[danup edit: I'm out of town this morning and instead of the usual low-impact fanshot I thought I'd front-page this fanpost as the day's thread. Enjoy.]

There is a great deal of variability in an athlete’s hitting performance year to year.  There can be a number of reasons for this.  A players true skill level could change due to aging, injury, or poor coaching.  We have constantly improving batted ball data that give us some indication of when a drop in poor performance is related to bad luck.  A sharp change is likely usually related to a combination of multiple factors, to varying degrees.  This post is an attempt to look at the long term trends of hitters in the years following a season of poor performance.  For this exercise we are using OPS+ changes from year to year, since that metric is so widely available in B-Ref data pulls that were needed to compile this.  We will also be looking at the relationship that age of the hitter (at the time of OPS+ drop) has on future season’s performance.  Finally, we will be looking at the relationship between the OPS+ the season of the drop and the rate of improvement in future seasons.  In other words, does a person that dropped from 100 OPS+ to 75 have a better chance of improvement than one that dropped from 150 OPS+ to 125?

Before we get into the results of the study, I want to walk through the methodology used.  I have pulled data from 1986 - 2010 (25 seasons), filtering out all individual’s seasons that had more than 400 plate appearances.   I then looked for individuals that had both back to back seasons and had a OPS+ drop of 20 or more from one season to the next.  I then pulled these individuals stats from the following year, and the following 3 years and compared their OPS+ for both those time periods, and compared them to the season of the drop.  To look at the trends by age and by hitting level, I then created 5 subsets for each category, trying to keep the subsets at a similar sample size.   So now we’ll dig into the findings…

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As the (fantastic) 2009 regular season comes to an end, I thought it would be a good idea to roll out our postseason awards.  Per VEP's suggestions, we will house them here in the fanposts section rather than under fanshots.    We will also follow vivaelpujols suggestion and combine voting for Cy Young, MVP, and Rookie of the year all in this one space.   Of course, we will limit all voting to the league that requires all players to bring both their bats and their gloves.  We'll leave those heathens on the other side to the fate they deserve, and let the baseball writers have the final word with them.  The fine upstanding citizens in the NL deserve better, and this is where we come in.  I'm sure, in due time, the lucky recipients of our awards will feel a sense of honor and accomplishment that the BBWAA simply cannot provide....at least not as long as the likes of Tom Haudricourt are there!

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I've had a fairly specific concern about UZR/150 for a little while, and think this is as good a place as any to bring it.  I know there has been some heated discussion about the metric's ability to accurately measure individual value.  My question/concern has more to do with the metric at a team level.  I'm hoping people can look at my concern and let me know their thoughts.  Is my interpretation right?  Are my methods of measuring reasonable?  I'm not a statistical expert, so I'll have pretty thick skin about it.  I'm posting this more to learn myself than to educate anyone else.  

Anyway, my general view of UZR/150 is that it is a step in a positive direction but still a long ways from what we have when we quantify offense and pitching.  I accept that you need a very large sample to measure at an individual level.  At a team level, I would think that you could be able to interpret data sooner.  More specifically, I wanted to look at how the difference between a teams FIP and ERA correlates with the teams UZR/150.  Presumably, all other things being equal, a team that plays good defense will have an ERA that is better than their FIP and those that play poor defense will have an ERA worse than FIP.  With over half the season behind us, I expected to see a pretty tight correlation between where a team ranked in UZR/150 and where they rank in differential between ERA and FIP.  I'd say there is a correlation, but I was surprised to see how weak it is. 

***The standard deviation is based off the difference using absolute difference rather than tracking both negative and positive variances.  I think that is the "right way" to do it, but not sure.  I think the key really is to make sure you keep comparisons between standard deviations apples to apples, so that's what I'll do here.  I'll compare the variability with other measurements using absolute difference.***

I then wondered if I really need to be looking at the connection between UZR/150 and a pitching staff's BABIP.   This link is even a little bit weaker, with an average difference at 6.87 and a standard deviation at 4.58.

I would not be considered a great advocate of UZR, but even so, these connections are much looser than I expected them to be.  Translating it into offensive terms, these items have about the same connection that batting average has to a team's ability to score runs (Average difference 6.47, standard deviation - 3.80).  For another point of reference, Woba ties much closer to ability to score runs (at avg difference of 2.2 and standard deviation of 1.88).

Most surprising, though, was how much tighter the measurements of luck (LOB %, BABIP) tied to ERA minus FIP.  The luck factors correlate about  twice as strongly as the defense behind the pitching (as measured by UZR/150).  LOB % has an average difference of 3.33, with a standard deviation of 2.75.  BABIP has a 2.73 average difference and a 2.24 standard deviation.

This really wasn't what I expected to see.  I've sat on this for a couple weeks, deciding whether to bring it here.  I'm hoping it will either draw some good discussion, or point me to factors that I should (or shouldn't) be looking at.   Maybe they are obvious to all but me....I've just started trying to substantiate my general position on the metric.   Maybe this is as much a conversation on FIP as it is UZR.  Not sure.  I just found this all interesting and a little surprising.  We probably have the resources here to make sense of what I am unable to, and wanted to give it a shot. 

As my name may suggest, I have been looking forward to this season for some time.  I am hardly unique in that regard, as Colby Rasmus is likely the most hyped prospect in our system since the guy he replaced in center was snapping 12 to 6 curveballs in Florida (Pujols emerged on the scene so quickly the hype could not possibly keep up with the production).  To this point, Rasmus is more than living up to the hype. 

I think it's a good time to take a look at where his season, as it stands now, stands up in Cardinal history amongst his peers.  By peers, I am looking at hitters 22 years or younger with 250+ plate appearances.  Before I even dig into the numbers, it is useful to note that there have only been 40 players in Cardinal history that meet this criterea, and there are 63 seasons amongst these players.  Some of the names with duplicate seasons include Simmons, Pujols, Musial, Medwick, Hornsby. 

Just filtering it out to this level thins the herd to the point where you are picking from a group whose talent far exceeds your random group of athletes.  If you are playing in the majors at 22, you are expected to have a long and productive career, and this was as true during the beginning of the last century as it is now.  That being said, let's take a look at where Rasmus stands in some categories amongst these 63 seasons with 250 plate appearances....

Rate stats

BA - Rasmus currently rates 19th at .288.  Musial tops the list by hitting .357 in 1943.  He appears twice ahead of Rasmus, as does Pujols, Hornsby, Medwick, and Simmons.  Templeton (1976), Bill DeLancey (1934), Chick Hafey (1925), Frank Snyder (1915),  Jack Smith (1917), Wattie Holm (1924), Hernandez (1976), and McCarver (1963) are also ahead of Rasmus at this point. 

OBP - Rasmus rates 23rd at .330.  It is pretty much the same cast of characters ahead of him with a handful of exceptions and additions.

SLG - Rasmus rates 6th at .504. Albert Pujols 2001 season leads at .610.  He also is ahead of Rasmus with his 2002 season.  The others ahead of him are DeLancey's 1934 season, Musial's 1943 season, and Medwick's 1934 season. 

ISO - Rasmus rates 4th at .216.  Pujols 2001 season leads at .281.  Pujols 2002 season and DeLancey's 1934 season are the only other 2 that are better.

OPS+ - Rasmus is 15th at 119. 

And a couple counting stats.... 

Doubles - Rasmus already rates 19th with 19.  If he is able to continue this pace and double his output with 38 then he will be 6th behind Musial, 2 Pujols seasons, and 2 Medwick seasons.

Homers - Rasmus already rates 8th with 11.  If he can double his output and finish with 22 he will only trail Pujols 2 seasons. 

So I think it is safe to say that Rasmus is entering pretty rarified air here.  Of course, I chose to do this right in the middle to end of a torrid hot streak so a big disclaimer needs to be stated.  Still, it is just as possible we are just witnessing the start of something.  Only the next few months will tell for sure.  On top of it all, nothing here accounts for plus defense at a premium position either, and this adds substantially to the value he brings.

A few general thoughts crossed my mind when I ran these on B-Ref.  First,  at the beginning of the year one of the last things I was concerned about is his ability to draw walks.  I would have listed it as a top strength.  I take a little added optimism in that fact personally, but maybe that is my bias shining through.  To my eye, he does not look like he is taking an overly undisciplined approach.  He is being very aggressive, but I don't see him chasing pitches way off the plate.  I see him going after pitches on the edges - he can improve there and likely will.  I also think he will have more opportunity to show this as pitchers start showing a more appropriate level of fear towards his power.  Which leads me to my second thought.

I think we sell Rasmus short of his abilities when we cap him as 25-30 HR potential, with strong emphasis on the word potential.  He very well may cap out around that level, but I think his potential ceiling is higher than that.  With his current performance, he is validating his season in AA a couple years ago.  That kind of power, at that age and that level, is virtually unheard of.  Last year's season in AAA justifiably altered peoples projections downward, but I think it is just as reasonable to move them back upward based off what we're seeing now.  I accept the possibility that this is a flukey hot streak, but I also know that power is almost always the last tool to blossom.  We can say whatever we want, but I think it is dangerous for the organization to cap his power potential this early in his career. 

After all that, I want to just make one disclaimer.  I am not proclaiming him a hall of famer, or anything of the sort simply because he's having a good start at such a young age.  This is, of course, just half of one season.  He's always shown a great deal of streakiness.  The plate appearances are so miniscule in size that he could hit a terrible slump for 2 weeks and drop like a rock in many of these measures.  I made a mention to Ankiel above - things can obviously change in a hurry. That all goes without saying, but after taking a look at the numbers and who they compare to I think I needed to say it anyway. 

Still, even though it is just a start to a career, it is impressive.  As pleased as we all are with Rasmus right now, I think what he is doing to this point is probably even a little bit better than many of us realize given his age.

It seems apparent that the decision to unceremoniously drop Adam Kennedy was fueled for emotional reasons, to some extent.  I do not believe Mo pulls the trigger on this move without support based in reason and logic, though.  TLR strikes me as a bit impulsive.  Mo strikes me as anything but.  I believe a large reason that Mo signed off on this move is the sheer numbers he can throw at the second base position.  I am going to try to justify the release of Adam Kennedy in a little more detail than I would feel comfortable writing in any existing post.  Just as a note, I am not looking at Schumaker in this.  That grand experiment is something I'll need to see to believe, but I hope it works out wonderfully.

At the outset, I will concede that the Cards are probably giving something up defensively, though I think Barden and Ryan are options in the competition that are capable of playing plus defense.  I do think expecting Kennedy to replicate last seasons results is asking a lot, but he is generally quite capable with the glove.  Probably the best defensive option.

Offensively, I expect the Cards are going to find something better.  How much better is the question.  Will it be by a wide enough margin to offset any slippage in defense? 

Just going off ZIPS, Kennedy projects at .647 OPS.  That seems about right to me.  The new cast of characters have these ZIP projections - Ryan .642, Barden .666, Hoffpauir .689, Greene .636.  I am not sure about Thurston but I suspect it would be somewhere around Hoffpauir's number.

Now I know the difference offensively here isn't real big.  I also know ZIPS has some flaws, particularly in accurately pegging younger talents.  But then that is kinda the point here, to me at least.  Kennedy has an established history and his variance offensively is negligible, particularly on the up side.  There are 5 internal options that project to be close or better offensively, and the amount of variance they each have is going to be great enough that it makes sense to take advantage of the numbers.  

So to take this a step further....


We can all agree that none of these ZIPS look very good.  Not everybody is going to hit exactly at their projection.  Some will overperform and some will underperform.  I believe the variance to these 5 would be greater than Kennedy's.   The numbers on the downside will likely be much lower as well - these guys are more likely to completely flame out too.  But the downside risk is managed by having numbers. 

What are the chances that at least one of these guys will hit their top 40%, 30%, 20%, 10% percentile projections?  Odds are pretty damn good.

Chances 1 of the 5 hits the 40% threshold -  92.8%
Chances 1 of the 5 hits the 30% threshold - 83.2%
Chances 1 of the 5 hits the 20% threshold - 67.3%
Chances 1 of the 5 hits the 10% threshold - 41%

I think the chances are pretty good that we can find an offensive upgrade that is significant enough to offset defensive slippage, plus some.  As an additional bonus, we have an opportunity to audition 5 people that could fit into plans at a very cheap cost for 2010 and beyond.   To me the only downside is the pain you have to go through as you sift through these options.  How long will it take?  How many misleading hot streaks will end up causing you to stick with a bad option too long?  I think this decision will cause a lot of heartburn in April, May, and maybe even June.  But I also think this team will be a better team in September without Kennedy.  If you are a dreamer, maybe even October.  I can get behind this move by Mo, whether urged by TLR or not, pretty easily. 

In todays entry, Dan hit on methods for building rotations.  He highlighted Tampa's  strength at the bottom, their depth of the rotation, and indicated that signs show this may be what the Cardinals are planning as well.  I've been of the opinion that getting guys in the 4 and 5 spot that can exceed 100 ERA+ is more important, or at least a better risk investment, than trying to find guys at the top of the rotation that can exceed 130 ERA+.  There are a number of reasons I feel this, but in this post I just want to illustrate what I believe is probably the most important reason. Projecting out pitching performance is difficult.  It's difficult to do looking ahead 1 or 2 years, and it's darn near impossible looking ahead 3 or 4.  I ran some numbers in B-Ref that show just how hard it can be and will post the results here. 

What I have done is look through the results year by year, and marked any pitcher that made at least 15 starts in a season and posted an ERA+ of 115 or greater.  Then I looked at those same players results and counted how many times in the 4 following years they were able to maintain that level (posted something 115 or greater).  I tracked everything from 2002 to present, so we have a full 4 year history after the 2002, 2003, & 2004 seasons. 

2002 - 47 starters had an ERA+ of 115 or better that season.  2 (or 4.3%) pitched at that level for all 4 of the following years (2003-2006).  Only 3 (6.4%) were able to post something better than 115 in 3 of the 4 following seasons.  There were 8 (17%) that did it for 2 seasons, 16 (34%) that could do it for 1 season, and 18 (38.3%) that could not do it any of the 4.

2003 - 32 starters were at 115 or above.  4 (12.5%) pitched that that level or above all 4 seasons.  2 (6.3%) did it for 3 of the 4 seasons, 5 (15.6%) did it for 2, 9 (28.1%) did it one season, and 12 (37.5) did not pitch above 115 any of the 4 seasons.

2004 - 44 pitchers qualified.  6 (13.6%) pitched at that level all 4 years.  3 (6.8%) did it in 3 of the seasons, 5 (11.4%) did it in 2 of them, 9 (20.5%) did it in 1, and 21 (47.7%) never did it again in any of the 4.

So we have 3 years worth of data there.  Just based off that, it appears that locking in on deals with the top caliber of pitchers, the #1's and #2's, is a very risky proposition.  ERA+ of 115 is nothing earthshattering, but it does represent performance around the top quarter. 

It appears that if you take a starter that is a top performer now and give them a 4 year deal, you have about a 10% chance of getting top of the rotation performance (a # 1 or solid #2) all 4 years.  You have about another 20% chance that he'll be able to do it for you for either 2 or 3 years.   You have almost a 30% chance he can do it for only 1 season, and over a 40% chance he will not pitch at that level for you at all.

This is why I believe the better (both in terms of risk and reward) investment is to bolster the bottom half the rotation.  Generally speaking, the greatest value in pitching lies in stockpiling pitchers that you project to pitch in the ERA+ range of 95-110, with a focus on keeping deals short term (Lohse - a topic for another day) and also on building depth for handling the injuries that will surely come.  Giving top of the rotation money for 4 years plus is a risky proposition.  You are investing for a level of consistency that the vast majority simply cannot provide. 

Kyle McClellan and Ryan Franklin are approaching 70 innings of relief work on the season.  It has long been a belief of mine that the 70 inning mark is a stress point for major league relievers, more or less.  Of course different pitchers will certainly have different thresholds, but just from observing I’ve noticed a general dropoff in performance in the years following a 70 inning plus workload.   It’s been more of an intuitive thing on my part, so I wanted to look up data to see if it supports the theory.  Specifically I looked at pitchers that logged over 70 innings in relief last year, and compared their performance this year (to date) to their last.  The results are alarming,

First, a couple disclaimers.  I just used pitchers that made every outing in relief last season and exceeded 70 innings.  I did not use pitchers that were primarily relievers but made some spot starts.  I also may have missed relievers that logged more than 70 innings work between multiple teams.  The reason for that is that I just went team by team in B-Ref to filter it out for simplicities sake.  If I am missing someone that split time with 2 teams, but still went over 70 innings we can include them in the sample and adjust the totals.  And finally, I have just went through 2007 results and compared to 2008.  One year’s data is far from conclusive, so I’d like to do some other years too eventually.  I may be a little strapped for time in the next few days though, so it may be a while.   

Anyway I found 37 pitchers that logged over 70 innings of (solely) relief work in 2007.  I hesitate to name them all, but I think some might like to know so I will list them anyway.  If you don’t care you can move on to the next paragraph….

***Tony Pena, Brandon Lyon, Pete Moylan, Oscar Villarreal, Rafael Soriano, Bob Howry, Michael Wuertz, Dave Weathers, Rafael Betancourt, Manny Corpas, Jason Grilli, Kevin Gregg, Lee Gardner, Chad Qualls, Dave Borkowski, Joel Peralta, Chris Bootcheck, Scot Shields, Jonathan Broxton, Rudy Seanez, Joe Nathan, Pat Neshek, Aaron Heilman, Mariano Rivera, Luis Vizcaino, Matt Capps, Heath Bell, Cla Meredith, Doug Brocail, JJ Putz, Ryan Franklin, Gary Glover, Joaquin Benoit, Casey Janssen, Saul Rivera, Jon Rauch, Chad Cordero***

Now Janssen has not pitched this year, so there is no point of comparison with him.  The 36 others have pitched, at least a little.  Several have had arm problems this year and have pitched a very limited amount, which may not be all that surprising. 

Here is how these pitchers collectively performed in 2007…

2,921.33 innings, 3.18 ERA, 7.87 hits/9, 2.83 walks/9, 1.19 WHIP, 0.73 HR/9

And in 2008 (to date)….

1697 innings, 4.01 ERA, 8.94 hits/9, 3.30 walks/9, 1.36 WHIP, 1.02 HR/9

Put another way, what we are seeing here is a 26% increase in runs allowed, a 14% increase in hits allowed, a 17% increase in walks allowed, and a 40% increase in homers allowed. 

It is just a one year sample, but I find this pretty damning.  My next question was whether a few bad apples were spoiling things for the whole bunch.  Well, not really.  Of the 36 pitchers with data for both years, 25 of them (69%) were worse in ERA, 27 (75%) worse in hits allowed, 20 (56%) in walks, 30 (83%) in WHIP, and 24 (67%) in HR’s allowed.

So here we are.  All hopes of making the playoffs are lost.  McClellan is approaching 70 innings.  He is expected to be a big part of the bullpen next year.  He has shown signs of tiring, and has had major arm surgery.  We have some AAA arms that need to be evaluated.  Can anybody tell me why we would want to push  McClellan to 75 – 80 innings this season? 

I’d just assume they thank him for fighting the good fight, and tell him they have seen enough and get ready for next season.  I think everything points in that direction.  It might not be a bad idea to have the same conversation with Franklin too, for many of the same reasons. 

Or at least maybe it isn't as bad as it seems coming off demoralizing series with Chicago and Milwaukee.  Had to get the Animal House reference in there somehow.  It seems that the VEB community is a bit down lately, with good reason, many of which have been well stated.  So I thought I'd highlight some of the reasons for optimism going forward to the rest of the season. 

1. As bad as the bullpen has been, it seems that the worst is over there.  It took longer than most would like, but it appears that Izzy and Franklin are moving out of the most crtitical roles, and McClellan and Perez are moving in.  It appears that Flores long run of ineffectiveness is over and Garcia is getting some opportunities.  Motte should be in the mix during the final month.  Will the kids be lights out?  I'd guess there will be some bumps in the road, but I feel comfortable saying it will not be as bad as it would with Flores, Franklin and Izzy pitching in all the high leverage spots.  This has been the biggest hole, and though we did not make a trade to help address it, I am comfortable saying there is an improvement.  An added bonus is that any failings from the younger crew might be a learning experience that can provide dividends down the road.  Can't say that about the 3 vets.  You kinda know what you're going to get, it isn't pretty, and there is no long term gain for going through the pain with them either.  There is hope in going to the youth here, both for the future and now.

2. It appears the Colonel is righting the ship.  His ERA has not increased each of the last 4 starts.  Prior to that it has increased, and rapidly, each of the previous 4.   His last 2 starts, he has allowed just under a baserunner an inning against 2 of the strongest lineups in the league.  Small samples?  Sure it is, but I was worried about whether the workload of starting was too much for him.  Facing 2 loaded lineups and faring better than ok against them calms the nerves quite a bit.  A solid Wellemeyer stabilizes the rotation, even if Carpenter can't go, or if Wainwright's rehab doesn't go as planned. 

3.  The middle of our lineup is darn good, and with Ankiel back I expect it to be starting together the rest of the way.  We've gone through maddening stretches where Ludwick would sit out.  Ankiel has been out for stretches too, and made his first start in a couple weeks tonight.  I look around the NL and I'll put Pujols, Ludwick, Glaus, Ankiel in the middle of the lineup against about anybody.  Tony likes to give rest to guys during the season, but I would suspect he will cut back on that the rest of way if health allows.  Presumably keeping them fresh for a moment just like this is exactly why he rests them.  I think he'll challenge them the rest of the way, partly because of reason number 4...

4.  We've had a pretty rough schedule in terms of off days so far, but we'll benefit from some rest this month.  That gives us a chance to give the big bats days off without taking those bats out of the lineup.  On the rotation side, it allows us to go 4 man quite a bit.   Tonights performance notwithstanding, Pineiro has been the 3rd wheel in this rotation.  I stood up for his signing at the time, but I must admit that there has been a big dropoff in his performance vs. the others.  Minimizing his exposure, or better yet, relegating him to mop up duty if things break our way with Carp or Wainwright is a big edge at this point. 

5. Looking at the competition for the wildcard (and that is where I am at at this point), there are some issues with those teams too.  We'd do well to finish strong in this Florida series.  Someone will emerge in the East, probably at the expense of the other teams in the race from that division (Philly, NY, Florida).   Whoever finishes 2nd and 3rd in that race will take some lumps in doing so, and that means if we take care of business we should be in good shape there.  Now Milwaukee has a loaded lineup and a strong 1-2-3 punch in the rotation.  However, they have shown a tendency to implode last year and, to some extent, this year too.  Their bullpen is no great shakes either.  And I know Sabbathia is a workhorse, but the Brewers are using him like a $3,000 claimer at Fairmount.   Make no mistake, I understand why they are doing it.  I probably would too, but a very likely scenario is that by doing this Sabbathia will run out of gas at the end.  Or at least, they will be forced to trust their own shaky bullpen earlier in his starts. 

This last month has beaten the team up a bit, and has beaten us up as fans a little bit too.  You can sense the tensions reading the threads here daily.  I can relate to all that.  It's possible the wheels are coming off and that the best is past us.  That's a distinct possibility.  However, I also think it is quite possible that this is a bottom for us.  We've taken some pretty severe hits, but here we are still in the picture.  There are signs with this team that suggest we'll be able to find that other gear that we'll need to find the postseason, in a year where my expectations were much lower.  We just don't know which way it will go, and that's part of the charm of baseball.  It's a long season filled with peaks and valleys.   I, for one, am excited to see where the rest of the year takes us.  I'm not ready to count this team out.   Was it over when the Germans bombed Pearl Harbor?

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Since tonight's game was a real snoozer, I decided to sort through MLB.com stats to see how our starters are stacking up to their peers.   More specifically, I am looking at where our regulars rank amongst all NL hitters (100 AB's or more) at their position in OBP and SLG. 

Here's where they stand...

                              OBP                               SLG

Molina            7th of 14 catchers             8th of 14

Pujols             1st of 17                             2nd of 17

Kennedy         14th of 17                          17th of 17

Miles               8th of 17                            11th of 17

Glaus             3rd of 15                             13th of 15

Izturis              9th of 16                             14th of 16

Ludwick         3rd of 51                             1st of 51

Ankiel             13th of 51                            14th of 51

Duncan          15th of 51                            32nd of 51

Schumaker    18th of 51                            34th of 51

The only people in the bottom half in OBP are Kennedy and Izturis.  The only people in the top half in SLG are Pujols, Ludwick, and Ankiel.   Those 2 items may not be particularly earthshattering to many, but it is pretty telling.   Personally, I walk away with two main impressions.

First one is that the middle infield, to the surprise of few, severely limits the potential of this team.  Kennedy, in particular, continues to be a real drag on the offense.   When you put the first third of his season in context with last season, it looks very likely that what we see is what we get there.  Izturis provides solid defensive support to a pitching staff that very much requires it, but is still a fairly significant offensive liability.  In my opinion, we have received so far is probably pretty close to the best Izturis has to offer.   It's a fair item to debate, and CardsWin and others might disagree, but that is just my opinion.  And Miles, to his credit, continues to max out on his abilities by performing at something approaching an average performance at second.  I've personally banged that drum enough - his alleged versatility is an illusion, he hits for about as soft an average as anyone, etc...  In all fairness, he ends up being the best second baseman we have time after time.  It's to his credit really, though I am always reluctant to give it.  The point really is that if Aaron Miles is your most productive bat in the middle infield, you have a problem there, but maybe that shouldn't be held against Miles. 

On the flip side, the outfield has been a big part of our success thus far.  I'd place it 2nd in importance, right behind starting pitching, to the W-L record.   All four outfielders with 100 AB's or more are well within the top half in OBP.   Considering none of them cost much in terms of dollars, this unit has been a tremendous value.    Duncan has not performed as expected in terms of power (SLG), but outside of that I do not think any of this group has disappointed at all.   Sometimes I sense that people sell the bottom end of this unit (Duncan, Schumaker, Barton) a little short. 

I understand there are limitations with these guys.  I agree Ludwick needs to start every day right now.   I share the desire to find a taker for one of them so we can turn our surplus here into a middle infielder.   I am curious what Joe Mather would do with an opportunity too.  

Agree on all those points, but I don't understand how sometimes all this morphs into the vitriol and disgust that some hold against Duncan and Schumaker.   All of the 4 outfielders listed above are showing they perform at a level resembling league average for a starter, and they do it at a low cost.   There isn't anyone in this unit really dragging us down the way the middle infield is.  They each are providing a value to the club to varying extents, in my opinion.   I think we should keep our general agreement that an outfielder should be moved, and our arguments over which outfielder it should be, in that context.  

Noticed Red Baron, through what was probably a rather innocent comment, sparked some really great discussion on Dave Duncan.  Few topics seem to be more polarizing to a Cardinal fan, it seems.  As is often the case here, both sides of the spectrum bring some sound reasoning to support their own point of view.  This is something I've put some amount of thought into myself over the past few years, and this seems like as good a forum as any to share them.  I understand this is a discussion point that has been rehashed again and again in many different fashions, so I hope people don't find all this to be a bit redundant.  I think it may be a somewhat different angle on an old topic, but I guess that is for others to ultimately decide.

One theme that is fairly common is that using the bargain bin approach to starting pitching is too hit and miss. Too many failed million dollar type signings here and there to justify for the success stories.  Too many Kip Wells and Toma Ohka's to get one Todd Wellemeyer.  I read and hear many people state that they wish we'd get more aggressive in the free agent market and go for more “sure thing” type pitchers.  My argument is that there are no sure things in pitching.  History shows that the decline of starting pitchers is unpredictable, and often swift and painful.  To illustrate it all, I'm going to look at the Cy Young voting for previous years.  Specifically who finished in the top 4 in voting from 2002-2005….

• Barry Zito
• Pedro Martinez
• Derek Lowe
• Jarrod Washburn
• Randy Johnson
• Curt Schilling
• John Smoltz
• Eric Gagne
• Roy Halladay
• Estaban Loaiza
• Tim Hudson
• Jason Schmidt
• Mark Prior
• Russ Ortiz
• Johan Santana
• Mariano Rivera
• Roger Clemens
• Roy Oswalt
• Bartolo Colon
• Cliff Lee
• Chris Carpenter
• Dontrelle Willis

If I were to look at this list I and classify the overall performance of the individuals for the years following, I would list some as clearly maintaining the high level of performance (Santana, Schilling, Smoltz, Halladay…), some as a mixed bag (Pedro, R. Johnson, Cliff Lee now that he’s started this year so well…), and several as undeniable busts (Zito, Washburn, Schmidt, Prior, Ortiz…).  It could certainly be argued in many cases which pitchers belong in which category.  For example, every pitcher hits a wall by the time they reach their late 30’s / early 40’s.  Putting too much expectation on a Pedro Martinez or Randy Johnson at that stage of their career is probably unfair.  I don’t really want to argue over those types of specific details. 

My point is centered around the more general picture this list presents.  You can look at any given year, and pick the pitchers that are considered most elite, and have little confidence that it will be maintainable for any length of time.  And the reality is that, unless they are the oldest of the group, when these guys reach Free Agency the expectation for signing won’t be just several million dollars, but several years.   Same principle applies if a Cy Young candidate is raised through your system and you want to resign to avoid free agency. 

As a general rule with pitchers, it isn’t the dollars that concern me near as much as the years.  Pitchers just are not as projectable as a hitter is.  Sadly, Chris Carpenter is a good recent example of this.  At one moment, Carpenter was a centerpiece of the rotation for years to come.  Five innings of work later, he is a question mark we have millions devoted to.  I love Carpenter - I don’t blame the Cardinals for offering the contract and he very well could bounce back and be worth the money in later years.  It is just a gamble that you have to take if you want to lock up a top starter. 

So going back to Dave Duncan and the Cardinals approach, I don’t mind a big focus on finding the salvageable retreads.  It’s not an approach you can hit 100% with, but then again, you don’t have to either.  You can find your way past the mistakes until you land the pitcher that works.  This is partly because of dollars, but mostly because these types will take one year deals.   When you find that guy that works out well, you can usually hang on to him (for a while) for a price tag that doesn’t come close to the value he provides in terms of wins. 

Going after the top free agents requires you to be right close to 100% also.  It may be easier to get it right for one of these versus signing a reclamation project, but not as much as most might think.  And with these types you cannot work your way past mistakes.  You are stuck with a much higher contract.  That may be problematic enough, but the real setback is that you are usually stuck with that contract for 3, 4, or even 5 years. 

Overall, I think Dave Duncan is a bit underappreciated, at least in his ability to coax something useful out of damaged goods.  I believe, generally speaking, taking that philosophy is superior to signing free agents pitchers to long term deals.  In my opinion, the Cardinals are one of the best at playing that particular game, and I think that is in large part to Dave Duncan.   Now clearly, the superior approach to both is to develop your own pitching in your system.  I’d give him mixed marks at that, because I can appreciate those that feel Reyes hasn’t been used properly.  Still, overall, I feel our shortcomings in that area have been primarily due to poor drafting.  The farm system has given Duncan little to work with, and given that, I think we have been very fortunate to have him here able to execute the stopgap plan effectively. 

Going forward, it appears the system will be giving Duncan a new test.  Soon, there should be some legitimate prospects in starting pitching that we can lean on.  The book is very much open on how Duncan will do with that, in my opinion, if he is still here at that time.  But when looking backward at what Duncan has already done, I think he gets sold a bit short. 

Over this past winter I have read the Baseball Prospectus book – “Baseball Between the Numbers”.  Found it to be pretty interesting overall, but one chapter in particular sparked some questions.  The chapter talked about the value of the stolen base, and more or less concluded the steal has limited value.  I've been stewing over this for some time now, and I thought this forum was a great place to get some answers to the questions the book has raised in my mind.  I hope maybe someone can help me reconcile the numbers I've used and maybe even spark a conversation on what the value of a steal is.

The book used one of Rickey Henderson's years (I am fairly certain it was the famous 1982 season) to illustrate the point that stolen bases provide minimal value, if in fact any at all.  The general rule that I've been operating under for some time has been that if you are successful 80% of the time attempting a steal you are helping your team.  Venture much below that mark and you are doing your team harm.  The book talks about run expectancy from taking that extra base.  It's a concept that is not new to me, so I understood the rationale.  I've even kinda operated on the same assumptions the book uses, but had never seen it explained quite as thoroughly.  In conclusion, the book argues that Rickey Henderson stealing bases is exciting but that his value lied mostly in his ability to get on base and little in his ability to steal a base. 

Though I have somewhat accepted that school of thought in theory, I have a hard time thinking about Henderson's season and believing all of that was for naught.  Becoming a fan while Herzog had his team running every chance they got, and winning while doing it, makes me a little dubious also.  So I decided to look at Henderson's 82' season in a different context.  A context that is another piece of gospel to us aspiring sabermetricians - OPS. 

I wondered what happen if we made the assumption that instead of stealing the extra base, or getting caught stealing, we instead assumed he got the same results from his work at the plate.  In other words, take the times he was caught stealing and assume an out at the plate (take it off his OBP for the year), and take the times he was successful and assume a double (add it onto his SLG for the year). 

In 1982, Henderson posted a line of .267/.398/.382 on 536 AB, with 130 steals in 172 attempts.  The OBP was based off reaching 261 times in 656 plate appearances (when factoring Sacs, HBP, and walks).  SLG was based off 205 total bases in his 536 at bats.   Translates to an OPS of .780.  Not bad, but far from legendary. 

If we take his results on the bases, and make the assumption that he had instead achieved the same results with the stick we’d do the following with those numbers:

 We’d take the 42 times caught stealing and assume and out.  This would mean he, in theory, reached base 219 times in 656 appearances for a new OBP of .334. 

We’d take the 130 successful attempts and assume a double.  This would mean he, in theory, would have had 335 total bases in 536 at bats for a new SLG of .625.

In reality, Rickey Henderson had an OPS of .780.  Making these new assumptions, which are based off his unique ability to achieve the same results in a different way, his OPS is .959.  This would indicate a HOF caliber season.   This is also more in line with what most of us would believe intuitively.

So this is where I need help.  I have a very hard time reconciling this in my mind.  It would seem to me that somewhere there is a flaw in the reasoning.  Is there a gap in the belief that you need to be 80% successful in steals for it to be effective?  Or is there a gap in using OPS to look at a players value?  Or is the flaw in the logic I’m using to translate Henderson’s season? 

Intuitively, I think that the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction.  The steal may have been overvalued in the 80’s.  Now, I tend to think it may be undervalued.   Using run expectancy would suggest it is being properly valued, but my example says maybe not.  I’d love to hear others thoughts on this.  This site is a daily stop for me, and it’s because I respect a lot of the thoughts and viewpoints I read.  I’m hoping it might be a worthy point of discussion.  Or at the least somebody can tell me where I’m way out of line trying to translate things this way.