SB Nation User Blog: Jack Moore

Kevin Towers: The End Of An Era

Jack Moore — Sat, 03 Oct 2009 06:00:19 -0000

More photos » by Lenny Ignelzi - AP

FILE - In this Nov. 4, 2008, file photo, San Diego Padres general manager Kevin Towers talks about the possibilities of trading star pitcher Jake Peavy and shortstop Khalil Greene, at a meeting of baseball GMs in Dana Point, Calif. Towers, the longest-tenured general manager in the major leagues, is being fired by the San Diego Padres after 14 seasons. (AP Photo/Lenny Ignelzi, File)

Browse more photos »

Floating around the rumor mill lately are reports that San Diego Padres GM will be fired after the season is over. Towers spent the last 14 seasons as the GM of the Padres, and over that span San Diego has made the playoffs 4 times, including their only World Series appearance in 1998. Assuming Towers will indeed lose his job, the Padres record over his Tenure will be 1107-1159, for a .478 winning percentage.

Of course, Jeff Moorad and the new Padres ownership group probably isn't terribly interested in the 1998 World Series run nor the back-to-back division titles in 2005 and 2006. As ESPN is wont to remind us, the world of professional sports is a "What have you done for me lately?" world. The Padres 74 win season this year certainly looks great compared to their 2008 win total of 63. However, their run differential suggests a talent level closer to 66 wins. Regardless, the talent on the field right now leaves something to be desired. The question must be asked, though - what did Towers do to deserve getting fired?

The Padres were a successful team by any rational measure from 2005-2007, averaging 86 wins and reaching the playoffs 2 times, narrowly missing a third in a legendary single-game playoff for the wild card. In 2008, the team won 63 games. What changes in on-field talent led to this massive drop-off? First, let's look at the major contributors from the 2007 team and their production in 2008.

Nearly every significant contributor from the 2007 team saw a significant drop in production or left the team through free agency. Jake Peavy couldn't follow up a tremendous 6 win 2007. Greg Maddux succumbed to age. Chris Young lost most of his 2008 to injury. Mike Cameron and Milton Bradley left to free agency. Old standby Trevor Hoffman slipped to nearly replacement level. Khalil Greene absolutely collapsed. Overall, the team lost over 16 wins of production from a core group of 13 players from the 89 win 2007 team.

Nobody stepped up to fill the gaps, either. The only position players not listed above to go above 1 WAR were Jody Gerut (3.2 WAR, no longer on the team) and Edgar Gonzalez (-0.4 WAR in 2009). Similarly, no pitchers stepped up to fill the gaps. Only Cha Seung Bak managed over 1 WAR in 2008, and he was injured through all of 2009. No team will be able to sustain a loss of 16 wins in production from their core and be able to compete without some contribution from new players. The Padres didn't bring in any big time free agents and weren't able to fill gaps with younger players.

This seems to suggest the Padres have not been able to infuse young talent into their team. There just haven't been players ready in AAA to come and fill in for aging or injured major leaguers. This isn't to say there's a lack of trying. Matt Antonelli, Nick Hundley, Paul McAnulty, Wade LeBlanc, Cla Meredith, Josh Banks, and Justin Germano saw significant time in 2008 and were all 25 or younger.

Unfortunately, the Padres did not get production out of this group of players. This inability to replace the lost production from 2007 led to the dismal 2008 season. Things are looking up this year, as they graduated Kyle Blanks and Everth Cabrera, who have combined for 1.8 wins in 2009 in under 600 PAs. They unloaded the expensive contract of Jake Peavy and picked up four decent prospects, giving a much needed boost to a 25th ranked farm system. They are a young team, with an average pitcher of 27 years old and average batter of 28, both below the league average.

However, no stars have been born out of these young players. The only truly elite player on the team is Adrian Gonzalez, as the only player with 3 or more wins above replacement this season. Also, the farm system doesn't have much in terms of elite prospects. With Kyle Blanks now in the majors, that leaves Mat Latos as their only top 100 prospect, and he ranks in the bottom half. They are deep, though, and they have one of the premier players in baseball to build around. They should have the money to rebuild with how low they've kept payroll.

Unfortunately for Kevin Towers, his farm system let him down in 2008 and 2009. It appears that the Padres are still a couple years away from making a run at the playoffs in a suddenly strong NL West. Without the elite chips to build with, Jeff Moorad isn't willing to wait around for a relic from the old ownership to win. Moorad could go in any number of directions, perhaps the most intriguing of which would be assistant GM Paul DePodesta of Moneyball fame. As for Towers, he has a solid reputation around baseball, and likely will not have to wait very long to find another job.

[Image: Justin Bopp. Data Sources: www.fangraphs.com, www.baseball-reference.com. Data Collection: Jack Moore]

Milton Bradley's Future

Jack Moore — Sat, 19 Sep 2009 20:23:22 -0000

More photos » by Jim Prisching - AP

8 months ago: Chicago Cubs' Milton Bradley flexes his injured leg during a stop in play in the fourth inning of a baseball game against the Milwaukee Brewers, Sunday, April 12, 2009, in Milwaukee. Bradley left the game with an injury. (AP Photo/Jim Prisching)

Browse more photos »

It's another down year in the North Side. The Cubs are barely above .500, and Murphy's Law appears to be in full effect once again. Perhaps the biggest disappointment of this season for the Cubs has been the inability of Milton Bradley to adjust to life in Chicago. The Cubs knew they were taking a risk with Bradley, as the slugger's long list of injuries and attitude problems hardly needs to be listed here. Now, Bradley's season is over after the Cubs suspended him for the season on Sunday.

It's not injuries that have brought Bradley crashing down to earth after a remarkable season with Texas last year. Bradley's played in 124 games so far, 2 fewer than last year. Bradley's wOBA fell 78 points from last year, a difference of over 30 runs in a similar sample size. His traditional statistics look especially poor, as Bradley's .257 batting average, 12 HRs, and 40 RBIs have drawn the ire of Cubs fans.

Given Bradley's less-than-affectionate comments regarding Cubs fans, it's not likely that he will be back in Chicago. With that as leverage, some opposing GM will likely be able to land the fiery slugger without having to pay a large piece of the 20 million dollars remaining on the last 2 years of his contract. Regardless of whether or not the Cubs jettison Bradley, someone as talented as him will likely find playing time on some roster. What should Bradley's next landing spot expect?

To put it succinctly, they should expect a productive player. In what was quite easily his worst season as a hitter since becoming an everyday player in 2002, Bradley still put up above average numbers. Bradley doesn't need to post impressive batting averages to be productive because he walks at a tremendous rate. This year, he's walking in 14.4% of his plate appearances. His IsoD (Isolated Discipline, OBP-AVG) remains staggering, this year at .121.

That isn't to say that everything is right with Bradley. Obviously, any drop of 78 wOBA points is alarming in some fashion. What's alarming here is the precipitous drop is Bradley's power. His SLG dropped from .563 to .397, and his IsoP (Isolated Power) dropped from .242 to .140. This is almost singularly the cause of Bradley's unfortunate season. As a player who has stayed relatively consistent with his walk numbers (especially since 2002), power production will shape a lot of Bradley's productivity at the plate.

Bradley's big power drop stems from a 10% drop in HR/FB and a 5% drop in LD%. Both those statistics were above his career norm, and have fallen below this year. We should expect some improvement in both those categories next year, which should result in a power rise and a production rise.

We shouldn't completely expect Bradley to return to his 2008 form in 2010. Bradley's 2008 season benefitted from tremendous BABIP numbers that we shouldn't expect him to repeat. This year, his BABIP fell from .396 to .311. .311 sounds more within reason for the average hitter, but Bradley has a career BABIP of .324, so based on his career profile it is possible that Bradley's BIP luck has been down. He managed to post a .405 wOBA in 2007 with a .329 wOBA, but he also had a .239 ISO.

Bradley is 31, and as such we shouldn't expect him to make any great leaps forward. Still, based on his last two years, he's probably better than a .345 wOBA hitter, which is already above average. He can produce as a DH in the AL, and his UZR of -1.0 in RF along with his positive career numbers suggest that he's not a burden in the outfield like the other "DH types" who were on the market this past winter, such as Pat Burrell and Raul Ibanez. Even if his production remains at its current level, some team could use his services, and he's much more likely to wOBA around .370 than the .345 he's at this year. He's been worth 1.3 wins in what is easily his worst season, and profiles as closer to a 2.5 win player next year. Some team with a need in the outfield or at DH should take a look at Bradley - it won't be costly and the benefits could be enormous.

Who is Seth Smith?

Jack Moore — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 01:37:49 -0000

Seth Smith

#7 / Left Field / Colorado Rockies

Height: 6-3

Weight: 215

Bats: L

Throws: L

Born: Sep 30, 1982

	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	K	SB	CS	AVG	OBP	SLG
2009 - Seth Smith	118	293	56	91	17	4	15	52	43	56	4	1	.311	.397	.549

Once again, the Colorado Rockies success is the major story of the National League playoff race. At the time of this writing, the Rockies currently sit 2.5 games in front of the San Francisco Giants for the NL Wild Card lead, with a record of 82-64 after opening up 18-28, with playoff odds below 1%.

A big part of the Rockies' good fortune this year has been the emergence of Seth Smith. At 27, Smith has emerged as a producer at the big league level after two insignificant major league stints in the previous two seasons. Smith's impressive stats above have impressed both traditionalists and sabermetricians alike. His .402 wOBA currently ranks 13th in the entire major leagues among players with 345 or more PAs (the amount Smith has as of Tuesday night)

Smith's contributions haven't been limited to the batter's box. In 75 games as a LF, Smith has posted a remarkable +7.5 UZR (+18.4 UZR/15). Smith's .913 RZR ranks favorably as well, and would tie for third in the league if he were qualified. However, these numbers should be taken with a pound of salt, due to a small sample size and the fact that Smith did not have anything more than an average COF defensive reputation coming into the league.

Of course, thanks to our sample of slightly over 450 PAs and 75 defensive games, we're hardly any closer to answering the title question than we were before the jump. Smith's 139 OPS+ is exciting, and for very good reason. Still, a lot can happen in 375 PAs (Smith's 2009 total). There's an even greater magnitude of uncertainty in Smith's defense, as UZR is known to have large measurement error, especially in samples of smaller than a full season. So, once again, I ask: Who is Seth Smith?

Despite the small sample size, it's clear that Smith has the ability to produce with the bat. Although Smith's season to date is certainly remarkable, his minor league numbers suggested a high level of offensive talent. Even in his first professional season, Smith showed above average on base and power skills, and showed improvement each season as he worked his way up the organizational ladder.

Smith was a bit above average for his age at each of these levels, but not by an alarming amount. The increase in power in 2006 would make any scouting director's day - it's the difference between Melky Cabrera and Matt Kemp this year. After 2007, Smith had a solid argument to start 2008 in the majors, but he would remain in Colorado Springs for one more season. The increase in Isolated Discipline (IsoD) that Smith showed in 2008, along with retaining high power numbers, removed all doubt that he was ready to test his skills against a major league pitching staff.

Smith has not been able to maintain the 15.6% walk rate that powered his .106 IsoD in 2008, but a 12.6% walk rate against major league pitching is fantastic. As a result, his IsoD is at a solid .085, well above his pre-2008 minor league numbers. Much like Marco Scutaro, who also has turned a tremendous walk rate into a career year, Smith is a selective hitter, only swinging at 40.5% of pitches against a league average of 45%. Between this year and last year in the minors, Smith appears to have true talent for reaching base, regardless of whether or not the ball is bouncing his way.

What may be more questionable for Smith are his power numbers. At .236, his ML ISO is over 20 points higher than his minor league career high. His 15.7% HR/FB rate is above average, but it's within 1 standard deviation of the mean, and as such it is certainly a reasonable rate to expect out of a hitter playing in Coors' Field. The more likely culprit for his higher power numbers is the .346 BABIP he's sported entering play on Tuesday. BABIP suggests that more hits are falling for Smith than we would expect in his average sample, and as such he may have had more doubles fall as well. As Smith doesn't appear to have any particular skill connected to posting a high BABIP, like an Ichiro-type player, we should expect some regression as he goes forward. Still, StatCorner's wOBA* doesn't expect heavy regression, rating him at a still-stellar .398.

The real question for Smith as his career goes forward is his defense. Smith's scouting reports suggest that he would be an average corner outfielder at best, whereas his +7.5 UZR in LF suggests he could possibly be an above average center fielder. His minor league numbers tell a completely different story. Thanks to www.minorleaguesplits.com, we can see that Smith's poor defensive reputation coming into the majors was perhaps optimistic. Between 3 levels and 4 years, Smith compiled a total of -59 totalZone runs below average. I would be shocked to see Smith continue to compile good fielding numbers in the majors, and would expect him to regress towards average if not below.

Still, Smith appears to be fully capable of posting wOBAs near .400, if not at or above that level. If he continues to do that, the Rockies will quickly run out of excuses to keep him on the bench. Given the chance, he could evolve into one of the league's superstars.

Nick Johnson's Odd 2009

Jack Moore — Tue, 08 Sep 2009 01:05:16 -0000

Nick Johnson

#20 / First Base / Florida Marlins

Height: 6-3

Weight: 235

Bats: L

Throws: L

Born: Sep 19, 1978

Nick Johnson's career has become one of the major oddities of professional baseball over the last decade. Johnson debuted in 2001 with the New York Yankees, and after mediocre seasons in 2001 and 2002, Johnson broke out in 2003. He became more selective and made more contact, resulting in a much higher walk rate (17.8% vs. 11.3% in 2002) and a much lower strikeout rate (17.6% vs. 25.9%). We see the impact of these rates in his slash line statistics, as a .243/.347/.402 season in 2002 became a .284/.422/.472 line in 2003.

Fast forward to 2009. Johnson's walk rates have remained fantastic since that 2003 season with New York, bottoming out in 2004 at 13.7% (vs. a league average of 8.7%) with Montreal after an offseason trade. High OBPs and above average fielding (+3.3 UZR/150 career) carried Johnson to seasons of 4.6 and 5.3 wins respectively in 2005 and 2006. Johnson's career never jumped to superstardom because of injuries, which forced him to miss siginificant time in both 2004 and 2008, and all of 2007.

In 2009, Johnson has remained mostly injury free, playing so far in 114 games. His OBP skills have not missed a beat, as he remains among the league leaders with a .421 OBP between his time with the Washington Nationals and the Florida Marlins, whom he was dealt to at the trading deadline. As might be expected given his injury history, his defense has declined quite a bit, and his UZR this year is quite low at -6.4.

What's odd for Johnson this year is his power production. Johnson has never been a severe power threat, especially as first basemen go. He's only topped 20 HRs once (2006), and that same year was the only one in which he eclipsed a .500 slugging percentage, and he's created his .370+ wOBA's mostly from his OBP skills. Johnson's SLG usually sits about 50-70 points above his OBP. This year, however, Johnson's SLG is actually 10 points below his OBP. Usually, players with OBPs greater than their SLGs have extraordinarily low SLG, as opposed to extraordinarily high OBPs. In fact, since 1901, only there have only been 40 seasons in which a batting-title-qualified player's OBP was greater than .420 and his SLG was less than .420.

Still, offensively, Johnson is a very productive player despite this anomaly. An average player makes outs at a frequency 7.8% higher than the frequency at which Johnson does. Regardless of whether those non-out PAs are homers, doubles, singles, or walks, whatever it is that Johnson is doing makes his team better. As a result, Johnson's wOBA is a tremendous .370, comparable to such sluggers as Carlos Pena (.374 wOBA, .538 SLG) and Raul Ibanez (.375 wOBA, .548 SLG).

Nick Johnson hits the free agent market in 2010 on pace for a 2.0-2.25 win season, coming off injury. His winter will certainly be a very interesting one.

Properly Evaluating Trades: A Look At One Famous Deadline Deal

Jack Moore — Fri, 04 Sep 2009 03:27:23 -0000

When reading analyses of trades past, it is very common to see the analyst insert the caveat that "we'll really know who won this trade in 3 years," or something along those lines. Of course, it's obvious that the Yankees won that famous "trade" in which they bought Babe Ruth from the Red Sox. Consider, though, that if Ruth had suffered a career ending injury in the first year following the trade, we'd never talk about it. That wouldn't make it a smart deal for the Red Sox. This is only the most obvious of examples, but the point is that we base far too much of how we evaluate trades on results, both in the immediate aftermath and in retrospective look-backs, as opposed to process.

Let us consider the following trade. For the sake of the exercise, only the relevant information of the players involved will be presented. No names, no teams. This trade occurred with free agency rules in place, and arbitration rules were as they are today. Minimum salary was roughly 140,000, and one marginal win cost roughly 750,000 dollars overall. A free agent win cost roughly 1.5 million. Here is the deal:

TEAM A (NL 7.5 GB OF PLAYOFF SPOT) TRADES
------------------------
PLAYER 1 - AGE: 27 POS: RP ML SEASONS: 2.5 ML IP: 159.3 CAREER WAR: 3.1 CONTRACT STATUS: PRE-ARB
AGE 25: 8.5 K/9 3.4 BB/9 29.2 IP
AGE 26: 8.6 K/9 3.5 BB/9 83.2 IP
AGE 27: 9.0 K/9 3.5 BB/9 46.0 IP
---
PLAYER 2 - AGE: 25 POS: SP/RP ML SEASONS: 1 ML IP 16.2 CAREER WAR: -0.8 CONTRACT STATUS: PRE-ARB
MINORS -
AGE 23: 7.7 K/9 4.1 BB/9 163.1 IP between AA/AAA
AGE 24: 10.9 K/9 3.6 BB/9 60.1 IP AAA
AGE 25: 9.6 K/9 2.9 BB/9 80 IP AAA
---
PLAYER 3 - AGE: 23 POS: SP ML SEASONS: 0 ML IP: 0.0 CAREER WAR: 0.0 CONTRACT STATUS: PRE-ARB
AGE 21: 8.6 K/9 3.9 BB/9 139.2 IP A
AGE 22: 8.3 K/9 2.8 BB/9 172.0 IP A+
AGE 23: 7.7 K/9 3.3 BB/9 133.2 IP AA

-----------------------------------------------------------

TEAM B (AL, 19.5 GB) TRADES

-----------------------------------------------------------
PLAYER 4 - AGE: 33 POS: 1B/DH ML SEASONS: 11 ML PA: 5409 CAREER WAR: 43.3 CONTRACT STATUS: SIGNED THROUGH AGE 33 SEASON AT 2.40MM REMAINING
AGE 31: +55 bRAA, -2 TZ, 5.5 WAR
AGE 32: +67 bRAA, -3 TZ, 6.5 WAR
AGE 33: +30 bRAA, -7 TZ, 2.7 WAR

DO NOT CLICK "CONTINUE READING THIS POST" OR READ PAST THE JUMP ("***") BEFORE VOTING IN THE POLL, OR IF YOU FIGURE OUT WHICH TRADE THIS POST IS REFERRING TO.

The point of this is to evaluate a trade without the bias that comes from the names, and knowing what happened in their careers. Let me know who you think wins this deal.

Online Surveys & Market Research

This deal was ranked among the top 10 worst deadline deals ever by the vaunted baseball analysts over at ESPN's Page 2. The year was 1997. Team A is St. Louis, and Team B is Oakland. In this deal, the Cardinals sent over T.J. Mathews (player A), Eric Ludwick (player B), brother of current cardinal Ryan Ludwick, and Blake Stein (player C), and received a player who would go on to break one of the most important and long-lasting records in baseball history, and according to some, revive baseball alongside Sammy Sosa. Player D is, of course, Mark McGwire. The luster is certainly gone from the McGwire name after his run-ins with steroids, but nobody can say that he didn't help the Cardinals during his time there. Big Mac would put up 2 more wins in the last 2 months of the season. All told, McGwire's mammoth power provided the Cardinals with 19.8 wins in 4 ⅓ seasons, certainly an impressive number.

Of course, the Cardinals really only received 2.2 of those wins as a result of the trade. Although you can certainly make an argument that the last two months McGwire spent as a Cardinal influenced his signing, he was still a free agent after that time. Really, what we see in this trade is the Cardinals trading a very solid reliever in Mathews, who had already posted 120 impressive innings as a ML reliever, as well as two young pitchers in Ludwick and Stein who had shown decent minor league peripherals. And you certainly can't pin any blame on the A's here, who likely had no shot to sign McGwire to a long term deal.

If any of the three players received by Oakland in this deal had panned out, this entire article wouldn't be necessary. Mathews' K/9 plummeted below 7 immediately after the trade, as did Ludwick's. Stein never posted a K/BB above 1.25 with either the A's or the Royals, whom he played for after his brief stint with the Athletics. Still, I think the process here was correct for the A's. They traded an asset that was essentially worthless to them as a team 20 games back of the playoffs, and received three pieces making the league minimum, each with a chance to contribute at a major league level. Mathews, especially, had already shown the ability to contribute at a very high level. Unfortunately for the A's, this one just didn't work. Chalk one up for "Good Process, Bad Result."

On the Cardinals side, I'm actually kind of baffled that they'd do this deal. Mathews had been very productive for his age and contract, while Ludwick and Stein weren't throwaway pieces. At 7.5 games behind, they would've needed about 5 or 6 McGwire's, if not more, to catch the leaders, and 2.4 million dollars certainly wasn't chump change in 1997. I don't know if they had some sort of inside information that suggested that McGwire would sign with them, or if this is just Tony La Russa's meddling, or what, but this deal didn't figure into the long term for a team that had an insignifcant chance at making the playoffs. This one goes into "Bad Process, Good Result" for me, and that's only if you include his time after the '97 season in the result. I suppose 2.2 wins are always good, especially for the fans, but it doesn't really help your team long term and I think it's unfair to count the free agent signing as part of the trade.

Still, because McGwire hit 70 HRs and many other memorable shots with the Cards from 1998-2001, this trade will always be seen as a win for St. Louis, despite the fact that it was a questionable trade given what was known at the time.

My Collaboration with Bugs & Cranks' Tyler Maas

Jack Moore — Tue, 01 Sep 2009 00:31:53 -0000

My Collaboration with Bugs & Cranks' Tyler Maas

Over the last week I collaborated with Bugs & Cranks author and my former colleague at Right Field Bleachers, Tyler Maas. We discuss some basic sabermetric questions and I also answer some questions related to the Brewers, in a slightly comedic fashion.

Five Win Wonder: Marco Scutaro

Jack Moore — Thu, 27 Aug 2009 00:04:39 -0000

Marco Scutaro

#19 / Short Stop / Toronto Blue Jays

Height: 5-9

Weight: 175

Bats: R

Throws: R

Born: Oct 30, 1975

	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	K	SB	CS	AVG	OBP	SLG
2009 - Marco Scutaro	123	494	88	144	33	1	11	55	76	62	10	4	.291	.385	.429

Every year sees players jump from relative obscurity to stardom. Although Marco Scutaro's traditional numbers (.291 AVG, 11 HR, 55 RBIs) have kept him under the mainstream media radar, Scutaro is having a year that will excite any sabermetrically inclined fan. After bouncing between 2B, 3B, and SS with Oakland from 2004-2007, Scutaro seems to have settled in as a SS with the Blue Jays, and his UZR with Toronto has been fantastic, rating at +17.5 runs in just over a full season's worth of games (+10 this year). Not only that, but Scutaro has been an on-base machine, supplementing his .291 batting average with a 13.3% walk rate to post a Jeter-esque .385 OBP. Combine that with his modest power (.138 ISO, best in his career), and Scutaro has been worth +15 runs with the bat as well (by FanGraphs wOBA)

Overall, Scutaro has been almost exactly worth 5 wins so far in 2009. This is certainly uncharted territory for the 33-year-old, and it certainly begs the question of what we can expect from him going forward. Why did a player who only put up 5.2 wins total in 5 full seasons from 2004-2008 suddenly double his career production in one fell swoop in 2009?

Walking To Work Can Be Rather Pedestrian

One of the keys to the improvement in Scutaro's offensive numbers has been the rise in his walk rate. Scutaro's best offensive season before 2009 was in 2006 with the Athletics, where Scutaro posted a .331 wOBA and was effectively average with the bat, after two years of -13.0 and -6.5. The main difference with Scutaro's 2006 was a rise in walk rate from 3.8% in 2004 to 8.6% in 2005 and finally to 12.0% in 2006. Scutaro's walk rate reverted towards back towards his 2005 rate in 2007 and 2008; in both years the utility man posted walk rates in the 9% area. In 2009, Scutaro's walk rate is up above 13% for the first time in his career, and Scutaro's posting a whopping .367 wOBA.

So, it certainly appears that walk rate is a big part of Scutaro's offensive game. But, as we can see on the above graph, there's a little bit more to the 2009 explosion in offense than the walk rate. For the first time in Scutaro's career, he's walking more than he's striking out. His 2006 walk explosion was met by a similar increase in strikeouts, a rise from 12% to 18%. In 2009, his strikeout rate has remained in the 12% range, where it has been every full season he's played except for 2006.

We can see some of the explanation in Scutaro's plate discipline numbers. After dropping his swing% about 7% from 2004-2005, Scutaro's walk rate increased from his miniscule 2004 rate of 3% up to an average 8%. This swing rate stayed static until 2009, when his swing rate dropped from an 40% (already well below average) to 35%. Scutaro's improved in nearly every single plate discipline stat. He's swinging at fewer pitches out of the zone, and making contact with more pitches both inside and outside of the zone. Scutaro is making it count when he doesn't get walked, and isn't swinging wildly at bad pitches.

Defense Matters

As Scutaro was moved around the field early in his career, he posted poor numbers at SS and relatively average numbers at his other infield positions (2B and 3B). For some reason, since he's latched on with Toronto, he's become one of the best defensive shortstops in the league. Every season with Oakland, all of his UZR component stats were average or below. Then, all of a sudden, at the age of 32, his range skyrocketed and he became the best fielder in the league. At his age, it would be hard to believe that he could maintain this kind of defensive production. Still, even if we assume some big drops in production for the next two seasons, Scutaro can still be a valuable asset. If Scutaro's wOBA drops back to average and his UZR drops back to average, as a SS, he'd still be a 2.7 win player.

However, if he continues to defy age and field like a +10 shortstop, his value will be immense for the next couple of seasons. Even with average hitting, he'd be a +3.75 win player, worth something like 15-18 million dollars for a one year deal. J.P. Ricciardi has a very valuable chip on his hands here. If the Blue Jays fall out of contention early, Scutaro could become a major piece for a playoff contender. Personally, it makes me wonder why Scutaro wasn't discussed nearly as much during this years trading season.

Mike Morse striking out against below-replacement-level Brewers LH RP Chris Narveson. Pitch 4 was...

Jack Moore — Sun, 23 Aug 2009 03:11:42 -0000

Mike Morse striking out against below-replacement-level Brewers LH RP Chris Narveson. Pitch 4 was a touch under 90 and was Narveson's fastest pitch of the night.

Larger pic: http://tinyurl.com/myf4gp

The White Sox - Huge Contracts to 2010 and Beyond

Jack Moore — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 04:56:56 -0000

More photos » by Lenny Ignelzi - ASSOCIATED PRESS

Jake Peavy's contract has 52 million dollars remaining on it. Will his contract, along with the 62 million remaining on Alex Rios's contract, bog down the White Sox, or will they be able to win with them?

Browse more photos »

The White Sox have arguably been the biggest movers and shakers of this year's soft trade deadline, adding two gigantic contracts in the forms of Jake Peavy and Alex Rios. The White Sox, through these deals, have added over 110 million dollars of salary between 2010 and 2014. There's no question that Jake Peavy and Alex Rios will provide some sort of production over the course of these contracts, even if it's not the level of production that the White Sox are paying for. The question for the White Sox is whether or not they can still manage to operate from under the burden of these and other large contracts. Before adding Peavy and Rios, the White Sox were already at a $96MM payroll entering the season - 12th highest in the league, but the 13th highest was $82MM. The White Sox certainly belong to that second tier of large-market teams, behind the New York teams, the Cubs, and the Tigers, but more in line with the L.A. teams, Seattle, and Philadelphia.

It's possible that the White Sox could afford to add payroll because they subtracted over 25 million dollars in payroll over the 2008 offseason. Still, these additions have pushed them right back into that 120 million dollar range. With the economy as it is, I find it more feasible for the White Sox payroll to remain in the 100-110 million range as it did in 2006 and 2007. Let's take a look at the team that the White Sox will have under control for the 2010 season.

Now, they will need to fill a 5th rotation spot, 2 bullpen spots, a DH spot, and 5 bench spots (or 3 bullpen spots and 4 bench spots, depending on how they work their bullpen). If they do this internally, those 9 spots will cost 3.6M, taking their total guaranteed money for 2010 up to $93.675MM. Along with Wilson Betemit's contract, for 1.75MM through 2010 and Cuban defector Dayan Viciedo's $2.25M contract, this brings up the total to $97.675 Using Tom Tango's convenient payroll to expected win% formula, we can see what kind of team the White Sox should be getting out of this money.

For the purposes of this exercise, let's assume that the average payroll remains near $90MM, much like last year when it decreased by only $1MM. Then, with a $97.675MM payroll, the White Sox should expect a .505 win%, or win 82 games. With a replacement level set at a .300 win%, that means that a team with the payroll of the White Sox payroll should be roughly 33 wins above replacement. This year's White Sox team, without any major contributions from Rios or Peavy, is currently on pace to be at +37 wins above replacement. However, the White Sox will be losing a significant group of players next year (assuming Josh Fields goes to the minor leagues where he belongs, and Wilson Betemit remains in the minors where he belongs).

PLAYER	WINS
Contreras	2.1
Thornton	1.8
Thome	1.6
Richard	1.3
Dye	0.6
Dotel	0.6
Poreda	0.2
Colon	0.2
Anderson	0.1
MacDougal	-0.1
Podsednik	1.1
Betemit	-0.7
Fields	-0.8

Removing these players and their 8 WAR, the White Sox would only be on pace for 26 WAR this year. Now, of course, given playing time consideration it's possible that the 16 players remaining with the team would be worth more than 26 WAR total. However, I highly doubt it would be the 7 WAR necessary to get up to the efficiency requirement.

Using 26 wins as our base, let's see what kind of performance we should expect out of the 2010 White Sox without any major free agent additions.

The additions of Rios and Peavy (who I project at roughly 3.5 wins each) add 7 wins.
Gordon Beckham should improve and receive more playing time. He could add anywhere from 1-3 more wins than he has produced this year (+1.1 through 61 games). If Beckham is a 3.0 win player next year (a conservative estimate), that would add an extra 1.5 wins to our base.
Aging from Konerko, Buehrle, and Pierzynski should lead to decreased production, on the order of about 1.5 wins.
Carlos Quentin's return to injury could add anywhere from 2-4 wins. For our purposes, Quentin adds 3 wins.

Then our rough projection for the White Sox WAR would be in the ballpark of 36 wins, with pretty large error bars, probably along the lines of 5 wins on the way down and 3 wins on the way up. This gives a win total estimate of 79-87. At the high end, this may be a playoff team, but it would be unlikely. If the Sox are willing to up their payroll to 110 million dollars, though, they may be able to add up to 5 wins, vaulting them to the 84-92 win range and putting them right in the thick of the race. Regardless, the young talent of players like Beckham, Danks, and Quentin offsets the large contracts of Peavy, Rios, Buehrle, and the other veterans on the team, and the White Sox are actually spending their money at a reasonably efficient level, especially given their status in the market.

Looking longer term, the White Sox only have 3 contracts coming off the books after the 2010 season: Paul Konerko ($12MM), AJ Pierzynski ($6.25MM), Wilson Betemit ($1.75MM), along with the buyouts for Dye and Thornton ($1.25MM), for a combined $21.25MM. With increases in the backloaded contracts of Peavy and Rios along with talented players entering their second and third years of arbitration (Danks, Jenks, Wise, Quentin), the relief will not be much. With their core getting older quickly, the White Sox will have to replenish the ML club with a depleted farm system, which has dealt two top arms in Poreda and Richard, and their 2nd best hitting prospect in Brandon Allen, all in a year in which two of their top 5 prospects graduated to the majors in Chris Getz and Beckham. If Kenny Williams is caught in a situation where he is inclined to buy in the near future, due to the large contracts for veterans and increasing contracts for young players already in place, the White Sox in 2012 may be due for a long rebuilding period. Still, Williams has the team in a condition to compete in 2010 and 2011 at least, and with good drafting the franchise could be set up for success.

Graph of the Day: Derek Jeter and Old Yankee Stadium

Jack Moore — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 06:23:08 -0000

Derek Jeter's HR totals the last 3 years (2009 excluded): 14, 12, 11. So far, through 45 fewer games than 2008, Jeter already has 12 HRs. Much has been made about the homer-increasing effect of the New Yankee Stadium. Let's take a look at where the 10 HRs Jeter has hit at the new park map out at the House that Ruth Built. Red dots represent balls that would not make it out at Old Yankee Stadium.

Again, there may be some errors due to scaling, but the effects seem pretty obvious. Only three of the 10 homers Jeter has hit at the new stadium would be out without the switch. With this boost in power, Jeter's ISO has risen 23 points from last year's mark. Jeter may be in a park that plays to his strengths as an opposite field hitter, but Jeter's 35, and not much has changed outside of where he's playing. Despite his increased production, it is still questionable whether or not Jeter's career can continue after he can't play SS any more.

Home run data from www.hittrackeronline.com