I was having a quick look at Greene's FanGraphs page the other day, and it struck me (as it has done every time I've looked at his stats in the last couple of years) what a truly exceptional base-stealer he is, potentially even verging on the "great" in this regard.  The unfortunate thing about Greene is that he's a real bit of a mishmash of uncomplimentary talents - plenty of power for a shortstop, but serious contact problems, and exceptional speed and instincts on the basepaths, coupled with an unfortunate propensity for making outs before he reaches first base (career MLB OBP of only .307 in 359 PAs), but this doesn't necessarily detract from the fact that, in isolation, his stealing stats are genuinely exceptional.

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Well. Apparently we traded Colby Rasmus. Who saw that coming?

I haven't been in the daily threads much this week, but from a cursory look last night, I noticed that the response to this trade, both in this blog and the wider baseball community, seems to be overwhelmingly negative from the Cardinals' point of view. What bothered me a little bit about much of the analysis of the deal, however, is the overwhelming presence of a great deal of narrative over actual nitty-gritty. As a scientist, I get concerned when I read potentially loaded statements about "trading 3 years of a cost-controlled centre fielder for rentals of a starting pitcher and a righty reliever, plus a few years of a LOOGY". I don't think it tells you a great deal about what's actually happened, and the reality is that the value of the deal is obviously entirely dependent on how good those individual pieces are.

What I'd like to do in this fanpost is examine, in as dispassionate a way as possible, each individual aspect of this trade; I'll try largely to use the concept of "surplus value", that is, the value of each piece in the trade, minus the payroll liabilities that they each entail. Obviously, there's a lot of guesstimation involved here, and some pretty huge error bars, so rather than prejudging that this is a "good", "bad" or "indifferent" trade, I'll look at the best, worst and median-case scenarios for each player involved, and try to make some sort of conclusion at the end of it all. I'll be using wins above replacement (FanGraphs WAR) and various projections/predictions/guesses of value to try to put a dollar amount on each asset in the trade; for reference, the cost of 1 WAR on the free agent market at present is approximately $4m, give or take.

Before I move onto that, I think I should just underline my thoughts on a wider sense relating to this deal. I'm not, frankly, a big TLR fan. For most of the time I've followed this team, I've considered him an average manager, at best (in a field of major league managers which often resembles a tallest midget contest). I thought that the various machinations of his apparent distaste for Colby have depressed his value significantly, and, as Dan pointed out yesterday in his front page post, he simply hasn't done his job very well (in terms of working with, not against, the players he's provided with). Regardless of the merits of Mozeliak's trade, LaRussa comes out of this even worse in my eyes. Frankly, I hope he's gone next year.

Full disclosure time - my initial impressions when I heard about the trade (I hadn't read VEB or any other analysis at this point) was that it was a slightly better haul than I thought we might get. I've been a big Jackson fan for a year or two and thought he was a potential FA target next year, I recall Marc Rzepczynski as one of the Jay's top 10 prospects a year or two ago, and thought Dotel had some value as a throw-in. I definitely thought it was probably a better deal, initially, the alternative offer from the Rays centred around Jeff Niemann.

In any case, let's move onto looking at the individual aspects of the trade:

1. The throw-in pieces.

I'll get this out of the way first. From our point of view, we did a bit of addition by subtraction by moving Brian Tallet back to his old team, dumping the apparently more or less finished Trever Miller, and giving up AAAA pitcher PJ Walters. We also managed to do a bit of subtraction by addition, picking up the husk of Corey Patterson, who will hopefully be marginalised the rest of the way as a 4th or 5th OF and who likely isn't any real upgrade over Adron Chambers as a back CF. All in all, I'm not sure these parts of the deal are worth any analysis - basically, all these players are basically worthless at this point (give or take) and these moves were simply to save a few hundred K and free up some roster space. So far, so insignificant.

2. Losing Colby this year

The hardest part, perhaps, of the deal to quantify. Colby's current value remains quite high, despite a difficult season. 

He's been worth 8.3 WAR thus far in his career over about two and a half full seasons, good for somewhere around 3.5 WAR per season, which probably remains his current true-talent level, difficult as it is to judge (recent slump included, he's on pace for about 2.5 WAR this year, but with a slightly unlucky BABIP). His career line of .258/.333/.442 is slightly above average (thanks to a decent walkrate and some power), a .336 wOBA and 109 wRC+. His baserunning has been good (both to my eyes and to all the stats) but that's included in his overall FanGraphs WAR total. He's shown improvements in his K rate this year (it's down to 20%) and, most importantly, he's not quite 25 years old yet, so it's possible he can tweak and improve his hitting as he moves into his peak years. 

His batted ball profile hasn't changed much over time, despite hitting more infield pop-ups this year (although combined with a reduction in K%, that still suggests he's simply having the same problems making solid contact he always has), so most of his "projection" in terms of hitting comes from his pedigree as a guy who saw success at a young age in the minors. It's important to note, however, that he was in fact never a dominant hitter in his way up the system, his big breakout year coming with a big 2007 in Springfield (AA) where he was arguably helped by playing in a ballpark that is hugely beneficial to left-handed hitters, to a still highly-impressive 152wRC+ (.932 OPS). However, he was slightly below average as a hitter in 2008 in Memphis, so, as I stated, perhaps his upside may be a little over-stated and it down to his seductive toolset and young age as much as any perceived super-prospect production.

Much of his value was estimated to be tied up in his fielding, as a speedy, smooth CF (the toughest OF position and third behind C and SS on the defensive spectrum). However, he's not quite lived up to expectations, putting up a strong first year according to UZR and then falling away to negative scores in his next two years. There is a massive error bar on UZR data, and it seems reasonable to take it with a pinch of salt, but I'd say (based on my own observations - good routes, good speed, error prone, poor arm) his final UZR figure of -3.6 runs per year (which equates, with the large error bars, to somewhere between "slightly above average" and "poor"), and FanGraphs fan scouting report (which aggregates fans' votes of a player's defensive production) and the Dewan plus/minus system. As UZR is incorporated into his WAR figure so far, let's say he's an average to slightly below-average CF, with the possibility that his slight struggles this year may mean that his skills may regress in future years, but with a high chance that he'll be average-ish or a little below going forward.

So, what have we traded away?

Assuming Rasmus is around a 3.5 WAR player right now, and assuming Jon Jay is about league average (or a tick above), the dropoff from trading Rasmus and replacing him with Jay is about 1.5 wins per year; pro-rated over the rest of the season, about half a win. However, we're also replacing Jay's production as a pretty regularly-playing 4th OF with some PAs from Corey Patterson (who sucks), Allen Craig (who is roughly equivalent in value to Jay) and perhaps more playing time in either OF or 2B for Skip Schumaker (who's maybe only a 1 WAR guy). It's hard to forecast how that'll all pan out, but I'd say it's likely we're losing at least another half win there.

Overall, the likely cost in 2011 of losing Rasmus is -1 win.

BEST-CASE SCENARIO: 
Rasmus continues to scuffle, Jay continues to get a bit lucky, Craig and Berkman are healthy and can fill in the gap, Patterson barely plays, and the trade costs us 0.
WORST-CASE SCENARIO: 
Berkman's injury is more long-term, meaning the backup corps of Patterson and a smorgasbord of AAAA Memphis guys have to fill in some more time. Probably -1.5 to -2 wins.
MEDIAN CASE SCENARIO: 
As noted above, -1 win.

3. Losing Colby going forward

I decided to put this section here, as it hangs together reasonably well with section #2, although it's actually not relevant to the value we gain from this trade THIS year.

So what's our favourite smooth home run hitter going to do over the next three seasons? Well, based on the above, I'd say the most likely expectation for a guy with 3 years' service time is a slight improvement. He's moving to a tougher environment to hit in (the ALE) and will face the stacked RedSox, Yankees and Rays rotations frequently, but he's moving out of a seemingly toxic environment where he clearly wasn't happy, and, as previously noted, starts 2012 as a 25-year-old with significant tools. ZiPS projects a .338 wOBA for the rest of 2011, and it's hard to see him not bettering that in the forthcoming years. As a 3.5 WAR guy now, I'd say it's probably fair bet for him to add 0.5 WAR/yr.

So, overall, if we assume he figures things out to SOME extent, we can project something like 4 WAR next year, 4.5 WAR the year after, 5 WAR the year after that. On average, a 4.5 WAR CF for three years, or about 1 WAR/yr better than he has been so far - a moderate improvement for a young guy moving into his peak. That costs us 13.5 WAR in the next three years.

BEST CASE SCENARIO: 
From our point of view, the ideal thing now would be for Rasmus' relatively unimpressive defense to continue to be an issue, and for him not to figure things out as a hitter. The "not developing beyond what he is now" hypothesis. It's hard to see his skills regressing significantly, so a 3-3.5 WAR/yr guy he remains. That costs us about 10 WAR.
WORST CASE SCENARIO: 
His defense moves back to average or slightly better (he certainly has the tools to be worth a few runs above average) and his hitting tools begin to coalesce. The 152 wRC+ of his AA season seems unattainable, but if he can hit .276/.361/.498 as he did (luck-assisted) last year, without the elevated BABIP, he's a 5-6 WAR guy with decent CF defense and no health issues. That costs us a painful ~17 WAR.
MEDIAN CASE SCENARIO: 
As above; 4.5 WAR for 3 years = 13.5 WAR(ish).

4. The guys we've gained this year

I should start by saying that E-Jax is a good pitcher. Probably better than you thought, if you hadn't looked at his stats lately. The wild pitcher with good stuff but no clue how to use it of his early-20s Rays days seems a thing of the past; he's 28 years old, and has put up the following lines for the last 3 seasons:

2009: 214 IP, 3.62 ERA, 4.28 FIP, 4.32 xFIP. Good for 3.5 WAR in a tougher ALC with the Tigers.
2010: 209 IP, 4.47 ERA, 3.86 FIP, 3.71 xFIP. Good for 3.8 WAR with the D'Backs in the slightly easier NLW.
2011: 121 IP, 3.92 ERA, 3.21 FIP, 3.42 xFIP. Good for 3.0 WAR mostly with the WhiteSox.

His walkrate, K rate, and GB rate have all improved since before this period. He's now a guy with control that borders on the excellent (2.88 BB/9), good stuff (his fastball velocity is consistently within the top 10 in baseball, as far as starters are concerned) and a 47% GB rate. He's on track for a 4.5-5 WAR season, and has been about as valuable as Jaime Garcia so far. His ZiPS projection calls for a 3.94 FIP going forward (which I find hard to understand, as he's bettered that quite substantially in the last two years), and he's moving to a league where he can throw against the opposition pitcher.

If we assume Kyle McClellan is charitably a 1-WAR pitcher, and E-Jax is something like a 4 WAR true talent guy (both of which may slightly underestimate the impact of this move), we're looking at a roughly 1 WAR gain in the remaining 9 or 10 starts Jackson is likely to make.

BEST-CASE SCENARIO - 
Jackson pitches like he has in 2011 so far, finds a few more GB under Dave Duncan, and is worth 2 WAR over what KMac would've provided.
WORST-CASE SCENARIO - 
some bad starts/regression for Jackson and he's merely a 0.5 WAR upgrade.
MEDIAN CASE SCENARIO - 
as above; 1 WAR.

Marc Rzepczynski (let's just call him Scrabble from here on in...) is going to be our lefty reliever for the rest of the year, and has accumulated a 2.83 ERA supported by a 3.13 FIP doing that job in Toronto. As we saw on Thursday, he has a impressive stuff and a K rate over 8 for his career. His 2.64 career FIP (2.84 xFIP) and 9.6K/9IP vs LHB suggests that he'll be an impact reliever if used mainly against lefties, but unlike even the best years of Trever Miller's career, he can also get righties out - an unlucky 4.69 FIP is underlain by a much more promising 4.13 xFIP. He's been worth 0.6 WAR in his 40-odd IP so far, and promises to be worth another 0.5 WAR going forward. With no replacement-level lefties on the staff this year (both Miller and Tallet were below replacement-level, and project to continue to be so) I don't think it's implausible he's actually a 1 WAR upgrade.

BEST-CASE SCENARIO - 
Scrabble tears it up in the pen and Miller continues to prove he's lost it, putting up a 5-ish FIP. The upgrade is nearer 2 WAR
WORST-CASE SCENARIO - 
Scrabble doesn't get enough innings to make a huge impact, and Miller bounces back a little in Toronto, showing he's not QUITE done yet. Still a likely gain of 0.5 WAR.
MEDIAN CASE SCENARIO - 
as above; 1 WAR.

Last but not least, the moves at the back of the pen are worth noting. The acquisition of E-Jax moves KMac back into a relief role, where he's put up an xFIP of approximately 4 in the last three years, replacing the entirely fungible Brian Tallet. Of somewhat greater value is the fact that McClellan can pitch to lefties, with a platoon split that is essentially non-existent. This makes him potentially useful if used correctly (and yes, with TLR that's a big IF) when contrasted with guys like Jason Motte and Mitchell Boggs. In a 7th or 8th inning game facing lefty-righty-lefty, especially if scrabble has been burnt, KMac is likely a better bet than either of our current set-up men.

Dotel is a minimal addition in real terms, bumping the soft-tossing PJ Walters off the roster, although he really should be the last righty out of the pen OR used specifically as a ROOGY. A somewhat wild journeyman with extreme flyball tendencies (do I have to duck if I invoke the phrase "rich man's Miguel Batista"?), Dotel's hovered around an unexciting FIP of 4 for the past couple of years, but he does have one redeeming feature - he's murder on right-handed hitters. A career 12K/9IP vs righties, and better than a 5:1 K:BB ratio this year, means his career and season FIPs vs RHB are both well below 3. As long as he never faces a lefty, Dotel is a useful addition in that he's probably the best pitcher on the staff at killing righties in a high-leverage situation.

The likely gain from these two minor bullpen additions is likely about 0.5 WAR over the rest of the season - they're both assets if used well, but could be a detriment if they used injudiciously.

BEST-CASE SCENARIO: 
Dotel only ever faces righties, and is immediately pulled for KMac or Scrabble in a high-leverage lefty situation. KMac isn't used as a primary set-up guy, but handles the long-man role and is used now and again against lefties in later innings. A possible gain of 1 WAR with a prevailing wind.
WORST-CASE SCENARIO: 
Either guy becomes the go-to 8th inning guy, moving Boggs, Motte and Lynn (all of whom are as good or better than KMac and Dotel) to lower-leverage work. A potential LOSS of value here, let's say -0.5 WAR.
MEDIAN CASE SCENARIO - as above; 0.5 WAR.

5. 2011 Trade Impact

The value of the trade, at least in the immediate, is that it likely improves the team in the short-term, in a close pennant race, between two fairly evenly matched teams. As I mentioned earlier, one win (or 1WAR) is worth roughly $4m, give or take, judging by recent free agent contracts. That said, not every win (or WAR) is born equally. 

Given the relative scarcity of occasions in baseball where 1 win is genuinely important (i.e. in a tight playoff race), and given the huge (apparently $20m+ in revenue, on average) benefits of reaching the post-season, wins become much more valuable in situations like the one we find ourselves in now. One could argue that the fact we hope/expect to contend in 2012 and 2013 slightly reduces that (i.e. we're not quite as "all-in" as the Brewers) but essentially the value of any wins added or subtracted right now is magnified. 

What WOULD you pay to add a win in a tight playoff race? $6m? $8m? I honestly can't answer that question, so, in a wild gambit that may undermine my entire thesis here, I've decided to include both those options, along with $4m, in evaluating the 2011 impact.  You can go with whatever you think is most appropriate; personally, I can envisage each win being worth at least double in a tight playoff race.

BEST-CASE SCENARIO:
0 WAR (losing Rasmus) + 2 WAR (Jackson) + 2 WAR (Rzepczinski) + 1 WAR (Dotel & KMac to the pen) = 5 WAR
Overall Surplus Value = $20m ($4m/win), $30m (6m/win), or $40m (8m/win).
WORST-CASE SCENARIO:
-2 WAR (losing Rasmus) + 0.5 WAR (Jackson) + 0.5 WAR (Rzepczinski) - 0.5 WAR (Dotel & KMac to the pen) = -1.5 WAR
Overall Surplus Value = $-6m ($4m/win), $-9m (6m/win), or $-12m (8m/win).
MY PREDICTED MEDIAN:
-1 WAR (losing Rasmus) + 1 WAR (Jackson) + 1 WAR (Rzepczinski) + 0.5 WAR (Dotel & KMac to the pen) = +1.5 WAR
Overall Surplus Value = $6m ($4m/win), $9m (6m/win), or $12m (8m/win).

Overall, the most likely outcome (broadly speaking) if we're valuing our wins at this point in the year about 1.5 to 2x as important as any other win, is that the trade adds about $10m of value this year.

One of the principle values of this trade, as we've discussed in some of the other threads, is the possibility of yielding some draft picks from two of the players involved, namely Jackson and Dotel. Both currently qualify as Type-B free agents, and so if they're offered arbitration over the winter and turn it down, the Cardinals net a supplemental draft pick (probably within the 40-50 range in the draft) in the 2012 MLB Player Draft, which is a valuable commodity (current top-10 Cards prospect Tyrrel Jenkins was a supplemental pick, as was current Cardinal Lance Lynn).

Using the reverse-engineered Elias Rankings from MLBTR, we see that Dotel is comfortably inside the Type-B bracket in either league this year, with an outside shot at type-A (which won't happen unless he gets some more save opportunities). Jackson looks a little vulnerable; he's a Type-B, but the curious (read: stupid) way the Elias rankings works puts him only near the bottom. However, his Type-B status is almost certainly safe; because the Elias rankings use stats from the last three years, they're currently including the tail end of his ugly 2008 with the Rays. So long as he matches or out-performs the August/September where he put up an ERA north of 5 (although he did, admittedly, pick up 7 pitcher wins) he should make it.

Jackson is a no-brainer to offer arbitration to, as there is zero chance he accepts it (barring an injury requiring major surgery). He's a Boras client and is due a big pay-day next year. Unless we intend to extend him (which may prove costly), we're likely to trade him up for a draft pick come the winter.

Dotel is a harder one to figure. As noted above, he's only a marginally useful reliever these days, but as a guy with a significant platoon split, arguably he still has utility. However, he's 37 and turns 38 before next season. His fastball, which remains his go-to pitch, has lost a bit of zip in the last three years, going from a 93mph pitch with the ability to touch 96 and 97, to being a strictly low-90s offering. He has a $3.5m option with a 750k buyout; I'd imagine the Cardinals might exercise the buyout and offer arbitration. He's unlikely to see a significant increase in salary from the $2.75m he's making this year, so even if he DOES accept arbitration (quite possible) he won't earn much more than the $3.5m in total. 

All that said, he was briefly a major league closer (TM) last year in Pittsburgh, and it's not impossible that he thinks a 2-year deal is possible or that he'll get north of $4m to pitch somewhere as a set-up man. On balance, I think offering arbitration is the right move for the Cardinals - at worst, they'll be paying somewhere between $3 and 4m for a righty specialist who, if used exclusively against righties, is probably just about worth that salary. It's also possible that the Cardinals come to a gentleman's agreement with Dotel, buying him out (netting him $750k) and allowing him to look for a $3m+ deal elsewhere (which makes him more money than his option year would), in exchange for the assurance that he'll decline arbitration.

How much is type-B compensation worth? As a very rough estimate, Victor Wang has shown that the average supplemental pick provides somewhere very roughly in the region of $3m of surplus value. Given that the Cardinals recent drafting record is fairly good, and we have a history of paying slightly-above-average with regard to slot prices, it's possible that such a pick is worth a little more to us. Shall we say $4m?

MOST LIKELY SCENARIO: 
Jackson is offered arby and accepts. Dotel is either allowed to walk, or ends up back here for $3m or so. I guess this happens maybe 50% of the time.
NET GAIN = $4m
BEST-CASE SCENARIO: 
Both end up type-Bs, both decline arbitration (perhaps with the gentleman's agreement with Dotel), and we net two draft picks. Rough stab in the dark, I'd say this happens 30% of the time.
NET GAIN = $8m
WORST-CASE SCENARIO: 
If Jackson gets unfeasibly unlucky with his W/L record and ERA, or gets injured, it's just about possible he slips off the type-B map. In this instance, the Cardinals gain no picks and could end up (over)paying Dotel $3-4m into the bargain. I guess this could happen 20% of the time.
NET GAIN = Diddly squat

7. The Colby Tax

Or - what the ultimate cost of three lost Rasmus years is. Assuming the $/WAR value sticks around $4m for the next three years, and assuming the WAR totals I discussed in part 2, we can take a rough stab at this surplus value we're losing. 

We also have to deduct what Colby will cost, however, as we can use that money to pay for other assets. Looking at a few recent arbitration cases we can make a pretty fair guess. Ryan Ludwick is a good comp in terms of both his production in the three years leading up to his arbitration seasons, and in terms of what I think Colby might get (although Ludwick avoided arby in each year, agreeing a 1-year deal with the Cards or Padres each time). Ludwick made $3.7m/$4.5m/$7m. I'm assuming Colby's position, youth and top prospect billing may mean a slight uptick on these numbers, so let's assume Rasmus costs $4m/$6m/$8m in arbitration for a total of $18m.

So, with reference to this putative arby salary scheme, and Colby's projected values from part 2, we lose:

MEDIAN VALUE:
-13.5WAR = $-54m + $18m (salary) = $-36m
BEST CASE:
-10WAR = $-40m + $18m (salary) = $-22m
WORST CASE:
-17WAR = $-68m + $18m (salary) = $-50m

8. Scrabbulous!

So, the balance of the trade really comes down to what we can expect from our new left-handed setup guy/possible future starter. The crux of the matter, really, is whether he IS a starter, and exactly how good he can be.

Marc Rzepczynski is, as discussed above, already a good left-handed reliever. He has good peripheral numbers, good results this year, and is capable of getting righties out as well as being tough on lefties. Also, he's right up Dave Duncan's street, throwing a wicked slider and a nice sinker, both of which generate lots of groundballs. 

However, the problem with non-closers (and all but the most elite relievers, in general) is that they're just not worth as much as everyday players or starting pitchers, as they only throw 60 or 70-odd innings most years. We might expect to see some improvements from Scrabble, and fairly elite reliever numbers going forwards - he's 25, he's already very good with less than 2 years major league experience, and he fits into our staff very well, but in terms of value he's unlikely to greatly exceed 1 WAR/yr as a lefty set-up guy.

All that said, I'm not sure there's anything yet to say that he can't make it as a starter. The groundball rate and the ability to pitch to righties impress greatly (his FIP and xFIP, as noted previously, are in the low-4s against RHB, and he has a serviceable changeup that, if he can develop it a little and rely on it more, could make for a nice three-pitch combo). Also, he already has some success - in 23 starts in the daunting environment of the AL East, a 3.94 xFIP (FIP, with HR/FB rate normalised to the league average) underlies slightly less impressive FIP and ERA numbers. Moving to the NL, under the tutelage of Dave Duncan, and avoiding having nearly a quarter of your starts against the Yankees (as has been the case so far) may help. There's also been talk from Goold and others that some in the org see him as a possible starter long-term, and he had some significant success starting in the minors (when he was one of the Jay's top 10 prospects), putting up sub-2.60FIPs right the way up the minors in 2008 and 2009 and moving quickly through their system.

On the other side of the coin, he's never thrown more than 160IP in a year, will have been a reliever for all of 2011, and Dave Duncan seems to be of the opinion that the guy's a reliever. His arm action is slightly funky; he's big enough at 6-3 and 200+ lbs to handle a starter's workload, but he is slightly round-arm with his delivery and one wonders whether his success against righties will sustain once teams have seen him more than a couple of times, unless Duncan can refine his approach and arsenal.

The 3.94 xFIP he's put up as a starter (and 1.6 WAR in 23 starts), and the fact his results and approach seem to be improving as he moves into his peak years, suggest that the guy can probably be a 2 WAR pitcher in the rotation in the NL Central, albeit not a big innings eater. With some improvement in terms of his efficiency and approach, 3 WAR (which I guess makes him the mythical "3rd starter" Jaime Garcia was always projected as, for a contending team, until the cutter turned him into a legit #1 or 2) seems within reach. It just depends whether the Cardinals give him the chance to do that.

The final point worth noting is that Scrabbulous has 4 years of team control remaining, one more year than Colby and that year will be for the league minimum, before he hits arbitration in 2013. We'll have him between ages 26 (next month) and 30.

BEST CASE:
 Scrabble turns starter next year, stretching out to ~160-odd IP and puts up decent 3rd starter numbers, earning 2 WAR. Three more (hopefully injury-free) years of similar production (2.5 WAR, 3 WAR, 3 WAR) take him up to age 30 and free agency. Total of 10.5 WAR
WORST CASE: 
Scrabble remains in the pen, perhaps after a failed attempt at starting, and puts up solid LOOGY/set-up guy numbers for four years, perhaps with some injury niggles. Total of 4 WAR
MEDIAN SCENARIO: 
Hard to peg this one, as it's probably more likely he's the best or worst case; he's either a competent starter or he isn't. Let's assume he stays in the pen this year and next, and then has 3 years as a competent, basically league-average, starter. 1 WAR next year plus 3 years of 2 WAR/yr as a starter = Total of 7 WAR
As with Rasmus, there's an arby cost. Assuming he's a reliever, or a reliever who later morphs into a tweener starter, a probable decent comp is the Cubs' Sean Marshall - $1m/$1.5m/$3m; roughly $5-6m. I'd bump the total up to maybe $10m if he starts for his last two years. If he's a starter, The Giants' Jonathan Sanchez is probably a good comp - $2.1m/$4.8m in years one and two, and next year he probably gets in the region of $7m. Let's call it $14m. So:

BEST CASE VALUE: 
10.5 WAR = $42m - $14m = $28m
WORST CASE VALUE: 
4 WAR = $16m - $5m = $11m
MEDIAN CASE VALUE: 
7 WAR = $28m - $8m = $18m

9. Conclusions

Well, I guess I should bring this very dry but hopefully fairly informative fanpost grinding to a shuddering halt. I think there's no question that we sold somewhat low on Colby, but I think (having considered the individual parts of the trade in some detail) the actual facts (as far as we know and can predict them) suggest it's not quite the trainwreck that it's been framed as, both here at VEB and by the media in general. The feeling that trading a possible 5-6 WAR CF coming into his peak years for a slightly disparate and potentially risky package is moving a potential cornerstone for some question-marks is well founded, but perhaps a little overly emotive. There's enough value in this package if some of the following pan out:

- genuine improvement in 2011 (and I haven't even touched on the value of having E-Jax over a lesser pitcher like Lohse in a potential playoff battle).

- Rzepczinski's been well-scouted, fits in with the org, and turns into a worthwhile starter (again, I haven't touched on the fact that this probably keeps Lance Lynn in the bullpen, where he's excelled and where I feel he may actually belong, long-term, but it certainly saves us on potentially expensive free agent deals and risky Carp extensions).

- E-Jax and Dotel turn into supplemental picks.

- Colby doesn't improve significantly over the next three years.

Simply looking at my rough, back-of-a-cigarette-packet calculations above, and assuming the Cards are prepared to pay a not-unreasonable $8m/win for the rest of the year, the following surplus values/losses can be attributed to the following possibilities:

ALL THE MEDIAN VALUES (what I think is most likely to happen): total surplus loss of just $2m
ALL THE BEST-CASE SCENARIOS: total surplus value gain of $54m
ALL THE WORST-CASE SCENARIOS: total surplus loss of $51m

I'm sure you can all get your geek rocks off by playing around with the values I've worked out for each possible scenario (think the Cardinals wouldn't want to pay $8m per win this year? Think Rasmus is a lock to be a 6 WAR guy going forward? Simply change those bits of each formula to your own volition, et voila!), but if we make all the assumptions I've made, get fair projected value out of the guys we traded for in 2011, get four seasons of good relief and/or competent starting pitching from Scrabble, a draft pick from Jackson, and Colby turns into a merely very good player rather than a bona-fide star, as you can see, it's not the disaster that perhaps we Rasmus-lovers all want to frame it as.

Hi guys

As promised, I'm putting up a quick recap of the Cards-Phillies game I went to last week, having finally gotten round to getting the photos on the computer.  Sadly, the game itself was a slightly disappointing experience, I managed to see one of only two (if memory serves) Cards losses from the 7 days leading up to the game, which lead into the pretty listless form we've seen from the team for the last week or so.  It was great to see the team in person for the first time in about 6 or 7 years, and great to see such a fine start from Adam Wainwright, but it was frustrating to see us looking so unlikely to put any runs on the board (despite leaving more ducks on the pond than Philly did), and the Ruiz walk-off homer, hit off Hawksworth, seemed to have an air of inevitability about it after he hit a very loud foul that just died outside the left-field foul pole a couple of pitches before.  Just one of the many close battles that slip out of a team's grasp over the longer war of the regular season, I guess.

In retrospect, it would've been nice to get to Pittsburgh this last week to see the last game of that series, but the terrible transport links across Pennsylvania (would you believe it takes nearly EIGHT HOURS to get a train from Philly to the Steel City?) and the fact that my friends in this region were only able to take a day off at the weekend meant that I just didn't make it.  Maybe next time.

Anyhow, onto the trip report:

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Looks like the previous hot stove post is going to break 700 posts, and, with it, some unfortunate Internet Explorer users' computers.  Thankfully, I'm running Chrome on my Cray XMT, so it's not a problem for me, but maybe drawing a line under the FIRST MEANINGFUL FREE AGENT DEALS OF THE FESTIVE PERIOD isn't a bad idea, now we have a bit more of an idea of how the market's shaping up.

via www.ldesign.com

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Yesterday the Cardinals added their first free agent of the off-season, and his name wasn't Holliday, Cameron, Harden, Lackey or even Kearns.  The identity of our latest redbird?  Ex-Kansas, NYM and Atlanta Braves utility guy Ruben Gotay, who signed a one-year minor league deal with an invite to spring training.  In the likely event that we hold onto him, he won't make more than the league minimum in 2010.

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http://www.mlbdailydish.com/2009/7/30/968725/cardinals-eyeing-as-springer

Strauss (vis mlb daily dish) reports that the Cards were interested in getting Springer as a throw-in on the Holliday deal. To me, that'd have made it much more palatable. He also mentions Qualls, who would be expensive (but is very good and a Cards-type pitcher - decent K rate, and he's really improved his control this year with his GB-inducing sinker to become an elite reliever).

Apparently the A's wanted another pitching prospect in our haul to include Springer in the Holliday deal. I would guess Lynn, Hawksworth (now he's doing OK in MLB), Boggs and Garcia would be off limits, which doesn't leave much. In the lower minors we have our two recently drafted relief prospects, who I would be reluctant to part with (fireballer Joe Kelly and Scott Bittle, he of the apparently devastating cutter), Deryk Hooker (one of our few potentially high-ceiling guys) and one or two other relief prospects of note. I think I would be comfortable dealing someone like Fernando Salas or Francisco Samuel (who are long-shots to make it, but both have high ceilings, Samuel more so), or a lower-end starting prospect like Adam Ottavino or maybe even PJ Walters. However, I can't really see us getting this deal done if they weren't prepared to include any of these guys in the Holliday deal.  So it's probably moot.

As for Qualls, he's apparently on the type-A/B cusp this year, probably a B, so will be an expensive signing.  He's also on a team-friendly contract ($2.35m for 2009).  I suspect it takes at least a high-level pitching prospect (someone like Boggs) to get this deal done.  Qualls has an ERA well below 4 every season in the majors so far (he came up in 2004), a career 3.68 FIP, and a FIP of 2.78 so far in two seasons as a D'Back (in a hitters' paradise, to boot).  He's suppressed his walkrate in the last two years, so his K/BB ratio sits at an elite 6.8 this season (which, so far, has been a career year as the D'Backs closer).  He has suppressed his HR rate, which partially comes from a stabilising of his HR/FB ratio (which was a little high in Houston, but is now perhaps a bit low in Arizona, so maybe due a *slight* regression), and partly from giving up less flyballs in general.  He's maintained his groundballing ways (58%) this season and throughout his career, and can now be seen as an elite groundball pitcher with excellent control to make up for his slightly-below-elite (but still good) stuff.  He's a lot better than any reliever on our team.  I think he's out of our price range in 2009, due to a lack of prospects.

IF Qualls is likely to be a type A, I would probably do the deal for Boggs, if the D'Backs want him, as I think we go with Hawksworth as our 5th arm for the remaining 8 or so starts he'd be making, and Qualls really helps our pen in the post-season, as well as giving us a couple of picks at the end of the year when he says no to arby.  Still, the Backs could be looking for more than even Boggs if he's an A - Boggs plus Samuel, perhaps.  It's getting expensive at that point, IMO.  Personally, I don't think this gets done, nor would I be especially keen on it.

So, that brings us to next season.  I think we need a RHRP quite badly.  Assuming we pick up Franklin's option, we'll have the following bullpen from the right side (2009 FIP in brackets):

Franklin (2.87)

KMac (4.20)

Motte (5.16)

Kinney (6.94)

Thompson (4.98)

Probably one of Hawksworth or Boggs will be involved too.  Franklin is set to regress, but I'm still fairly confident he can be above-average, maybe pencil in a FIP of about 4.  KMac remains slightly above average, he may improve but I don't think we'll see the early-2008 version again; once more, I think a FIP around 4 is realistic.  Motte is likely to improve but he's probably not the bullpen ace we hoped he might be, and he's a big question mark as his K rate hasn't carried over from AAA and he still needs a 2nd pitch; who knows how he'll go, he probably has the highest ceiling and the lowest floor of the three main arms.  All bets are off on Kinney, Thompson and the rest who'll be lucky to see replacement level.

Overall, our bullpen will be below-average, potentially verging on quite poor, from the right-hand side.  So what about the two guys we're apparently interested in this year?

Qualls will be an expensive free-agent; he could be pitching himself into Kerry Wood or Brian Fuentes-type money this season, and if he's cheaper than that (and not a type-A) he's probably a good add.  I'm thinking he gets at least 3 years, probably around $20m from someone.  I simply don't like giving relievers that sort of money, even though he's just about worth it in WAR terms (based on his D'Backs years, he's a 2-win player).  I'd pass on Qualls unless he comes in below this sort of valuation, especially with the need to add to Pujols' contract, potentially sign Holliday and then still pick up a #4 SP and potentially someone who can handle 3B.

Springer, however, is an interesting case, still.  He's been pretty effective the last 3 years, after a mediocre career, and although I think much of that is luck with HR rate, there's still a persuasive case that he's at least as good as any of the other RHP in our pen next year.  He'll be 42 next season, and his inability to pitch more than one inning (and more than 2-3 times a week) is a worry, but he should share the bulk of the high-leverage innings with KMac and maybe Motte, so I suppose that's less of a concern.

Since 2005, with the Astros, he's put up the following K/BB ratios: 2.57, 2.88, 3.47, 2.50, 3.38.  Overall, he strikes out nearly 3 hitters for every 1 he walks.  That puts him in the "very good" bracket of relievers.  Now, I believe he was basically lucky in his two years with us - he only gave up HR on about 4.5% of his flyballs, which is probably unsustainable (his career rate is around a more-or-less-average 9%).  He's also a fairly extreme flyball pitcher, giving up an airball well over 50% of the at-bats he faces (52% career, 59% this year).  However, we have a stadium that suppresses homers, and a likely outfield of Holliday/Ankiel, Rasmus and Ludwick, which has to rate as one of the best in the game.  So Busch is a good fit for him, and we can perhaps expect his "real" numbers to out-perform his DIPS.

Additionally, he has made his family home in Missourri and one of his children has been treated for a heritable illness nearby, so he's made it known that he's happy here and that it would be his preference over other locations.  His ERA, crucially, has regressed this year to 4.42, which might suppress interest in him, along with his age.  He was signed for $3.3m by the A's last time round (down from the $3.5m we gave him the year before), and I'm pretty confident his value has dropped since then.  Add in a hometown discount for us, given the circumstances, and I think we get him for around $1m, $2m at the most.

He's not the absolute bullpen ace he looked in 2007, but given his relative success the last 5 years, plus his WAR values according to FanGraphs, he adds 0.5-1 WAR to our team (given he's replacing relievers who are potentially below replacement level, or 4.50 FIP) and is murder on right-handed hitters.  $2m is relatively cheap for a guy like Springer, and it's less than we'd pay for any of the other decent bullpen options on the open market.

So, I say go for Springer next season.  The only complication might be if he's a type B again - it wouldn't shock me if Beane offered him arby, knowing he likely gets no more than $4m and nets a pick otherwise.  In that case, Springer might just accept for a last big payday and the chance to secure his family's future.  However, if I were Mo, I'd probably be on the phone to Springer and let him know that he's got a home here next year.  I'd even consider offering a low-end prospect for him if he's a type B this year, although I imagine the A's valuation and what I'd be willing to pay wouldn't fit.

Following his apparent hamstring strain last night vs the Pirates, it looks like our 2nd best hitter is going to be out for a while.  Not only do we lose our 2nd starting outfielder of the year to injury, and our #4 hitter, but it also further weakens our already pretty poor lineup vs LHP.  Teams will likely be trying to throw every southpaw they've got against us for the next few weeks.  So who do we call up?

The options as far as I can see are:

1) Joe Mather.  Perhaps the most obvious like-for-like option, as a power-hitting corner OF.  However, he's been in a serious slump since ST and hasn't really emerged from it yet in AAA (.394 OPS (!) in nearly 100 PAs).  Has probably lost a lot of his stock as a result.

2) John Jay.  Hit well in ST but he lacks power and is yet ANOTHER LH, which probably makes him a Rasmus fill-in at best.  Also stinking up the joint in AAA this year.  Good fielder.

3) Allen Craig.  Likely only useful in LF (moving Dunc to right and weakening our OF defence quite badly), but could also soak up time at 3B vs LHP (with Robinson starting in the OF).  Another who's struggling in memphis (.670 OPS) but with a low BABIP.  Hit well in ST and has some power.  Considered a -ve defender in LF or 3B, although some comments I've seen don't actually reckon he's THAT bad.

4) David Freese. Not an OF, so he'd probably be our starting 3B and we'd have to find some ABs for Thurston/Schu in the OF.  Not hitting well this year (combined .650 OPS in MLB/AAA).  Good glove at the hot corner.

5) Brett Wallace. Not an OF again, probably can only fit in at 3B.  I'd like to see him tried in LF but realistically he'd probably be a train-wreck as he's not played there and is far too large.  So it's hard to see how he'd fit into the team.  Also, we're giving up an arb year on our top prospect for (most likely) a month or so in MLB.  Undoubtedly the best hitter of the lot, however, and is walking at a higher rate in AA this year.

So, surprisingly few options, really.  If Ankiel's not ready to return, it's hard to find anyone who can step in and give us anything near Ludwick-like production, and we really need to find a RHB anyhow.  My pick would probably be Craig, but I'm yet to be convinced he's going to come straight up and rake, and I'd much rather see him at 3rd than out of position in the OF (and the Dunc/Craig/Rasmus OF arrangement is, defensively, rather ugly).  This isn't a good situation for the cardinals to be in at all.

Hey folks.  Have to say that I'm a little bit disappointed that we dumped Barton (a guy I think should've been with the big league team all year instead of Ryan, given his ability to hit LHP, his OBP/lead-off skills, and the fact he still offers some upside/trade-value if he's given a chance to play at the MLB level) for what appears to be a middle reliever that Atlanta didn't have any place for today, but I thought I'd take a bit more of a closer look at what we got back in the deal.  Here goes...

First of all, we probably know what we've given up in Barton - a no-power LF with a slightly noodley arm, who has great range in a corner OF spot but will probably never be a good enough defender to play CF.  UZR last year had him a +15 run LF (in a very small sample size, only 200 innings or so; he's also +ve for ARM rating, which I find a bit suspect).  He's probably, however, at least a +10 run leftfielder, given his speed and the fact he's already had defensive success there.

His main value offensively comes from his OBP - he got on at a .354 clip last year (albeit with an unsustainably lucky year on balls in play) and has enjoyed an OBP close to .400 in the minors (albeit hovering around .350 in his stints at AAA).  He has limited power (ISO of .124 last year isn't too out-of-sync with his minor league numbers) and, despite suggestions he might develop some power, he's 27 and is realistically probably never going to exceed 10HR in a major league season.  He was a 0.8 win player last year (per FanGraphs) in only 179 PA, which makes him probably at the very least an average LF, and potentially a solid RH part of a platoon in that position, or a good 4th or 5th OF for a contending team.  It should be said, however, that a lot of his value derives from his fielding (small sample size alert, although it has to be said that corner outfielders don't generally field well as a group) and his OBP (bolstered by a .348 BABIP last year).  In a full season, he might be just about an average major league outfielder.

Now, Blaine Boyer - he's a 27 year-old middle reliever/set-up type who throws from the right side.  He's been generally said to have above-average stuff throughout his career, and (as has been mentioned in the other thread) John Smoltz has said some good things about him.  Is he better than anyone currently in our bullpen?

Boyer pitched in 76 games and threw 72 innings last year.  To put that in perspective, Kyle McClellan only pitched in 68 games (albeit with 75 IP).  He finished with an ugly ERA of 5.88, however, his FIP was somewhat better, at 4.20.  He had a very similar year to KMac, pitching solidly in the first half then falling away badly after the all-star break, perhaps due to over-use.

Breaking down Boyer's pitching, he is a reasonably high strikeout guy, recording just over 8K/9IP in his major league career since breaking into the Braves' pen in 2005.  Walks have never been a major problem but, like KMac, his problems will come when he starts issuing the free passes.  He's recorded about 3.6BB/9IP, which means his K/BB ratio is 2.2 for his career, 2.6 in his solid 2008 campaign.  That's not bullpen ace material, but it compares well with KMac (2.36 career), Franklin (1.8 career), Springer (2.17 career, albeit much higher in his 2 year Cards' stint, at a little over 3).

Boyer's a slightly groundball-inclined pitcher, but not excessively so.  For his career, he's got a 1.35 GB/FB rate, which is somewhere in the ballpark of average I think.  He produces a GB just under 50% of the time, which is something that might've caught Dave Duncan's eye, despite the fact his repertoire (which I'll go onto) is a bit more "power"-orientated than your archetypal Duncan project....

Boyer throws a fastball (4-seam I think) which averages around 93mph for his career, but he can touch the mid-90s.  I don't have any pitchFx stuff (presumably someone else can chip in with that) but given his reasonably decent GB rate he probably throws some sinking/bottom-of-the-zone stuff, rather than trying to overpower at the letters.  He also relies heavily on a curveball sitting in the mid-70s, which he throws about 20% of the time.  However, in 2009 in his 3 appearances (when he's been shelled) his breaking ball has perplexingly been coming out a LOT faster, recording as a slider in the mid-80s.  He hasn't thrown his curve once, which is odd.  Not sure if this is something he's been working on in spring, but presumably the sooner he goes back to being a FB/CB pitcher, the better, and I'm sure that's something he'll be working on in St Louis.  He also has an occasional changeup which seemingly isn't very good, but I guess he might toss it in now and again vs LHB.

Boyer's splits are a tiny bit concerning - he's much better (as you might expect, given his pitching repertoire) against right-handed batters than southpaws.  Righties are held to a respectable 0.701 OPS against him in 317 PA, and he gets them out about 70% of the time when he faces them.  He also has a K/BB ratio close to 3 against them.  Against lefties, however, in his (limited) 198 PA, he gives up an .835 OPS, and only gets them out a little over 60% of the time.  To put that in perspective, he's worse against left-handed batters (small-ish sample size alert!) than Trever Miller is against righties, and he has a (slightly) bigger platoon split.  He probably shouldn't be facing LHB in high-leverage situations.  If he's to face lefties, it'd be nice to see if the organisation can develop his occasional changeup into a pitch he can reliably use against them.  Otherwise he'll probably walk too many and get hit reasonably hard.

Going back to 2008, his only full season of MLB pitching, and there's good reason to suspect he was a little unlucky.  Although it's worth noting BABIP doesn't influence FIP, he did have an unusually high one for a hard-throwing reliever (3.17) and he was either unlucky or (if you like) bad at holding runners - a LOB (left-on-base) percentage of 57% is astoundingly low, which is likely why his ERA looked so bad.  Despite his solid K/BB ratio I alluded to earlier, he was a bit unlucky on homeruns - he gave up 1.25 dingers per 9 innings, but 12.5% of his flyballs went long, which is a tiny bit more than you might expect, especially for a groundball-inclined pitcher.  Looking at where his 10 dingers landed, most of them were pretty cheap shots (falling in the first 5-10 yards of the HR area) so with a bit more luck (and moving to a slightly more pitcher friendly park) he might suppress that a bit.

Boyer's reasonably high K totals, decent stuff (mid-90s FB, decent breaking ball) suggests that, with a bit of the Duncan magic, he can be a useful reliever for us if a) his struggles this year in his 3IP aren't due to any injury, mental implosion or other possible long-term trend and b) he's used responsibly in a Springer stylee and brought on to face mostly right-handed hitters.  He's a guy who's always had an "upside" tag and so probably represents a bit of a "low baseline, reasonably high upside" pickup than merely being a solid middle-reliever.  Best case, he becomes a second K-Mac, albeit one who can't really pitch very well to lefties.  Worst case, he's had his struggles at times at the major league level so could sink or potentially merely be a so-so middle reliever who can eat innings.  It's hard to see anything in his stats that mark him out as being better than, say, Josh Kinney, and he doesn't have the raw stuff of Perez or Motte, but, given our RP collywobbles lately, he might be a decent addition.  For the moment, minus Brad Thompson, we have the imperfect solution of Mitchell Boggs in the major league pen (he should be making starts in Memphis, ideally) so it could be that Boyer starts (either in AAA or StL) with the intention of having him cover some of the long-man innings, with the potential of him taking Kinney's projected 7th inning spot while Josh works things out in AAA.  Another right-handed arm in the pen can't hurt and, if used primarily against right-handed hitters, he looks like he *might* stick.

Overally, I think the Braves got the best player in this deal but there's a decent argument that we've dealt an average-ish OF (albeit one who fulfills an immediate organisational need - RHB who can lead-off) from a position of depth for someone who might be able to help us now or at least pretty soon in a position we suddenly look a little shallow at (RHP in the pen).  I reckon we might've been able to do better but, given the organisation's view of Barton, I dunno if I'd be too disappointed, except that one of my favourite fringe players has been dealt.  Let's wait and see what we get from Boyer before judging this trade too harshly.

In a related point - now that Barton's gone, Craig NEEDS to come up, probably for Freese.  He can be plugged into LF against LHP once Duncan stops hitting them, and he can play some 3B otherwise.  Barden and Thurston aren't going to keep knocking the cover off the ball indefinitely and Craig looks ready.

Well, it appears that our 25-man is all set for the season, with Joe Mather being the last name cut from the list today http://stlouis.cardinals.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20090402&content_id=4112094&vkey=news_stl&fext=.jsp&c_id=stl

So it would appear we're starting the season with a total of FIVE middle infielders, and pretty much no power on the bench.  Does anyone else think that perhaps Barden, Ryan, Thurston AND Schumaker is a little bit of overkill for the 2B spot?  In all honesty, I don't think it'll be too long before changes are made but I can't really see that this is a sensible move in any way.  The trio of Barden, Ryan and Thurston are likely to be seeing VERY limited action other than as pinch-hitters and (in one of Barden/Ryan's case) 2B when there's a LHP on the mound.

2008 stats:

Mather AAA OPS:    1.041 in 254 PA

Barden AAA OPS:    .770 in 456 PA

Ryan MLB/OPS:         .629 in 306 PA

Thurston AAA OPS:  .823 in 575 PA

Kind of hard to justify Mather starting 09 in AAA when you consider that the amount of defense THREE backup middle infielders are going to have to play (between each other) could quite easily be handled by two.  In case I haven't made myself particularly clear - this is an awful decision and I hate it. There is about as much reason for carrying Brian Barden and Brendan Ryan on an MLB roster as there would be, say, carrying Cesar Izturis and Brendan Ryan on the same MLB roster.

Redundancy, people....

Hey guys, long-time lurker, short time contributor, first fanpost... Go easy...

I note today that Will Ohman, he of the triumvirate of until-recently unsigned quality LHRP on the market (the others being Joe Beimel, who signed for the Nats for ~$2m, and Dennys Reyes, who we picked up for two years and $3m), has just signed on with the Dodgers.

At the time of the Reyes signing, I was broadly in favour of us adding another lefty (not 100% convinced with Miller as more than a decent LOOGY and the rest of the scrapheap guys, even my favourite hobbyhorse Ian Ostlund looked, to be blunt, awful), but I'd have liked to have seen Ohman as the target.  That said, the Reyes deal looked good - we'd picked up a solid, quality lefty with a good recent record for two years for what seemed considerably less than the ~$3m we thought might take to get Ohman.

However, Ohman's deal with the Dodgers is of the MINOR league flavour, and will be worth about $1.5m (what we're paying Reyes per year, but only on the hook for one year, and with nada owed if he breaks down injured and doesn't make the team) if Ohman makes the team and hits his incentives (which, realistically, is a foregone conclusion if he stays fit).

So, I'd like to compare the deals by taking a closer look at the players.

Ohman's 32 this year and has put up FIPs of 3.17, 3.87 and 3.9 the last three years (most recent first) in 160 IP (small-ish sample size). 

He averages a K per inning, but walks about 4 per 9 (although that dropped last year to a little over 3).  He's exclusively a fastball/slider pitcher with not especially overpowering stuff that works best against lefties but has been reasonable against righties.

Reyes is also 32 this year and has put up FIPs of 3.67, 4.60 and 2.87 the last three years (most recent first) in 120 IP.

He averages a little under a K per inning, and walks nearly 5 per 9 (although that was good last year at less than 3; seems he's a bit inconsistent and has put up some great years along with some where he's badly struggled with walks.  I'm hypothesising this might be to do with facing a larger number of RHB).  He too is a fastball/slider guy with so-so stuff but relies more on his deceptive slider than Ohman (throws it ~40% of the time).

So far it's hard to separate them; Ohman's trending in the right direction, and probably has a slight advantage in K/BB rate.  He's also pitched a few more innings and been more consistent, but to counter that, Reyes has played in a tougher league (although realistically a LOOGY in the NL is unlikely to ever pitch to another pitcher, which more or less negates that aspect).  Reyes also has the advantage in groundball creation - he's consistently posted >50% GB rates the last few years, touching the 60%s at times, whilst Ohman is more reliant on his outfield, only posting about 40% GB rates; this probably negates a bit of Ohman's advantage in Ks and BBs.  Given our ballpark and defensive alignment this year, I'm not sure if the GB/FB split is hugely relevant, however.

Now, a quick digression - my main reason for preferring Ohman over Reyes was that, even though both are decent pitchers, that Ohman is at least respectable against righties, as well as being a bit more durable.  If we signed him, we could use him more frequently in high-leverage situations (and perhaps move K-Mac to the rotation, giving us more depth) because you'd not be afraid of giving him the odd AB vs RHB.  But do the numbers bear that out?

For the last three years, the splits (purely in terms of OBP, or rather, how successful the two pitchers are at retiring opposition batters) are as follows; percentages in parentheses are the % of total ABs against RHB or LHB):

Ohman vs RHB:     387 ABs      (55%)      0.348 OBP

Ohman vs LHB:     315 ABs       (45%)     0.283 OBP

Reyes vs RHB:       242 ABs      (45%)      0.372 OBP

Reyes vs LHB:       279 ABs      (55%)      0.269 OBP

So there you have it.  Ohman's probably a bit more durable and has thrown to more ABs but has pitched about the same number of ABs/IP as Reyes (so, for example, Reyes isn't being heavily protected against certain hitters or pitching more one-out (LOOGY) games, although he IS being used more judiciously against LH matchups).  Ohman is a bit better against RHB than Reyes, so as you'd expect he's thrown to a few more of them than Reyes has.  This probably makes him marginally more usefull in bullpen matchups and in terms of "spreading the innings around" effectively as he's more flexible; you'd be more ready to throw him the ball with a LHB/RHB/RHB combination coming up and leave him in for the whole inning, for instance, putting less stress on your bullpen.  HOWEVER, Reyes is probably better than Ohman as a pure LOOGY.

All that said, these sample sizes are pretty small.  The difference in OBP for both pitchers is not that great - it probably demonstrates that Ohman is a bit more of a "left-handed reliever" and Reyes is a bit more of a "LOOGY" but perhaps it's barely significant.

So, in summary, I think I'd still have preferered Ohman, but it's hard to say we made a mistake picking up Dennys instead.  Both guys figure to be worth 0.5-1 win next year, making both contracts excellent value.  Ohman wins by a notch, given that his contract is a bit lower and for one less year, though you could argue that LA is a more attractive prospect for a lot of ballplayers than St Louis, so we might've had to offer a better deal than the one he ultimately signed for.  But, in the end, I'm pretty satisfied that Reyes was a good pickup.

Thoughts?