SB Nation User Blog: Gopherballs

Shane Costa and Ryan Shealy Eras Officially End

Gopherballs — Tue, 17 Nov 2009 17:35:31 -0000

MLB has released the list of six-year minor league free agents, which includes notable Royals Shane Costa, Ryan Shealy, and Chris Lubanski. Under the rules, a minor leaguer with six full years of credited service time in the minors can become a free agent if his organization does not place him on its 40-man major league roster. Neither Costa, Shealy, nor Lubanski were expected back, so this comes as no surprise. Costa is now free to fulfill his destiny as a backup outfielder for the Padres, while Shealy and Lubanski will be looking for jobs filling out AAA rosters.

CHONE Projections for 2010

Costa: 279/336/418, +1 batting runs above average

Shealy: 245/329/398, -2 batting runs above average

Lubanski: 243/309/379, -13 batting runs above average

The full list of now former Royals is after the break.

Pitchers: RHP Juan Abreu, RHP John Bannister, LHP Tim Hamulack, RHP Luke Hudson, LHP Michael O'Connor, RHP Chad Orvella, LHP Heath Phillips

Catchers: J.R. House, John Suomi, Vance Wilson

Infielders: Chase Fontaine, Ryan Shealy, Corey Smith

Outfielders: Cory Aldridge, Shane Costa, Chris Lubanski, Brian McFall, Tim Raines Jr.

Juan Abreu is a mild surprise as he has posted double digit K/9 rates throughout his career, but given that he also has posted a BB/9 rate near 6.0, the surprise is only mild.

The players can always re-sign with the Royals, so some of them may be back.

The Latest Word on Evaluating Catcher Defense, or Miguel Olivo's Defense Is As Bad As We Thought

Gopherballs — Wed, 14 Oct 2009 00:20:17 -0000

The Latest Word on Evaluating Catcher Defense, or Miguel Olivo's Defense Is As Bad As We Thought

Our own devil_fingers spent an inordinate amount of time creating his own methodology to evaluate catcher's defense based on throwing out runners, preventing wild pitches and passed balls, throwing errors, and catching errors. Not surprisingly, the three Royals backstops fared poorly: Pena was -2.9 runs in limited playing time, Buck was -4.8 runs in more playing time, and Olivo was 113th out of 114 at -8.8 runs (thanks Mike Napoli).

Further Evidence Baseball Prospectus Is As Out of Touch As A Mike Meyers Comedy

Gopherballs — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 23:10:59 -0000

From today's Christina Kahrl chat, following up on an answer in which she badmouths Ryan Sweeney:

vegasbill (Las Vegas): UZR and BPro defense stats both have Sweeney as a pretty great defender. Combined with his average offense he's a valuable player.

Christina Kahrl: Average for what, all major league hitters? Certainly not for right fielders; a .261 EqA from a corner outfielder isn't valuable, it's something you have to overcome to score enough runs to contend.

How did one of the main Baseball Prospectus writers completely miss the boat on valuing defense and positional adjustments?

Flooding the Market: 1B/DH-Types Abound

Gopherballs — Thu, 10 Sep 2009 18:28:28 -0000

One development last offseason was that many good hitting but defensively challenged players – or "1B/DH-types" – found a weak market for their services and had to take contracts well below what they would have received in previous years (Adam Dunn, Pat Burrell, Bobby Abreu, etc.). The Royals, however, were unable to take advantage, as they preemptively filled their one open 1B/DH spot by surrendering Leo Nunez to Florida instead of waiting for the Marlins to formally non-tender Mike Jacobs.

This offseason, potential free agent 1B/DH-types will again be plentiful. Here is the list according to Cots (which includes a few "OF" and "3B" whose defense or health are so bad that they really should only DH anymore):

Bobby Abreu
Hank Blalock
Russell Branyan
Carlos Delgado
Jason Giambi
Troy Glaus
Ross Gload
Ken Griffey Jr.
Vladimir Guerrero
Aubrey Huff
Nick Johnson
Adam LaRoche
Hideki Matusi
Robb Quinlan
Gary Sheffield
Matt Stairs
Mike Sweeney
Jim Thome
Chad Tracy

This list does not include other 1B/DH-types who potentially could be available in trade (Milton Bradley, Lyle Overbay, Pat Burrell) or as non-tenders (Casey Kotchman, Jack Cust, our own Mike Jacobs).

Even accounting for a few players such as Griffey, Stairs, or Sweeney who might retire voluntarily (or involuntarily like Mark Grudzielanek or Kenny Lofton), it quickly becomes apparent that there will be more of these players available than there will be full-time jobs available. As last year showed, this creates a situation where contracts can become downright reasonable.

This offseason may not play out exactly like last offseason with the hysteria over the economy downgraded to level yellow, but teams are still going to be cautious with big contracts. And it is also clear that more teams are properly evaluating defense, so teams as a whole are moving closer to paying defensive-challenged hitters to their actual worth.

The moral of the story is that while it may take more than $5 million to sign Bobby Abreu this offseason, a team should be able to sign a decent hitter to DH or play 1B without spending much money and without a long-term commitment. It is debatable whether the Royals should look to an add a 1B/DH-type (actually, it is several debates, including one about a certain Hawaiian prospect coming off a disappointing year, one about looking for free talent, and one about Jose Guillen – if he is not told to report to spring training in Alaska and promptly set adrift on an ice flow with a $12 million check, he enters the year as the presumptive DH). But if the Royals decide to seek out a 1B/DH-type, the key is patience.

So in other words, Dayton, please keep that 4 year/$50 million offer sheet to Aubrey Huff off your fax machine.

Free Talent Alert

Gopherballs — Thu, 27 Aug 2009 16:37:31 -0000

Free Talent Alert

With too many outfielders and a full 40-man roster, the Rockies have designated corner outfielder Matt Murton for assignment. While no future star, Matt Murton is a nice player who can hit for average, take a walk, avoid strikeouts, hit the ball in the gaps, and play an average to slighly above average corner outfield. A right-handed hitter, he has mashed LHP (career: 306/374/483, 857 OPS) while holding his own against RHP (career: 276/340/412, 752 OPS). Only 27, he is under club control for four more years (although he may qualify for arbitration next year as a Super 2). There is not a lot of upside, but with regular playing time, he could be a league average (~2.0 WAR) player -- maybe a little more with an age 27-29 peak bump -- for near the league minimum. At the very least, he would make a very good fourth outfielder, especially for a team with two left-handed hitters starting in the corners (like say David DeJesus and Mark Teahen). And yes, a right-handed (and cheaper) Mark Teahen is a fair comparison.

This would be a little move, but one that could push the Royals back in a positive direction at little cost.

Billy Butler is Average, or Fangraphs Steals Devil_Fingers' Material

Gopherballs — Wed, 12 Aug 2009 16:25:28 -0000

Billy Butler is Average, or Fangraphs Steals Devil_Fingers' Material

R.J. Anderson of Fangraphs and D-Rays Bay takes a quick look on players who have been essentially average this year. "Borrowing" the idea from somebody else "appropriately named Devil_Fingers," he lists a few average players, some surprising (Jason Bay? Really!), some not (Mark DeRosa), based on Wins Above Replacement (WAR). The Royals' own Billy Butler gets a shout out.

One player who missed the cut was Adam Dunn, who despite mashing the ball this year, is still below average because he plays awful, awful defense in both the outfield and at first base. If Dunn was a DH, however, he would actually be average to slightly above average.

More Thoughts on Davies

Gopherballs — Thu, 28 May 2009 16:42:19 -0000

Davies 2009 (through May 27 start):

4.94 FIP
6.33 K/9, 3.86 BB/9, 1.64 K/BB, 8.9% swinging strike rate
1.23 HR/9, 11.8% HR/FB
17.4% LD%, 44.4% GB%, 288 BABIP

The K/BB is almost exactly his 2008 1.65 K/BB, so he has added a few strikeouts at the expense of a proportional number of walks. A good sign is that his swinging strike rate is up almost a 1% from 8.0% in 2008. As expected, his HR/FB rose from an unsustainable 6.7% in 2008 to a tick above average in 2009. He has also turned about 5% of batted balls from line drives (21.6% LD% 2008) into groundballs (38.8% GB% 2008).

Going from a flyball pitcher to a neutral pitcher helps, but Davies needs to push his K/BB closer to 2.0 to become an effective middle of the rotation starter.

There also seems to be a commonality between the teams from last September and his first start this year when Davies was dominant -- he faced the Mariners, White Sox, Twins, and White Sox again -- all teams that generally employ an aggressive approach at the plate and like to swing at pitches out of the zone. On the other hand, he tends to have mixed results against teams with better patience and discipline.

Davies for now is an adequate back of the rotation starter who still has some work to do to become a middle of the rotation starter. He has the raw tools to work with, but it will not come automatically. If it does not happen, he probably could become a pretty decent reliever who could go multiple innings -- relievers usually add velocity and control is not as important. With Cortes battling his own control problems on a second tour of duty in AA, the Royals do not have any major league ready pitching prospects to push anyone out of the rotation. But the clock is still ticking on Davies, as he will already be in his second year of salary arbitration this offseason, when teams start having to pay starters real money. He has come a long ways from 2006 and 2007 when he was one of the worst starters in baseball, but the Royals will have a tough call in the not-so-distant future if Davies does not show more improvement.

When Is A Small Sample Size No Longer Small?

Gopherballs — Fri, 22 May 2009 15:37:15 -0000

When Is A Small Sample Size No Longer Small?

Eric Seidman at Fangraphs has a nice article summarizing research on when sample sizes become (somewhat) reliable for hitters. The research suggests that the following stats begin to stabilize with the corresponding number of plate appearances:

50 PA: Swing %
100 PA: Contact Rate
150 PA: Strikeout Rate, Line Drive Rate, Pitches/PA
200 PA: Walk Rate, Groundball Rate, GB/FB
250 PA: Flyball Rate
300 PA: Home Run Rate, HR/FB
500 PA: OBP, SLG, OPS, 1B Rate, Popup Rate
550 PA: ISO
Did not stabilize by 650 PA (the cutoff): BA, BABIP

The underlying work was done by a well respected analyst who goes by the handle Pizza Cutter at the Statistically Speaking blog. His research on pitchers is here.

Brayan Pena DFA'd

Gopherballs — Sat, 25 Apr 2009 22:09:34 -0000

Brayan Pena DFA'd

Or so says one of the totally legitimate rumor sites. Considering Pena historically has struggled against RHP and has a questionable defensive reputation, he might actually clear waivers.

This clears a spot for the return of Jose Guillen.

So What Are K/9, BB/9, and K/BB Anyway?

Gopherballs — Wed, 25 Mar 2009 16:42:05 -0000

Continuing with the series on explaining useful statistics as requested in the excellent For All the Dummies post, this entry looks at three key pitching statistics that both scouting and statistical analysts consider very important: strikeout rate (K/9), walk rate (BB/9), and strikeout-to-walk ratio (K/BB, or alternatively K:BB). Again, the purpose here is provide a brief introduction and (likely oversimplified) explanation of these stats, not to start any debates or provide any in-depth analysis.

So what are K/9, BB/9, and K/BB? K/9 is strikeouts per nine innings. The formula is simple and the same as ERA except using strikeouts instead of earned runs: K/IP x 9. Some analysts prefer to use strikeouts per game pitched (K/G) or strikeout percentage (K%), which provide slightly sharper accuracy as they are based on strikeouts per batters faced instead of innings pitched. But given the minor differences, K/9’s simpler formula, and its wider usage, this post will use K/9.

BB/9 is bases on balls (walks) per nine innings. The formula, as you can probably guess, is BB/IP x 9. As with strikeouts, BB/G and BB% are alternatives.

K/BB is simply the ratio between a pitcher’s strikeouts and walks. K/BB is the formula too (total strikeouts divided by total walks).

Why do K/9 and BB/9 matter? K/9 and BB/9 are what are known as rate stats (just like ERA, FIP, batting average, OBP, etc.). Rate stats are excellent for evaluating and comparing players because they neutralize playing time (the number of innings pitched varies widely from pitcher to pitcher) and focus on the player’s level of performance. Counting stats, like raw totals of strikeouts and walks, usually need some context to provide meaning.

For example, consider that in 2008, Brett Tomko (41 Ks) recorded one more strikeout than Robinson Tejeda (40 Ks). This gives an initial (and misleading) impression that Tomko and Tejeda were roughly equal at striking hitters out. But Tejeda (39.1 IP) pitched 20 fewer innings than Tomko (60.2 IP). Using the K/9 rate stat immediately conveys the superiority of Tejeda (9.38 K/9) over Tomko (5.93 K/9) in this aspect of the game. Because K/9 rate provides this immediate context, it is much better than just listing the raw number of innings pitched and strikeouts. And, frankly, most readers (maybe even without realizing it) will probably end up trying to do the math in their head to compare the number of strikeouts per inning.

The same goes for BB/9.

The other great thing about strikeout and walk rates is that based on evaluating years and years of data, strikeout and walk rates correlate very strongly from year-to-year and are two of the most repeatable skills in baseball. In other words, past strikeout and walk rates are very good indicators of future strikeout and walk rates.

So what are good K/9 and BB/9 rates? As a preliminary note, what is considered good and bad strikeout and walk rates will depend on whether the pitcher is a starter or a reliever. On average, starters have lower K/9 rates and BB/9 rates than relievers. One of the main reasons is that starters generally do not throw as hard as relievers because starters must pace themselves, while relievers usually can throw at maximum effort given that they will only face a handful of batters. Throwing with less velocity and force generally will decrease strikeouts but improve control, leading to fewer walks.

The major league averages for the last three seasons are:

2008

Overall: 6.8 K/9, 3.4 BB/9

Starters: 6.5 K/9, 3.1 BB/9

Relievers: 7.5 K/9, 3.9 BB/9

2007

Overall: 6.7 K/9, 3.3 BB/9

Starters: 6.3 K/9, 3.1 BB/9

Relievers: 7.4 K/9, 3.7 BB/9

2006

Overall: 6.6 K/9, 3.3 BB/9

Starters: 6.2 K/9, 3.1 BB/9

Relievers: 7.3 K/9, 3.7 BB/9

Thus, in general, the average pitcher should be expected to post rates around 6.7 K/9 and 3.3 BB/9, with the average starter closer to 6.3 K/9 and 3.1 BB/9 and the average reliever closer to 7.4 K/9 and 3.7 BB/9.

Among the Royals regulars last year, Greinke (8.14 K/9) and Meche (7.83) led the starters, while Tejeda (9.38) and Soria (8.82) led the relievers in strikeout rate. Davies (5.65), Bannister (5.57), and Hochevar (5.02) were all below average.

As for walk rate, Greinke (2.49 BB/9) and Bannister (2.86) led the full-time starters, swingman Tomko (1.93 BB/9) led the regulars overall, while Peralta (2.39) and Soria (2.54) led the relievers. Meche was average (3.12), and Hochevar (3.28) and Davies (3.42) were moderately below average.

What about K/BB? As the major league averages listed above suggest, the average is right around 2.0 K/BB. In other words, the average pitcher should post twice as many strikeouts as walks. K/BB is useful because it is a good indicator of a pitcher’s command. A low BB/9 rate may show that a pitcher can throw strikes, but a good K/BB shows that a pitcher can throw quality strikes.

While not conclusive, good pitchers tend to post K/BB above 2.0 while bad pitchers tend to post ratios below 2.0. Last year, Soria (3.47 K/BB) and Greinke (3.27) led the Royals, while Duckworth (1.05) and Gobble (1.17) were the worst among the regulars. Among the other starters, Meche was solid (2.51), Bannister was just about average (1.95), while Davies (1.65) and Hochevar (1.53) fell below average. In the majors overall, the four pitchers who posted K/BB rates above 5.0 were four of the best pitchers in baseball – Halladay (5.28), Haren (5.15), Beckett (5.06), and Lee (5.00), while the bottom four were generally lousy – Greg Smith (1.28), Barry Zito (1.18), Kenny Rogers (1.15), and Daniel Cabrera (1.06).

So all you really need to look at is K/BB, right? While K and BB rates are the most important components in evaluating pitchers, a pitcher can still struggle if his K/BB is above 2.0, but it usually takes a disaster involving batted balls (allowing lots of home runs or line drives) to do so. For example, last year, Tomko (3.08 K/BB), Farnsworth (2.77 K/BB), and Peralta (2.71 K/BB) all posted good K/BB ratios, but struggled because they posted horrendous home run rates – Tomko (1.63 HR/9), Farnsworth (2.24 HR/9), Peralta (2.56 K/9). Home run rates are a topic for another day, but for context, an average home run rate is somewhere around 1.0 to 1.1 HR/9, and among AL pitchers with 50+ IP, Peralta finished dead last, Farnsworth was second to last, and Tomko was fifth to last.

On the flip side, a pitcher can still contribute with a poor K/BB if he can, among other things, limit home runs – despite below average K/BB rates, Davies (0.80 HR/9) and Hochevar (0.84 HR/9) both posted decent home run rates last year (although Hochevar is more likely to repeat that result than Davies for reasons that will become apparent when home run per fly ball rate is discussed).

In summary, the advantages provided by high strikeout or low walk rates should be obvious. Last year, Greinke had one of the best strikeout rates (8.14 K/9) among AL starters – 21.5% of all batters that Greinke faced made an out before even putting the ball in play – which is approximately 5% better than the average starter. In contrast, Horacio Ramirez (3.13 K/9) struck out only 8.5% of the batters he faced, one of the worst rates in all of baseball. Forcing an out without giving the hitter an opportunity to get a hit or even advance runners with an out is the best possible outcome for pitchers, as it essentially eliminates any chance of the other team scoring as a result of that at-bat.

Again, the same goes for BB/9 – the fewer walks surrendered, the fewer base runners, and the fewer opportunities to allow runs.