SB Nation User Blog: Jabberwocky

The State of the Rockies (Post GM Meetings Edition)

Jabberwocky — Fri, 11 Dec 2009 17:22:10 -0000

More photos » by Mark J. Terrill - AP

Chris Iannetta got his. Will Clint Barmes be next?

Well, the 2009 Winter Meetings could have gone two ways for the Rockies. One, Dan O'Dowd could have dangled Brad Hawpe, the Rockies could have made overtures to well...anyone of significance. This was unlikely, and did not come to pass. Instead, Rafael Betancourt did the smart thing and accepted arbitration from the Rockies while Jason Marquis made an equally good business decision and declined. The Rockies didn't select anyone in the Rule 5 draft, nor did they have anyone selected. Pretty ho hum to be sure.

However, some significant events did take place regarding the Rockies during the Winter Meetings, giving fans an even clearer picture of the way the roster will shake out. Betancourt's acceptance of arbitration was obviously the most significant, as the Rockies were prepared to bring back LaTroy Hawkins for two years, $7.5 million--a move that for some reason screamed Luiz Vizcaino 2.0 to me--if he had declined. So I'm glad that the Rockies will have an accomplished 8th inning man next year so long as they can fit it into their budget.

As I've said before, if there's a year to spend a little for an extra marginal win or two, it's this one. The NL West crown has never seemed more up for grabs for the Rockies than it appears this year, especially with the Dodgers shuffling through a bizarre offseason, the Giants yet to secure a big bat, and the Padres nickeling and diming their roster. Meanwhile, it was the Diamondbacks who were the big movers of the NL West at the GM meetings in trading away high-upside Max Scherzer and Daniel Schlereth to Detroit as part of a three team deal that netted them All-Star pitcher Edwin Jackson as well as Yankees pitcher Ian Kennedy to solidify their rotation for at least 2010. Should Brandon Webb come back strong from surgery, that is one scary rotation developing in Arizona for 2010--and a reason why they will be overrated by about 10 wins in preseason predictions by pundits everywhere. At least, that's my prediction--the Diamondbacks coming in at around 78 wins next year because I'm not sold on their hitting nor their health.

In any case, the Rockies made a move over the winter meetings in locking up Chris Iannetta through his arbitration years (three years, $8.3 million) plus a cheap club option ($5 million) for his first year of free agency. Rob Neyer applauded the move and I agree with him. Love him or like him, this is a solid move for the Rockies, and here's why...

The Rockies are paying Iannetta roughly market value for a player of his stature...if he repeats his 2009 season for four more years. Many people, myself included, seem to believe that Iannetta will perform a bit better than that. Fangraphs' Matt Klaassen projects Iannetta for 2.5 WAR in 2010 (assuming only 100 games played) and explains that he's being paid to be a 1.5 win player this year when you adjust for the fact that the contract is buying out his first arbitration year and not a free agency year. The fans on FanGraphs who have projected Iannetta seem to believe that he will be a 4 WAR player in 2010--which is a little optimistic for me (I see him in the 2.5-3 WAR range next year given adequate playing time), but Iannetta is entering his baseball prime and I wouldn't rule the upper range out.

In return for the security of having a guaranteed paycheck for the next three years (something the soon to be non-tendered Garrett Atkins might be wishing for right now), Iannetta has given up potentially larger arbitration salaries over the next few years--and if he plays as well as Klaassen and myself have predicted he will, CDI will ultimately be a large bargain (to the tune of $30-40 million in net value) for the Rockies over the life of his contract.

The Rockies are busy negotiating multi-year deals with Huston Street and Clint Barmes, but it is unlikely that either of those deals, if signed, will be as team friendly or have a comparable net value (especially in Street's case due to his 3 year, $30 million demands).

The Torrealba Situation

In his Iannetta article, Klaassen bemoaned the handing out of multi-year contracts to aging, marginal at best catchers like Ivan Rodriguez and Jason Kendall. While Yorvit Torrealba is only 31 and has definitely shown that his bat has some life last year, he's far closer to those catchers in value added than he is to Iannetta. Meanwhile, he has seen that Rodriguez got 2 years, $6 million and wants the Rockies to match this number. The Rockies have countered with $5.6 million. Either contract will give Torrealba way more money than he's worth in tangible on the field value. At most he's worth $4 million over two years. At most. Any more is, quite frankly, ludicrous. Just because the market for aging backup catchers who can't hit or field particularly well but can "handle a pitching staff well" has gone crazy doesn't mean that the Rockies need to succumb to it. In all honesty Torrealba should be happy that he has garnered as much interest in his modest skill set as he has.

Look, it's no secret that I'm neither a fan of Torrealba as a player nor am I convinced of the importance (or tangible benefit) of the attributes for which he is valued. So take my advice how you will. But the only way that makes sense to me is to evaluate a player based largely on his quantifiable production (I'm not advocating that this is the correct way to do so, just that it is the way that I do it), and the numbers that I value rate Torrealba at a very low level. He has been an important part of the Rockies' Rocktober runs as an emotional leader and as someone who has produced well in high leverage situations, and for that I thank him sincerely. However, it's just time for both parties to move on.

Free Agency Update

For the Rockies, moving on from Torrealba could land Miguel Olivo, formerly of the Royals, in their laps for a similar 2 year deal. Olivo, who is four days older than Torrealba, is famously lacking in patience (BB rate of 4.6% in 2009) but he does have some pop in his bat (23 HRs) and he did produce 2.2 WAR for the woeful Royals last year. You could call him a Chris Iannetta without patience. Looking at his career numbers, Olivo's 2009 stands out as a clear career year at the plate, so he could be due for some regression that could be mitigated somewhat by moving to the NL and a hitter-friendly park. If he can be had for 2 years, $4-5 million, the Rockies could certainly do worse than Olivo as a back-up.

As for other previous targets, the Winter Meetings saw prospective utilitymen Pedro Feliz and Bobby Crosby got snapped up. Orlando Hudson remains a possibility, albeit one that would only be consummated very late in the offseason at a discounted price. Meanwhile, the Rockies appear to have shied away from several other potential players to fill the Garrett Atkins role. However, there are a few that I haven't gone over yet that have been linked to the Rockies:

Fernando Tatis: The utilityman will be 35 on Opening Day, has been bumming around the majors since 1997 for five teams but has accrued only 7.105 years of service time, a testament to his journeyman status. However, in 2009 Tatis was quite good in part time status, producing 1.5 WAR in 340 PAs with positive value in both hitting and fielding. He can probably be had cheaply (around $2.25 million), can provide depth at several positions, and has demonstrated his ability as a pinch hitter (as Franklin Morales can attest). I'm putting him at the top of my revised wish list.

Melvin Mora: The 37 year old Mora has been at least a league average player as recently as 2008 (and much better than that in the recent past), but does he have anything left in the tank and would he accept a part-time slot? That and his likely $4-5 million asking price is enough to scare me away.

Rob Quinlan: Quinlan is a 32 year old AAAA player who has spent parts of the last seven years with the Angels as a reserve corner infielder. At this point it's clear to me that he's pretty much a replacement player and I wouldn't advocate signing him to a major league deal.

The Rockies have talked with Jose Contreras about him returning, though the Rockies want to pay him as a reliever while Contreras wants starter money. Quite frankly, he should be paid as a starter given his FIP (4.11) last year. Colorado has also approached Jason Giambi about returning to fill Atkins' spot, though he is searching for a DH job that will give him more PAs next year. If Giambi does become available, having his bat on the bench definitely provides the Rockies with an intimidating edge for opposing managers to worry about.

Roster and Payroll 2010 Update

There has been some discussion by some that I've projected Betancourt's arbitration award too high at $6.4 million, and they do certainly have a point. Betancourt does not measure up well in saves, the traditional reliever stat valued highly by arbitrators, and the Darren Oliver case that I've cited in projecting Betancourt's salary does seem like an outlier. In any case, when I was projecting Betancourt's salary (indeed, any salary in this projection) I have been erring on the high side, being conservative on the amount of money the Rockies have to spend.

For this projection, I'm going to switch gears a little bit and reduce Betancourt's salary to that of his $5 million option that the Rockies declined. Plus, I'm adding Iannetta's salary (represented as $2 million, which is what I've heard) into the players under contract category. Outside of the Rockies selling the rights of OF Matt Murton to Japan's Hanshin Tigers, the Rockies made no 40 man roster moves at the Winter Meetings--and since Murton wasn't projected to be on the 25 man roster not much has changed on that front (though the Rockies do now have three open 40 man roster slots).

Players Under Contract (Torrealba and Embree are team option buyouts)

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary	Add. Min. Obligation	Years After 2010
Todd Helton	12.059	$16,600,000	$23,700,000	1
Aaron Cook	7.02	$9,833,000	$10,583,000	1
Brad Hawpe	5.058	$7,500,000	$500,000	0
Jeff Francis	5.04	$5,875,000	$0	0
Troy Tulowitzki	3.033	$3,500,000	$25,750,000	3
Manuel Corpas	3.076	$2,750,000	$3,750,000	1
Ubaldo Jimenez	2.087	$1,250,000	$8,000,000	2
Yorvit Torrealba	8.03	$500,000	$0	0
Alan Embree	15.059	$250,000	$0	0
Matt Belisle	4.02	$850,000	$0	0
Randy Flores	5.061	$650,000	$0	0
Chris Iannetta	3.029	$2,000,000	$6,300,000	2

Total		$51,558,000	$78,583,000

Pre-Arbitration Players: While I'm still projecting Phillips as the back-up catcher for now, I'm not holding my breath on that one and am expecting an expenditure of roughly $2.7 million in 2010 on the back-up catcher's roster spot.

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary
Eric Young Jr.	0.042	$412,000
Dexter Fowler	1.027	$413,030
Franklin Morales	2.01	$414,060
Ian Stewart	1.154	$416,120
Carlos Gonzalez	1.06	$415,090
Seth Smith	1.119	$415,090
Matt Daley	0.155	$412,000
Paul Phillips	2.06	$427,450

Total		$3,324,840

Arbitration Players: With the subtraction of Iannetta from the ranks of the arbitration eligible, the Rockies now have seven potential arbitration cases this winter counting Betancourt.

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary	Difference from 2009
Huston Street	5	$8,775,000	95.00%
Jorge De La Rosa	5.015	$5,600,000	180.00%
Clint Barmes	4.122	$4,225,000	160.00%
Taylor Buchholz	3.14	$1,055,000	0.00%
Jason Hammel	2.153	$2,026,560	380.00%
Rafael Betancourt	6.079	$5,000,000	50%
Ryan Spilborghs	3.072	$788,500	90.00%

Total		$27,470,060	136.29%

Grand Total Payroll: $82,352,900

Remember, this roster has only 24 players on it (with Buchholz starting the year on the DL)--it still requires a replacement for Garrett Atkins. In other words, it will likely end up around $84.5 million--by far the highest in Rockies history. The increase from last week's projection is due to the fact that Iannetta's salary increased by larger than the 350% I had projected (actually it is a 482% raise from 2009).

Well, that's it until next time (TBD). I'd love to hear any and all thoughts, Rowbots--just please try to keep it civil.

Poll

Who would you rather have as the backup catcher for the Rockies in 2010?

The State of the Rockies: Pre-Winter Meetings Edition

Jabberwocky — Sat, 05 Dec 2009 19:14:03 -0000

Yes, Rockies fans, it's that time that you've all been waiting for: Hot Stove Season. Now that arbitration offers have been made from clubs to some of their free agents, it's time for the free agency period to begin in earnest--or at least it will when those who have been offered arbitration decide to accept or decline it (the deadline for that is December 7th). Then at the Winter Meetings in Indianapolis (the 7th through the 10th) GMs will have a pretty good idea of where the free agent market stands and what their teams' needs are.

Given the way the chips have fallen so far, it's looking increasingly like the Rockies won't make any moves of great consequence at the Meetings, though the possibility of a big trade looms insidiously just under the surface as the Rockies look to shape their roster and payroll for the 2010 season.

In this belated edition of Purple Row Academy I will do my best to break down how the upcoming Winter Meetings and the Rule 5 draft will affect the Rockies. In addition, I'll offer up some analysis on the Rockies' arbitration offers to Jason Marquis and Rafael Betancourt plus a look at some free agents the Rockies have targeted (an expanded target list for the Rockies from the last edition).

Winter Meetings

Running from next Monday through Thursday, the Winter Meetings are a hot stove afficionado's dream--where trade buzz runs fast and furious while agents make their best pitch to GMs about their clients. A lot of deals will get talked about, but likely very few will be consummated.

As you'll see below, the Rockies don't really have a lot of flexibility with either roster slots or payroll, so they will likely be on the reactive, listening side of the trade proposals and free agent players rather than being proactive about it. One eventuality that could and should be pursued by Dan O'Dowd is the potential trade of Brad Hawpe.

O'Dowd has downplayed the possibility of such a move, but that's what he needs to be saying at this juncture to maintain the strength of Hawpe's trade market. Were he on the open market, Hawpe would probably be graded as a high second-tier corner outfielder/DH option, a man that would command higher than a $7.5 million salary for 2010.

I've written about it in detail before, but Hawpe is the rare trade asset whose value to another team (particularly in the AL) is MUCH greater than it is to the outfielder-rich, lefty-saturated Rockies PLUS the opportunity cost (giving Smith/Fowler/Gonzalez more plate appearances and $7.5 million of payroll flexibility) happens to be a better alternative than simply keeping Hawpe.

While the Rockies are looking to contend in 2010 and therefore might be more likely to have a more aggressive outlook on short-term payroll, this move would likely pay off now and in the future for Colorado--even if all the Rockies receive in return are prospects (though I believe the return would include a MLB-ready young back-end starter). After all, the Rockies have Matt Murton in reserve or they could use Eric Young Jr. in the outfield.

Beyond a potential Hawpe deal though, I don't see the Rockies making too many waves next week.

Rule 5 Draft

That includes the Rule 5 draft, to be held next Tuesday the 8th. Teams can select players from other MLB organizations' minor league systems that have not been protected on the 40 man roster. For a $50,000 fee, if a team selects a player he becomes their asset, so long as he remains on that team's 25 man roster or DL all year, after which time the player may be sent down.

Looking over the players that are eligible for the draft, the only one that is of interest to me is one pointed out by Keith Law, Angels prospect Bobby Cassevah. He has average fastball velocity but has extreme groundball tendencies (70%), an ability that is valuable at Coors Field--particularly out of the bullpen. I don't see it happening though, because while the Rockies have two spots open on their 40 man roster currently, I don't foresee a 25 man roster spot being open.

As for whom the Rockies could lose, OF Cole Garner and RHP Craig Baker have been mentioned as possibilities. That's the downside of having a deep system like the Rockies do--they lose prospects to the Rule 5 Draft (David Patton and Everth Cabrera last year) because they have too many to protect.

Arbitration Offers

One offer I like and one I'm not such a big fan of but can live with--about par for the course, I guess.

Jason Marquis

Given the high demand and low supply of even second-tier starting pitching, there is a very low chance that Jason Marquis will accept arbitration from the Rockies--pencil me down for 3 years, $25-30 million from the Mets (pencil them into the playoffs the next three years).

Marquis could decide to remain a Rockie, and in doing so garner a 2010 salary of $10-11 million or so, but my guess is that he'll take the security of a longer contract with a similar amount of guaranteed money per year. It's a good time to be a free agent for Marquis, despite the economic situation--teams want solid starting pitching and supply is very low. Accepting arbitration and risking a down year would not only hurt Marquis' bargaining power next year, but also there's a stronger pitching free agent class in 2010 (headlined by Roy Halladay, Josh Beckett, Cliff Lee, and Brandon Webb), so getting a long-term deal just makes good business sense for Marquis.

Rafael Betancourt

It's a different market and different situation for Betancourt. For one thing, he's older (35 on Opening Day) and he's a right-handed reliever, a market with considerably more supply and less demand.

There's no denying that Betancourt was a great performer that solidified the back end of the Rockies' bullpen in 2009. However, it's highly unlikely that there is a team out there that is willing to surrender a high draft choice and give Betancourt a multi-year deal--or one that at least would pay him what he would get in arbitration from the Rockies (around $6 million is what I've estimated).

At this point it would likely be a poor business decision for Betancourt to do anything but accept arbitration with the Rockies due to his Type A status and age. The Rockies want Betancourt back, but they have a Plan B in LaTroy Hawkins should Betancourt refuse arbitration.

As others in this community have opined, this offer of arbitration hedges the Rockies' risk with Betancourt. For some, the worst situation that could happen for Colorado was that Betancourt would walk and the Rockies would get nothing out of the deal. With the arbitration offer, that won't be the case--heck, Betancourt could reject arbitration, test the open market, and then sign with the Rockies for a lower cost. I don't see this happening though--I fully expect Betancourt to do the smart thing and accept arbitration.

Personally, I'm not sure that getting Betancourt back for anything over $3 million is such a great deal for the Rockies, but then again, I happen to value relief pitching at a lower level (and am extremely wary of its variability) than most people. However, if there's any year for the Rockies to pay a little extra for a few more marginal wins, it's this year. The Rockies are in contention now and should be encouraged to take steps to ensure at least a 90 win season.

Roster and Payroll 2010 Update

Projecting Betancourt at receiving a $6.4 million award (as I've outlined here) in arbitration, this is how the Rockies' 2010 roster and payroll currently looks:

Players Under Contract (Torrealba and Embree are team option buyouts)

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary	Add. Min. Obligation	Years After 2010
Todd Helton	12.059	$16,600,000	$23,700,000	1
Aaron Cook	7.02	$9,833,000	$10,583,000	1
Brad Hawpe	5.058	$7,500,000	$500,000	0
Jeff Francis	5.04	$5,875,000	$0	0
Troy Tulowitzki	3.033	$3,500,000	$25,750,000	3
Manuel Corpas	3.076	$2,750,000	$3,750,000	1
Ubaldo Jimenez	2.087	$1,250,000	$8,000,000	2
Yorvit Torrealba	8.03	$500,000	$0	0
Alan Embree	15.059	$250,000	$0	0
Matt Belisle	4.02	$850,000	$0	0
Randy Flores	5.061	$650,000	$0	0

Total		$49,558,000	$72,283,000

Pre-Arbitration Players (Phillips projected as back-up catcher)

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary
Eric Young Jr.	0.042	$412,000
Dexter Fowler	1.027	$413,030
Franklin Morales	2.01	$414,060
Paul Phillips	2.06	$427,450
Ian Stewart	1.154	$416,120
Carlos Gonzalez	1.06	$415,090
Seth Smith	1.119	$415,090
Matt Daley	0.155	$412,000

Total		$3,324,840

Arbitration Players (assumes Atkins non-tendered, Murton not on roster)

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary	Difference from 2009
Huston Street	5	$8,775,000	95.00%
Jorge De La Rosa	5.015	$5,600,000	180.00%
Clint Barmes	4.122	$4,225,000	160.00%
Taylor Buchholz	3.14	$1,055,000	0.00%
Jason Hammel	2.153	$2,026,560	380.00%
Chris Iannetta	3.029	$1,867,500	350.00%
Rafael Betancourt	6.079	$6,405,000	83%
Ryan Spilborghs	3.072	$788,500	90.00%

Total		$30,742,560	167.25%

Grand Total Payroll: $83,625,400

The 2010 payroll including Betancourt would be the largest Rockies ODP ever (up over $8 million from last year), and it isn't complete. This roster has 24 players on it (because Buchholz will begin the season on the DL, plus Torrealba and Embree will not actually be on the team) and the open slot is for a utility infielder to replace Garrett Atkins.

Now I don't believe that it's quite this simple--I think that Torrealba, McKenry, or another option could supplant Phillips at backup catcher while a player like Corpas, Daley, or EY2 could be sent down to AAA to begin the season--but barring a trade there is only one definite opening on the 2010 Rockies that will be filled on the free agent market. For that reason, I'll be concentrating on players that fit the utility infielder mold or that have been prominently mentioned as free agent targets recently.

Free Agency Update

In the last edition I provided a list of potential free agent targets for the Rockies and all of them remain available at the moment (though Jose Contreras is looking like he's headed to Japan). In particular, Jamey Carroll has drawn a lot of interest, while Pedro Feliz has found himself jobless due to Placido Polanco signing in Philly.

While Feliz would be my ideal target to fill the Rockies' utility infielder void, let's look at the free agency targets (those that plied their trade for others last year) that the Rockies have expressed interest in (pitching and hitting) from most interesting in my estimation to least:

Justin Duchscherer: The Duke represents a possible market inefficiency that the Rockies could exploit to bolster their starting pitching depth. Twice an All-Star for the Oakland A's, Duchscherer's last couple of years have been derailed due to injury (hip and elbow) and depression. However, the 32 year old righty has shown himself to be an above-average starter and reliever--and he would likely be in search of a cheaper one year deal to build up his market value. Plus, he was once traded for Luis Vizcaino (and his second best career comparison per Baseball Reference is Betancourt). Colorado could be the perfect landing spot for him at a price around $2-3 million (with incentives for more).

Orlando Hudson: O'Dowd has downplayed the Rockies' interest in Hudson, but the possibility of Hudson in the lineup every day with Barmes as a super-utility player is nonetheless intriguing. Since the Dodgers declined to offer the 32 year old Hudson arbitration, signing him costs no draft picks. I'd bet on Hudson commanding a salary around $5 million per year for anywhere from 1-3 years. Hudson has been at least league average (2 WAR or greater) every year since 2004, so this price would likely be a bargain. This is the sort of move that a Hawpe trade could enable with increased payroll flexibility, but as it is I don't see it happening because the Rockies really are attached to Barmes at second.

Bobby Crosby: To be honest, given the Rockies' lack of roster and payroll flexibility, I would much rather sign Crosby than Hudson to fill the one remaining roster slot. The 2004 AL ROY has the versatility and right-handedness to fit the Rockies' super-utility role to a T. He would come fairly cheaply considering all the hats he'd be wearing (I'd estimate in the $2-3 million range) due to the fact that he has played poorly (an understatement really) since his 2004 campaign. While his career .302 wOBA is worrisome, Crosby has positive fielding value and will be moving from a tough AL hitter's park to a permissive NL run-scoring environment--and at worst he would be a cheaper version of Garrett Atkins circa 2009. The Rockies could certainly do worse for a utilityman.

LaTroy Hawkins: Hawkins would be Betancourt's replacement, pure and simple. The 37 year old will probably perform worse than Betancourt but will also get paid less (around $3.5 million) to do it. I'd rather Betancourt just accept arbitration than to have Hawkins back, honestly--I have this vision of Hawkins as being Alan Embree 2.0 next year for whatever reason.

Noah Lowry: The 29 year old former Giant lefty has been sidelined by injuries the last two seasons, making him a huge enigma and a gamble for any team that is interested. If the Rockies can get him on a minor league deal that would be ideal, but if signing him required a major league deal it probably would be too rich for the Rockies' budget.

By next week, after the Winter Meetings, we should have a much better idea of where the Rockies stand in free agency and trades, plus a much firmer handle on how the 2010 Rockies roster will look.

The State of the Rockies: A Sane Free Agency Preview

Jabberwocky — Thu, 19 Nov 2009 22:44:25 -0000

Ladies and Gentlemen, the siren of the MLB free agency period once again beckons, luring unsuspecting baseball fans into wrecking their ships against the sharp jagged rocks--in this case dreams of big-ticket free agents for even the smallest markets, ill-conceived trade schemes, and long soliloquies about why the owner/GM/beat writer is a complete and utter moron. This column, my dear friends, is the beeswax to put in your ears to defend you from those beautiful seductresses (and their horrible ideas) as you look forward to the 2010 Rockies.

Yes, that's right. A few minutes ago, the floodgates officially opened for major league free agency. In addition, all MLB teams are required to set their 40 man rosters in advance of the December 8th Rule 5 draft. I've written about all three subjects in Purple Row Academy before, so for those of you who are curious about how those processes are carried out, check out these primers:

Free Agency (the dates listed therein are from last offseason)

40 Man Roster

Rule 5 Draft

All three of these articles have supporting links that clarify the issues even further.

In this installment of the State of the Rockies, I opine about the puzzling Garrett Atkins decision, revisit Rafael Betancourt's situation, examine the Rockies' current 40 man roster status, and look some free agent targets that I'd like the Rockies to consider (plus, how they would fit into the budget that I've outlined over the last two weeks).

Join me after the jump if you value your sanity.

Why didn't the Rockies non-tender Garrett Atkins before the 40 man roster had to be set?

Good question. There's one main reason for doing this, and that's to extend the window of time that the Rockies have to trade the underperforming third baseman for another few weeks--until the December 12th deadline for tendering contracts for players under team control. Unfortunately for Colorado and Dan O'Dowd, the chances of such a deal being consummated reside squarely between slim and none.

It's not that Atkins isn't drawing interest from other teams. Just three years ago he was a player worth 6.4 WAR, he can play both corner infield positions somewhat passably, and he is theoretically in his prime (he'll turn 30 on the date that the Rockies will probably non-tender him). The problem is, Atkins' value as a trade asset to the Rockies is basically nil. Because by rule Atkins' salary next year unless he is a free agent can be no less than 80% of last year's total ($7.05 million), teams that would trade for Garrett would at a minimum be paying $5.64 million for a player that was flat out awful in 2009. The point is that I can't fathom another team trading the Rockies anything (and I mean anything) for him when he'd come much more cheaply once he's been non-tendered.

However, since the Rockies have seven slots open on the 40 man roster as of today (more on that later), it appears that Colorado has enough room to protect the prospects they want from the Rule 5 draft without removing Atkins from it. I'm hoping against hope that O'Dowd can finagle a deal for Atkins, but let's just say that I'm not holding my breath.

What's up with Rafael Betancourt?

From the poll results of last week's column, it appears that the vast majority of you want Betancourt back next year, preferably on a multi-year deal with less of a hit on a per-annum basis. Since the Rockies did decline his option, which was the right call in my opinion, they face a further decision with the soon to be 35 year old reliever--whether to offer him salary arbitration or not by the December 8th deadline.

It is my opinion that if he were offered arbitration, Betancourt would be crazy not to accept it. His status as a Type A free agent severely pollutes his value on the free agent market, chasing away a number of potentially interested teams that don't want to give the Rockies their first round pick for a solid set-up man. Considering Betancourt's age and the relatively high volatility of relief pitching performance, the risk for another team is particularly acute. I believe that as a result Betancourt would be very fortunate indeed to receive an offer that approaches what he would get in arbitration.

And what would that be? Let's look at some precedent--a tale of two relievers, if you will.

Last year two veteran relief pitchers (Darren Oliver and David Weathers) accepted arbitration from their clubs. Oliver was a Type A free agent while Weathers was a former closer who had once been perceived as being productive. Oliver was coming off of a 1.0 WAR season in which he was very effective, while Weathers had produced 0.2 WAR.

Oliver, who was going to be 38 in 2009, got his salary increased through arbitration from $2 million to $3.665 million, while Weathers, who was going to be 39, went up from $3.3 to $3.5 million. Those are 83.3% and 6% raises respectively, as would befit their recent performance levels. In 2009, Oliver continued to defy science and produced an even better, 1.5 WAR year at age 38, while Weathers was DFA'd and ended up with -0.8 WAR--while being paid $3.5 million. That's the risk inherent with offering arbitration--some decisions pan out and some fail.

Given that Betancourt is likely better than both of the pitchers above and a little younger (35 compared to 38-39), he’ll get a slightly higher raise, closer to Oliver's 83% raise and maybe larger. In 2009 Betacourt was making $3.5 million—which means that I’m estimating an increase of 2.9 million (or 83%) to $6.4 million—in other words, more than the option the Rockies just declined should he accept arbitration. Who knows though…arbitrators work in mysterious ways.

The draft picks should Betancourt not accept arbitration and sign with another team would be worth about $5 million, so the Rockies are gambling that they can either re-sign Betancourt for a lower price tag or that another team would be willing to offer him a crazy contract despite his free agency status. If it works, O'Dowd is a genius--but I just have serious doubts that everything will work out. Bottom line though, the worst case scenario is that the Rockies pay Betancourt well over $6 million next year--which is pretty palatable as far as worst case scenarios go.

Who is worth protecting from the Rule 5 draft?

As I mentioned above, the Rockies have only 33 spots filled on their 40 man roster, meaning that they technically have room to protect up to seven prospects from the Rule 5 draft. Of course, that's not really realistic. As I've outlined previously, the Rockies have holes on the major league roster that need to be filled--namely replacements for their ten free agents and Atkins--so in effect they can protect only a few players.

Hat tip to WolfMarauder on this, but going strictly by the Purple Row PuRP list, the Rockies have four prospects that would need to be protected from the draft: Michael McKenry (C), Cole Garner (OF), Chaz Roe (RHP), and Edgmer Escalona (RHP)--plus Alberto Alberquerque (RHP), who the Rockies received in exchange for Jeff Baker.

Now admittedly the minor league system isn't my area of expertise, but if I were to hazard a guess, the Rockies will likely protect McKenry, Garner, and Roe--leaving both Escalona and Alberquerque (among other lesser prospects) eligible for the draft. They simply won't be able to protect more than that--not if the Rockies plan to field a complete roster come Opening Day 2010. We'll see soon enough.

Who should the Rockies be looking at in free agency?

Given that, by my calculations, the Rockies currently have 23 players under contract for next year (22 if you allow that Buchholz will start on the DL), they will need to fill those holes. This might be through re-signing free agents such as Yorvit Torrealba at back-up catcher, Rafael Betancourt as a set-up man, and Joe Beimel as a lefty out of the pen. Or they could go by the cheap youth method, promoting McKenry to the big leagues come Opening Day while using Deduno and Chacin in the bullpen. Or they could make a foray into the free agent market. Finally, the Rockies could explore the trade market both as a buyer and a seller. To that end, Baseball Prospectus has a few tips for those interested in making up interesting trade rumors.

My prediction is that the Rockies will explore a little of each, signing at least one of their free agents (my guess is that they do get Betancourt back one way or another) and maybe two (Torrealba seems somewhat likely as well), while should Torrealba fall through McKenry seems to be the most cost-effective candidate. I think that the Rockies are likely to trade one of their outfielders (and I've recommended Hawpe many many times), maybe two--and O'Dowd could perform a miracle and trade Atkins. Either way, I think the Rockies will be looking for one of two things in free agency: a back-up corner infielder/veteran and a relief pitcher, preferably a lefty.

Given this and the fact that the Rockies' budget is undeniably tight, here are a few players that I would recommend at least kicking the tires on that are within the Rockies price range. By no means is this list exhaustive, but these players would fill a need for Colorado.

Free Agency Targets

Pedro Feliz: Yes, he's a pretty bad hitter and yes, he's old, but Feliz fields his position very well (he could likely play first base at a high level too) and has shown at least some power--two important characteristics for a NL bench player. He's sufficiently veteranny (he'll be 34 years old), he's right-handed, and would likely cost around $3-5 million to sign. Ultimately, he's injury insurance that gives the Rockies a lot of flexibility in later innings. Obviously, Feliz will be looking for a starting situation before he would choose to come to the Rockies, which is a big stumbling block.

Jamey Carroll: He has already been awesome for the Rockies before (3.1 WAR in 2006), plus he can play almost anywhere on the diamond (and do it well). The fans and players love him already, and he's willing to come off the bench. The problem is that the competition for the utilityman will be fierce this offseason, and he might be snapped up for close to $3 million.

Felipe Lopez: He represents an upgrade at second base, plus he has defensive versatility. His excellent year last year could price him out of Colorado's range, though in my opinion he is being severely undervalued by many. This is a pipe dream that RMN and I share.

Juan Uribe: He's another former Rockie, one who has excelled in this type of role already on the Giants. Unfortunately for Colorado, he may have performed too well for the Giants, who really want him back. My prediction is that San Francisco gets their man.

Joe Crede: He's great with the leather and serviceable with the bat. The problem is that he's looking for a starting job and he's had three back surgeries already. Give him an incentive laden salary with a low base and he's your man--but Crede's probably not coming to Colorado in a part-time role (especially since he's a Boras client).

Eric Hinske: The last three years, the teams that Hinske has been on have made the World Series, winning it twice. How much more of a veteran winner can you be? Plus he's good with the bat and is versatile (though not particularly competent) defensively.

Jose Contreras: More than any other Rockies free agents, I want Contreras back next year as rotation insurance and as a swing man with excellent stuff in the bullpen--heck, I'd like to see the Rockies pay up to $3 million for his services. Whether that would be enough is another matter.

John Smoltz: If he'd deign to sign with the Rockies, Colorado would be glad to have his power arm in the bullpen or even in the fifth starter's role.

Rodrigo Lopez: He has found success in Colorado before and would serve as rotation depth.

Mark Hendrickson and Scott Eyre (Type B): Serviceable veteran left-handed relievers that would cost around $2-3 million each.

To that effect, there are many relievers or failed starters that O'Dowd could pick up cheaply off the scrap heap that would perform at a decent level for this team--I'm not really as worried about the bullpen.

The bottom line is that I think the Rockies should sign Feliz or a similar player to replace Atkins while inking a veteran starter/reliever for the bullpen. If Colorado does move Hawpe, they'll likely receive a bullpen arm in return that could fill the void as well. Either way, I'm expecting free agency to cost the Rockies around $8-10 million, bringing their ODP to around $87 million.

Atkins won’t be released Friday when 40-man roster set

Jabberwocky — Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:03:19 -0000

Atkins won’t be released Friday when 40-man roster set

From Renck at the Denver Post...

I don't know, but this just seems a little ridiculous to me. Is there anyone who will really give up a player for Atkins given that he will cost at minimum $5.6 million next year should he be traded for.

I can understand interest in Atkins from other teams, but not at that price. For that reason Atkins is a waste of a 40 man roster spot that could be used to protect another prospect from the Rule 5 draft.

More on this decision when I post my free agency preview sometime soon.

The State of the Rockies: Post GM Meetings Update

Jabberwocky — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 22:39:50 -0000

In what will be a semi-weekly occurrence from now until January on Purple Row Academy, I'm going to update my post on the State of the Rockies. In other words, I will update my loyal readers (all three of you)--as well as anyone ~~stupid~~ intrepid enough to follow me after the jump as to the roster framework the Rockies are looking at as some big offseason deadlines approach.

This week, I'll be looking at what has happened thus far for the Rockies and what that means going forward. Also discussed will be the Rockies' impending decision on Rafael Betancourt's club option and how the Rockies are affected by the Elias Free Agent classifications.

By next week, we should have a better idea of what the Rockies are doing as the beginning of free agency and the deadline to set 40 man rosters approaches (November 20th).

Jump with me, brave souls, to roster-building nirvana...

Before I begin, let me first note that this analysis will be limited to what I can project the 25 man roster to be, since I'm forecasting the 2010 ODP (which only includes the active roster and DL). For most of the players not on the 25 man roster but who are on the 40 man, they will be paid the prorated minimum should they make the Show and considerably less in the minor leagues.

What the Rockies Already Owe in 2010

This category is for money that the Rockies have already committed to the 2010 roster. Note that this only includes players who are under contract with the Rockies (not just under team control), giving management concrete salary obligations to work around. This data, as well as much of the data for the rest of this study, was contributed by the incomparable Jeff Euston at Cot's Contracts.

For each player I'll give their name, approximate ML service time, 2010 salary, and minimum future salary obligations.

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary	Add. Min. Obligation	Years After 2010
Todd Helton	12.059	$16,600,000	$23,700,000	1
Aaron Cook	7.02	$9,833,000	$10,583,000	1
Brad Hawpe	5.058	$7,500,000	$500,000	0
Jeff Francis	5.04	$5,875,000	$0	0
Troy Tulowitzki	3.033	$3,500,000	$25,750,000	3
Manuel Corpas	3.076	$2,750,000	$3,750,000	1
Ubaldo Jimenez	2.087	$1,250,000	$8,000,000	2
Yorvit Torrealba	8.03	$500,000	$0	0
Alan Embree	15.059	$250,000	$0	0

Total		$48,058,000	$72,283,000

This list of players the Rockies definitely owe money to next year has become more certain, especially since Colorado declined the options of Embree and Torrealba as I predicted. Embree won't be back, but as RG wrote this morning, the door is open for Torrealba to return.

Pre-Arbitration Players

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary
Eric Young Jr.	0.042	$412,000
Dexter Fowler	1.027	$413,030
Franklin Morales	2.01	$414,060
Ian Stewart	1.154	$416,120
Carlos Gonzalez	1.06	$415,090
Seth Smith	1.119	$415,090
Matt Daley	0.155	$412,000

Total		$2,897,390

The main difference on this pre-arb chart is that I've taken out Paul Phillips, who was outrighted on Monday to clear up 40 man roster spots and looks like he'll become a free agent. That leaves a hole in the projected roster at backup catcher, perhaps to be filled by Torrealba, a cheaper in-house option such as Mike McKenry, or even a free agent catcher.

Even with the extra spot in the roster open, I'm not using Matt Murton to fill it because he would be the sixth outfielder. One of Murton, Ryan Spilborghs, and Hawpe will likely be gone--and more than one leaving is possible.

Arbitration-Eligible Players

Since my previous post two weeks ago, the Rockies have avoided salary arbitration with two of their prospective cases, relievers Randy Flores and Matt Belisle. The Rockies were able to secure the services of these two relievers for less than I had predicted--Flores for $650,000 and Belisle for $850000, raises of 6.25 and 8.33% respectively. Both contracts have incentives based on number of appearances, neither of which I predict will be triggered.

With Belisle and Flores in the fold, the Rockies stil have eight potential arbitration cases to negotiate--including that of Garrett Atkins, who is almost certain to be non-tendered. The Rockies may (should) do this before the November 20th deadline for setting the 40 man roster in order to protect another prospect from the Rule 5 draft. Let's face it: Atkins won't engender much interest from teams at his current price point (minimum of $5.64 million). For that reason I'm removing him from the below chart. Bold numbers represent concrete salaries, not just predictions

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary	Difference from 2009
Huston Street	5	$8,775,000	95.00%
Jorge De La Rosa	5.015	$5,600,000	180.00%
Clint Barmes	4.122	$4,225,000	160.00%
Taylor Buchholz	3.14	$1,055,000	0.00%
Matt Belisle	4.02	$850,000	6.25%
Randy Flores	5.061	$650,000	8.33%
Jason Hammel	2.153	$2,026,560	380.00%
Chris Iannetta	3.029	$1,867,500	350.00%
Ryan Spilborghs	3.072	$788,500	90.00%

Total		$25,837,560	141.06%

As you can see, this is considerably less than two weeks ago, due mostly to Atkins but also because Belisle and Flores were signed more cheaply than I had anticipated. Another effect of Atkins being removed is that the Rockies' average player salary increase from arbitration is closer to reflecting the league average of 172%.

Of the seven arbitration cases that remain, I could really see De La Rosa and maybe Spilborghs getting to actual salary arbitration. De La Rosa in particular could garner a larger salary than I predict here (more in the $6.5 million range). Meanwhile, Barmes and Street seem more likley to take the multi-year contract route and might have lower salaries this year than I'd projected.

Estimated Rockies 2010 ODP

This calculation represents the status quo, if the Rockies neither re-sign any of their free agents nor get rid of any players under team control (besides Atkins, that is) and remain dormant in free agency. The resulting roster would have 22 players on it with Buchholz starting the year on the DL (therefore the salary of three players would need to be added in) and would be paid:

Multi-Year Contracts: $48,058,000

Pre-Arbitration Contracts: $2,897,390

Arbitration Contracts: $25,837,560

Total ODP: $76,792,950

In other words, a roster that still has three spots open is about $1.6 million over last year's ODP.

The Betancourt Variable

The variables as far as the Rockies are concerned from now until November 20th are their free agents. The most pressing and important of these players to the front office is set-up man Rafael Betancourt, whose $5.4 million club option expires tomorrow.

Betancourt has reportedly already turned down a multi-year offer from the Rockies, so it is important for Dan O'Dowd to decide whether he wants the 35 year old Betancourt to be the set-up man next year or not. If the option is declined, Betancourt may still be retained, but the Rockies will have to bid against other teams for his services.

I've made my opinion on the issue of bullpen spending pretty clear--I believe that bullpen performance is highly variable, very fungible, and an inefficient use of salary dollars. Obviously many people disagree with me on this, but I'd prefer the Rockies to bring back Jose Contreras as a combo set-up man rotation insurance.

As Thomas Harding notes, the Rockies are interested in re-signing Contreras and Joe Beimel, who combined will probably make about the same as Betancourt's club option.

Free Agent Classification

Another reason for the Rockies to perhaps let Betancourt go would be his status as a Type A free agent. I wrote about free agency compensation several months ago, but the gist is that the top 20% of players in their positional groups (1B/DH/OF, 2B/SS/3B, C, SP, RP) as calculated by Elias are classified as Type A free agents. The formula for these calculations is complicated, convoluted, and confidential, rarely making a list that makes much sense.

In return for losing one of these players in free agency, a club receives the signing club's first round pick in the Rule 4 draft as well as a sandwich pick between the first and second rounds. As I discussed in my analysis of the Betancourt trade back in July, the draft picks from a type A free agent are typically worth $5 million to a team. In fact, in that article I recommended that the Rockies decline Betancourt's option and retain the draft picks.

Unfortunately, the Rockies would have to offer Betancourt arbitration in order to receive the draft picks in return--and in this lackluster market, the risk is high that Betancourt will accept and get even more than the $5.4 million club option. The same logic applies to Colorado's other free agents. If the Rockies want to take advantage of the Type B status (sandwich pick as compensation) of Jason Marquis, Torrealba, and Beimel they would have to offer arbitration--and there is a relatively high risk that these players would accept.

Is the risk worth it? For someone like Betancourt, who probably won't get a commensurate offer on the open market, especially with his type A status, the proposition is too chancy. For Marquis, who is likely to draw strong interest in a weak starting pitching market from his hometown Mets, the risk might be low enough to offer him arbitration. My personal view is that Colorado should offer arbitration to Beimel because his arbitration cost would be around his market cost--relatively low. Marquis could command $10-12 million in arbitration, so the Rockies need to be certain that he would decline before they offer it to him.

Next week the picture for the Betancourt situation should be a little clearer as the option decision will be made and the 40 man roster will be solidified. Until then, don't touch that stove. It's hot.

Poll

Should the Rockies exercise their $5.4 million club option on Rafael Betancourt?

Yes. He was nails last season and provides a solid bridge to Huston Street.

111 votes

No, the Rockies should try to sign him at a lower price over a multi-year deal.

131 votes

No, Betancourt is old and signing him would tie up too much salary to the bullpen.

40 votes

282 votes | Poll has closed

Just What is Brad Hawpe Worth Exactly?

Jabberwocky — Thu, 05 Nov 2009 22:05:29 -0000

In the comments of my column last week about the Rockies' contract situations, much of the discussion centered around what the Rockies should do with outfielder Brad Hawpe this offseason.

Brad Hawpe

#11 / Right Field / Colorado Rockies

Height: 6-3

Weight: 205

Bats: L

Throws: L

Born: Jun 22, 1979

	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	K	SB	CS	AVG	OBP	SLG
2009 - Brad Hawpe	145	501	82	143	42	3	23	86	79	145	1	3	.285	.384	.519

Dan O'Dowd has said that Hawpe wasn't on the market, inferring that he wouldn't move Hawpe unless it was for a Matt Holliday-type return. Hawpe is due $7.5 million in 2010 with a $10 million team option in 2011 that will be voided if he is traded--meaning that for other teams he'd be a one year rental. Also of note is that Hawpe would likely qualify as a Type A free agent for the team that traded for him, netting that team two first round draft picks as compensation were Hawpe to walk away after the one year.

Here's the thing: Hawpe rode a hot streak with the bat in 2009 to the All-Star game but came back down to earth hard in the second half, all the while providing subpar defense. In fact, according to FanGraphs, Hawpe's batting value was virtually canceled out by his fielding last year. Due to this fact, despite Hawpe's offensive production he was worth only 1.3 WAR in 2009--which is actually right in line with his $5.5 million compensation.

The Rockies have a good problem with outfield depth, as Hawpe just may be the fourth best outfielder on the Rockies' roster going into 2010, behind Seth Smith, Carlos Gonzalez, and an improving Dexter Fowler. Because the Rockies will have an abundance of potential salary arbitration cases this winter, Hawpe's contract may be a little too unwieldy to remain on the roster--O'Dowd may need Hawpe's money to pay for a player like Rafael Betancourt, Jason Giambi, or the replacement of Garrett Atkins.

After the jump, I'll use the Trade Value Calculator, originally developed by Beyond the Boxscore's Sky Kalkman, to determine Hawpe's value to both the Rockies and to a prospective trade partner, as well as a short foray into simple economic theory.

Projecting Hawpe in 2010

Adhering strictly to the FanGraphs calculation of WAR, as I outlined a few months back, I was able to come up with a reasonable projection for Brad Hawpe in 2010.

First, and most importantly, was the determination of Hawpe's projected 2010 wOBA. I used a combination of Bill James' projections for Hawpe in 2010 (which admittedly are a little optimistic) tempered with my own observations (Hawpe won't get as many PAs as James projects, nor will he play as many games due to the Rockies OF depth).

Using a baseline of 575 PA, 136 games played, and 1150 innings, I came up with the following values for Hawpe:

For batting, I used wOBA = .384, which is pretty much in line for Hawpe (.383 and .385 in 2008 and 2009), leading to a total of 26 wRAA. Fielding was a little trickier, but I used Hawpe's career FRAA total (-90.8) and divided it by his total innings played on defense, then multiplied it by my projected 1150 innings to get a 2010 FRAA total of -18.6.

Replacement ((#PA/600) * 20) and Positional ((GP/162) * -7.5) adjustments were relatively simple, with Hawpe getting 19.2 and -6.3 RAR in those categories.

All told, I'm projecting Hawpe to produce a little over 2 WAR in 2010.

Hawpe's Value to Rockies and Others

In other words, teams looking to trade for Hawpe as a one year rental that will play a corner outfield position can expect to receive this much net value:

Brad Hawpe

Year	Sal (M)	WAR	Val (M)	Net (M)	Sal (M)
2010	$7.5	2.0	$9.3	$1.8	$7.5
2011
FA Picks			$5.0
Total	$7.5	2.0	$14.3	$6.8

Looking at Hawpe from a purely quantitative standpoint, what is represented above should be his perceived value to other teams. However, as has been suggested numerous times, Hawpe would be more valuable to an AL club as a DH.

Projecting Hawpe as a DH would mean using the positional adjustment for a DH (-17.5 RAA) while erasing his negative fielding impact. As a result, Hawpe's new projected WAR would increase to over 3 for 2010:

Brad Hawpe

Year	Sal (M)	WAR	Val (M)	Net (M)	Sal (M)
2010	$7.5	3.0	$13.9	$6.4	$7.5
2011
FA Picks			$5.0
Total	$7.5	3.0	$18.9	$11.4

As you can see, Hawpe could be a very valuable commodity if he were simply to leave his glove at home and hit full-time in the American League. Of course, with the AL currently being the stronger league, there is no guarantee that Hawpe's projected numbers would come to pass.

Using a similar process, I projected Hawpe to regress slightly in 2011 in his age 32 season to about 1.5 WAR. This season plus his Type A free agent status affords this picture of Hawpe's value to the Rockies over the life of his contract:

Brad Hawpe

Year	Sal (M)	WAR	Val (M)	Net (M)	Sal (M)
2009	$7.5	2.0	$9.3	$1.8	$7.5
2010	$10.0	1.5	$7.0	-$3.0	$10.0
FA Picks			$5.0
Total	$17.5	3.5	$21.3	$3.8

So what does this mean? It means that Hawpe is much more valuable as a trade asset to other teams than he is to the Rockies. Sure, he'll provide 3.5 WAR over two years to the Rockies, a surplus value of $3.8 million, but Hawpe would be worth three times as much to an AL team as a DH if he voided his 2010 option.

It's the type of tempting market inefficiency that the Rockies need to continually exploit if they want to survive and thrive with their mid-market payroll. Hawpe's market value to other teams is increased due to his status as an All-Star and as a potential veteran leader--a quality that Hawpe purportedly utilizes with the Rockies.

I wish that I could put a concrete value on such intangible contributions, but there's no way that those intangibles are worth $3 million. The extra value in addition to the short-term flexibility provided to O'Dowd by freeing up some payroll space is simply too good to pass up. But there's one more reason to make a trade...and that's where the economics come into play.

Opportunity Cost

For those of you who have never taken an economics course, an opportunity cost is the value of the next best alternative which, as the result of making a decision, you have foregone the use of. In other words, the opportunity cost is the other stuff that you could be doing with your time or money, and it factors heavily into an economic decision.

What this means on a baseball level is if the Rockies were to get rid of Hawpe, they would not replace Hawpe with nobody and lose 2.0 WAR. They would instead gain incrementally increased production from players like Smith, Fowler, Gonzalez, Spilborghs, and Murton--who would benefit from more playing time. How much?

Consider this theoretical situation (I say theoretical because I doubt Tracy would play Smith/Fowler/Gonzalez regularly):

Smith would likely be the primary beneficiary of Hawpe moving on, gaining about 175 more PA, while Fowler would get another 80 and Gonzalez another 60.

Originally, using Bill James' projections (again, these are usually optimistic) Smith, Fowler, and Gonzalez were projected to produce 3.05, 2.46, and 4.09 respectively. With an increase in opportunities and the same rate stats these numbers for Smith, Fowler, and Gonzalez improve to 4.60, 2.89, and 4.55. Incrementally, this is a net improvement in WAR due to Hawpe's absence of 2.45--more value than Hawpe himself would have provided in 2010 and at a $7.5 million cost savings. Makes sense, right?

In this case, even if the Rockies were to trade Hawpe for a pile of nothing they would actually be improved due to the opportunity costs being higher than the potential economic gain of having Hawpe stay.

Of course, it really isn't as simple as that. The scenario above is something of a best case scenario for Colorado. Should any of the three starters have an injury, having Hawpe as a safety net would be better than a Matt Murton or Ryan Spilborghs to fill in. In addition, Smith seems to be doomed to a platoon situation in the outfield, making it unlikely that he'd actually be that productive in 2010.

However, even if the other outfielders are not up to the task of replacing Hawpe's 2 WAR, the payroll flexibility gained by dealing Hawpe (or the pieces received in return) will also likely produce WAR for the Rockies now or in the future, further hedging against the risk of the trade.

Bottom Line

While Brad Hawpe's value might have taken a hit after his cold second half of 2009, the lefty has a great deal of value (real and perceived) to other teams (especially in the AL as a DH)--more value than he has to the Rockies over the remainder of his contract due to their depth at the position and the higher relative value of payroll space to them. However, this value is more likely than not to decrease as the 2010 season progresses, so the sooner the Rockies make a move the better.

The Rockies should be actively searching for a trade partner and be willing to accept a package built around a young back-end starter and a B prospect or corner infield depth in exchange for the 30 year old Hawpe. Should no reasonable offers emerge, then the Rockies have a pretty nice Plan B too.

Economics demands it!

The State of the Colorado Rockies (Pre-Free Agency)

Jabberwocky — Wed, 28 Oct 2009 04:15:57 -0000

While Major League Baseball has yet to crown a champion, the Rockies' season is (unfortunately) over and it is time to look forward towards the swiftly oncoming offseason. The Rockies have quite a to-do list this year.

The clock for Colorado and the rest of MLB starts ticking when the Fall (Winter?) Classic concludes, as teams have 15 days to exclusively negotiate with their prospective free agents. After that time (let's say November 20th), free agents are, well, free to go where their services are most sought after. The original team has until December 12th to tender 2010 contracts to their free agents.

For those players (like Garrett Atkins) who have less than six years of MLB service time, their teams control their rights, but must tender the player a contract offer or salary arbitration, by December 1st--with the player needing to make a decision by the 7th. As a result, at baseball's Winter Meetings from December 7-10, teams will have some idea as to where the market stands.

Finally, December 8th is a very important deadline, as it is the day in which MLB clubs must set their 40 man rosters in preparation for the Rule 5 Draft, which occurs on the 10th.

These dates and other offseason deadlines are explained in more detail here.

To learn a little bit more about some of the topics I just touched upon, please check out these previous sessions of Purple Row Academy, which I'll be updating over the offseason:

Trades and Contract Tenders

Rule 5 Draft

Now that you understand a little better the timeline that Dan O'Dowd and the Rockies are working with, I'll break down the Rockies' contract situations (and the decisions to be made therein) extensively after the jump.

What the Rockies Already Owe in 2010

For each player I'll give their name, approximate ML service time, 2010 salary, and minimum future salary obligations. This means that I assume that the Rockies decline every club option.

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary	Additional Minimum Obligation	Years After 2010

Todd Helton	12.059	$16,600,000	$23,700,000	1
Aaron Cook	7.02	$9,833,000	$10,583,000	1
Brad Hawpe	5.058	$7,500,000	$500,000	0
Jeff Francis	5.04	$5,875,000	$0	0
Troy Tulowitzki	3.033	$3,500,000	$25,750,000	3
Manuel Corpas	3.076	$2,750,000	$3,750,000	1
Ubaldo Jimenez	2.087	$1,250,000	$8,000,000	2
Yorvit Torrealba	8.03	$500,000	$0	0
Alan Embree	15.059	$250,000	$0	0

Total		$48,058,000	$72,283,000

This chart shows that the Rockies, even if they do not re-sign Torrealba or Embree, have committed over $48 million to seven players on the 2010 roster. And these are only the players who the Rockies know how much they have to pay. Again, this is if the Rockies don't pick up any club options on these players.

Pre-Arbitration Players

For the players listed below, the Rockies have the option of keeping them under control for several more years and can do so cheaply in 2010 (for a price between $400,000 and $460,000). For the purposes of this exercise I'm assuming a 3% raise over 2009 salary. This is assuming that the Rockies let Embree and Torrealba walk and find internal replacements. The pre-arbitration players:

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary
Eric Young Jr.	0.042	$412,000
Dexter Fowler	1.027	$413,030
Franklin Morales	2.01	$414,060
Paul Phillips	2.06	$427,450
Ian Stewart	1.154	$416,120
Carlos Gonzalez	1.06	$415,090
Seth Smith	1.119	$415,090
Matt Daley	0.155	$412,000

Total		$3,324,840

This chart tells us that the Rockies will be paying a little over $3.3 million to eight players on the 25 man roster. This fact again emphasizes the importance of teams maximizing the value of young players.

The player whose omission sticks out on that list is Matt Murton. With his service time, he would seem to be eligible for Super Two Arbitration status, but due to the fact that he did not accrue at least 86 days of ML service time in 2009 he is rendered ineligible for salary arbitration. At least, I think so. Of course, unless the Rockies unload either Hawpe or Ryan Spilborghs, Murton won't be on the roster--and since this projection is based upon roster stability, Murton is not included on this projection.

Projecting these 15 slots was easy--it's the potential arbitration cases that can get tricky.

Arbitration-Eligible Players

In addition to the 15 players mentioned in the tables above, plus Matt Murton (who would be the victim of a numbers game if the status quo is kept), the Rockies have 10 potential salary arbitration cases on their hands with players that have between three and six years of ML service time (Tracy Ringolsby lists them here). Calculating potential salaries for these players is quite tricky. As I noted when I wrote about ML service time, the average salary raise in 2009 was 172% when multi-year deals for arbitration-eligible players (like Ryan Howard's 3 year, $54 million deal) are included.

The Rockies in 2008 gave raises of over 300% to Clint Barmes and Jorge De La Rosa plus hefty salary increases to Taylor Buchholz, Huston Street, Garrett Atkins, and Jason Grilli--raises which increased payroll by $7,649,000 over the six players' 2008 salaries. This year, the Rockies' situation will be much more expensive, with several of their arb-eligible players performing at a high level in 2009.

When projecting arbitration raises for the Rockies I did so based on some past history--giving higher % raises to players with a lower starting salary and to those who had performed in a starting role.

Here's which I came up with, provided the Rockies tendered a 2010 contract offer to each of their arbitration eligibles:

Player Name	ML Service Time	2010 Salary	Difference from 2009
Garrett Atkins	5.072	$5,640,000	-20%
Huston Street	5	$8,775,000	95%
Jorge De La Rosa	5.015	$5,600,000	180%
Clint Barmes	4.122	$4,225,000	160%
Taylor Buchholz	3.14	$1,055,000	0%
Matt Belisle	4.02	$1,200,000	50%
Randy Flores	5.061	$900,000	50%
Jason Hammel	2.153	$2,026,560	380%
Chris Iannetta	3.029	$1,867,500	350%
Ryan Spilborghs	3.072	$788,500	90%

Total		$32,077,560	134%

This chart tells us that based on career performance and function (weighted more heavily toward 2009), the Rockies will pay these 10 players over $32 million--about $13.7 million more than they were paid in 2009. This chart is even assuming that Garrett Atkins will be tendered and will accept a minimum 80% of his previous year's salary (unlikely). Even with Atkins, the projected average arbitration salary increases is only 134%, well below 2009's MLB average of 172%--meaning that my estimated raises, shocking in their size as they may seem, may even be on the low side.

Estimated Rockies 2010 ODP

This calculation represents the status quo, if the Rockies neither re-sign any of their free agents nor get rid of any players under team control and remain dormant in free agency. The resulting roster would have 24 players on it with Buchholz starting the year on the DL (therefore another player's salary would need to be added in) and would be paid:

Multi-Year Contracts: $48,058,000

Pre-Arbitration Contracts: $3,324,840

Arbitration Contracts: $32,077,560

Total ODP: $83,460,400

In other words, the Rockies' ODP will need to grow by $8,259,400, or 10.98%, in order to maintain the status quo (a cost certainty price floor, if you will).

What This All Means

It's pretty obvious to me that the status quo won't happen, as Atkins will likely be non-tendered and one of the outfielders (Hawpe, Spilborghs, or Murton) will be shopped around and dealt. What the above calculation shows, however, is that the Rockies will have very little payroll flexibility to add pieces for 2010--especially if the Rockies need to replace Atkins and grab another bullpen piece.

The most pressing issue given this limitation is the $5.4 million team option on set-up man Rafael Betancourt--in my opinion the team simply can't afford to pay it, unless they are planning on moving Hawpe and his $7.5 million contract. Also, the Rockies have a few free agents they'd like to re-sign, including Joe Beimel (who will probably cost around $2 million), Jason Giambi ($1.5 million), and Torrealba (at most $2 million). Again, Colorado would need to move Hawpe to make this possible.

Remember though that if the Rockies do move Hawpe, they'll receive trade assets in return--and especially if those players are major leaguers they must also be well-compensated.

If I Were In Charge...

Given the financial limitations facing the Rockies and in light of the fact that they were very successful in 2009, a fine line must be walked between cost consciousness and competitiveness. Because the Rockies can not add very many, if any, significant pieces given their current projected payroll, they need to make a few moves. Here's what I would do this offseason to shape the 2010 Rockies:

1. Non-Tender Garrett Atkins. For the love of God, please--Atkins doubles as expensive and bad.

2. Pick only one or two out-going free agents to re-sign. There isn't any room for more than that. The Rockies' top priority should be getting back Betancourt or Beimel if they can get them back for a reasonable price (in this case, under $2.5 million). Relief pitching is too fungible and the market too inefficient to pay relievers big bucks. Likely this person will be Beimel. If the Rockies can get Torrealba back for about $1.5-2 million, they should do it--but they should let him walk if he wants much more than that. An alternative to Torrealba would be to keep Giambi around if he could be had for $1.5 million to come off the bench. I would keep one or the other (or neither), there isn't money for both.

Torrealba would replace Phillips on the roster or Giambi would replace the recently outrighted Omar Quintanilla.

3. Look hard for a taker for Brad Hawpe. In order for the Rockies to shore up their rotation and find a suitable sub for Atkins, they will need to move someone from their glut of outfielders to maintain payroll flexibility. Hawpe may very well be the Rockies' best hitting outfielder and an excellent leader in the clubhouse, but his horrific defense, much higher salary, and All-Star status make Hawpe an ideal trade piece--a player that has much more marginal value to prospective trading partners than he does to his own team. Even after his cold second half, Hawpe does have value around the league (especially as a DH), enough to garner the package I've outlined below.

A possible trade package for Hawpe would be a young back-end rotation starter and either a corner infield reserve or a B prospect or two. The Rockies need starting pitching depth for the simple reason that they were fortunate with pitcher health last year (basically the same five starters all year)--something that will likely not continue next year. They do have a bevy of good pitching prospects, but they will be relying on Francis or Morales to nail down the fifth slot in the rotation, so some insurance is probably needed. If the Rockies can get a major league-ready arm plus a prospect for Hawpe they should pull the trigger.

If no such trade package were to surface, either Spilborghs or Murton would need to be moved--and my decision would be Spilborghs due to the fact that he's older, will command a higher salary, and has Scott Boras as an agent.

4. Gauge the market for Manuel Corpas. If someone will offer value, I'd move him. But value in this situation would be relatively high--I'd hate to sell low on Corpas.

5. Bring in the usual suspects on minor league deals as pitching depth. There are plenty of guys that fit this mold (Fogg, Herges, Rincon, etc.). This is cheap depth to be used in case of dire emergencies only.

The resulting ODP from these moves (assuming Hawpe is moved) would be about $76.7 million, a slight payroll increase from 2009.

Purple Row Awards: National League Cy Young Award

Jabberwocky — Thu, 22 Oct 2009 15:28:15 -0000

More photos » by Marcio Jose Sanchez - AP

Tim Lincecum won the Cy Young in 2008...will the PR staff award it to him again this year?

Browse more photos »

Continuing the trend of Purple Row staff handing imaginary hardware to those we feel are most deserving of it, today we reveal the winner of the Purple Row NL Cy Young Award.

The main-stream media had a dilemma between Tim Lincecum of the Giants and the pair of Chris Carpenter and Adam Wainwright of the Cardinals. Proponents of Wainwright (most wins with 19 and innings pitched with 233), Carpenter (lowest ERA at 2.24, best record at 17-4, and best WHIP at 1.01), and Lincecum (most strikeouts at 261, best FIP at 2.34, a freakish windup, and long shaggy hair) all have good arguments.

See which pitcher captured the hearts and minds of PR writers after the jump.

As if RMN's hint yesterday wasn't enough, the winner of the 2009 PR NL Cy Young award is:

1st Place - Tim Lincecum

#55 / Pitcher / San Francisco Giants

Height: 5-11

Weight: 170

Bats: L

Throws: R

Born: Jun 15, 1984

	W-L	G	GS	CG	SHO	SV	BS	IP	H	R	ER	HR	BB	K	ERA	WHIP
2009 - Tim Lincecum	15-7	33	32	4	2	0	0	225.1	168	69	62	10	68	261	2.48	1.05

Perhaps biased by the fact that they saw Timmay (he's livin' a lie) most often due to his position in the NL West, the esteemed voters voted for Lincecum by a pretty wide margin, four placing him in the top position.

And really, what is not to like about Lincecum this year? You know, besides his hippie hair cut and his position on a divisional rival? His record may not have compared favorably to Carpenter and Wainwright, but a lot of that is due to the awful offense supporting his efforts (five of his losses were classified as Tough Losses, or losses suffered in games he had a quality start in).

His sterling tRA (2.52) and FIP (2.34) bear out the fact that he did pitch as well if not a little better than his ERA indicates, plus his 8.2 WAR leads everybody but Albert Pujols in the NL and is 1.6 about the second place WAR pitching finisher (who comes in fourth on this ballot).

Lincecum had four complete games, two of them shutouts, led the league with 26 quality starts (which was 81% of his starts on the year), and had the best K/9 ratio of any starter in the NL (10.42). In other words, Timmay thoroughly deserves the 2009 NL Cy Young Award.

Here were the runners-up:

2nd Place - Chris Carpenter

#29 / Pitcher / St. Louis Cardinals

Height: 6-6

Weight: 230

Bats: R

Throws: R

Born: Apr 27, 1975

	W-L	G	GS	CG	SHO	SV	BS	IP	H	R	ER	HR	BB	K	ERA	WHIP
2009 - Chris Carpenter	17-4	28	28	3	1	0	0	192.2	156	49	48	7	38	144	2.24	1.01

3rd Place - Adam Wainwright

#50 / Pitcher / St. Louis Cardinals

Height: 6-7

Weight: 230

Bats: R

Throws: R

Born: Aug 30, 1981

	W-L	G	GS	CG	SHO	SV	BS	IP	H	R	ER	HR	BB	K	ERA	WHIP
2009 - Adam Wainwright	19-8	40	34	1	0	0	0	233.0	216	75	68	17	66	212	2.63	1.21

So why didn't Carpenter or Wainwright finish higher? Besides the fact that Lincecum truly was dominant for a poor offensive club this year, Carpenter and Wainwright both had FIPs that were well above their ERA totals (2.78 and 3.11 respectively), while Carpenter missed a month early on due to injury which allowed others to compile better counting stats. Meanwhile, Wainwright is a very good pitcher for a very good team who compiled a bunch of decisions, many of them wins.

Both Carpenter (5.6) and Wainwright (5.7) had WAR totals more comparable to Ubaldo Jimenez (5.7) than either Javier Vazquez or Lincecum, which is why they finished lower on my ballot at least (with Carpenter's excellent rate stats compelling me to place him second).

And with an honorary fourth place finish, because he really did have a great season and I am writing this recap:

4th Place - Javier Vazquez

#33 / Pitcher / Atlanta Braves

Height: 6-2

Weight: 210

Bats: R

Throws: R

Born: Jul 25, 1976

	W-L	G	GS	CG	SHO	SV	BS	IP	H	R	ER	HR	BB	K	ERA	WHIP
2009 - Javier Vazquez	15-10	37	32	3	0	0	0	219.1	181	75	70	20	44	238	2.87	1.03

And you're now probably asking yourself, Javier Vazquez? Really? Yep. Vazquez put up some pretty impressive numbers in his own right this year, though he was overshadowed by the other three contenders due largely to his poor record. To be sure, Vazquez's 1.03 WHIP and 238 strikeouts (both second in the NL) are nothing to scoff at, and neither is his exceptional, league-leading K/BB ratio of 5.41 (Lincecum's was 3.84 for a reference point).

All this and the fact that Vazquez finished in second in NL pitching WAR with 6.6 and it's clear that Vazquez at the least belongs in the same company as Carpenter and Wainwright (and was good enough to earn him a spot on three ballots).

In any case, here were the final results (on a 30-20-10 scale):

Lincecum (150)
Carpenter (105)
Wainwright (35)
Vazquez (30)
Jimenez (20)
Street (10)

And here was each individual ballot:

NL Cy	RMN	PF	togb	Russ	Silverblood	Jabbs
1	Lincecum	Lincecum	Carpenter	Lincecum	Carpenter (T-1)	Lincecum
2	Carpenter	Carpenter	Lincecum	Jimenez	Wainwright (T-1)	Carpenter
3	Vazquez	Vazquez	Street	Wainwright	Lincecum	Vazquez

Silverblood voted for Carpenter and Wainwright as a first place tie (a total cop out), which meant that each pitcher received 25 points. Meanwhile, RMN, PF, and I entered the same ballot while Russ and togb had a Rockies pitcher in the mix for the Cy Young.

Tomorrow PF will reveal the winner of the PR AL MVP award.

How Efficient and Effective Were the Rockies in 2009?

Jabberwocky — Fri, 16 Oct 2009 02:56:58 -0000

This story was originally posted on Purple Row (where I write a weekly column called Purple Row Academy) and represents an update of sorts to articles that I wrote back in May on the concept of marginal wins. This community probably understands this pretty well, so treat it as a refresher if you will.

A common theme for Purple Row Academy this entire year has been looking at ways to quantify a player's value to a team, especially through the Wins Above Replacement (WAR) stat used notably by FanGraphs. For those who don't understand what WAR is or how it is calculated, here's a crash course from previous PR Academy sessions:

Position Players

Pitchers

By looking at the sum for a team of each player on that team's value, one can attempt to measure both how efficient and how effective that team was. But WAR is by definition an individual statistic and judging efficiency by WAR alone would be only the sum of individuals. This is problematic because seldom in baseball does the sum of the individual players' successes accurately measure the team's performance.

A metric measuring team performance to compare to the individual performance calculated by WAR is therefore what we require. What can we use to measure how well and how efficiently the team performed? There's always the simple end of season payroll vs. number of wins linear comparison to figure out MLB payroll efficiency using 3 year averages from 2006 to 2008, which I did a few months back.

But that is assuming that all wins are equal. As any economist worth their salt will tell you, this is patently false. In light of that, I'll go back a little farther back in PR Academy sessions to the concept of Marginal Wins.

If I had to explain this concept in two sentences, I'd say that MP and MW are basically setting a floor (minimum possible outcome) for both payroll (in 2009, $11.2 million--which happens with 25 players on the active roster plus 3 on the DL making the minimum of $400k) and wins (30% of all games, or 48.6 wins, which all but one team has accomplished since the implementation of the amateur draft in 1965). The farther the team reaches from this minimum plateau of wins, the more difficult (not to mention important and expensive) each incremental, or marginal, win becomes.

Marginal Payroll and Marginal Wins

The creator of the system, BP's Doug Pappas, explains that "the Marginal Payroll/Marginal Wins (MP/MW) system evaluates the efficiency of a club's front office by comparing its payroll and record to the performance it could expect to attain by fielding a roster of replacement-level players, all of whom are paid the major league minimum salary" (basically Wins Over Replacement Team). The formula is:

(club payroll - (28 x major league minimum) / ((winning percentage - .300) x 162)

The first half of the equation measures the club's marginal payroll and the second measures the marginal wins. The lower the number, the more efficiently the club spent its cash. Comparing this number to the club's actual winning percentage provides another way to evaluate teams. As Pappas explains:

Low MP/MW, good record: Efficient ballclub (2003 Marlins, Athletics)
Low MP/MW, bad record: Not spending enough to compete (2003 Devil Rays)
High MP/MW, good record: Spending its way to the top (2003 Yankees)
High MP/MW, bad record: Poorly-run club (2003 Mets, Rangers)

Since a team's payroll fluctuates throughout the year and I use Opening Day Payroll (ODP) to calculate MP/MW, this metric is probably best used to evaluate the efficiency of the front office's offseason moves and as a gauge for a team's expectations going into the year.

To emphasize the inequity of wins, this is what I said back then:

Though it can be (and has been) done by a small payroll team, going from 60 to 80 wins in MLB is an insignificant accomplishment on a macro level because those teams still miss the playoffs. In moving from 80 to 90 wins, however, a team goes from an also-ran to a bona fide playoff contender. After all, 68 of 78 teams (87%) in the last ten years that crossed the 90 win threshold made the playoffs, making these marginal wins much more important and therefore expensive.

For example, the average value of a marginal win in 2008 was about $2.7 million, but the value of a win getting you from 89-90 wins was worth almost $6 million.

It isn't a simple concept by any means, but I've found that MP/MW or WORT has produced some excellent results. I'll show how the Rockies did by this metric after the jump.

Rockies Historical MP/MW Performance

Using the formula above and FanGraphs WAR data, I've already crunched some numbers for the Rockies as to their efficiency from 2002-2008 (which is as far back as FanGraphs WAR data goes back). That analysis is here:

Given that data, I'll break down the Rockies' 2009 season in a similar fashion.

Rockies Historical Dollar Win Values

The Efficiency of the 2009 Colorado Rockies

Opening Day Payroll: $75,201,000

This season marked the highest ODP on record for the Rockies as a franchise, eclipsing the mark set in 2001 of $71,541,334. This was largely due to the arbitration raises given to six players. With an eye toward next year, the Rockies' ODP for 2010 looks to be higher due to the fact that they have 13 potential arbitration cases coming up this offseason (though they'll likely only have 10 returning to the team).

W-L Record: 92-70

This of course also marks a franchise record, besting the 90-73 mark of the 2007 team. This team was the best compensated Rockies team, and as their record bore out, the best performing team as well.

Linear Payroll Efficiency: $817,402

This number was found simply by dividing the Rockies' ODP by their win total. While this number is higher than other seasons in past years, this doesn't take into account the fact that ODPs have risen dramatically since the franchise's inception. For example, the Rockies won 67 games in 1993 with an ODP of $8,829,000 (LPE of $131,776). This is yet another reason that efficiency should be judged on the basis of marginal wins.

Marginal Payroll:

Formula: ((ODP) - (28 * League Minimum) = (($75,201,000 - (28 * 400,000) = $64,001,000

Again, this represents the amount that the Rockies spent above MLB's price floor ($11.2 million). This year's total is second most in team history to 2001's $65,941,334.

Marginal Wins:

Formula: ((Winning % - .300) * (# of games played)) = (.568 - .300) * (162) = 43.4 MW

This number represents the amount of wins the Rockies produced about the floor set by Pappas of 30% of games won (48.6). This total is the most in franchise history, defeating 2007's 41.1 MW total.

Marginal Payroll / Marginal Wins:

$64,001,000 / 43.4 = $1,464,677

This number represents how much money the Rockies spent per marginal win this year. It ranks below 2007 ($1,065,304) and a number of other years in which the Rockies had a much lower MP. With the salary growth in MLB so explosive these last two decades and considering that the cost of a marginal win in 2008 was $2.7 million, the Rockies' MP / MW number is really quite good. Last year, that number would have been fifth in MLB.

Team Hitting WAR: 18.7

Note that the above number includes hitting by pitchers, who "contributed" a total of -3.7 hitting WAR. That's why they're paid to pitch and not hit. Of course, it also includes Garrett Atkins (-0.5), who owes the Rockies $2.1 million for his "performance" in 2009. Courtesy of FanGraphs, here's a list of the Rockies' contributors to hitting WAR by player.

What is notable is that the Rockies had six players performing at least at a league average (about 2.0 WAR) level in 2009, the highest FanGraphs has measured (in 2008 we only had 3 such players), but had no superduperstar (Tulo's 5.5 WAR is great, but only ties him for 14th in MLB among hitters and 28th for all players). This makes sense, since a major strength of this team was its depth.

Historically, the Rockies' 18.7 hitting WAR puts them well behind 2007 (22.4 WAR) but bests every other season in the FanGraphs era.

Team Pitching WAR: 23.6

With this total, the Rockies tied the Red Sox for the best pitching from a WAR standpoint in 2009. It goes without saying, but this was the greatest pitching staff the Rockies have ever assembled. Here's the final list of 2009 Rockies pitching WAR contributors.

Of note is that all five members of the Rockies starting rotation posted at least league average performances (that's for any pitcher). Those five by themselves contributed 18.9 WAR! Ubaldo Jimenez's 5.7 WAR season is also by far the greatest Rockies pitching season ever, besting Aaron Cook's 4.7 last year. In addition to the starters' second place in MLB finish in pitching runs above average, the bullpen was sixth in MLB in PRAA.

The challenge next year will be maintaining both this high level of performance and the remarkable health this year of the entire roster.

Total WAR: 42.3

A good measure of a team's efficiency at the end of the year involves comparing its WAR totals to its MP / MW totals. If a team's marginal wins total exceeds its WAR total, then the performance of the team as a whole was greater than that of the sum of its parts.

In the case of the 2009 Rockies, this was certainly the case as Colorado finished with 1.1 more MW than their WAR data would have suggested.

Total Dollar Value of Player Production:

Here is Dave Cameron of Fangraphs on Dollar Win Value:

90 free agents signed major league contracts last winter, ranging from Alex’s Rodriguez $275 million deal to Josh Towers' $400,000 contract with the Rockies. The sum of those 90 contracts paid out $396 million in 2008. To figure out what the average cost per win of a 2007 free agent was, though, we need to know how many wins that group was worth.

To calculate this, I did a three year weighted average of their win values, then multiplied that value by .95 to factor in aging and estimate what teams considered a player’s true talent win rate for 2008. In total, I came up with 88 wins, or $4.5 million per win. That’s what major league teams were paying for a marginal win last winter, so for 2008, that’s a players dollar per win value as listed on the site. I re-did this for all years going back to 2002, and the dollars per win for each are as follows:

2002 - $2.6m / win
2003 - $2.8m / win
2004 - $3.1m / win
2005 - $3.4m / win
2006 - $3.7m / win
2007 - $4.1m / win
2008 - $4.5m / win

In other words, Cameron is showing that a free agent, on the whole, cost $4.5 million per WAR as of 2008--whereas an average marginal win in that year cost only $2.7 million. This fact serves to show that looking for marginal wins on the free agent market is an inefficient proposition. It is more efficient to build from within and to get lots of production from young cost-controlled players, as the Rockies have done.

Generally though, this reflection of value is based not on the actual cost of a MW but on the market cost of a MW. As I explained a few months ago:

Due to the nature of the calculation (each WAR in the dollar value calculation being equal to the market cost per MW, which was higher than the average cost per MW), the Rockies are consistently receiving a higher "dollar value" from their roster than their ODP may suggest. However, if this "dollar value" concept would be adjusted to reflect merely the average cost per MW each year (in other words, taking into account all players instead of just free agents), then the "dollar value" numbers would often be below a team's ODP--especially if that team rates low on the MP/MW formula.

According to the "dollar value" concept as FanGraphs has it ($4.5 million per WAR), the Rockies as a collection of individuals produced $190,350,000 of value. Hitters were responsible for $84.15 million while pitchers contributed $106.2 million ($85.05 million of which came from the starting rotation). When the whole team is considered ($4.5 million per MW), the value produced is $195,300,000--again, the whole equaling more than the sum of its parts.

This valuation is assuming that the Rockies had built their team entirely of free agents, which is obviously not the case. Using my "home brew" calculation of $2.7 million per MW (a reflection of all marginal wins, not just FA MW), the Rockies as individuals produced a more realistic $114,245,023 of value. As a team, the Rockies produced $117,215,934. This shows that compared to their ODP in 2009, Colorado had surplus value of $42,014,934--a number which would certainly rank very highly in MLB this year (if I had the time I would prove it), though behind the 2007 squad in terms of efficiency.

Effectiveness

Of course, the Rockies were far from the most efficient team in MLB this year. That title belongs once again to the Florida Marlins, who had a MP/MW ratio in 2009 of $667,552 per MW. But the Marlins were not the most effective team in baseball, as they did not parlay their excellent marginal wins ratio into a playoff berth (and the revenue that comes with it).

My definition of MLB effectiveness gives a heavy weight to playoff appearances and championships. For that reason, I'd argue that the Rockies this year were the most effective club in baseball (with the possible exception of the World Series winner, as long as it isn't the Yankees). And for what it's worth, any of the four teams still alive that win the championship will have done so inefficiently.

The Rockies have created among the highest marginal win totals in MLB despite having a lower-half payroll (18th) and securing a playoff berth. What is remarkable is that the Rockies can say this for the second time in three years. Rockies fans are lucky to be following a smart organization that seems primed to continue their success in the near future.

How Efficient and Effective Were the Colorado Rockies in 2009?

Jabberwocky — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 03:54:37 -0000

Position Players

Pitchers

Marginal Payroll and Marginal Wins

(club payroll - (28 x major league minimum) / ((winning percentage - .300) x 162)

Low MP/MW, good record: Efficient ballclub (2003 Marlins, Athletics)
Low MP/MW, bad record: Not spending enough to compete (2003 Devil Rays)
High MP/MW, good record: Spending its way to the top (2003 Yankees)
High MP/MW, bad record: Poorly-run club (2003 Mets, Rangers)

To emphasize the inequity of wins, this is what I said back then:

Though it can be (and has been) done by a small payroll team, going from 60 to 80 wins in MLB is an insignificant accomplishment on a macro level because those teams still miss the playoffs. In moving from 80 to 90 wins, however, a team goes from an also-ran to a bona fide playoff contender. After all, 68 of 78 teams (87%) in the last ten years that crossed the 90 win threshold made the playoffs, making these marginal wins much more important and therefore expensive.

For example, the average value of a marginal win in 2008 was about $2.7 million, but the value of a win getting you from 89-90 wins was worth almost $6 million.

It isn't a simple concept by any means, but I've found that MP/MW or WORT has produced some excellent results. I'll show how the Rockies did by this metric after the jump.

Rockies Historical MP/MW Performance

Given that data, I'll break down the Rockies' 2009 season in a similar fashion.

Rockies Historical Dollar Win Values

The Efficiency of the 2009 Colorado Rockies

Opening Day Payroll: $75,201,000

W-L Record: 92-70

This of course also marks a franchise record, besting the 90-73 mark of the 2007 team. This team was the best compensated Rockies team, and as their record bore out, the best performing team as well.

Linear Payroll Efficiency: $817,402

Marginal Payroll:

Formula: ((ODP) - (28 * League Minimum) = (($75,201,000 - (28 * 400,000) = $64,001,000

Again, this represents the amount that the Rockies spent above MLB's price floor ($11.2 million). This year's total is second most in team history to 2001's $65,941,334.

Marginal Wins:

Formula: ((Winning % - .300) * (# of games played)) = (.568 - .300) * (162) = 43.4 MW

This number represents the amount of wins the Rockies produced about the floor set by Pappas of 30% of games won (48.6). This total is the most in franchise history, defeating 2007's 41.1 MW total.

Marginal Payroll / Marginal Wins:

$64,001,000 / 43.4 = $1,464,677

Team Hitting WAR: 18.7

On the whole the Rockies ranked 16th in MLB in this category, though AL teams have a leg up on NL teams because the above number includes hitting by pitchers, who "contributed" a total of -3.7 hitting WAR to the Rockies. That's why they're paid to pitch and not hit. Of course, it also includes Garrett Atkins (-0.5), who owes the Rockies $2.1 million for his "performance" in 2009. Courtesy of FanGraphs, here's a list of the Rockies' contributors to hitting WAR by player.

Historically, the Rockies' 18.7 hitting WAR puts them well behind 2007 (22.4 WAR) but bests every other season in the FanGraphs era.

Team Pitching WAR: 23.6

The challenge next year will be maintaining both this high level of performance and the remarkable health this year of the entire roster.

Total WAR: 42.3

In the case of the 2009 Rockies, this was certainly the case as Colorado finished with 1.1 more MW than their WAR data would have suggested.

Total Dollar Value of Player Production:

Here is Dave Cameron of Fangraphs on Dollar Win Value:

90 free agents signed major league contracts last winter, ranging from Alex’s Rodriguez $275 million deal to Josh Towers' $400,000 contract with the Rockies. The sum of those 90 contracts paid out $396 million in 2008. To figure out what the average cost per win of a 2007 free agent was, though, we need to know how many wins that group was worth.

To calculate this, I did a three year weighted average of their win values, then multiplied that value by .95 to factor in aging and estimate what teams considered a player’s true talent win rate for 2008. In total, I came up with 88 wins, or $4.5 million per win. That’s what major league teams were paying for a marginal win last winter, so for 2008, that’s a players dollar per win value as listed on the site. I re-did this for all years going back to 2002, and the dollars per win for each are as follows:

2002 - $2.6m / win
2003 - $2.8m / win
2004 - $3.1m / win
2005 - $3.4m / win
2006 - $3.7m / win
2007 - $4.1m / win
2008 - $4.5m / win

Generally though, this reflection of value is based not on the actual cost of a MW but on the market cost of a MW. As I explained a few months ago:

Due to the nature of the calculation (each WAR in the dollar value calculation being equal to the market cost per MW, which was higher than the average cost per MW), the Rockies are consistently receiving a higher "dollar value" from their roster than their ODP may suggest. However, if this "dollar value" concept would be adjusted to reflect merely the average cost per MW each year (in other words, taking into account all players instead of just free agents), then the "dollar value" numbers would often be below a team's ODP--especially if that team rates low on the MP/MW formula.

Effectiveness

The Rockies have created among the highest marginal win totals in MLB despite having a lower-half payroll (18th) and securing a playoff berth. What is remarkable is that the Rockies can say this for the second time in three years. Truly we fans are lucky to be following a smart organization that seems primed to continue their success in the near future.