint, and keeping their eyes on Wade and James on the perimeter or middle of the court, the Heat offense finally looked mortal. It will be interesting to see how the Heat adjust to the expected bevy of zone they’ll see over the next few days, but few defenses can cover the interior range the Celtics can with Garnett and a quick Brandon Bass patrolling the bottom of the zone.

What other nuggets can be taken away from the game?

Sasha Pavolic [Warning, obvious statement upcoming] couldn’t guard LeBron James (duh!), but he also made a poor decision to skip a pass with LeBron on the weak side, and provided weak help on a baseline rotation. Considering he was expected to be the fourth small forward on the Celtics depth chart behind Pierce, Daniels, and Jeff Green, Pavlovic isn’t the worst fourth-string small forward in the game, but the drop off from him and LeBron, Carmelo Anthony, and Luol Deng is incredible.

Jermaine O’Neal provided nothing. He was abused by Bosh one-on-one, only took one shot on 22 minutes, and grabbed just one rebound.

The Celtics killed Miami when running curl/fades for Allen and a big man. Miami chased over the curls to start the game, but Allen routinely popped open for long jumpers. They adjusted by having the screen defender blitz Allen when he popped out, but that usually left Brandon Bass open for mid-range jumpers. When the Heat pinched the curl from the top, the Heat were strung out and unprepared when the Celtics ran their continuity with Rondo drives or screen/rolls.

Battier set a solid transition screen for a second straight game (he left Jason Terry on the floor in the game against Dallas allowing a three-point-play opportunity for Cole), allowing Norris Cole to hit a transition runner. I’m an unabashed Battier homer and when you see him generate two points out of nothing simply by laying the wood in transition you notice why he’s the subject of New York Times Magazine articles.

The Celtics playing as well as they have in two rough road games without arguably their best player makes me rethink the Eastern Conference pecking order. It’s still early and the grind of the season may still overwhelm their older roster, but Boston has looked like a contender early on considering the Pierce injury. Ken Berger certainly thinks so.

However, while the Heat clearly look like the best team in the league, the zone troubles against the Celtics were similar to their offensive struggles against the Dallas Mavericks during last season’s Finals. Let’s see how they solve those woes going forward. If they can find ways to keep LeBron and Wade attacking quickly, they should be prepared for anything opponents throw at them. If they can’t though, the Heat may spend another postseason with their fourth quarter offense lost in the twilight zone.

It took 81 minutes but finally a team may have exposed a small chink in the Miami Heat armor. After dismantling the Dallas Mavericks on Sunday, the Heat were picking apart the Boston Celtics, leading 90-79 in a game not nearly as close as the score would indicate.

Boston had stayed in the game with torrid three-point shooting from Ray Allen and Keyon Dooling (who finished a combined 10-14 from downtown), and an aggressive Rajon Rondo who drove primarily to score. One of Rondo’s perceived flaws from seasons past was that he tended to be too unselfish at times, with the pass being his first, second and third options when Boston needed more scoring punch. He finished with 15 field goal attempts only eight times during the regular season last year, only tallied more than 15 attempts three times, and didn‘t get to double digit free throws in the regular season.

Well, Rondo went 7-15 from the field against Miami, and 7-11 from the stripe on the heels of his 11-19 field goal shooting, 9-12 free throw shooting performance against the New York Knicks in Boston’s opener. With Paul Pierce and Jeff Green injured, and with the rest of Boston’s roster relatively light on creative shot-making outside of Allen and Kevin Garnett, Rondo clearly understands that he needs to be more of a scorer to put points on the board in Pierce’s absence.

However, while Boston’s offense generated a respectable 107 offensive rating against the Heat, Miami’s new "blitzkrieg" offense overwhelmed the Celtics as the Heat shot an absurd 32-48 until the 2:42 mark of the third quarter. The Heat were criticized for relying too heavily on isolations and screen/rolls for Wade and James, but a bigger reason for Miami’s relatively stagnant offense last year was their tempo.

Consider the Heat’s first seven minutes of the game. The Heat ran 14 halfcourt possessions that consisted of:

• A LeBron corner isolation against Sasha Pavlovic resulting in a made jumper.
• A LeBron post up of Marquis Daniels off a duck-in, resulting in a foul and two made free throws.
• Four Wade isolations on Allen resulting in two of three made field goals, plus one of two free throws for five points. All his shots were from the mid-range on in.
• A Wade isolation on Dooling leading to a blow by and made layup.
• A Wade post up on Daniels that went through Wade’s hands.
• Three Bosh isolations against Jermaine O’Neal leading to a layup, an airball, and one of two free throws.
• A Bosh made three in early offense.
• A Mario Chalmers made catch-and-shoot three after back screening for LeBron.
• A staggered screen/roll for Chalmers leading to a Joel Anthony layup against an ineffective baseline rotation by Sasha Pavlovic.

That’s a total of 22 points in 14 possessions, though 11 of the plays ended in one-on-one moves by the Big Three. You’ll notice far fewer screen/rolls to prevent Boston from trapping, and less of a reliance on the off-ball corner screens the Heat relied on primarily last season, but the offense was effective for Miami’s offense when simply running one-on-one plays. What was the caveat? All but three of those possessions ended with the shot clock in double digits. Miami attacked faster, got into its offense faster, and instead of running perfunctory actions that accomplished little before being forced to attack against a short clock, Miami trimmed the offensive fat running quick-hitters that attacked before Boston could get set. And we haven’t discussed how potent they were in transition.

Miami was only really slowed down when the Celtics switched to a zone late in the third quarter, completely turning the Miami offense on its heels. Gone were the quick attacks, and gone were the abilities for the Big Three to attack in space. Miami had to move the ball to move the zone, the Celtics had their eyes fixed on Miami’s perimeter players allowing them to swarm and defend without fouling, and driving lanes for the Big Three were rarely open.

Charting possessions against the zone, we see a much different spread of how the Heat attacked possessions.

• LeBron posted up Rondo once but missed a fadeaway with the Celtic defense converging on him.
• LeBron isolated Keyon Dooling at the top, but a pass to a cutter was deflected by Dooling for a turnover.
• LeBron cut to the middle but Wade’s pass was over his head.
• LeBron missed a catch-and-shoot jumper.
• LeBron drove before the zone could set up and hit a layup.
• Wade isolated Dooling twice and Brandon Bass once, missing three jumpers.
• Wade drove quickly against the zone and hit a runner.
• Wade drove away from a Bosh screen and missed a runner.
• A Wade/Bosh screen/roll led to a Norris Cole missed jumper.
• Bosh either rolled or cut (the cameras didn’t catch the full play coming out of a timeout) and sank a layup.
• Shane Battier missed a pindown three.
• Norris Cole had five catch-and-shoots, or catch-pull-and-shoots and hit three jumpers.
• Cole drove against the zone and missed both his attempts, plus Haslem missed a putback.
• A Cole/Haslem screen/roll led to a missed runner.
• Udonis Haslem cut twice leading to a pair of unsuccessful possessions.
• Haslem also missed a catch-and-shoot.

Tally up the plays and the Heat scored only 12 points on 24 zone possessions, an awful ratio. Also, only half of the possessions ended with Wade, James, or Bosh making the deciding play of the possession. While Cole responded with several big shots down the stretch, having the Big Three play a small offensive role is a success for the defense. The zone forced the Heat to use more shot clock with 11 possessions ending with the shot clock in single digits.

Finally, the zone kept Wade, Bosh, and James off the line. The trio combined for 23 free throws in the game—none on a zone possession.

Here’s a look at how the Heat operated against man-to-man versus zone.

The Heat bring the ball out with four players above the free throw line. Bosh is at the strong elbow, Chalmers the top of the key, and Anthony the weak elbow.

Anthony moves way out beyond the three point line while Chalmers cuts off him to the weak corner. Bosh opens at the top of the key. Notice how the action draws Garnett away from the play, leaving Boston’s backcourt responsible for rotations to the paint.

Bosh spins to the middle of the paint, Boston is spread too far to provide adequate help, and O’Neal fouls Bosh. He stepped to the line and made 1-2 free throws. Notice how much time came off the clock: two seconds. Here's the play full speed:

Next, we see Wade bring the ball up after a make.

Wade is just bringing the ball up, but he makes a move to Allen’s right.

Wade then crosses over and attacks the basket. Chris Wilcox sees what’s happening and tries to rotate, but he’s on the other side of the paint.

Wilcox meets Wade under the basket, which is far too deep.

In typical Wade fashion, he makes the basket and winds up on the floor. Again, notice the shot clock. There are still 16 seconds left. If Wade doesn’t like his chances, he can pull out and the Heat can set up a play. By attacking quickly though, he puts extreme pressure on opposing bigs to be constantly in position to help, even after a made basket. Here's the play at full speed:

Meanwhile, contrast that to how the Heat attacked the zone.

LeBron sees the zone and immediately looks to center the ball.

The ball ends up swung to Battier without a lot of movement on Miami’s end.

Battier centers the ball, Haslem cuts through, while LeBron flashes to the middle. After Battier dribbles to the center, he passes to Cole on the wing. The ball hasn’t crossed the three-point line yet.

LeBron flashes to the strong elbow but Rondo is shaded over preventing an entry pass. Should LeBron catch a pass, he’ll be surrounded by at least four Celtics.

Another perimeter pass to Battier. The ball hasn’t touched LeBron’s hands since he made the first pass to trigger the set, and the ball hasn’t crossed the three-point line.

Battier skips the ball to Haslem in the corner and cuts through. The dribble-drive and post up game of LeBron has been neutralized by the zone.

Haslem kicks the ball out to Cole. The shot clock is now in single digits and the Heat haven’t gotten into any action which can see them attack the basket.

LeBron pops out to receive a pass while Battier drifts behind a Haslem down screen for a three-pointer.

Battier IS open for the shot, but the zone takes the air out of the ball for Miami, keeps the ball out of the paint, and uses up clock. Most importantly, it forces somebody other than LeBron to beat them which on this play…

…does not happen as Battier's three is short. Here's the video.


This set had only one member of the Big Three on the court. However, with multiple stars, the effects were similar.

Bosh swings the ball to the right wing and cuts through the paint.

A pass to Battier centers the ball as Wade flashes in the middle.

Battier swings it back to Cole, but the pass to Wade in the middle is cut off.

The ball gets swung to Bosh. He looks like he wants to make a one-on-one move against Bass, but Wade flashes to the strong side clogging the area. Bosh kicks the ball back out. Bosh skips the ball across the court and follows by flashing to the strong side. Wade replaces on the weak side, while Battier will do the same basket cut and weak side fan he did in the first clip. Cole can’t get the ball to Bosh, the shot clock is in single digits, and the Heat still haven’t performed any sort of meaningful attacking action.

Cole kicks it to Wade who is open for a split second. However, Wade doesn’t want to attempt a spot-up three.

He tries to drive left on Dooling, but big bad Brandon Bass has the baseline cut off. Battier is open in the corner if Wade chooses.

Instead of making the pass, Wade gets impatient and attempts everybody’s most efficient shot—the contested step back jumper a foot inside the three-point arc. There are five seconds on the shot clock and Wade is kept out of the paint.

While Wade can make some spectacular shots, this attempt misses and there are nobody but Celtics there to collect the rebound. Here's the full clip:

The Heat could have tried to simply shoot the Celtics out of the zone, but it isn’t in Battier’s nature to attempt quick threes, and if Wade and LeBron are attempting long contested jump shots, the defense has succeeded. James Jones perhaps could have shot the Celtics out of their zone, but he had all sorts of trouble defending Allen on his baseline curls.

Instead, with the Celtics fielding five fluid defenders, choking off the paint, and keeping their eyes on Wade and James on the perimeter or middle of the court, the Heat offense finally looked mortal. It will be interesting to see how the Heat adjust to the expected bevy of zone they’ll see over the next few days, but few defenses can cover the interior range the Celtics can with Garnett and a quick Brandon Bass patrolling the bottom of the zone.

What other nuggets can be taken away from the game?

Sasha Pavolic [Warning, obvious statement upcoming] couldn’t guard LeBron James (duh!), but he also made a poor decision to skip a pass with LeBron on the weak side, and provided weak help on a baseline rotation. Considering he was expected to be the fourth small forward on the Celtics depth chart behind Pierce, Daniels, and Jeff Green, Pavlovic isn’t the worst fourth-string small forward in the game, but the drop off from him and LeBron, Carmelo Anthony, and Luol Deng is incredible.

Jermaine O’Neal provided nothing. He was abused by Bosh one-on-one, only took one shot on 22 minutes, and grabbed just one rebound.

The Celtics killed Miami when running curl/fades for Allen and a big man. Miami chased over the curls to start the game, but Allen routinely popped open for long jumpers. They adjusted by having the screen defender blitz Allen when he popped out, but that usually left Brandon Bass open for mid-range jumpers. When the Heat pinched the curl from the top, the Heat were strung out and unprepared when the Celtics ran their continuity with Rondo drives or screen/rolls.

Battier set a solid transition screen for a second straight game (he left Jason Terry on the floor in the game against Dallas allowing a three-point-play opportunity for Cole), allowing Norris Cole to hit a transition runner. I’m an unabashed Battier homer and when you see him generate two points out of nothing simply by laying the wood in transition you notice why he’s the subject of New York Times Magazine articles.

The Celtics playing as well as they have in two rough road games without arguably their best player makes me rethink the Eastern Conference pecking order. It’s still early and the grind of the season may still overwhelm their older roster, but Boston has looked like a contender early on considering the Pierce injury. Ken Berger certainly thinks so.

However, while the Heat clearly look like the best team in the league, the zone troubles against the Celtics were similar to their offensive struggles against the Dallas Mavericks during last season’s Finals. Let’s see how they solve those woes going forward. If they can find ways to keep LeBron and Wade attacking quickly, they should be prepared for anything opponents throw at them. If they can’t though, the Heat may spend another postseason with their fourth quarter offense lost in the twilight zone.

Of all the subplots in Miami’s heroic 83-80 comeback victory over the Chicago Bulls in Game Five of the Eastern Conference Finals, the LeBron James versus Derrick Rose individual matchup may have been the juiciest.

The confrontation between the most talented player against the most valuable one indeed proved memorable, as LeBron issued a royal decree and executed Rose on the spot.

Consider the final 10 minutes of the game:

• Rose finished the game hitting only one of his final eight field goal attempts with no assists, two turnovers, and one trip to the line (which included a damning choke job) during that stretch.
• LeBron’s strength, length, and quickness eliminated Rose’s attempts at playing screen/roll offense, plus Chris Bosh and Udonis Haslem both played excellent screen defense, never allowing Rose to turn the corner.
• The three times Rose was able to get a half-step on James, Haslem and Bosh were again there to contest misses at the rim.
• When Rose overpenetrated and foolishly jumped in the air to pass late in the fourth, Dwyane Wade struck into the passing lane for a key interception.
• When Rose tried to pitch a throwback pass to Kurt Thomas on a screen/fade, LeBron deflected the pass and stole it.
• Rose also frequently dribbled the ball atop either wing aimlessly, killing time and forcing the Bulls to try and beat the buzzer far too often.
• While Rose’s offense was ineffective, his defense was boneheaded.
• He was late recovering to LeBron in transition, and provided a tepid closeout. LeBron calmly sank a three over him.
• Another poor closeout saw Rose nicking Wade’s elbow on a three-pointer, count it, plus the foul.
• He hacked LeBron across the arm on a layup attempt resulting in one made free throw.
• A questionable call when defending Wade in transition led to another plus-one.
• He was also blitzed by Wade for a layup, though his positioning was respectable, and the fault lie more with Thomas’ inability to alter shots after rotating.
• Still, Rose had a chance to undo most of the damage with two free throw attempts with 27 seconds to go and the Bulls down two. After making the first freebie, he clanged away the second freebie, as well as Chicago’s season.

Meanwhile, LeBron James was awe-inspiring, both with his clutch shooting, and with his lock and chain defense.

• Besides the defensive plays listed above, LeBron also deflected a Thomas pass to a cutting Rose for a steal.
• James boxed out on the glass and grabbed three defensive rebounds.
• After Thomas tried to flop his way into a charge on a LeBron drive, James sank two free throws.
• A snake dribble around a early offense wing screen/roll led to a foul and free throw.
• After a sloppy dribble, LeBron was fouled after diving for a loose ball, earning another free throw.
• Down eight with two minutes to go, LeBron caught an open pass and sank a critical three.
• Down three with a minute to go, LeBron brought the ball up, used a wing screen by Haslem to shed Brewer, and hit a clutch triple.
• With the game tied and 30 seconds to go, LeBron whittled the shot clock down and hit a pull up jumper at the key to give the Heat the lead.
• LeBron stayed with Rose and blocked his desperation heave at the buzzer to clinch the series.

Whereas Rose took advantage of unique circumstances to garner the regular season MVP, LeBron used Game Five as a platform as to why he’s the best player on the planet. In doing so, he continued to silence his critics over the course of the series. He silenced both critics of his jumper and of his heart with back-breaking jumper after back-breaking jumper. He silenced critics of his defense and of his intensity by stymieing Luol Deng, and shutting down Rose at critical junctures. And he silenced critics of his uncoachability and inability to work within an offense by diligently executing Miami’s corner screen system and making the right decisions all series long.

Bravo, a performance fit for a king!

Of course he had help.

While Wade was largely too casual and ineffective on offense and made several screen defense breakdowns over the course of the game, he scored on several broken plays late, and nailed a pivotal four-point play during the crux of Miami’s comeback.

Chris Bosh’ screen defense was exceptional, his jump shooting was true, his rotations were alert, and his pump fakes were convincing. Removed of the burden of carrying a team, Bosh has joined Wade as excellent princes in his kingdom.

Joel Anthony’s defense was Grade A, and he even managed to hit a driving layup plus foul over the inept Carlos Boozer.

Udonis Haslem committed a surprising number of defensive mistakes and couldn’t drop the ball in the ocean—0-5 FG—but his defense late influenced several Bulls misses at the rim.

Mike Miller made plays with his passing, his cutting, his shooting, and his rebounding.

The Heat team defense was exceptional, suffocating the life out of the Bulls with pinpoint rotations, constant energy, and perpetual hustle. No surprise a Pat Riley managed team would be in such great conditioning despite exerting such high effort.

Miami’s baseline rotations were always a step ahead, often because Miami’s corner defenders on the weak side of Chicago’s side screen/rolls could ignore the player, trust their ability to close out, and sell out on hard rotations.

Also, give credit to Eric Spoelstra for getting his three superstars to buy in completely to his defensive philosophy, and for running an effective corner screen offense using Bosh as a safety valve usually at the opposite high post. Spoelstra’s virtues of patience, trust, professionalism, and attention to detail have all paid off so far.

Aside from Rose’s individual collapse, the Bulls played an admirable game and season unbefitting such a dismal collapse.

Chicago’s own defense was more impressive than even Miami’s, with Chicago’s wings forcing Wade into a dismal shooting game, Luol Deng hounding LeBron into a rough first 40 minutes, and precise  rotations of their own limiting Miami’s open looks at the basket.

Chicago again had some success on the offensive glass, converting second shot opportunities into easy scores even after Miami’s initial defense stifled them.

Chicago didn’t overload its defense as severely to stop LeBron on the strong side, leaving fewer openings on diagonal passes from the wing or baseline to a wide-open Bosh at the elbow.

Kurt Thomas and Ronnie Brewer each made critical fourth-quarter offensive plays to provide a modicum of offense, while Thomas’ board work was also valiant.

However, several fatal flaws did Chicago in.

• Whereas in general, Chicago’s defense was of the highest order, Carlos Boozer was a weak link. His quick hands earned some steals in Miami, but his habitual soft closeouts, poor lateral movement, and absent rotations gifted Miami with too many easy points.
• Likewise, Boozer tucked his tail between his legs on the offensive end—1-6 FG.
• Chicago’s defenders too often lacked discipline on Miami’s head fakes.
• Luol Deng had trouble creating his own offense, and his high dribble prevents him from making plays in traffic.
• Kyle Korver couldn’t make up for his poor defense with shooting.
• Before Rose’s choke job, Brewer also missed a free throw.

Still,  considering Chicago’s approach to the game, and their quantum leap from last season to this season, the year can only be considered as an unmitigated success.

The question becomes, what do the Bulls need to do in future years to supplant the Heat?

Derrick Rose’s character assassination as a point guard is partly overblown by the media. True, he’s not as good as LeBron James, and all his minor flaws were ripped open to the world by LeBron—Rose is still a poor decision maker in traffic and makes the incorrect decision an inordinate number of times. Rose is also often out of control on his drives, leaping up into his shots way too far from the basket. Rose’s jump shot still doesn’t have enough arc and is unreliable. He also doesn’t have great vision and is prone to careless defensive mistakes.

Still, the comparisons to Russell Westbrook are largely invalid because Rose will run an offense, often making the correct trigger pass, cutting away from the ball along the baseline, and then coming back to the ball after initial early offense sequence is run. Rose seldom aborts plays simply to clear out or screen/roll the same way Roes does.

In these respects, Rose is more advanced as a point guard. He seldom forces bad shots, and plays passable on-ball defense.

What Rose needs to work on is his vision and his decision-making. Elite defenses are able to capitalize on Rose’s bad habits in the lane, and his relative lack of vision results in missed open teammates. Rose also has to work on his focus at both ends, particularly the defensive end. Finally, few things alleviate choke-itis except self-confidence, trust in one’s self, and alleviated pressure. A better supporting cast could do wonders for Rose, but the performance could also become self-prophesizing.

Luol Deng is a definite keeper thanks to his defense, his versatility, and his range, but he’s not a creative enough handler to be a secondary scorer. In a perfect world, he’s a third option, meaning the Bulls need to bring in an elite scorer.

Carlos Boozer was supposed to be that guy, but as his performances against the Lakers and now the Heat will indicate, he’s an offensive coward against length, and too irresponsible on defense to make up for it. In a perfect world Boozer would be shipped out, but his recently signed expensive contract and poor play make that possibility extremely unlikely.

While the Bulls two-guards are all acceptable rotation players, none is a difference maker at a championship level. Two of them should be shipped out, and a more capable playmaker brought in.

Joakim Noah, Taj Gibson, and Omer Asik are all young, athletic defenders, while Noah doubles as a great passer. All have value, but only surrounding a dreadnaught post scorer, which Boozer is not.

As a fifth big man in a four-big rotation, Kurt Thomas should also be welcomed back, though his defense is a notch below his young thoroughbred counterparts.

C.J. Watson is passable because of his ball-pressure and his shooting, but makes too many mistakes with the ball.

In other words, the Bulls are extremely close—but those final pieces are often the hardest pieces to acquire.

As for the Heat, they’re also close to fulfilling the expectations they set for themselves when Bosh and James joined Wade last summer. With their ferocious defense, boundless energy, and star-powered scoring, the Heat are four wins away from NBA divinity.

Of all the subplots in Miami’s heroic 83-80 comeback victory over the Chicago Bulls in Game Five of the Eastern Conference Finals, the LeBron James versus Derrick Rose individual matchup may have been the juiciest.

The confrontation between the most talented player against the most valuable one indeed proved memorable, as LeBron issued a royal decree and executed Rose on the spot.

Consider the final 10 minutes of the game:

• Rose finished the game hitting only one of his final eight field goal attempts with no assists, two turnovers, and one trip to the line (which included a damning choke job) during that stretch.
• LeBron’s strength, length, and quickness eliminated Rose’s attempts at playing screen/roll offense, plus Chris Bosh and Udonis Haslem both played excellent screen defense, never allowing Rose to turn the corner.
• The three times Rose was able to get a half-step on James, Haslem and Bosh were again there to contest misses at the rim.
• When Rose overpenetrated and foolishly jumped in the air to pass late in the fourth, Dwyane Wade struck into the passing lane for a key interception.
• When Rose tried to pitch a throwback pass to Kurt Thomas on a screen/fade, LeBron deflected the pass and stole it.
• Rose also frequently dribbled the ball atop either wing aimlessly, killing time and forcing the Bulls to try and beat the buzzer far too often.
• While Rose’s offense was ineffective, his defense was boneheaded.
• He was late recovering to LeBron in transition, and provided a tepid closeout. LeBron calmly sank a three over him.
• Another poor closeout saw Rose nicking Wade’s elbow on a three-pointer, count it, plus the foul.
• He hacked LeBron across the arm on a layup attempt resulting in one made free throw.
• A questionable call when defending Wade in transition led to another plus-one.
• He was also blitzed by Wade for a layup, though his positioning was respectable, and the fault lie more with Thomas’ inability to alter shots after rotating.
• Still, Rose had a chance to undo most of the damage with two free throw attempts with 27 seconds to go and the Bulls down two. After making the first freebie, he clanged away the second freebie, as well as Chicago’s season.

Meanwhile, LeBron James was awe-inspiring, both with his clutch shooting, and with his lock and chain defense.

• Besides the defensive plays listed above, LeBron also deflected a Thomas pass to a cutting Rose for a steal.
• James boxed out on the glass and grabbed three defensive rebounds.
• After Thomas tried to flop his way into a charge on a LeBron drive, James sank two free throws.
• A snake dribble around a early offense wing screen/roll led to a foul and free throw.
• After a sloppy dribble, LeBron was fouled after diving for a loose ball, earning another free throw.
• Down eight with two minutes to go, LeBron caught an open pass and sank a critical three.
• Down three with a minute to go, LeBron brought the ball up, used a wing screen by Haslem to shed Brewer, and hit a clutch triple.
• With the game tied and 30 seconds to go, LeBron whittled the shot clock down and hit a pull up jumper at the key to give the Heat the lead.
• LeBron stayed with Rose and blocked his desperation heave at the buzzer to clinch the series.

Whereas Rose took advantage of unique circumstances to garner the regular season MVP, LeBron used Game Five as a platform as to why he’s the best player on the planet. In doing so, he continued to silence his critics over the course of the series. He silenced both critics of his jumper and of his heart with back-breaking jumper after back-breaking jumper. He silenced critics of his defense and of his intensity by stymieing Luol Deng, and shutting down Rose at critical junctures. And he silenced critics of his uncoachability and inability to work within an offense by diligently executing Miami’s corner screen system and making the right decisions all series long.

Bravo, a performance fit for a king!

Of course he had help.

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Sometimes in the NBA a team comes out much more ready to play than its opponent and rides that activity level to a victory. That was exactly the case in the Dallas Mavericks’ 93-87 victory over the Oklahoma City Thunder in Game One.

After fantastic offensive performances in Dallas, the Thunder seemed lethargic at the onset. Screens were more perfunctory than purposeful. Cuts were non-existent. Meaningful weak side action was seldom run. Players settled for contested jumpers. By the time the Thunder woke up, they were down 23 points.

Meanwhile, the Mavericks played spirited defense at the onset.

• Jason Kidd, Shawn Marion, and DeShawn Stevenson each took turns defending Kevin Durant early. Their physicality forced Durant to catch the ball farther out than he would optimally want, and Stevenson and Marion used their length to eliminate entry passes. Later in the game Tyson Chandler would take a few turns defending Durant to a positive effect.
• Dallas shows on screens were excellent, with even Dirk Nowitzki hedging perfectly and delaying the ball handler on screen/rolls.
• The Mavs scouted and had their help defenders chuck Durant when he cut along the baseline from one side of the floor to the other.
• Dallas’ help defense was active, always providing assistance on drives to the basket.
• After James Harden blitzed the Mavs in Game Two, Rick Carlisle adjusted and gave Jason Terry help by trapping Harden’s screen/rolls.
• Dallas attacked Durant’s defense with Marion early, and it appeared to discourage Durant.
• The Mavs pounced on any faulty pass or dribble, coming up with five steals in the first quarter.
• With Dallas’ defense creating turnovers, the Mavs were able to fuel their transition game. This allowed Marion to get going early, and discouraged the Thunder.

Of course, many of the Thunder’s problems were self-induced.

• The dirty secret of the Jeff Green-Kendrick Perkins trade is that Perkins has been a dud in the playoffs. His rotations were frequently late or absent, his passing was abysmal, he takes too long to gather himself at the basket, and too often he found himself trying to tip out rebounds rather than securing them, leading to extra Mavs possessions.
• When Durant is faced with aggressive ball denial, he’s not strong enough to shed the defender. Against the Grizzlies, the Thunder countered this by having Durant screen the ball and fan, but the Mavericks aren’t coming off Durant’s body to hedge on the screen the way the Grizzlies did. Instead the Mavs are switching the screens because they’re comfortable with Stevenson or Kidd checking Durant.
• Durant also missed several shots from in close where he doesn’t have the body to ward off Tyson Chandler’s physical length.
• Russell Westbrook committed four acts unbecoming of a point guard in the opening frame. He forced a drive into traffic and was stripped for a turnover, he forced an early offense jumper that clanged out, he pushed off on Stevenson on a stepback attempt for another offensive foul, and he missed a layup.
• Westbrook also committed faulty closeouts, seemed unawares as to how to fight through a screen, and put no pressure on Jason Kidd while setting up the offense.
• Finally, Scott Brooks deserves some of the blame. His offense has virtually no continuity, so once a primary option is taken away, it’s up to the players to make offense appear out of nothing.

This is disappointing, because once the Thunder picked up their effort, they had some success.

The Thunder successfully crowded Nowitzki on his isolations, fronted his post ups, and closed out hard on his catch-and-shoots. The Thunder also elected to two-time Dirk from the baseline. As a result, Dirk had a rough second half.

Serge Ibaka used his length to contest Dirk’s jumpers, forcing Dirk to miss all three of his isolations against him.

Nick Collison’s strong upper body and relative quickness prevented Dirk from getting separation. Collison bodied Dirk into shooting only 2-5 against him (with a pair of blocked shots), plus Collison’s ferocious hands wrenched the ball from Dirk twice, leading to three turnovers. Dirk also failed to seal Westbrook on a post up, meaning Dirk’s one-on-one ventures in the first quarter only generated four points in 12 possessions, an exceptional ratio.

Dirk also was blocked on a roll to the basket, and shot 3-7 on various catch-and-shoots, usually after setting a screen then fading, to create open space. For the most part though, Dirk was a non-factor.

Likewise, Jason Terry couldn’t find the range—3-12 FG—but he kept his forced shots to a minimum, moved the ball, and hit a big floater late. On the defensive end, he was better at staying attached to James Harden’s body on screen/rolls, and funneled him into help. Considering how Dirk struggled though, Terry’s poor performance was another win for the Thunder.

Westbrook continued to knock down his screen/roll jumpers and abused J.J. Barea in the fourth quarter. It should also be noted that on Westbrook’s assaults, Chandler was usually able to provide effective help and meet Westbrook above the lane, while Brendan Haywood’s help was often a step late.

However, despite these successes, the Thunder couldn’t completely overcome the huge deficit they set for themselves allowing the Mavs to hang on for the win.

What do they need to do differently to capture Game Four?

• Get more continuity in their offense. Since Westbrook has so much trouble making the appropriate trigger passes, how about the Thunder run some 1-2-2 sets in the first quarter where Westbrook brings the ball up, makes an entry pass to Ibaka, and cuts through to the corner to effectively set a double screen or a split cut with Durant? This gives Durant some options to come to the ball, generates weak side action, and puts Westbrook along the baseline where he’s effective as a cutter. Oklahoma City can still run some continuity bringing Westbrook back around to post up or screen/roll.
• Kendrick Perkins has to be given a shorter leash if he’s not going to play with maximum effort. It’s a risk giving extra minutes to Nick Collison because the foul trouble he could be placed in, but against Haywood and the Mavericks bench, how about giving Nazr Mohammed and his short range jumper some time?
• If not Mohammed stealing some minutes from Perkins, the Thunder need to play small to create spacing for entry passes to Durant.
• Putting James Harden in screen/rolls puts the ball in the hands of Oklahoma City’s best playmaker.
• Keep crowding Dirk and hope the refs hold their whistles.
• Most importantly, come out with full energy right from the onset to put the Mavs on their heels and not the other way around.

As for the Mavs, they can take solace in winning a road game in which its two best scorers didn’t play particularly well—a testament to the team’s defensive fortitude and maturity. A similar defensive performance in Game Four will have them in the lookout seat with the NBA Finals coming in to view over the horizon.

Sometimes in the NBA a team comes out much more ready to play than its opponent and rides that activity level to a victory. That was exactly the case in the Dallas Mavericks’ 93-87 victory over the Oklahoma City Thunder in Game One.

After fantastic offensive performances in Dallas, the Thunder seemed lethargic at the onset. Screens were more perfunctory than purposeful. Cuts were non-existent. Meaningful weak side action was seldom run. Players settled for contested jumpers. By the time the Thunder woke up, they were down 23 points.

Meanwhile, the Mavericks played spirited defense at the onset.

• Jason Kidd, Shawn Marion, and DeShawn Stevenson each took turns defending Kevin Durant early. Their physicality forced Durant to catch the ball farther out than he would optimally want, and Stevenson and Marion used their length to eliminate entry passes. Later in the game Tyson Chandler would take a few turns defending Durant to a positive effect.
• Dallas shows on screens were excellent, with even Dirk Nowitzki hedging perfectly and delaying the ball handler on screen/rolls.
• The Mavs scouted and had their help defenders chuck Durant when he cut along the baseline from one side of the floor to the other.
• Dallas’ help defense was active, always providing assistance on drives to the basket.
• After James Harden blitzed the Mavs in Game Two, Rick Carlisle adjusted and gave Jason Terry help by trapping Harden’s screen/rolls.
• Dallas attacked Durant’s defense with Marion early, and it appeared to discourage Durant.
• The Mavs pounced on any faulty pass or dribble, coming up with five steals in the first quarter.
• With Dallas’ defense creating turnovers, the Mavs were able to fuel their transition game. This allowed Marion to get going early, and discouraged the Thunder.

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Give Scott Brooks credit for having the guts to ride four bench players plus Kevin Durant in Oklahoma City’s 106-100 win over the Dallas Mavericks in Game Two of the Western Conference Finals. However, while the focus of the game has been on Brook’s decision to bench Russell Westbrook down the stretch, it’s impact has been largely overblown.

For sure, Westbrook’s immature game—and more importantly, his immature response to Scott Brooks chastising him for breaking off plays—had frequently prevented the Thunder offense from getting into its second and third options, something that wasn’t the case with backup Eric Maynor on the floor.

However, Westbrook had also been more willing to run the offense in Game Two, was much more under control with his decisions, made terrific passes, and was exceptional in screen/rolls, knocking down four of his eight long jumpers.

Plus, while Maynor was able to run the offense smoothly in the fourth, and sank several nifty floaters, he also had a near disastrous endgame, failing to get the Thunder into several sets, getting trapped at halfcourt and wasting a timeout, and coughing the ball up late.

However, Westbrook still is undisciplined in his play calling and gives up on sets way too early. He’s also reluctant to make trigger passes that would trigger second options, and overhandled or forced shots a half dozen times in Game Two. Plus he has an alarming habit of making unnecessary no-look passes—two of which became turnovers in Game Two. It’s understandable that Westbrook’s point guard skills still aren’t up to snuff—he wasn’t a point guard in college and has always been a score-first option in the offense. How well he comes back from his Game Two benching will have a lot to say in who wins the series—because the Thunder aren’t advancing without him playing well.

No, the real story of Game Two was how thoroughly James Harden destroyed Jason Terry in their head-to-head matchup in the second half.

The raw numbers reflect this quite clearly…

Harden—5-6 FG, 3-4 3FG, 1-2 FT, 3 REB, 1 AST, 0 TO, 14 PTS.
Terry—0-4 FG, 0-2 3FG, 0-0 FT, 0 REB, 0 AST, 1 TO, 0 PTS.

…though the details are even worse.

• With the third quarter winding down, and Jason Kidd denying an entry pass to Kevin Durant at the top of the circle, Harden isolated Terry way above the wing. Terry kept giving ground on Harden’s advancing dribble, before Harden pulled up and sank a three. Terry’s closeout was flawed, hitting Harden on the elbow, giving him a four-point play.
• Harden did a decent job of chasing Terry around a double curl to begin the fourth, resulting in Terry fading away and missing the jumper.
• Terry gave way too much space to Harden when playing a zone, concerning himself too much with Durant at the elbow. Dirk Nowitzki was at the bottom of the zone, he should have been the one concerned with Durant, with the back of the zone flooding over. With Harden all alone, he sank a three.
• A wing screen/roll gave Terry an opening at the free throw line, but he bricked the jumper.
• After a missed Dirk Nowitzki jumper, Terry ball-watched in the corner, not even jogging back to balance the court. Harden grabbed a long rebound, and with Dirk the only man back in transition, blew by him for a layup.
• Terry played a Harden curl badly, jumping out at him 28 feet from the basket and fouling him.
• Harden sank a catch-and-shoot three over J.J. Barea.
• A good entry pass by Harden to a crowded Durant led to Durant sinking a jumper.
• Since Terry wasn’t getting any open looks, he decided to launch the next semi-open shot he saw. This resulted in a missed one-on-three transition triple.
• With Terry playing good defense, Harden was able to use some fancy dribbling to create an inch of separation and sink a spectacular jumper. Though Terry was in Harden’s space, he didn’t get a hand up on the shot attempt.
• Terry mistakenly cut despite being open in the corner leading to Jason Kidd throwing the ball away.
• Harden was able to provide the second scoring threat behind Durant that allowed the Thunder offense to proliferate. He also provided strong defense.
• Terry couldn’t get untracked, causing the Mavs offense to struggle when Nowitzki was played well.

With Dirk and Durant more than capable of providing consistent scoring, whoever wins the second option battle between Harden and Terry will mostly likely win the series. Lost in. Lost in Game One’s Nowitzki onslaught is that Terry played a strong game, something he didn’t duplicate in Game Two.

Why else did the Thunder win?

• Kevin Durant’s effortless mid-range shooting is par for the course, but he also made several crafty passes leading to open shots for teammates.
• The Thunder were better able to crowd Nowitzki instead of giving him free reign to shoot his awkward step back jumpers. Oklahoma City also somewhat successfully was able to front Dirk and provide baseline help, keeping him from blowing up.
• Nick Collison had a strong defensive game, able to execute the gameplan on Dirk, provide strong help defense, and secure defensive rebounds. On offense, he even managed to hit a spinning half-hook in the lane.
• The Thunder downsized in the fourth quarter resulting in several possessions where Dirk was guarding a three-point shooter. The Thunder executed a very crafty staggered curl, with Durant coming off a staggered screen, followed by Daequan Cook coming off the same screen, with Maynor and Durant making the right trigger passes leading to the Cook sinking the three.
• Dallas’ took too many threes and didn‘t make enough of them—9-27.
• Shawn Marion missed seven shots in the paint, and four layups.
• Barea’s defense was attacked for profit by the Thunder. Similarly, Peja Stojakovic’ defense was atrocious, and Brendan Haywod was late on several rotations.
• The Thunder offense proved too explosive for the Mavs to handle.

While it will be interesting to see how Westbrook plays in Game Three, pay close attention to James Harden vs. Jason Terry. If Harden dominates the matchup as he did in Game Two, the Mavs will be hard-pressed to win. Only if Terry can spread his jet wings and soar will the Mavs ascend through the clouds and reach the NBA Finals.

Give Scott Brooks credit for having the guts to ride four bench players plus Kevin Durant in Oklahoma City’s 106-100 win over the Dallas Mavericks in Game Two of the Western Conference Finals. However, while the focus of the game has been on Brook’s decision to bench Russell Westbrook down the stretch, it’s impact has been largely overblown.

For sure, Westbrook’s immature game—and more importantly, his immature response to Scott Brooks chastising him for breaking off plays—had frequently prevented the Thunder offense from getting into its second and third options, something that wasn’t the case with backup Eric Maynor on the floor.

However, Westbrook had also been more willing to run the offense in Game Two, was much more under control with his decisions, made terrific passes, and was exceptional in screen/rolls, knocking down four of his eight long jumpers.

Plus, while Maynor was able to run the offense smoothly in the fourth, and sank several nifty floaters, he also had a near disastrous endgame, failing to get the Thunder into several sets, getting trapped at halfcourt and wasting a timeout, and coughing the ball up late.

However, Westbrook still is undisciplined in his play calling and gives up on sets way too early. He’s also reluctant to make trigger passes that would trigger second options, and overhandled or forced shots a half dozen times in Game Two. Plus he has an alarming habit of making unnecessary no-look passes—two of which became turnovers in Game Two. It’s understandable that Westbrook’s point guard skills still aren’t up to snuff—he wasn’t a point guard in college and has always been a score-first option in the offense. How well he comes back from his Game Two benching will have a lot to say in who wins the series—because the Thunder aren’t advancing without him playing well.

No, the real story of Game Two was how thoroughly James Harden destroyed Jason Terry in their head-to-head matchup in the second half.

The raw numbers reflect this quite clearly…

Harden—5-6 FG, 3-4 3FG, 1-2 FT, 3 REB, 1 AST, 0 TO, 14 PTS.
Terry—0-4 FG, 0-2 3FG, 0-0 FT, 0 REB, 0 AST, 1 TO, 0 PTS.

…though the details are even worse.

Continue reading this post »

Give the Miami Heat credit for making the proper personnel and tactical adjustments in their 85-75 victory over the Chicago Bulls, squaring up the Eastern Conference Finals at one game apiece.

The most important adjustment the Heat made was Eric Spoelstra’s decision to incorporate 3-1 screen/rolls late in the fourth quarter with LeBron James as the ball handler and Mike Bibby as the screen-setter. LeBron would have the ball up top defended by Luol Deng, while Bibby would come off a corner screen set by Dwyane Wade and then screen for LeBron with Korver checking Bibby.

The Heat ran LeBron/Bibby screen/rolls six times down the stretch with the following results.

• Deng went way under the Bibby screen and got strung out for a split second, while Korver’s hedge on LeBron was ineffectual. LeBron sank a critical three.
• Deng shoved Bibby to the ground for a non-shooting foul.
• Though Deng was screened again by Bibby, Joakim Noah pre-rotated nicely to meet LeBron outside the paint and string him backwards. With the play successfully strung out, the Heat merely passed the ball along the perimeter until James missed a three with the shot clock winding down.
• Again, Deng was screened off by Bibby and Noah rotated to meet LeBron. LeBron missed a short runner over Noah’s outstretched hand, but grabbed the rebound and stuck the putback.
• Korver reached in on his hedge and committed a non-shooting foul.
• With Rose defending Bibby, Deng was able to fight over the screen and square up LeBron. LeBron iso’d Deng, though, and hit a clutch dagger that sealed the game.

Not counting the non-shooting fouls, the Heat scored seven points the four times they ran the screen/rolls. It was a nice tweak by Spoelstra as it managed to get Luol Deng’s rangy defense off of James without bringing one of Chicago’s ubiquitous big men to cut James off trying to turn the corner on the screen.

Give credit to Spoelstra. After getting pantsed by Tom Thibodeau in Game One, Spoelstra got the better of the coaching matchup in Game Two.

Why else did Miami win?

• Though he almost disastrously rode him too long, summoning Udonis Haslem was a masterstroke for Spoelstra. Haslem provided the same terrific screen defense Joel Anthony was providing, with the added benefit of being able to recover and secure prime defensive rebounding real estate. Also, unlike Anthony, Haslem was a factor on the offensive end.
• Haslem was active on the offensive glass (three boards), connected on two of his five jumpers, and even threw down three impressive dunks to provide the Heat with offense and energy from somebody other than one of the Big Three.
• Also, while his first baseline rotation was tardy, Haslem’s second meaningful defensive possession saw him draw a charge. His subsequent rotations were usually on-point, and he had no qualms hustling and diving for loose balls to secure possessions.
• In short, Haslem provided championship-level help defense, complementary offense, and necessary hustle. While some tertiary Heat players have provided one or two of those qualities, with Haslem providing all three, they were able to offset Chicago’s depth and energy.
• Spoelstra also limited the minutes of James Jones, Mario Chalmers, and Anthony, giving Bibby more minutes, along with Haslem.
• Wade scored enough early to pace the Heat until James heated up late.
• Thanks in large part to Chicago’s exemplary screen/roll defense and athletic defensive wings, LeBron and Wade checked out of the game late in Game One. Also, the teamwide hustle level of the Heat wasn’t up to snuff in Game One. However, even when James and Wade were struggling to score in Game Two, they stayed active on the defensive end and weren’t outhustled.
• As a result, Chicago’s offense wasn’t gifted with the same number of broken plays they were gifted in Game One and had more trouble scoring against Miami’s suffocating defense.
• Bibby was frequently isolated by Rose and lived to tell the tale (though Bibby was frequently chumped on screen/rolls by giving Rose too much room). Bibby’s screening also played a huge part in Miami’s endgame offense.
• Deng’s sharp Game One was largely fueled by broken plays and sloppy second half defense by LeBron. In Game Two, LeBron was much more engaged in limiting Deng’s wide open looks. When Deng was asked to create offense against LeBron, James locked him up and threw away the key, holding Deng to an unsightly performance—5-15 FG, 1-7 3FG, 2-2 FT, 2 AST, 4 TO, 13 PTS.
• James’ quick hands and quickness in the passing lanes also led to three steals.
• Chris Bosh’s defense was passable, and while he didn’t do much, he didn’t make many egregious mistakes.
• Jamal Magloire set bone-crunching screens.
• The Heat also deserve credit for providing very good interior defense, for playing harder than Chicago, and for not panicking after the Bulls tied the game late in the fourth.

While those are the majority of the reasons why the Heat won, there are several critical reasons why the Bulls lost.

• The Bulls missed over a half dozen layups, with Carlos Boozer and Rose the main culprits.
• Rose was often out of control and forced a number of wild drives, and subsequent wild shots in the paint. He shot 7-23 for the game, an awful number, though he shot 2-10 inside the paint—even worse.
• Boozer didn’t provide any post offense, scoring all three baskets on cookies generated by offensive rebounds or his teammates penetrations. His defense was the weak link of Chicago’s frontcourt, he was frequently late on his interior rotations, and was ineffective on his screen/roll soft shows. The only area Boozer was a factor in was on the offensive glass.
• Taj Gibson made crucial plays down the stretch as he provided a jumper, a left hook, and a screen/roll dunk to get the Bulls back in the game. Defensively, he blocked a Haslem shot attempt, induced a travel when Bosh tried to post him, perfectly covered LeBron when soft showing on his screen/rolls—plus his rotations span the breadth of the globe. However, Gibson only played 22 minutes to Boozer’s 27.
• Omer Asik had a strong second half, but he committed an offensive foul in the first half, and a poor hedge allowed LeBron James to split a trap and get a layup to close the second quarter, giving the Heat a halftime lead.
• After outplaying LeBron in Game One, Deng lost his matchup in Game Two.
• The Heat did a better job of providing hard contests and shows on Korver, preventing him from popping open for wide open looks. Without his shooting (1-7 FG, 1-5 3FG) making up for his exploited defense, Korver was a liability.
• The Bulls had trouble generating easy offense against the Heat. With Deng matched up against an All-NBA defender, the Bulls need a second scorer to step up when Rose is having a bad game. Again, the onus here is on Boozer.

With the Heat making the proper adjustments, it’s up to Thibodeau and the Bulls to take the necessary countermeasures.

When Wade goes to screen for Bibby in the corner, Korver can overplay the topside of the screen forcing Bibby to the baseline. The Heat could sink the weak-side big into the paint to protect against a backcut and trust their rotations to get out to cover Bosh at the elbow. This is one possible way to defend the corner curl Bibby uses to screen for James.

The Bulls could also simply look to jam Wade’s screen, but Korver’s lack of physicality makes that strategy hard to execute.

The simplest, and most effective measure would be to have Deng fight harder and get under the screen quicker, but any delay by Deng leaves James with a head of steam against a help defender—not a good position for the Bulls to be in.

Boozer needs to be given a shorter leash. If he’s missing layups and only looking to fade away on his offensive moves, then he’s not covering up for his defensive deficiencies.

Also, the Bulls need to get more weak-side action to keep Miami’s help defense occupied.

Whatever the case may be, the Heat did their job in Chicago and broke the Bulls’ home court advantage. Let’s see which pawns each coach decides to move, and which pieces end up capturing or being captured as the Eastern Conference Final chess match moves to South Beach.

Give the Miami Heat credit for making the proper personnel and tactical adjustments in their 85-75 victory over the Chicago Bulls, squaring up the Eastern Conference Finals at one game apiece.

The most important adjustment the Heat made was Eric Spoelstra’s decision to incorporate 3-1 screen/rolls late in the fourth quarter with LeBron James as the ball handler and Mike Bibby as the screen-setter. LeBron would have the ball up top defended by Luol Deng, while Bibby would come off a corner screen set by Dwyane Wade and then screen for LeBron with Korver checking Bibby.

The Heat ran LeBron/Bibby screen/rolls six times down the stretch with the following results.

• Deng went way under the Bibby screen and got strung out for a split second, while Korver’s hedge on LeBron was ineffectual. LeBron sank a critical three.
• Deng shoved Bibby to the ground for a non-shooting foul.
• Though Deng was screened again by Bibby, Joakim Noah pre-rotated nicely to meet LeBron outside the paint and string him backwards. With the play successfully strung out, the Heat merely passed the ball along the perimeter until James missed a three with the shot clock winding down.
• Again, Deng was screened off by Bibby and Noah rotated to meet LeBron. LeBron missed a short runner over Noah’s outstretched hand, but grabbed the rebound and stuck the putback.
• Korver reached in on his hedge and committed a non-shooting foul.
• With Rose defending Bibby, Deng was able to fight over the screen and square up LeBron. LeBron iso’d Deng, though, and hit a clutch dagger that sealed the game.

Not counting the non-shooting fouls, the Heat scored seven points the four times they ran the screen/rolls. It was a nice tweak by Spoelstra as it managed to get Luol Deng’s rangy defense off of James without bringing one of Chicago’s ubiquitous big men to cut James off trying to turn the corner on the screen.

Give credit to Spoelstra. After getting pantsed by Tom Thibodeau in Game One, Spoelstra got the better of the coaching matchup in Game Two.

Why else did Miami win?

Continue reading this post »

Promoted FanPost

Give the New York Knicks, and particularly Anthony Carter, credit for a valiant comeback attempt late in their Game Four defeat. However, the Knicks were outclassed by a focused Boston Celtics team falling 101-89 as the Celtics earned the sweep.

The Knicks did a much better job on their off-ball screen coverage, with players fighting harder around curls and bigs showing better on those same screens. The Knicks also did a much better job communicating on Boston’s off-ball movement, and working through screens and not switching.

As a result, Ray Allen—5-13 FG, 14PTS—never really got untracked, and without the Knicks switching Carmelo Anthony’s big, quick body off Paul Pierce, he had a quiet day—5-18 FG, 13 PTS.

After two miserable performances mitigating one dazzling one, Anthony also deserves credit for a strong Game Four. While he had some trouble elevating over Pierce’s crowding defense, he abused Jeff Green and looked to attack the basket more than in any game in the series. He also made appropriate passes which would’ve been turned into more than three assists with a less motley supporting unit.

Anthony also had easily his best defensive game of the series, not taking the shortcuts he’d taken earlier in the series. Looking at ‘Melo’s final tally, we see two dream performances, and two nightmares. In the clutch, we see him making correct plays in Game Two, while being the main culprit in New York’s Game One loss.

Not an altogether damning performance, but certainly not good enough for Anthony to earn a place on basketball’s superstar pedestal. Perhaps Anthony will have a better postseason with a full year of acclimating to teammates and coaches? It’ll take 12 months to find out.

Why else did the Celtics win?

Continue reading this post »

Give the New York Knicks, and particularly Anthony Carter, credit for a valiant comeback attempt late in their Game Four defeat. However, the Knicks were outclassed by a focused Boston Celtics team falling 101-89 as the Celtics earned the sweep.

The Knicks did a much better job on their off-ball screen coverage, with players fighting harder around curls and bigs showing better on those same screens. The Knicks also did a much better job communicating on Boston’s off-ball movement, and working through screens and not switching.

As a result, Ray Allen—5-13 FG, 14PTS—never really got untracked, and without the Knicks switching Carmelo Anthony’s big, quick body off Paul Pierce, he had a quiet day—5-18 FG, 13 PTS.

After two miserable performances mitigating one dazzling one, Anthony also deserves credit for a strong Game Four. While he had some trouble elevating over Pierce’s crowding defense, he abused Jeff Green and looked to attack the basket more than in any game in the series. He also made appropriate passes which would’ve been turned into more than three assists with a less motley supporting unit.

Anthony also had easily his best defensive game of the series, not taking the shortcuts he’d taken earlier in the series. Looking at ‘Melo’s final tally, we see two dream performances, and two nightmares. In the clutch, we see him making correct plays in Game Two, while being the main culprit in New York’s Game One loss.

Not an altogether damning performance, but certainly not good enough for Anthony to earn a place on basketball’s superstar pedestal. Perhaps Anthony will have a better postseason with a full year of acclimating to teammates and coaches? It’ll take 12 months to find out.

Why else did the Celtics win?

Continue reading this post »

After playing sluggish and sloppy basketball in Boston until they needed it most, the Boston Celtics came up with a rousing performance in their 113-96 dismantling of the New York Knicks. Contrarily, after a gutsy performance in Game Two, the New York Knicks were lifeless in their return to Madison Square Garden. No surprise then that the Celtics romped in a coast-to-coast victory.

Here are the particulars:

What The Celtics Did Right

The Celtics made it a point of emphasis to get more motion in their offense, often running a set called “floppy action.” This often resulted in a pin down for Ray Allen on one side of the floor, followed by a pin down for Pierce on the other side as opposed to the bevy of screen/rolls and isolations ran in Boston.

Partially as a result of these precise pindowns, Allen was simply remarkable when given a sliver of daylight—8-11 3FG, 32 PTS, continuing his torrid shooting in the series.

Pierce’s successes mostly came in transition, broken plays, and because the Knicks switched nearly every screen involving him, on screen/rolls. And successful Pierce was—14-19 FG, 6-8 3FG, 38 PTS, though 13 of those points did come in a fourth quarter of extended garbage time.

After getting his head served on a platter by Carmelo Anthony in Game Two, Pierce was better able to crowd ‘Melo in Game Three rendering him largely ineffective.

Though Kevin Garnett was only a marginal scoring threat, and while he had several porous defensive possessions against the Knicks' second unit, Garnett dominated the Knicks' starting frontcourt on the glass, and set sturdy screens which freed up Allen and Pierce.

Garnett and Jermaine O’Neal provided excellent interior rotations.

Rajon Rondo hit a few jumpers, completed some tricky layups, and helped out on the glass, but mostly he just stayed at the top of the key, hit the correct open teammate in stride, and watched his assist total rise for a prodigious 20 dimes en route to a triple-double.

Jeff Green played his most assertive game of the series, with several smart cuts and tough layups to his ledger.

Nenad Kristic made a couple of excellent close outs.

When the Knicks showed hard to take away Allen’s curls to the three-point line, the Celtics screen-setters would alertly cut and find themselves open at the basket.

The Celtics simply played much, much harder than the Knicks.

The Celtics screens were effective.

The Celtics offense executed at will, and their defensive rotations were precise. Though they had some great individual performances, their win wasn’t a matter of bludgeoning the Knicks with great individual plays, but dissecting the Knicks with the power of perfect execution.


What The Knicks Did Wrong

Try as he might, Amar’e Stoudemire was limited by his back and tragically turned in a mute performance—2-8 FG, 3 REB, 7 PTS.

Give Amar’e credit for trying to push aside his pain and perform, but after an ineffective first half, and after a last ditch effort to remove his back brace didn’t improve matters, Stoudemire should’ve sat out the majority of the second half. There’s no shame in being too injured to play, but there’s no benefit in being too unhealthy to be effective.

Without Amar’e opening up a second offensive front, the Knicks needed another explosion from Anthony to remain competitive. Unfortunately for the Knicks, after his brilliant Game Two, ‘Melo turned in a bogus Game Three—4-16 FG, 15 PTS.

With the Celtics interior help defense much more precise than in Game Two, and with Pierce much more effective at crowding and challenging ‘Melo’s perimeter shots, Anthony was forced to jack up contested jumpers with the hope they’d go in. He did an adequate job of moving the ball—6 AST, 5 TO, and was again active on the glass—11 REB, but his jumper stayed in Boston.

Much worse than his stalled offense was his putrid defense. Anthony had some success in Boston when isolated by Pierce and on several help defensive scenarios—and continued this trend early in the game by getting back in transition and making several on-point defensive rotations.

However, Anthony was too timid to fight through any screens, switching whenever one was presented him. This allowed Pierce to be matched up with smaller Knicks guards which he either pulverized on drives or shot over with limited defensive pressure.

Also, Anthony’s inability to fight through pindowns allowed the Celtics bigs to post Anthony. The Knicks would immediately double, the secondary rotations would be AWOL, and the Celtics would end up with wide open perimeter jumpers.

Anthony failed to be alert and tag Celtics three-point shooters in transition, failed to communicate switches, and was an outright defensive liability.

That’s one superstar performance and two disasters unbecoming of a superstar for the series scorebook.

Landry Fields looks overwhelmed by the magnitude of the playoffs. Not only is he not making shots, but he’s been airballing jumpers and bobbling passes all series.

Fields also was given a rude lesson in defending screens. Perpetually beaten by Allen’s initial cuts and subtle pushes, Fields was constantly trailing Allen’s screens. Without coordinated shows by the Knicks bigs, the Knicks weren’t able to provide any pressure on Allen’s threes.

Toney Douglas made wrong decisions for most of the night, and was likewise burned by Allen when defending him.

Ronnie Turiaf provided nothing on the glass—0 REB.

Bill Walker threw away an awful entry pass and misplayed several screens into open shots.

Mike D’Antoni didn’t make any adjustments to his Anthony auto-switch defense, and by the time he decided to blitz Allen’s screen/rolls, it was midway through the third quarter and the backside rotations were absent. D’Antoni’s players appeared completely befuddled and overwhelmed by Boston’s offensive execution, and suffered almost systemic defensive breakdowns that have plagued the Knicks down the stretch of the first two games in Boston, and in Game Three. In other words, Doc Rivers badly out-coached D’Antoni.

Of course it wasn’t all bad. New York’s secondary players had some nice performances.

Jared Jeffries was his usual busy self on defense and the offensive glass, and even posted Garnett for a layup.

While Walker made some mistakes, his effort was strong and he made plays on both sides of the ball, creating jumpers for himself on offense, and making several successful contests on defense.

Shawne Williams spaced the floor with his range shooting, and provided the only good shows on Allen curls all night.

But aside from small token victories here and there, Game Three was a massacre—some parts of which can be excused (the injuries), and much which cannot (the effort, the breakdowns, the lack of adjustments).

Expect the Celtics habit of stepping off the gas pedal when comfortable to rear itself in Game Three, and expect an embarrassed, angry Knicks team to come out with focus and precision in a Game Four win.

But for all intents and purposes, this series is over.

Promoted FanPost

After playing sluggish and sloppy basketball in Boston until they needed it most, the Boston Celtics came up with a rousing performance in their 113-96 dismantling of the New York Knicks. Contrarily, after a gutsy performance in Game Two, the New York Knicks were lifeless in their return to Madison Square Garden. No surprise then that the Celtics romped in a coast-to-coast victory.

Here are the particulars:

Continue reading this post »

After two games of passive defense, the Portland Trail Blazers needed to increase their activity level to keep themselves from getting swept away by the Dallas Mavericks in the first round. Give the Blazers credit, then, for doing just that—challenging passes, pressuring dribbles, and simply playing harder than the Mavs en route to a 97-92 victory.

This difference in activity level was clearly actualized in the first few minutes of the game.

• Gerald Wallace fought through a cross-screen and deflected an entry pass into Shawn Marion.
• A kick-out pass by DeShawn Stevenson was thrown directly at Wallace for a steal.
• Marcus Camby tapped out a loose ball in traffic for an offensive rebound.
• With Wesley Mathews hounding Jason Kidd bringing the ball up and Andre Miller pressuring Stevenson at mid-court, a Kidd pass to Stevenson sailed out of bounds.
• Camby rotated nicely from the weak side to block a Marion layup attempt.
• LaMarcus Aldridge and Matthews trapped a Kidd wing screen/roll and deflected Kidd’s pass for a steal.
• Matthews swiped at a Jason Terry dribble from behind for another deflection.
• Matthews again knocked away a Kidd pass, and poked a dribble from him on the same possession leading to a steal.

After forcing only six Mavs turnovers in Game Two, the Blazers were able to create three steals, force four turnovers, block a shot, grab an offensive board, generate four deflections, and make "energy" plays on eight defensive or loose ball possessions—all within the first six minutes of the game.

These deflections fueled Portland’s previously absent transition game and allowed Matthews to get going in transition where he sank his first four threes and his first six overall shots while his teammates eased into the game.

Of course the Mavericks would rebound behind a splendid offensive showing by Jason Terry—10-13 FG, 5-7 3FG, 4-5 FT, 7 AST, 2 TO, 29 PTS, but the ability for the Blazers to create turnovers allowed them to run more effectively than they had previously and put the Mavs on their heels.

Why else did the Blazers win?

• They ran a steady diet of post ups throughout the game designed to attack either the small statures of Dallas’ guards, disadvantageous switches, or to allow LaMarcus Aldridge to operate close to the basket.
• More specifically, the Blazers ran a total of 29 post ups. They shot 10-20 as a result of these post ups and scored 27 points on 29 possessions, a strong ratio.
• These post ups often work because of the inverted nature of Portland’s offense. Because Dallas’ best shot blocker in Tyson Chandler had to stay attached to LaMarcus Aldridge on the perimeter, he was less able to drop down and provide help defense at the rim. Also, since guards were doing the posting, they were better able to make correct passes the few times Dallas doubled.
• Here is the points-per-possession ratio of Blazers post ups: Aldridge—10 post ups, seven points produced. Wallace—four post ups, two points produced. Nicolas Batum—two post ups, no points produced. Rudy Fernandez—one post up, zero points produced. Brandon Roy—four post ups, seven points produced. Miller—six post ups, seven points produced. Matthews—two post ups, four points produced.
• And the points per possession involving the Mavs: Kidd—four times posted, zero points allowed. Nowitzki—three times posted, zero points allowed. J.J. Barea—nine times posted, 12 points allowed. Terry—four times posted, six points allowed. Marion—two times posted, two points allowed. Brendan Haywood—four times posted, four points allowed. Tyson Chandler—three times posted, three points allowed.
• Roy had more elevation on his jumper and was therefore able to hit three pull-up jumpers off the dribble, something that was absent from his games in Dallas.
• With Matthews leading the way, the Blazers shot 8-14 from downtown. Even Miller sank a flat-footed triple.
• Aldridge owned his matchup with Chandler. He posted him three times for three baskets, and more importantly, saddled Chandler with foul trouble for most of the game.
• Aldridge also scored eight points in seven assorted catch-and-shoot possessions.
• The Blazers largely played off of Kidd in the belief that he wouldn’t repeat his successful shooting from earlier in the series. Their hypothesis was correct as Kidd only shot 2-8 from the outlands.
• Miler scored in the paint, made good decisions, and was his usual steady self—16 PTS, 7 AST, 3 TO.
• Chris Johnson gave the Blazers some shot blocking during a nice stretch in the second half.
• Barea fought hard but was simply overmatched on defense. Terry didn’t battle quite as much, and was similarly torched.
• Haywood doesn’t give the Mavs as much activity on the offensive glass as Chandler does. With Chandler on the bench, Mavs possessions were largely one-and-done.
• Nowitzki’s help defense was often too slow to be effective.
• Instead of driving to the hoop, Dirk’s gameplan was to back his defenders down more in Game Three. Against Portland’s bigs (Aldridge, Batum, Wallace, and Camby), Dirk only generated five points on eight post possessions.
• Portland’s proclivity to switch on defense and not help off Dirk prevented Dallas’ tertiary players from going off.
• Peja Stojakovic once again had an ignominious second half in a road playoff game. His most egregious blunder was a botched inbounds pass on a Jason Terry curl. The ball ended up nowhere near Terry and bounced off Dirk's hip as Dirk was finishing setting the screen.
• Stevenson gave the Mavs less than nothing.

This being said, there were many reasons why the Mavs had a chance to win.

• Terry at least made up for his bad defense with a superb offensive effort.
• The Blazers still haven’t found a way to corral Dirk facing the basket and driving or in two-man games. Some strong screens, combined with a switching philosophy, afforded Dirk multiple opportunities to back down smaller defenders. He created 14 points on 14 post possessions—but nine came on four possessions against Roy and Matthews. Dirk had unsuccessful possessions posting Miller and Fernandez.
• On various forms of catch-and-shoots, screen/rolls, screen/fades, and curl/fades, Dirk created 13 points on nine possessions. He was particularly deadly in tandem with Terry, where he created seven points on three possessions.
• The Mavs frequently attacked Miller’s porous defense and got into the paint, especially with Terry and Barea.
• Haywood’s post defense on Aldridge has been stellar, while Dirk was effective in Game Three in his individual efforts defending Aldridge.
• Thanks to sturdy post defense on LA, Aldridge only shot two free throw attempts.
• Gerald Wallace had another quiet game, while Rudy Fernandez is nowhere to be found.

Give the Blazers credit then for stepping up their activity level in Game Three and riding the posting up of their guards to success. No doubt Rick Carlisle will tweak his defense to allow more help to protect his guards in the box.

Likewise, give the Blazers credit for playing harder than the Mavs, something that can’t be guaranteed won’t happen again in Game Four.

On the flip side, the Blazers haven’t been able to contain dribble penetration all series long, while Aldridge has been unable to overpower Haywood and get to the line.

Whoever makes the right adjustments to correct these shortcomings in Game Four—or whichever unlikely player steps up with a big performance they way Roy did in Game Three—could determine the series.

Given the ease with which Dirk and Terry have operated, the Blazers still have the longer way to go to duplicate their result in Game Three.

After two games of passive defense, the Portland Trail Blazers needed to increase their activity level to keep themselves from getting swept away by the Dallas Mavericks in the first round. Give the Blazers credit, then, for doing just that—challenging passes, pressuring dribbles, and simply playing harder than the Mavs en route to a 97-92 victory.

This difference in activity level was clearly actualized in the first few minutes of the game.

• Gerald Wallace fought through a cross-screen and deflected an entry pass into Shawn Marion.
• A kick-out pass by DeShawn Stevenson was thrown directly at Wallace for a steal.
• Marcus Camby tapped out a loose ball in traffic for an offensive rebound.
• With Wesley Mathews hounding Jason Kidd bringing the ball up and Andre Miller pressuring Stevenson at mid-court, a Kidd pass to Stevenson sailed out of bounds.
• Camby rotated nicely from the weak side to block a Marion layup attempt.
• LaMarcus Aldridge and Matthews trapped a Kidd wing screen/roll and deflected Kidd’s pass for a steal.
• Matthews swiped at a Jason Terry dribble from behind for another deflection.
• Matthews again knocked away a Kidd pass, and poked a dribble from him on the same possession leading to a steal.

After forcing only six Mavs turnovers in Game Two, the Blazers were able to create three steals, force four turnovers, block a shot, grab an offensive board, generate four deflections, and make "energy" plays on eight defensive or loose ball possessions—all within the first six minutes of the game.

These deflections fueled Portland’s previously absent transition game and allowed Matthews to get going in transition where he sank his first four threes and his first six overall shots while his teammates eased into the game.

Of course the Mavericks would rebound behind a splendid offensive showing by Jason Terry—10-13 FG, 5-7 3FG, 4-5 FT, 7 AST, 2 TO, 29 PTS, but the ability for the Blazers to create turnovers allowed them to run more effectively than they had previously and put the Mavs on their heels.

Why else did the Blazers win?

• They ran a steady diet of post ups throughout the game designed to attack either the small statures of Dallas’ guards, disadvantageous switches, or to allow LaMarcus Aldridge to operate close to the basket.
• More specifically, the Blazers ran a total of 29 post ups. They shot 10-20 as a result of these post ups and scored 27 points on 29 possessions, a strong ratio.
• These post ups often work because of the inverted nature of Portland’s offense. Because Dallas’ best shot blocker in Tyson Chandler had to stay attached to LaMarcus Aldridge on the perimeter, he was less able to drop down and provide help defense at the rim. Also, since guards were doing the posting, they were better able to make correct passes the few times Dallas doubled.
• Here is the points-per-possession ratio of Blazers post ups: Aldridge—10 post ups, seven points produced. Wallace—four post ups, two points produced. Nicolas Batum—two post ups, no points produced. Rudy Fernandez—one post up, zero points produced. Brandon Roy—four post ups, seven points produced. Miller—six post ups, seven points produced. Matthews—two post ups, four points produced.
• And the points per possession involving the Mavs: Kidd—four times posted, zero points allowed. Nowitzki—three times posted, zero points allowed. J.J. Barea—nine times posted, 12 points allowed. Terry—four times posted, six points allowed. Marion—two times posted, two points allowed. Brendan Haywood—four times posted, four points allowed. Tyson Chandler—three times posted, three points allowed.
• Roy had more elevation on his jumper and was therefore able to hit three pull-up jumpers off the dribble, something that was absent from his games in Dallas.
• With Matthews leading the way, the Blazers shot 8-14 from downtown. Even Miller sank a flat-footed triple.
• Aldridge owned his matchup with Chandler. He posted him three times for three baskets, and more importantly, saddled Chandler with foul trouble for most of the game.
• Aldridge also scored eight points in seven assorted catch-and-shoot possessions.
• The Blazers largely played off of Kidd in the belief that he wouldn’t repeat his successful shooting from earlier in the series. Their hypothesis was correct as Kidd only shot 2-8 from the outlands.
• Miler scored in the paint, made good decisions, and was his usual steady self—16 PTS, 7 AST, 3 TO.
• Chris Johnson gave the Blazers some shot blocking during a nice stretch in the second half.
• Barea fought hard but was simply overmatched on defense. Terry didn’t battle quite as much, and was similarly torched.
• Haywood doesn’t give the Mavs as much activity on the offensive glass as Chandler does. With Chandler on the bench, Mavs possessions were largely one-and-done.
• Nowitzki’s help defense was often too slow to be effective.
• Instead of driving to the hoop, Dirk’s gameplan was to back his defenders down more in Game Three. Against Portland’s bigs (Aldridge, Batum, Wallace, and Camby), Dirk only generated five points on eight post possessions.
• Portland’s proclivity to switch on defense and not help off Dirk prevented Dallas’ tertiary players from going off.
• Peja Stojakovic once again had an ignominious second half in a road playoff game. His most egregious blunder was a botched inbounds pass on a Jason Terry curl. The ball ended up nowhere near Terry and bounced off Dirk's hip as Dirk was finishing setting the screen.
• Stevenson gave the Mavs less than nothing.

This being said, there were many reasons why the Mavs had a chance to win.

• Terry at least made up for his bad defense with a superb offensive effort.
• The Blazers still haven’t found a way to corral Dirk facing the basket and driving or in two-man games. Some strong screens, combined with a switching philosophy, afforded Dirk multiple opportunities to back down smaller defenders. He created 14 points on 14 post possessions—but nine came on four possessions against Roy and Matthews. Dirk had unsuccessful possessions posting Miller and Fernandez.
• On various forms of catch-and-shoots, screen/rolls, screen/fades, and curl/fades, Dirk created 13 points on nine possessions. He was particularly deadly in tandem with Terry, where he created seven points on three possessions.
• The Mavs frequently attacked Miller’s porous defense and got into the paint, especially with Terry and Barea.
• Haywood’s post defense on Aldridge has been stellar, while Dirk was effective in Game Three in his individual efforts defending Aldridge.
• Thanks to sturdy post defense on LA, Aldridge only shot two free throw attempts.
• Gerald Wallace had another quiet game, while Rudy Fernandez is nowhere to be found.

Give the Blazers credit then for stepping up their activity level in Game Three and riding the posting up of their guards to success. No doubt Rick Carlisle will tweak his defense to allow more help to protect his guards in the box.

Likewise, give the Blazers credit for playing harder than the Mavs, something that can’t be guaranteed won’t happen again in Game Four.

On the flip side, the Blazers haven’t been able to contain dribble penetration all series long, while Aldridge has been unable to overpower Haywood and get to the line.

Whoever makes the right adjustments to correct these shortcomings in Game Four—or whichever unlikely player steps up with a big performance they way Roy did in Game Three—could determine the series.

Given the ease with which Dirk and Terry have operated, the Blazers still have the longer way to go to duplicate their result in Game Three.

Give the New York Knicks a round of applause for battling the way they did in Game Two against the Boston Celtics. Down Chauncey Billups, and with Amar’e Stoudemire injured, ineffective, and out for the second half, the Knicks were able to ride a Carmelo Anthony 42-point supernova to a three-point lead with 2:37 left in the game.

However, for the umpteenth time, the Celtics were able to make key adjustments and execute down the stretch while the hapless Knicks made critical errors.

Here are the events that transpired after the 2:37 mark.

• After a switch, Anthony allowed Paul Pierce to get to the middle of the court with his strong hand. Jared Jeffries was late in his rotation and fouled Pierce. Pierce was able to hit two clutch free throws.
• Instead of taking the chance of getting burned by Anthony late, the Celtics began doubling him at the wing. Anthony made the appropriate pass, but Bill Walker missed a wide open three.
• A Pierce/Rondo 3-1 screen/roll was played poorly by the Knicks. Toney Douglas’ hedge was ineffective while Walker died on the Rondo screen. Instead of switching, Pierce turned the corner and found himself with a wide open 16 footer. Anthony was late rotating, but Pierce missed the shot.
• A Toney Douglas dribble was poked away on a great defensive play by Rajon Rondo for a key turnover.
• Roger Mason Jr. was forced to pick up Pierce in early offense. Pierce vaporized Mason’s defense, Jeffries stepped up to cut off Pierce, but the next baseline rotation—which should’ve been Bill Walker helping off Glen Davis—never came. Pierce fed Garnett for a dunk and the Celtics took the lead.
• With the Celtics doubling Anthony and Rondo playing excellent ball-denial defense on Douglas, Mason was forced to burp up a three late in the shot clock, which clanged off the rim.
• After Jeffries grabbed the offensive rebound and the Knicks called timeout, D’Antoni set Anthony in the middle of the court to stretch the Celtics defense when they doubled. He kicked it to Mason who found a seam to the basket, but bricked the layup. Fortunately for the Knicks, he grabbed his own miss.
• Instead of staying in front of Jeffries with the ball at the left wing, Davis moved to the halfcourt side of Jeffries to prevent an entry pass into Anthony rather than doubling Anthony after the catch. Jeffries took advantage of the overplay, drove to the rim, and took advantage of soft defense by Garnett to hit a clutch, unlikely layup with 19 seconds to go.
• Garnett returned the favor by destroying Jeffries in the post for a right hook. Instead of drawing up something overly complex, Rivers had Rondo enter the ball into Garnett and cut through, while Pierce stood at halfcourt, with Ray Allen and Delonte West on the weak side perimeter to prevent a double team.
• D’Antoni designed a nicely conceived play to generate a two-on-one advantage at the basket. After Jeffries set a down screen for Anthony who received the pass, he cut to the right box. Jeffries expected Garnett to rotate on time, which would’ve left Bill Walker all alone on a cut for a potential layup. Garnett’s rotation, however, was uncharacteristically late and Jeffries didn’t have the passing angle to dish the pass to Walker. A more talented scorer could’ve gone up for a layup as Garnett was on the wrong side to defend a shot, but as a limited offensive player, Jeffries didn’t have the confidence he could make the basket. He attempted a desperation pass. Garnett stole it, secured it, and called time out.
• With four seconds left, down one, the Knicks still had a prayer of fouling and getting a decent look at a last second desperation heave. However, the Celtics inbounded the ball to West in the backcourt and Anthony refused to chase him down, citing afterwards that he “couldn’t get out there,” to foul West. By the time West was flagged down, less than a second remained and the game was over.

What have we learned from the two games?

That Anthony has the talent to destroy one-on-one coverage, particularly when he attacks quickly and gets in an early rhythm. Instead of holding the ball and waiting before making an offensive move, Anthony, for the most part, was more decisive with his attacks. Also, Anthony was much more aggressive in attacking the basket and not settling for long jumpers. Instead of bogging down and having the Celtics dictate what ‘Melo was going to do with the ball, ‘Melo’s more assertive nature kept Boston behind the eight ball for the first 46 minutes.

It should also be noted that the Knicks ran more screen/rolls with ‘Melo, particularly in the second half. Going down the line and looking at what Anthony did with his possessions, we see that he was mostly defended by Pierce in the game. When isolated with Pierce, Anthony allowed the Knicks to shoot 5-9 and score 16 points on 12 possessions. Anthony decimated Jeff Green, shooting 2-2 against him and generating nine points in five possessions, an awesome ratio. The only other player Anthony was isolated against more than once was Davis, and he shot 1-2 against him and generated five points in three possessions, another winning ratio.

Anthony missed a jumper isolating Allen, missed a jumper isolating Rondo, and missed a three isolating Jermaine O’Neal rounding out his iso possessions. For the game though, Anthony generated 30 points in 23 isolation possessions. A one-to-one ratio is usually considered very good in isolations, so Anthony’s points-per-possession ratio was outstanding.

Anthony’s post ups were far less successful, generating only two points in four possessions. He missed a layup against Rondo, threw the ball away against Allen, and two back downs of Pierce led to a pass to Turiaf which turned into a missed layup, and a second pass to Turiaf which turned into two made free throws. Since Boston was easier able to double Anthony in the post, the Knicks weren’t as prodigiously efficient when Anthony tried to operate down there, with a two-points in four possessions ratio dropping Anthony’s total efficiency down to 32 points in 27 possessions.

On catch-and-shoots, Anthony hit two of his five jumpers for six points in five possessions, another strong ratio. Anthony also hit a putback on one offensive rebound possession, and cherry picked in transition for a basket (made possible when O’Neal missed an open shot). This raises his efficiency rating to 42 points in 34 possessions.

Anthony also engaged in a number of screen/rolls, plays that were largely missing from his Game One dud.

With Ronnie Turiaf as the roller, the Knicks scored two points in two possessions, with the points coming on a nice feed from ‘Melo to a rolling Turiaf at the cup. The other Melo/Turiaf screen/roll led to Amar’e missing a wing jumper.

With Jeffries as the roller, the Knicks scored two points in three possessions. ‘Melo was able to beat Pierce and Davis and dunk, ‘Melo missed a jumper off a second screen, and a kick to Walker led to a missed three.

Walker was the roll man on two possessions. ‘Melo used on screen to hit Jeffries for a layup, and went away from a second screen to hit a sweet 20-foot turnaround over Pierce.

Anthony threw the ball away his one screen/roll with Landry Fields, while a Shawne Williams free throw came out of the one time he screened for Anthony.

As the ball handler on screen/rolls, Anthony generated seven points in nine possessions, a mediocre number.

Anthony also was the roll man on two screens with Douglas, with the Knicks failing to convert each time.

I normally don’t incorporate being the screener with using a possession if I’m analyzing an entire team, but since I’m only studying Anthony’s used possessions, let’s go ahead and give him two empty ones. Anthony also hit a free throw off a defensive three-seconds call which would normally be attributed to Amar’e Stoudemire (who was isolating at the time of the call, creating the three-second violation), but again for the sake of this exercise, tack a point on for Anthony without adding a possession. Give credit to Anthony for three points for a cut, and add a possession for a miscellaneous turnover. Also add two points on a tremendous outlet pass to give ‘Melo six points on these five miscellaneous possessions.

Anthony rounded out his possessions by being instantly doubled at the end of the game on four possessions, making passes directly leading to four scoring opportunities for teammates. Walker missed a three, Mason missed a three and a layup, and Jeffries turned it over.

This gives Anthony a rating of 55 points in 52 possessions, which given the circumstances, is fantastic. Anthony turned in a tremendous offensive performance, especially when looking at his one-one-one numbers.

What else did we learn?

• It’s not always about how effective you are as it is when you’re effective. Garnett had only scored two points in five possessions against Jeffries until his final-seconds hook. Jeffries got the better of KG for most of the game, but Garnett bested Jeffries when it mattered the most.
• While New York’s individual defense was okay, and while Jeffries and Turiaf made some respectable rotations and shows on off-ball screens, New York’s perimeter defenders were horrendous. Anthony and Walker too frequently failed to make proper rotations, failed to locate and target Allen on broken plays, and failed to get around screens leading to disadvantageous defensive matchups.
• Toney Douglas’ inability to guard anybody straight up was exploited by Rajon Rondo, who had 30 points and seven assists. Douglas was on his heels, picked off by screens, and even posted into oblivion. Worse, Douglas committed the cardinal sin of not stopping the ball in transition. Combined with awful court balance, this allowed Rondo to score 12 transition points on his own in the first quarter and 16 for the game.
• When overplaying Anthony and denying him the ball, the Celtics had trouble stopping Douglas. This is because the man who would be asked to show on Douglas coming off of ‘Melo’s screen—Paul Pierce—was attached to ‘Melo and unable to show. This led to Douglas turning the corner naked and led to a pair of wide open looks.
• Douglas is soft, attempting far too many 15-foot floaters instead of fully attacking the basket, or taking an under-control jumper.
• Jermaine O’Neal’s help defense is sporadic at best, and would be exposed by a more versatile offensive-team.
• Pierce carried the Celtics with timely shooting in the third quarter to give the Celtics a reasonable lead. While he couldn’t get on track in the fourth quarter, he set several excellent screens that forced the Knicks to switch.
• Likewise, Rondo set several steel screens, and Davis pancaked at least two Knicks on screens.
• Green is another softie who has trouble finishing through contact and isn’t comfortable enough defending up in Anthony’s grill the way Pierce is.
• Green, Delonte West, and Nenad Kristic have given the Celtics virtually nothing.
• Anthony still makes excuses for his focus and effort-based mistakes.

The optimistic will say that the Knicks were a blown call and two injuries away from being up two-love in the series, while the pessimist will point out Boston’s precision execution as always being a step ahead of whatever the Knicks tried to do.

The realist understands that if Stoudemire isn’t healthy for Game Three and if the Knicks don’t clear up all their breakdowns, the Celtics will find themselves in the second round.

Give the New York Knicks a round of applause for battling the way they did in Game Two against the Boston Celtics. Down Chauncey Billups, and with Amar’e Stoudemire injured, ineffective, and out for the second half, the Knicks were able to ride a Carmelo Anthony 42-point supernova to a three-point lead with 2:37 left in the game.

However, for the umpteenth time, the Celtics were able to make key adjustments and execute down the stretch while the hapless Knicks made critical errors.

Here are the events that transpired after the 2:37 mark.

• After a switch, Anthony allowed Paul Pierce to get to the middle of the court with his strong hand. Jared Jeffries was late in his rotation and fouled Pierce. Pierce was able to hit two clutch free throws.
• Instead of taking the chance of getting burned by Anthony late, the Celtics began doubling him at the wing. Anthony made the appropriate pass, but Bill Walker missed a wide open three.
• A Pierce/Rondo 3-1 screen/roll was played poorly by the Knicks. Toney Douglas’ hedge was ineffective while Walker died on the Rondo screen. Instead of switching, Pierce turned the corner and found himself with a wide open 16 footer. Anthony was late rotating, but Pierce missed the shot.
• A Toney Douglas dribble was poked away on a great defensive play by Rajon Rondo for a key turnover.
• Roger Mason Jr. was forced to pick up Pierce in early offense. Pierce vaporized Mason’s defense, Jeffries stepped up to cut off Pierce, but the next baseline rotation—which should’ve been Bill Walker helping off Glen Davis—never came. Pierce fed Garnett for a dunk and the Celtics took the lead.
• With the Celtics doubling Anthony and Rondo playing excellent ball-denial defense on Douglas, Mason was forced to burp up a three late in the shot clock, which clanged off the rim.
• After Jeffries grabbed the offensive rebound and the Knicks called timeout, D’Antoni set Anthony in the middle of the court to stretch the Celtics defense when they doubled. He kicked it to Mason who found a seam to the basket, but bricked the layup. Fortunately for the Knicks, he grabbed his own miss.
• Instead of staying in front of Jeffries with the ball at the left wing, Davis moved to the halfcourt side of Jeffries to prevent an entry pass into Anthony rather than doubling Anthony after the catch. Jeffries took advantage of the overplay, drove to the rim, and took advantage of soft defense by Garnett to hit a clutch, unlikely layup with 19 seconds to go.
• Garnett returned the favor by destroying Jeffries in the post for a right hook. Instead of drawing up something overly complex, Rivers had Rondo enter the ball into Garnett and cut through, while Pierce stood at halfcourt, with Ray Allen and Delonte West on the weak side perimeter to prevent a double team.
• D’Antoni designed a nicely conceived play to generate a two-on-one advantage at the basket. After Jeffries set a down screen for Anthony who received the pass, he cut to the right box. Jeffries expected Garnett to rotate on time, which would’ve left Bill Walker all alone on a cut for a potential layup. Garnett’s rotation, however, was uncharacteristically late and Jeffries didn’t have the passing angle to dish the pass to Walker. A more talented scorer could’ve gone up for a layup as Garnett was on the wrong side to defend a shot, but as a limited offensive player, Jeffries didn’t have the confidence he could make the basket. He attempted a desperation pass. Garnett stole it, secured it, and called time out.
• With four seconds left, down one, the Knicks still had a prayer of fouling and getting a decent look at a last second desperation heave. However, the Celtics inbounded the ball to West in the backcourt and Anthony refused to chase him down, citing afterwards that he “couldn’t get out there,” to foul West. By the time West was flagged down, less than a second remained and the game was over.

What have we learned from the two games?

That Anthony has the talent to destroy one-on-one coverage, particularly when he attacks quickly and gets in an early rhythm. Instead of holding the ball and waiting before making an offensive move, Anthony, for the most part, was more decisive with his attacks. Also, Anthony was much more aggressive in attacking the basket and not settling for long jumpers. Instead of bogging down and having the Celtics dictate what ‘Melo was going to do with the ball, ‘Melo’s more assertive nature kept Boston behind the eight ball for the first 46 minutes.

It should also be noted that the Knicks ran more screen/rolls with ‘Melo, particularly in the second half. Going down the line and looking at what Anthony did with his possessions, we see that he was mostly defended by Pierce in the game. When isolated with Pierce, Anthony allowed the Knicks to shoot 5-9 and score 16 points on 12 possessions. Anthony decimated Jeff Green, shooting 2-2 against him and generating nine points in five possessions, an awesome ratio. The only other player Anthony was isolated against more than once was Davis, and he shot 1-2 against him and generated five points in three possessions, another winning ratio.

Anthony missed a jumper isolating Allen, missed a jumper isolating Rondo, and missed a three isolating Jermaine O’Neal rounding out his iso possessions. For the game though, Anthony generated 30 points in 23 isolation possessions. A one-to-one ratio is usually considered very good in isolations, so Anthony’s points-per-possession ratio was outstanding.

Anthony’s post ups were far less successful, generating only two points in four possessions. He missed a layup against Rondo, threw the ball away against Allen, and two back downs of Pierce led to a pass to Turiaf which turned into a missed layup, and a second pass to Turiaf which turned into two made free throws. Since Boston was easier able to double Anthony in the post, the Knicks weren’t as prodigiously efficient when Anthony tried to operate down there, with a two-points in four possessions ratio dropping Anthony’s total efficiency down to 32 points in 27 possessions.

On catch-and-shoots, Anthony hit two of his five jumpers for six points in five possessions, another strong ratio. Anthony also hit a putback on one offensive rebound possession, and cherry picked in transition for a basket (made possible when O’Neal missed an open shot). This raises his efficiency rating to 42 points in 34 possessions.

Anthony also engaged in a number of screen/rolls, plays that were largely missing from his Game One dud.

With Ronnie Turiaf as the roller, the Knicks scored two points in two possessions, with the points coming on a nice feed from ‘Melo to a rolling Turiaf at the cup. The other Melo/Turiaf screen/roll led to Amar’e missing a wing jumper.

With Jeffries as the roller, the Knicks scored two points in three possessions. ‘Melo was able to beat Pierce and Davis and dunk, ‘Melo missed a jumper off a second screen, and a kick to Walker led to a missed three.

Walker was the roll man on two possessions. ‘Melo used on screen to hit Jeffries for a layup, and went away from a second screen to hit a sweet 20-foot turnaround over Pierce.

Anthony threw the ball away his one screen/roll with Landry Fields, while a Shawne Williams free throw came out of the one time he screened for Anthony.

As the ball handler on screen/rolls, Anthony generated seven points in nine possessions, a mediocre number.

Anthony also was the roll man on two screens with Douglas, with the Knicks failing to convert each time.

I normally don’t incorporate being the screener with using a possession if I’m analyzing an entire team, but since I’m only studying Anthony’s used possessions, let’s go ahead and give him two empty ones. Anthony also hit a free throw off a defensive three-seconds call which would normally be attributed to Amar’e Stoudemire (who was isolating at the time of the call, creating the three-second violation), but again for the sake of this exercise, tack a point on for Anthony without adding a possession. Add on three points on a cut, plus a turnover on a miscellaneous bad pass. Also add two points on a tremendous outlet pass to give ‘Melo six points on these five miscellaneous possessions,

Anthony rounded out his possessions by being instantly doubled at the end of the game on four possessions, making passes directly leading to four scoring opportunities for teammates. Walker missed a three, Mason missed a three and a layup, and Jeffries turned it over.

This gives Anthony a rating of 55 points in 52 possessions, which given the circumstances, is fantastic. Anthony turned in a tremendous offensive performance, especially when looking at his one-one-one numbers.

What else did we learn?

• It’s not always about how effective you are as it is when you’re effective. Garnett had only scored two points in five possessions against Jeffries until his final-seconds hook. Jeffries got the better of KG for most of the game, but Garnett bested Jeffries when it mattered the most.
• While New York’s individual defense was okay, and while Jeffries and Turiaf made some respectable rotations and shows on off-ball screens, New York’s perimeter defenders were horrendous. Anthony and Walker too frequently failed to make proper rotations, failed to locate and target Allen on broken plays, and failed to get around screens leading to disadvantageous defensive matchups.
• Toney Douglas’ inability to guard anybody straight up was exploited by Rajon Rondo, who had 30 points and seven assists. Douglas was on his heels, picked off by screens, and even posted into oblivion. Worse, Douglas committed the cardinal sin of not stopping the ball in transition. Combined with awful court balance, this allowed Rondo to score 12 transition points on his own in the first quarter and 16 for the game.
• When overplaying Anthony and denying him the ball, the Celtics had trouble stopping Douglas. This is because the man who would be asked to show on Douglas coming off of ‘Melo’s screen—Paul Pierce—was attached to ‘Melo and unable to show. This led to Douglas turning the corner naked and led to a pair of wide open looks.
• Douglas is soft, attempting far too many 15-foot floaters instead of fully attacking the basket, or taking an under-control jumper.
• Jermaine O’Neal’s help defense is sporadic at best, and would be exposed by a more versatile offensive-team.
• Pierce carried the Celtics with timely shooting in the third quarter to give the Celtics a reasonable lead. While he couldn’t get on track in the fourth quarter, he set several excellent screens that forced the Knicks to switch.
• Likewise, Rondo set several steel screens, and Davis pancaked at least two Knicks on screens.
• Green is another softie who has trouble finishing through contact and isn’t comfortable enough defending up in Anthony’s grill the way Pierce is.
• Green, Delonte West, and Nenad Kristic have given the Celtics virtually nothing.
• Anthony still makes excuses for his focus and effort-based mistakes.

The optimistic will say that the Knicks were a blown call and two injuries away from being up two-love in the series, while the pessimist will point out Boston’s precision execution as always being a step ahead of whatever the Knicks tried to do.

The realist understands that if Stoudemire isn’t healthy for Game Three and if the Knicks don’t clear up all their breakdowns, the Celtics will find themselves in the second round.

While the New York Knicks put up a game fight in their 87-85 Game One loss to the Boston Celtics, too many players failed to rise to the playoff occasion. Comparatively, while the Celtics were sluggish and lethargic over the first half, many players made enough critical plays down the stretch to secure a Celtics win.

Let’s take a look then at Game One’s heroes and goats, saving the good guys for last.

Goats:

Carmelo Anthony

Aside from a small flurry in the second quarter, and some success on transition screen/rolls in the second half, Anthony was a total non-factor—5-18 FG, 4 AST, 5 TO, 15 PTS. He took himself out of the game early with two early fouls in the game’s first two minutes, and shot the Knicks out of the game late with a John Starksian performance.

His second half numbers were especially egregious—1-11 FG, 2 AST, 2 TO, 3 PTS. Anthony’s proclivity for one-on-one basketball plays right into Boston’s overload defensive hands, which combined with strong individual defense neutralized Anthony.

‘Melo isolated Pierce five times in the second half, missing four shots and getting ripped with 1:30 to go. He also isolated Green once and Allen once, missing both shots.

‘Melo was blocked by Jermaine O’Neal on a rub cut to the basket, missed both his catch-and-shoot opportunities, and committed an offensive foul by discarding Paul Pierce with his left arm late in the game.

His only made basket came on a transition put back (he was 1-2 in transition, missing a layup), and his other point came on an early screen/roll where he was fouled (and only made 1-2 attempts).

The worst part is that, despite being a very talented passer, ‘Melo massages the ball before entering into any offensive move. This allows defenses to load up their help, and prevents teammates who rely on timing and execution to have any chance of succeeding. Look, for example, at how Landry Fields has turned from a role-playing savant to an afterthought in two short months.

And it isn’t as if ‘Melo made up for his poor play with championship defense, not when he was completely unaware of Pierce cutting behind a baseline screen, closing out late, sloppy, and fouling him on a three-pointer.

Looking at ‘Melo’s body of work in the clutch, we see him getting stripped by Pierce, committing an offensive foul, and jacking up a 30 footer with time left on the clock.

Just as in Denver, ‘Melo still hasn’t shown the ability to adapt his game when faced with a difficult defense, to make snappy decisions, and to not check out mentally in crucial situations.

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While the New York Knicks put up a game fight in their 87-85 Game One loss to the Boston Celtics, too many players failed to rise to the playoff occasion. Comparatively, while the Celtics were sluggish and lethargic over the first half, many players made enough critical plays down the stretch to secure a Celtics win.

Let’s take a look then at Game One’s heroes and goats, saving the good guys for last.

Goats:

Carmelo Anthony

Aside from a small flurry in the second quarter, and some success on transition screen/rolls in the second half, Anthony was a total non-factor—5-18 FG, 4 AST, 5 TO, 15 PTS. He took himself out of the game early with two early fouls in the game’s first two minutes, and shot the Knicks out of the game late with a John Starksian performance.

His second half numbers were especially egregious—1-11 FG, 2 AST, 2 TO, 3 PTS. Anthony’s proclivity for one-on-one basketball plays right into Boston’s overload defensive hands, which combined with strong individual defense neutralized Anthony.

‘Melo isolated Pierce five times in the second half, missing four shots and getting ripped with 1:30 to go. He also isolated Green once and Allen once, missing both shots.

‘Melo was blocked by Jermaine O’Neal on a rub cut to the basket, missed both his catch-and-shoot opportunities, and committed an offensive foul by discarding Paul Pierce with his left arm late in the game.

His only made basket came on a transition put back (he was 1-2 in transition, missing a layup), and his other point came on an early screen/roll where he was fouled (and only made 1-2 attempts).

The worst part is that, despite being a very talented passer, ‘Melo massages the ball before entering into any offensive move. This allows defenses to load up their help, and prevents teammates who rely on timing and execution to have any chance of succeeding. Look, for example, at how Landry Fields has turned from a role-playing savant to an afterthought in two short months.

And it isn’t as if ‘Melo made up for his poor play with championship defense, not when he was completely unaware of Pierce cutting behind a baseline screen, closing out late, sloppy, and fouling him on a three-pointer.

Looking at ‘Melo’s body of work in the clutch, we see him getting stripped by Pierce, committing an offensive foul, and jacking up a 30 footer with some time left on the clock.

Just as in Denver, ‘Melo still hasn’t shown the ability to adapt his game when faced with a difficult defense, to make snappy decisions, and to not check out mentally in crucial situations.

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It appeared that for most of the Dallas Mavericks’ 89-81 Game One victory over the Portland Trail Blazers, Dirk Nowitzki would hear an all-too-familiar refrain. With an infamous history of postseason choke jobs, Nowitzki and the Mavs were singing the same chorus.

At the end of three quarters, Nowitzki was 5-16 with no free throws and six turnovers. In 10 possessions defended by LaMarcus Aldridge, Dirk was 2-8 with two offensive fouls for four points in 10 possessions, a horrendous ratio. Against Nicholas Batum, Dirk was 1-4 with two turnovers, a kick-out pass leading to a missed three, and a kick out leading to a Peja Stojakovic three for another poor ratio of five points in eight possessions. Dirk missed two jumpers over Gerald Wallace, and though he was 1-1 against Andre Miller, he also was ripped by Wallace double teaming, and threw a pass away for two points in three possessions.

Only on a screen/roll when Wesley Matthews picked up Dirk did Nowitzki have a good ratio, hitting a jumper over him for a couple of points in one possession.

Overall though, in 24 possessions, Dirk only generated 13 points, a far cry from an elite scoring ratio.

Meanwhile, Dirk’s counterpart was rolling. LaMarcus Aldridge, who is much more assertive in the post than in years past, was 9-16 for 21 points scoring in a variety of ways. He hit a jumper over Dirk, plus scored on one of the two times he posted Dirk, for a successful four points in three possessions.

Against Chandler, he scored on all three of his cuts, was blocked in transition, and in nine post ups, shot 2-5, was fouled twice for three free throws, turned the ball over, had Jason Kidd strip him, and found Andre Miller for a made jumper for nine points against Chandler in the post, a solid number. Altogether, he tallied 15 points in 13 possessions against Chandler, a winning ratio.

Aldridge posted Marion twice, getting stripped once, and feeding Batum for a layup for two points in two possessions. Aldridge rolled on a screen and dunked in a lob over Stojakovic. Aldridge also dunked in transition with nobody defending him. Only Brendan Haywood could stop Aldridge, forcing a missed jumper, and blocking his shot in the post.

Tally it all up and Aldridge’s 22 possessions generated 25 points—12 points more than Dirk and on fewer possessions. While Dirk was flailing around, clearly lacking composure over Portland’s physical defense, and some outright bad calls going against him, Aldridge was playing like an MVP candidate.

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It appeared that for most of the Dallas Mavericks’ 89-81 Game One victory over the Portland Trail Blazers, Dirk Nowitzki would hear an all-too-familiar refrain. With an infamous history of postseason choke jobs, Nowitzki and the Mavs were singing the same chorus.

At the end of three quarters, Nowitzki was 5-16 with no free throws and six turnovers. In 10 possessions defended by LaMarcus Aldridge, Dirk was 2-8 with two offensive fouls for four points in 10 possessions, a horrendous ratio. Against Nicholas Batum, Dirk was 1-4 with two turnovers, a kick-out pass leading to a missed three, and a kick out leading to a Peja Stojakovic three for another poor ratio of five points in eight possessions. Dirk missed two jumpers over Gerald Wallace, and though he was 1-1 against Andre Miller, he also was ripped by Wallace double teaming, and threw a pass away for two points in three possessions.

Only on a screen/roll when Wesley Matthews picked up Dirk did Nowitzki have a good ratio, hitting a jumper over him for a couple of points in one possession.

Overall though, in 24 possessions, Dirk only generated 13 points, a far cry from an elite scoring ratio.

Meanwhile, Dirk’s counterpart was rolling. LaMarcus Aldridge, who is much more assertive in the post than in years past, was 9-16 for 21 points scoring in a variety of ways. He hit a jumper over Dirk, plus scored on one of the two times he posted Dirk, for a successful four points in three possessions.

Against Chandler, he scored on all three of his cuts, was blocked in transition, and in nine post ups, shot 2-5, was fouled twice for three free throws, turned the ball over, had Jason Kidd strip him, and found Andre Miller for a made jumper for nine points against Chandler in the post, a solid number. Altogether, he tallied 15 points in 13 possessions against Chandler, a winning ratio.

Aldridge posted Marion twice, getting stripped once, and feeding Batum for a layup for two points in two possessions. Aldridge rolled on a screen and dunked in a lob over Stojakovic. Aldridge also dunked in transition with nobody defending him. Only Brendan Haywood could stop Aldridge, forcing a missed jumper, and blocking his shot in the post.

Tally it all up and Aldridge’s 22 possessions generated 25 points—12 points more than Dirk and on fewer possessions. While Dirk was flailing around, clearly lacking composure over Portland’s physical defense, and some outright bad calls going against him, Aldridge was playing like an MVP candidate.

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Despite being the three-time defending Western Conference champions, the Los Angeles Lakers appear vulnerable entering the postseason. This vulnerability stems from a lack of effort down the stretch manifesting into a five-game losing a streak, a dogfight against the San Antonio Spurs’ B-Squad, and an overtime affair against the moribund Sacramento Kings.

Looking at the Lakers’ 102-93 win over the Spurs reveals countless examples of the team’s physical and mental laxation.

• Catches and dribbles were largely uncontested. As a result, the Spurs were able to get into whatever offense they wanted to run.
• The Lakers’ screen/roll defense was awful, especially when Pau Gasol’s man was setting the screen. Gasol stands far too upright on defense making it easier for opposing players to split hedges and get into the paint.
• Perimeter rotations were generally late or confused, resulting in San Antonio’s big men getting wide open looks from behind the arc. As a result, Matt Bonner shot 3-3 and Steve Novak 2-3 from the bonus land.
• In the Lakers’ attempt to rectify the problem, their bigs starting flying out at shooters uncontrolled, leaving Bonner and Novak able to pump, take a step, and hit a similarly uncontested jumper.
• Screens weren’t set with any authority leaving them largely ineffective.
• Ron Artest fouled Richard Jefferson on a jump shot to close the first half, was beaten off the dribble by Matt Bonner, and was guilty of two missed rotations.
• While Pau Gasol’s post defense was acceptable (according to my unofficial notes, the Spurs only scored on two of their seven possessions against Gasol in the post), he was a non-factor when protecting the basket, allowing penetrators to hit short jumpers without stepping up.
• Shannon Brown was perpetually lost on defense and couldn’t shoot well enough to make up for it.
• Both Artest and Kobe Bryant were broken down by Gary Neal in the fourth quarter as he hit two big runners to keep the Spurs close.

To compound matters, Andrew Bynum suffered a bone bruise on his right knee which could limit him going into the playoffs.

Of course it wasn’t all bad. Derek Fisher drew three offensive fouls and stymied San Antonio’s point guards, Gasol and Odom had their way in the post, and the Lakers helped their cause with exceptional free throw shooting—25-28.

But it wasn’t until after a fourth quarter timeout, following Kobe failing to ice Gary Neal to the sideline on a screen/roll allowing Neal to hit a floater, and Odom carelessly losing track of Steve Novak allowing him to make a corner three, that the Lakers began to play with any impetus.

Kobe set a strong screen on Novak forcing a switch, Odom was able to post Neal and draw Spurs help defenders, Brown cut inside the three-point arc, and Odom found him for a crisp elbow jumper.

A few minutes later, Odom posted Novak, got to his left hand, and hit a plus-one left hook. The following possession Kobe was able to get all the way to the basket for a pair of free throws, and on the next possession, Odom posted Bonner and hit a righty layup plus-one.

Each move was powerful and executed instantaneously before the Spurs were able to set up their defense. It was a far cry from the ball-stopping pull-up jumpers that characterized the Lakers first three quarters.

Defensively, the Lakers put more pressure on the perimeter, and aside from some terrific individual plays by Neal, the Spurs stopped scoring.

Sometimes, it’s just that simple. Playing with more effort can lead to more effective play. The past three seasons have been strong indicators that a crisp, focused, peak Lakers team will probably be the best team in the league, but this season the Lakers have been prone to long stretches of uninspired play.

While the intensity of the playoffs should reinvigorate the Lakers spirits, it appears that it’s harder than usual for the Lakers to rouse themselves out of their collective doldrums. Even in the postseason the last few seasons, the Lakers have had games where they haven’t put their foot on the gas pedal. Given how difficult it’s been for them to snap out of funks, any prolonged stretch of uninspired play this postseason may prove to be fatal.

After a shaky start to the Carmelo Anthony era, the Knicks have begun to turn things around, carrying a seven-game winning streak down the stretch of the season. This comes on the heels of a nine-loss-in-ten-games stretch preceding the current winning streak.

But which Knicks will we see in the playoffs? The winning Knicks? The losing Knicks? Something in between? Let’s examine New York’s 97-92 Wednesday victory over a respectable Sixers team to examine what lies in store.

Good Knicks:

The Knicks run much more isolations with their current incarnation than they did pre-’Melo, and with good effect. Against the Sixers the Knicks ran 13 isolations for Amar’e Stoudemire (mainly from the left elbow) and generated 17 points, a good ratio.

With Elton Brand and Spencer Hawes far too slow to contest him on the perimeter, Stoudemire had free reign to shoot unpreserved jumpers to his heart’s content. When the Sixers did try to contest, he had the speed to create offense off the dribble. Finally, the threat of Stoudemire isolating opened up passing lanes to open teammates. Amar’e has been much more unselfish than in years past, and while he doesn’t have great vision, he registered seven assists.

Also, the Knicks ran 11 isolations for Anthony, scoring 14 points on those possessions despite being matched with a talented defensive counterpart in Andre Iguodala. Anthony played a bit farther out on the perimeter against the Sixers than he did as a Nugget, where he mostly operated in the mid-post. But tricky inside-out dribbles, the fantastic threat to get to the basket, and flawless jump shot mechanics eviscerated Iguoldala’s defense from the outside.

Carmelo also used a pair of pindown threes plus a dribble-pitch jumper from the left wing to give the Knicks breathing room to start the second half, ballooning an eight-point halftime lead to 14 in a few minutes.

Also, while ‘Melo is slow to recognize open teammates, he’s an excellent passer, beautifully threading the ball through cracks to open teammates, as he did on one first quarter screen/roll to Sheldon Williams for a dunk.

No surprise, the Knicks have a tremendous amount of firepower with Carmelo and Stoudemire on the floor at the same time.

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As the season winds down to its inevitable conclusion, the Golden State Warriors are staring down yet another sub-.500 season by the bay. As usual, the team has offensive firepower, and as usual, the team’s general defensive deficiencies mitigate their offensive success.

I took the liberty of charting each possession of Golden State’s 112-106 loss to the Mavericks Wednesday night, discounting extreme transition, fluky broken plays, and two offensive and three defensive plays at the beginning of the contest because the game was pre-empted by an earlier ESPN telecast.

Monta Ellis is Golden State’s designated offensive scorer and he puts the shooting in shooting guard, tallying 31 of Golden State’s 88 possessions. He ran 20 screen/rolls against the Mavs to great effect, leading the Warriors to 12-15 shooting and 30 points during those 20 possessions, an excellent ratio. His isolations were about league average, 3-6, seven points, six possessions, while he scored four points in two post ups and missed a designated catch-and-shoot around a brush screen.

Ellis may be pint-sized but he’s extremely quick, has a reliable jumper, and has tremendous hang time to float in the lane and adjust his shot around rotating bigs at the basket. He had great success using his speed to get around hedging Dallas big men and breaking into the lane.

He’s not a tremendous finisher at the rim due to his lack of strength, but is creative enough to hold his own due to his clever release points and subsequent acrobatic finishes.

His handle is a bit high, and he’s an unwilling and mediocre passer, which led to his five turnovers, but he did make accurate drive-and-kick passes around screens to spot-up shooters, hence his 11 assists for the game.

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With Blake Griffin in tow and a cast of young talent flanking him, there’s finally reason for optimism in Clipperland. That young talent was on display during the Clippers’ 116-108 victory over the Knicks, though the team still leaves much to be desired.

Let’s examine that game to see what the Clippers have and what the Clippers will need to escape the dregs of the Western Conference.

The Good

Not only is Blake Griffin talented, but he has a high motor. Of his 17 field goal attempts, three came in transition where he:

• Sprinted down the court after his man shot a jumper, easily beating the Knicks down for a dunk.
• Finished on the break with a nifty left-handed layup
• On defense, stepped in the way of Danilo Gallinari at halfcourt, forcing him to lose his dribble. Sensing the ball rolling to a teammate, Griffin sprinted down, caught an outlet pass, and hustled himself into a layup.

Clearly Griffin has unbridled athleticism forcing opponents’ court balance to be at a premium, and opposing big men to hustle back in transition.

In more conventional offense, Griffin was 7-14. He posted up 10 times, eight times via planting himself or dribbling himself into the post, twice after receiving a cross-screen. The results were as follows:

• On a baseline out of bounds play, Vinny Del Negro drew up a play that had Griffin receiving a back screen to establish post position. The Knicks switched Raymond Felton onto him after the screen and promptly smothered Griffin when he received the ball. Griffin made the appropriate pass out of the double and as the ball got swung, flashed to the other side of the court for a catch-and-dunk.
• After setting up in the left mid-post with Amar’e Stoudemire on his top shoulder, he adjusted to an overthrown entry pass, caught the ball, drop stepped, and with Stoudemire playing on the top side, was square with the basket to complete another rim-rocker.
• After facing Stoudemire, he attempted a clumsy left-to-right spin move that pounded the backboard.
• After coming around a cross-screen, Griffin missed a makeable layup.
• Another post up also saw him miss a lefty layup.
• A sixth post up allowed Griffin to drop in a right hook.
• After a receiving a cross-screen, Griffin used the screen, but found himself well behind the backboard. No matter. He caught the ball and in one pivot, created enough space to hit an elegant scoop layup.
• Griffin posted up once again on the left block and as he turned over his left shoulder came back to his right and missed a close shot. Griffin clearly does not trust his left hand and it’s far les developed than his right.
• Late in the game, Griffin posted up on the right box and missed a right hook over a double team.
• Later, Griffin tired another right hook from the right block over Wilson Chandler but Stoudemire provided well-timed help and blocked the shot from the side.

All in all, Griffin finished 4-10 in the post for eight points.

Griffin is also comfortable passing out of the post especially on the catch.  He has average passing skills and plus vision for a power forward, though teammates missed several shots that resulted from accurate passes. His two assists came on rudimentary out passes after the Knicks doubled or dug and failed to rotate, and his turnover came when an off-target pass to DeAndre Jordan was broken up and intercepted.

Griffin was also able to spin off Stoudemire and dunk in a 30-foot pass on a broken play.

He rounded out his shooting with an awkward missed floater on a drive from the top of the key, by rolling on a screen, avoiding a defensive rotation, hanging in the air, and hitting a sweet banker, and by cutting to the basket and recording an uncontested dunk.

Griffin can also handle and outleap most players on the glass.

With his combination of athleticism, power, and skills, Griffin is a generational big man, and he has enough post polish to be more than just a highlight reel. Offensively, he’s a legitimate offensive force.

While Jordan doesn’t have Griffin’s polish, he’s another high flyer who can get up the court, present a target, and finish. Most of his success came from lounging around the hoop and collecting cookies from teammates, but one possession, he simply cut down the lane, received an alley-oop pass and dunked, creating offense out of nothing.

His long arms and wingspan make him a talented shot blocker, and a key swat on a Wilson Chandler pull-up helped the Clippers seal the deal late in the game. He also wasn’t suckered into taking the numerous open jumpers the Knicks afforded him throughout the contest.

Ryan Gomes came to play, hitting 8-11 shots, all but one of them jumpers. He also stayed with Amar’e around a curl—a difficult play to stop—forcing Stoudemire into a missed jumper. Gomes is a quality fourth forward on a good team.

Randy Foye made a number of difficult shots, especially late in the fourth to kill the Knicks’ comeback attempt.

Baron Davis’ 16 assists are inflated by the Knicks’ absent interior defense, but more often than not, he was able to draw a crowd and find the open man, usually Griffin or Jordan for an open dunk, or Gomes for a mid-range jumper.

Eric Bledsoe is another impressive youngster with good creativity. Of his many highlights, he was able to curl around a screen, hang, and hit a scoop layup. He hit two more complicated layups, plus knocked down three of his five jump shots, made several nifty drive-and-drop passes, and showed good smarts in punishing the Knicks’ press by immediately attacking the rim for an assist on a layup.

Most impressive was Bledsoe’s energy, which led to a cut for a layup and four offensive-rebounds. He even played respectable one-on-one defense at times. While he’s still learning the game, Bledsoe is a player who makes things happen.

On the whole, the Clippers did a terrific job of pushing the ball, even after makes, preventing a poor Knicks defense from having the chance to get set. The Clippers also played relatively unselfish and won wholly on the strength of their explosive frontcourt.


The Bad


As good as Blake Griffin is on offense is as bad as he is on defense. Aside from a pair of charges—where he was clumsily off balance and overwhelmed by Stoudemire, but Stoudemire needlessly ran him over—Griffin spent the entire game giving up too much room to Knicks shooters, getting beaten at the point of attack by Knicks penetrates, and channeling his inner statue when playing help defense.

Jordan is another inferior defender. While shot-blocking is his pedigree, he sells out to swat shots, often leaving his own man wide open in the process. The Knicks took advantage of his lack of discipline for over a dozen layups at his expense. He also did a poor job defending screens and perimeter. His only impressive defensive play, aside from his late block, came when Stoudemire faced him up and Jordan stayed with him goading him into a miss.

Also, while Griffin and Jordan looked to slip most screens, the ones they did try to set where nearly all whiffs. And neither player—nor any other Clipper—boxes out.

Of Griffin’s five turnovers, one came on an aforementioned bad pass, and one came on a three-second violation, but one came on a careless travel, another when he tried to rip the ball through Stoudemire but was too upright, and a final one when he over dribbled and was stripped by a help defender—all suggesting Griffin needs to work on his awareness, but all correctable in time.

Griffin also needs to get into a lower stance on defense. He’s far too upright which makes it difficult for him to make quick movements.

Davis and Foye combined to forced a dozen shots or drives. Neither played any defense aside from gambling into passing lanes, and Davis especially elected to keep his hands at his sides when Knicks shooters were rising up.

Gomes lacks the foot speed to be anything more than a facilitating backup and an average defender.

Bledsoe plays a bit out of control, while Foye is a poor passer.

Ike Diogu displayed his poor awareness early in the second quarter where with five seconds left on the shot clock, he caught an inbounds pass under the basket, didn’t go up for an immediate layup—despite being open—held the ball, was swarmed, then panicked and through the ball back out to a teammate as the clock expired.

The Clippers screen defense was awful, with poor grades on the bigs for inadequate shows or zones, poor grade on the help which was often absent, and poor grades for the man defending the ball as neither Davis, Foye, or Bledsoe made any concerted effort to get over the screens, elected to go under and take their chances instead.

Los Angeles also frequently miscommunicated and failed to rotate on the perimeter as well, and were lucky the Knicks shot so poorly (6-26) from downtown.

So while the Clippers are talented, they only play offense and they still lack the sophistication to be consistently reliable against good defenses. The simple return of Eric Gordon and Chris Kaman’s mechanical post game wouldn’t change that. If those traits aren’t changed, the Clippers will just be another dangerous, but severely flawed team in a murderous conference.

Let’s see if Griffin (and his teammates) can come back next season with a more aggressive defensive disposition before putting a timeline on their expectations. If he comes back the same old Griffin, the Clippers will continue to be the same old Clippers.