SB Nation User Blog: Jay

More on DeRosa-Perez swap, reactions from Lee and others

Jay — Sun, 28 Jun 2009 18:45:49 -0000

More on DeRosa-Perez swap, reactions from Lee and others

The Accountability All-Stars weigh in. Wood: "This is the result of how we've played as a team." Hafner: "We're going to miss him. At the same time, this team has a lot of depth at positions and we're still looking to win as many games as we can." But as for Cliff: "Until you have a no-trade clause in your contract, there's always a chance something will happen."

The sidebar names Jess Todd and Francisco Samuel as two of the names on the Indians' pick list.

"The Indians are informing teams that Cliff Lee is indeed available."

Jay — Sun, 28 Jun 2009 16:16:23 -0000

"The Indians are informing teams that Cliff Lee is indeed available."

Those words this morning from Ken Rosenthal of Fox Sports. The language is a little stronger than prior reports, which suggested that the Indians were willing to listen to offers but would have to be overwhelmed. Of course, the Indians are always wiling to listen to offers — literally on any player — and of course, they will still need to be overwhelmed in order to trade Cliff Lee.

So what's different about this report? The suggestion that the Indians essentially have put the other 29 clubs "on notice" — we really might trade this guy, so if you were thinking about trying to overwhelm us, better get on it right now before some other club does.

The Colon/Sabathia bonus: Act now, and you can have him for three months in this year's pennant race, not just two. And the only-Colon bonus: You also get a very reasonable 2010 option, which means (best case) he can be part of your pennant race next year as well, or (worst case) you can re-flip him a year from now if you're out of it.

Rosenthal reports that the Rangers potentially make a good fit, if they can figure out a way to fit in his salary, and if they're willing to let go of an advanced prospect who's a potential ace. Rosenthal reported just four days ago that the Dodger have an interest, and that the Phillies inquired but weren't yet prepared to overwhelm.

In today's report, Rosenthal quotes a source as saying that Lee is set on becoming a free agent after 2010. This is not entirely news, and the then-age-32 pitcher is unlikely to be a good value signing for any club. It does reflect the reality that with another disappointing season under our belts, we're losing whatever shine we had with respect to signing or re-signing veterans who want to win.

Lee's sentiment may be giving the Indians a little push here, although they certainly are in a position to do nothing and not feel stupid about it. Much moreso than in prior years, however, money may be a real factor — not for 2009, but for 2010. The economic situation combined with a disappointing season could lead to truly massive shortfalls in ticket revenue, both for 2009 walkups and 2010 season tickets. A highly touted rookie may not be able to match Lee's performance in 2010, but he might not be that far off, and he'll definitely be $8 million cheaper.

Even beyond all that, the simple reality is that there likely will never be a better time to sell high on Cliff Lee. He is the reigning AL Cy Young winner, and he's got a 2.23 ERA over his last 14 starts. Over his last 47 starts, he has a 2.67 ERA, and he's allowed only 19 home runs in that span while averaging more than 7 IP per start.

Jose Veras added, Jensen sent down

Jay — Sat, 27 Jun 2009 02:58:40 -0000

Jose Veras added, Jensen sent down

Up seven runs ... two lead-off walks ... yeah, we've seen enough of that this season. A little surprising to see them burn Jensen's option at this late date, when it seems like he probably should have been sent down weeks ago.

Jose Veras is ... well, he just is.

I say to [Wedge], "You can say that I don't play hard or whatever, but I'm the same guy every...

Jay — Thu, 25 Jun 2009 22:30:51 -0000

I say to [Wedge], "You can say that I don't play hard or whatever, but I'm the same guy every time." Whether I play good or bad, I play the same. You can't say I don't play hard, because I try to do my best every time. Sometimes things don't [go your way], and that's baseball.

"Every year, [Wedge and I] have the same problem. I don't know why. I try to do my job.

"It makes me a little bit mad sometimes. But it's his decision. He's the manager, and he can say whatever. But I try to do my best.

"I was fine at shortstop. I didn't do too bad. [The move] doesn't make me mad. Maybe it's good for my future to play third base. But right now I feel like I could play short.

"I think that someday I could go to a different team and maybe have a chance to play short."

Jhonny Peralta, as told to Castrovince.

Hey, Mark: Cut the Crap

Jay — Wed, 24 Jun 2009 03:54:39 -0000

Mr. Mark Shapiro
Progressive Field
2401 Ontario St.
Cleveland, OH 44115

Dear Mark,

I'm writing you today with a serious concern, as a devoted fan of the Cleveland Indians. And to be honest, I'm also deeply concerned as a fan of Mark Shapiro. You've always presented a public image as a highly effective, intelligent, level-headed, and reasonable guy, and a class act, to boot.

So from one classy, reasonable guy to another, I really have to tell you, it is time for you to cut the crap. And by "the crap," I mean the public defense of your manager, Eric Wedge.

I understand that you think highly of Wedge. I understand that you're loyal and, like I said, a classy guy. But your loyalty towards Wedge has now become something quite disloyal and un-classy — to your bosses, to your organization, and to Indians fans everywhere. Life is tricky that way.

Let's start with the fans. Mark, this has been a brutal season. Just brutal. And I'm sure you know, it's even more brutal as one horrible disappointment coming right on the heels of the last horrible disappointment. In a season like this, how many Indians fans are interested in reading or hearing about your defense of Eric Wedge?

That's right, Mark, zero. Nobody wants to hear this crap, Mark, and nobody thinks you should be spending any of your time talking about it. Even if you're right — and you're not right, by the way, but let's not get off-track — even if you're right, Mark, nobody wants to hear it. Every time you defend Wedge, you're just spitting in the eye of every fan who's tired of losing, and you will never, ever convince even one fan that you're right about this.

And in a season like this, the fans' feelings need to be respected. I know you're not going to respect the fans' feelings in your decision-making — you never have, and I'm not saying you should start now — but at the very least, Mark — again, one reasonable, classy guy to another — you ought to respect the fans' feelings in your public statements. I'm one of those "intellectual bloggers," Mark, and even I'm saying, cut the crap.

On to your bosses, team owner Larry Dolan and team president Paul Dolan. On this issue, and for the first time in your tenure as GM that I can recall, you actually have been disloyal to your bosses and surprisingly un-classy. The Dolans are going to meet with you this week, or so we are told. There is going to be a "process of evaluation," and we are led to believe that one of the things being evaluated is the future of Wedge and his staff. Ultimately, they might decide Wedge needs to be fired — they might — and it's their right to decide that.

And yet, here you are — their subordinate — publicly lobbying for Wedge to keep his job, and poor-mouthing the notion that he (or any manager!) should be fired. In other words, you're criticizing the very decision that the Dolans may make next week! Here's what you told Peter Gammons (emphasis mine):

... our players have never stopped playing hard, never quit on him; there's been no back-biting or dissension and, frankly, we may have been in position to win games we shouldn't have. I think just firing the manager is a cop-out. Winning is an organizational result.

Here's the thing, Mark: the Dolans might eventually decide that Wedge ought to be fired — and yes, Mark, reasonable, well-intentioned people might actually believe that. And now, they'll have to publicly contradict their GM in order to do it. Tell me something, if they do fire him, have you given any thought to what you're going to say at the press conference?

Hey, you know that thing I said was a cop-out the other day? Firing the manager? Yeah, well, my bosses have told me to do that.

Right. So you've kind of put them in a corner on this. Not very loyal, and not very classy.

Finally, the team itself. Again, I understand that you feel very strongly about Wedge. I understand that he's been a partner in your process, a great team player. I understand that you feel he has truly extraordinary leadership qualities — what exactly those extraordinary qualities are, I'm not really clear on, but I do understand that you feel that he has them.

Here's the thing, though, Mark: Eric Wedge is not entitled to a lifetime appointment as manager of the Indians. There are many well qualified people who could do his job at least adequately, including at least two already in your employ, and Wedge doesn't deserve a never-ending trial run any more than they do. He doesn't get an indefinite free pass any more than MIke Hargrove did, any more than Charlie Manuel did.

You remember Charlie Manuel, right? Perfectly good manager. Didn't really do anything wrong. You fired him anyway, apparently believing, "Eh, I think maybe somebody else can do better." You didn't really seem to need any better reason than that, and Manuel was in just his third season. And I think you're a classy enough to guy to concede, Mark, that it turns out the Charlie Manuel is a pretty decent big-league manager after all. And I'm a classy enough guy to concede that you weren't necessarily wrong for firing him. After all, nobody is entitled to a lifetime appointment, and you thought you could do better — that's good enough for me.

But now it's Wedge on the hot seat. Your hire, your partner, but that shouldn't change anything. After three disappointing seasons out of four, Mark, don't you have to admit that it's possible that maybe — maybe — somebody else could do better?

It's possible, right? Possible?

Say it with me, Mark: It's possible.

So cut the crap, Mark. Enough with the excuses. I know all about the injuries, but Grady and Asdrubal have only missed 20 games, not 100, not even 50. And as for the rotation, what's happened there is pretty much what we expected when the season started. Be honest — the fact that either one of Pavano and Reyes is still in the rotation and pitching decently is better than anyone assumed would unfold. And be honest — you didn't really expect Scott Lewis to remain healthy and effective all season, and if it weren't for roster issues, Huff would have started the season in Cleveland ahead of Lewis anyway.

So the rotation problems really come down to Carmona, and Carmona's failures aren't a result of bad luck. Working with Carmona, reaching Carmona, righting Carmona, was the responsibility of Wedge and his staff. And they failed, Mark. They couldn't fix Carmona, just as they haven't been able to fix a half-dozen other disappointing players, like Garko, Francisco and Shoppach. It's now going on four years of failure to get Jhonny Peralta to focus consistently on doing his job. For a manager whose best asset is supposed to be his sterling leadership, what does that say?

I asked a couple days, ago, and I'll ask it again: Exactly which players have been helped by Wedge's purportedly great leadership? Guys like Sizemore or Martinez, who are so famously self-motivated? Veterans like Dellucci and Blake, who were so famously great teammates with great professionalism and great approaches? If not them, and if not our younger, struggling players ... then who?

And getting back to that quote you gave Gammons: "... our players have never stopped playing hard, never quit on him ..."

Is that it, Mark? That's the big deal about this guy? That these players — most of whom are competing for playing time and/or a 2010 contract — have continued to do their jobs, rather than deciding not to do their jobs anymore?

Here's another one: "I believe no one cares more about these players and this organization than Eric Wedge. I feel strongly he's making every effort to move this in a positive direction."

Is that it? He cares a lot and tries hard? Seriously?

Time to face facts, Mark. Whatever exceptional qualities you have observed in Eric Wedge, after six and a half years, there is little if any evidence that those qualities have ever really helped the Indians win ballgames. It is an insult to a guy like Joel Skinner to suggest that Eric Wedge has been anything special as a manager. It's an insult to the whole organization, and it's an insult to the fans.

Comments like that demonstrate that you're loyal to your troops, yes, but they also suggest strongly that you're a little too close to the situation to see it clearly. And you don't work for your troops, Mark. You work for the team. You work for the Dolans. You work for us.

So it's time to cut the crap, Mark. I'm not saying you have to fire Wedge. That's between you and the Dolans. But we really don't need to hear or read another goddammned word about what a special guy Eric Wedge is, or about what a heckuva job he's doing, or about how firing him would be especially rash, or unwise, or a cop-out. He hasn't been part of the solution in Cleveland, and it's possible — it's possible — that he's part of the problem.

Say it with me, Mark: It's possible.

Warmest regards,

Jay

Laffey shines, Weglarz slams for Aeros

Jay — Wed, 24 Jun 2009 05:40:58 -0000

Laffey shines, Weglarz slams for Aeros

Laffey goes four scoreless in his second rehab appearance, allowing just one single and one walk with four strikeouts. Asdrubal started at shortstop and was removed after six innings; he went 0-3. Weglarz doubled for the Aeros' only hit through seven innings, but a pair of walks and a pair of singles set up Weglarz for a game-winning grand slam in the 8th.

Sizemore activated, Sipp up, Crowe down, Vizcaino out

Jay — Tue, 23 Jun 2009 18:42:38 -0000

Sizemore activated, Sipp up, Crowe down, Vizcaino out

For fairly obvious reasons all around. Have I mentioned lately that the Crowe draft pick never made any sense to me at all? And I usually don't even bother to critique the draft, but that pick just stuck out like a sore thumb.

However Beautiful the Strategy

Jay — Mon, 22 Jun 2009 04:33:04 -0000

The season is over. We've had some dreadful luck, but a reversal of fortune by itself couldn't change the commanding position our rivals cumulatively hold over us. We're five games behind Chicago and no better than they are, in terms of runs scored and allowed. We're six games behind a Minnesota squad that overall has been 37 runs better. And we're now ten games behind Detroit and 49 runs worse than them.

The differences in runs matter for two reasons. First, they show that our poor standing isn't just about bad luck, timing and leverage. Just because we're 13 games under .500, with 12 losses that should have been wins, doesn't mean we should be 11 games over. It doesn't work that way. We should have won most of those 12 games but not all of them, and we stole a few back, too. Bad luck and timing aside, this club is still a mediocrity at best, and injuries happen to all clubs, not just ours. That leads me to the second reason that the differences in runs matter: They suggest strongly that there's little reason to think we can catch Detroit or Minnesota, and we're not even 50-50 to catch Chicago.

Let's be honest. Luck can't explain the club's manifest mediocrity, three years out of four. The Indians front office has won respect and accolades within the industry, adoration across the blogosphere and plenty of lavish praise on this very site. The Indians consistently have put together good teams on paper that fell apart on the field. We've excused them for bad luck, for random variation, for injuries and variance and vagaries. At this point, it is fair to say, simply, that the people in charge have not gotten the job done.

Winston Churchill said it best: "However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results."

Can we discuss this like adults? Should we even try? Hard to say. It is so much simpler just to say, fire the manager. The Indians have failed; we know that much. We have a pretty clear idea how they've failed, but we're pretty fuzzy on why. There are web forums now boiling over with the usual reasons and theories, the sorts of things that get dismissed here out of hand. For most of those theories, it's time to redouble our dismissiveness — the problem surely isn't that we've failed to give Barfield more of an opportunity. For others, it may be time to reconsider.

I won't fault Shapiro's front office for having a plan. (How stupid is that? Would we rather they didn't have a plan?) I would like to pose some theories as to why the Shapiro program has failed much more than it has succeeded up to this point. Each theory deserves a lot more thought and research than a new dad is likely to cough up after midnight — that would be none — but that will come later. For now, let's just try out some new ideas — and old ones.

Theory #1: They might as well be bloggers.

Maybe the joke is on us. The Indians make the "right" moves, like signing Dave Dellucci, not the "wrong" moves, like signing Raul Ibañez. They know the stats, we know the stats, so when they make a move, it looks right to us. Problem is, we tend to forget that the numbers rarely tell us the full story. It's one thing to argue the numbers with a fellow fan — all I've got is the numbers, and all he's got is the numbers, because neither of us are scouts — but it's quite another to praise a front office for being able to Paint By Numbers. I mean, hell, any of us could paint by the numbers.

Maybe it isn't a good thing that I can understand and explain most every move the Indians make. Maybe they should be making moves that don't make sense to me — because after all, all I've got are the numbers. The saberblog view is essentially that since the numbers are all we can be sure about, the numbers are all that matter, and anything else is pure luck. In other words, the entire career of a GM like Pat Gillick was pure luck.

The Indians have done a great job at amassing value on paper, but they've shown little ability to discover value that isn't evident in the numbers. I've been able to explain pretty well why the Indians do almost everything that they do — aside from burying Marte. Maybe that's a problem.

Theory #2: The scouting and player evaluation is mediocre.

It is entirely possible that the Indians simply don't have a good scouting apparatus and don't have a genuinely gifted group of evaluators in the organization. Where there's a clear track record and a big sample size of performance data, the Indians have done a pretty good job of figuring out which players have value, but they rarely are in the market for such players. More often, they're in the market for a third-tier veteran, with a spotty or inconsistent track record, often distorted by injury.

Samples in baseball are never really "controlled" in a scientific sense, but drastic variance in a player's physical health render a player's entire performance record essentially moot. Imagine if some ballparks half as large and others twice as large, and imagine you never really knew which ballpark a player was playing in for any given game — injuries are like that. For many other players — for every reliever — there isn't that much of a record to go on, and the ability to amass performance data and project it forward is basically useless; what your evaluators see with their own eyes and report to the club is paramount.

Antonetti pointedly noted last winter that no team consistently out-performs the market in free agency, but this is an odd defense. For an organization with the stated goal of producing industry-best results in all phases of its operation, the failure to out-perform the market is simply that: a failure. It is the front office's function to outperform the market on statistical analysis, and also to outperform the market on valuation and risk assessment, and finally to outperform the market on scouting. That is, if there are five players who project stastistically to similar performance in the coming year, the Indians ought to be able to pick which one is likeliest to outperform (and least likely to underperform) that statistical projection, based on the scouting alone. There is little evidence that the Indians have the ability to do this, especially when you look at the ways the Indians have outperformed and underperformed in acquiring talent.

The Indians often are criticized for a conservative draft strategy, but the criticisms don't really add up. I think the numbers show that the Indians' strategy makes perfect sense, but there's a much stronger case that their mediocre yield is simply the result of mediocre scouting. Right strategy, wrong players.

In free agency, the Indians can't shop at the top of the market, nor can they usually sign second-tier players who generally represent very poor value in terms of risk and marginal wins. The analysis leads them to third-tier players, but their scouting may not be good enough to select the right ones. Right strategy, wrong players.

Business analysis has the Indians investing heavily in much of Latin America, while pulling back in the corrupt and over-saturated Dominican and moving into other international markets. They've done very well in this area, but why? I submit to you that the Indians have had some breakthrough conceptual ideas in their development strategy — education and dentistry among them — and that beyond that, this is basically a numbers game. The Yankee Years has a great digression about how the Indians ended up with a guy like Fausto Carmona, and Shapiro essentially concedes that it's a cattle call. You don't need great scouting to sign a few dozen 15- and 16-year-olds with really great tools, and beyond that, productivity in Latin American signings is about process and volume, not evaluation.

Yes, what I'm suggesting is that scouting 16-year-olds may not be all that hard, and that's why the Indians can excel in this area. It may be that scouting 18-year-olds isn't hard either — maybe the Indians could outperform other teams if they drafted more high school players, but their analysis is telling them (correctly) that that's a bad idea. Perhaps the analysis says they need to focus on more fully developed college players — the kind they may not be all that great at scouting. How would that be for irony?

The Indians have also done very well in trades for prospects, but they are always acquiring prospects who are thriving in Double-A or who are performing very well at a young age in Advanced-A. Think about the big line that the PTM system draws, between age-22 in Advanced-A and age-23 in Double-A. It takes great scouting to identify college players who eventually will perform very well in Double-A, or high schoolers who someday soon will thrive in Advanced-A. Once they've done that, however, it probably doesn't take particularly good scouting to figure out that they're probably going to make good major leaguers.

Or maybe we really needed to keep Tony LaCava. I can't help but notice that Brian Tallet is having a much better career than Billy Traber.

Theory #3: Their statistical analysis isn't all that great.

I know, this one seems like it's out of left field. I think it's beyond question that the Indians are doing an amazing job of collecting the data. They're collecting all kinds of crazy things, from the distance the catcher's mitt has to move to catch each pitch to the quotes that players give to reporters after the game. There's no question that high-quality data collection is the foundation of high-quality data analysis, but not everyone who's doing the former is getting the latter.

Before hiring Keith Woolner last year, the Indians didn't even have a full-time data analysis executive. It was, apparently, assistant GMs and interns running numbers in Excel whenever they wanted to analyze something. So we had a club spending $100 million on players every year, spending upwards of $1 million on data collection, and apparently not spending $100,000 on dedicated data analysis. And while the Indians' decisions have been sabermetrically sound, again, there's scant evidence that their methods are more advanced than those used by dozens of bloggers every day. In particular, they seem to be fixated on positional value — VORP, Sabermetrics 101 — while evidently being baffled by defensive value — until recently, a doctoral-level topic in sabermetrics.

Think about it. We could have stuck a group of defensively excellent, mediocre hitters in center field, at shortstop and catcher, while moving Grady, Jhonny and Victor to LF, 3B and 1B — years ago. We would have had outstanding defense at basically all six of those positions — and the kicker is, we ended up with a bunch of crap hitters at all the corner positions anyway. Gootz in center, Asdrubal at shortstop, Shoppach at catcher. Hell, we could have done that this year.

How long did we stick with Jhonny at shortstop? How many runs did it cost us? And now, quick — what's the difference in positional value between shortstop and third base? Would you believe it's only five runs over 162 games? And the difference between LF and CF is ten runs. Does anyone believe that the difference in defensive skill between Sizemore-Gutierrez and Dellucci-Sizemore is only ten runs?

Let me assure you, I am only playing devil's advocate here. It is by no means clear that any of those decisions were wrong. I'm just saying, there's a case to be made that the Indians' application of sabermetric concepts is fairly unsophisticated. I mean, seriously, they're putting Garko in the outfield. You can't tell me they really understand defensive value when they do things like that.

Theory #4: Eric Wedge has no clue.

I have long held that fire-the-manager is the lowest form of baseball discourse, but as many here have noted, my tune changed earlier this year. It's one thing to argue, year after year, that we can't prove that the Many Bad Things that happen to the Indians are the manager's fault. But after a certain number of years, the question rightly should be reversed. With so many qualified candidates in the world for such a tiny number of jobs, at some point, the question becomes not why fire him, but why hire him?

In other words, what reason do we have to believe that he's helping this team win games in any way?

Eric Wedge may be a special guy. He may be special friend. He may even be a great motivational speaker. But it is time to put to rest the assertion that he is a great motivator. We have had some great talents who've had some great seasons, but apart from them, it seems we've seen a lot more down years than up years from our regulars. If Wedge is such a great leader, how has his leadership helped Peralta, Garko, Francisco or Carmona?

Who, in fact, has it actually helped? Guys like Sizemore or Martinez, who are so famously self-motivated?

Understand, I'm not impressed with dissection of Wedge's tactical game. Managers are often criticized for sticking with their starters too long — allegedly trying to get them the "W" — but this criticism misses the basic fact that a struggling starter is almost always a better pitcher than the club's 6th or 7th best reliever, and that's the pitcher who's going to get used in the 5th or 6th inning. As for bunts and hit-and-runs and the like, those plays more often than not are close to break-even, with the specific personnel involved more than capable of tilting the balance one way or the other.

No, the apparent problem with Wedge is much worse. He doesn't seem to have any kind of grasp on which players deserve playing time. Time after time, we've seen hundreds of plate appearances given to hitters whose results are terrible and have been terrible for a long time. This gets back both to player evaluation issues and to the monoculture. Wedge consistently and openly favors players whom he feels are giving him a "quality at-bat" or who have "the right approach." (I don't mean to mock by my use of quotes, only to quote.)

Here's what Wedge doesn't seem to grasp. Those players with the lousy results and great approach are getting the lousy results despite the great approach. The great approach doesn't suggest that the player will do better; rather, if the Indians are right about what constitutes a great approach, then a great approach suggests that that player can't do any better than he already has been doing. Specifically, it doesn't mean that Dellucci is going to bounce back; it means that this is the best he can do. He's seasoned and maximizing his game, and his production likely can be matched by even a raw and inconsistent Matt LaPorta. In decision after decision, Wedge has favored a player whose approach he respected over one with actual upside.

Theory #5: They've created a monoculture.

We've been kicking this one around for about three years, and the evidence has mounted that not only is it true, but it's harmful. They're looking for a certain kind of player personality, and they've found about 18 of them, and a little too often, all 18 of them slump at the same time.

If you aren't one of Shapiro's Right Guys, you can't get in this organization. And if you aren't one of Wedge's Right Guys, you can't get in the lineup. I don't excuse Brandon Phillips for his crap attitude, and I don't excuse Jhonny Peralta for being a young veteran who doesn't respond to coaching. Still, it is undeniably a failing of this organization that with players who don't fit a certain mold, there is a total breakdown in communication. If you're not in, you're way, way out.

The monoculture extends most noticeably (and humorously) to the front office personnel, where it has produced a group of people whose ideas, speech patterns and jargon are utterly interchangeable. (If we asked Brad Grant about th Hafner contract and Antonetti about the draft, would the answers really be any different?) The Indians insist that they have an open organization where everyone is empowered and ideas are heard. But what if they seek out and retain people who essentially have the same types of ideas?

Shapiro's character test has always been at once admirable and dubious. His job is to build a championship-caliber baseball club, and the Indians already have the deck stacked against them when it comes to financial resources. Is it really wise to further restrict the players who we're willing to sign based on highly subjective character judgment? I recognize that creating a great clubhouse culture has its upside, but it's inevitable that in a limited marketplace for talent, you can't put a premium on personality while holding constant your premium for talent.

Sandy Koufax said it all: "In the end it comes down to talent. You can talk all you want about intangibles, I just don't know what that means. Talent makes winners, not intangibles. Can nice guys win? Sure, nice guys can win — if they're nice guys with talent. Nice guys with a little talent finish fourth, and nice guys with no talent finish last." (I've pulled this one out before, but it bears reprinting.)

This doesn't just apply to players, either, but to everyone in the organization. Here's a chilling thought for you — maybe by insisting on the Right Guys across the board, they've managed to miss out on many of the best scouts.

Theory #6: This is all one big problem.

A few years ago, it was fashionable to speculate about why Billy Beane's "stuff" doesn't work in the postseason. A better question now might be, why doesn't it work in Cleveland? The most obvious explanation is that Shapiro cares a great deal about things that Beane basically doesn't care about at all. Specifically, he cares about the character of his players, he cares about what each player might mean to the community, and he cares about what his manager thinks. While I'm sure all of that makes for a more rewarding workplace, there is scant evidence that any of it has helped the Indians win games.

Analysis and decision-making often drift toward areas of organizational confidence, even if that drift puts decisions out of balance. The Indians are appropriately humble about statistical projections, but they must figure that they know as much as anyone else about this. They're confident that they know what makes a player a good teammate, and they know what "the right approach" looks like. Given the subjectivity of scouting, they favor the player with the best statistical projection. Given the uncertainty of statistical projection, they favor the player who has a great approach and is a great teammate. And given the vagaries of defensive evaluation, they favor putting a player in his most valuable position, because that math is simpler. They are sure that a slugging catcher is more valuable than a slugging first baseman, and they are sure that Dellucci's approach is better than LaPorta's, and they are sure that Casey Blake is a better teammate than anyone in the world.

So if you're looking to wrap it all up in one big theory, here it is: The Indians are smart, serious and well-intentioned. But when they make their decisions, they put a lot of emphasis on a bunch of things that, in the grand scheme of things, really do not help a baseball team win ballgames. I can't tell you how to build a bullpen that isn't historically bad, but I'm pretty sure it doesn't have much to do with statistically analyzing a very small sample of innings or showing up to camp in good shape, and it doesn't have anything to do with being a good teammate or getting along with Eric Wedge. The Indians seem to know an awful lot about those subjects and almost nothing about putting together a non-horrible bullpen.

That, and maybe their scouting sucks.

Aquino out — Mike Gosling in

Jay — Fri, 19 Jun 2009 18:56:24 -0000

Aquino out — Mike Gosling in

Greg "Remember that guy?" Aquino designated for assignment, en route to waiver claim or whatever. Hot-handed Mike Gosling purchased from Columbus and called up. Hey, he's from Stanford! Maybe he can be Our Jeremy Guthrie!

Game Thread 2: June 6, 2009

Jay — Sat, 06 Jun 2009 22:25:13 -0000

So, we're losing. Not badly, but in an aggravating way nonetheless.