SB Nation User Blog: Steve Slowinski

Fun with Trade Strings

Steve Slowinski — Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:21:44 -0000

This has been a busy off-season so far, with some big trades being completed, and I can't resist taking a look at some of the trade strings those trades created. Obviously, the biggest trade thus far has been the Halladay-Lee swap, so let's start there. The trade, although I initially thought of as a three-way-trade, was actually more like two separate trades that just happened to be completed on the same day. The Phillies traded Lee to the Mariners for prospects, and they traded different prospect to the Blue Jays for Roy Halladay. Here's how it looks visually:

I have to agree with Dave Cameron - I don't have any idea why the Phillies gave up Lee for so little. Those three prospects aren't near the quality of the prospects that they initially gave up to acquire Lee, and anyway, why not keep Lee? He's only making around $9M this upcoming season, which is an incredible bargain for his talent, and a rotation that featured Halladay, Lee, and Hamels would be quite formidable. If they kept Lee for a full season and then let him go as a Type-A free agent, they'd get two picks for him in the upcoming draft, which possibly wouldn't be that far of a downgrade from the talent they received by trading him.

While looking at Cliff Lee's history, I couldn't help but notice what an incredible deal the Indians initially got when they acquired him. Bartolo Colon for Cliff Lee and Grady Sizemore? Yes, please.

Despite seeming to make a bad decision trading Brandon Phillips for Jeff Stevens, the Indians even managed to make that work out, eventually turning Stevens into Chris Perez. That Colon trade just keeps on giving, especially when you consider that Bartolo Colon had only about three and a half more good seasons left in him when they moved him in 2002.

Last, I want to take visually look at the other big trade this off-season: the Curtis Granderson trade. The Tigers gave up a lot in Jackson and Granderson, but they received Max Scherzer, a solid middle-reliever, and two top prospects. And remember, the Tigers wouldn't have had Jackson without first trading Matt Joyce.

I'd love to say that the Rays p'owned the Tigers and stole Matt Joyce from them, but Jackson pitched quite well for them this year. The processes may not have been the best, but the Tigers got lucky and made the most of it. Yes, Jackson's FIP still wasn't great, but now that he's been traded, the Tigers don't need to worry about him regressing in the future. Results-wise, he was a great addition this past year and they managed to flip him while his value was high, getting back an incredible young arm in Max Scherzer. Compare:

2009	ERA	FIP	xFIP	tRA
Scherzer	4.12	3.87	3.88	4.52
Jackson	3.62	4.28	4.39	4.75

Mark this down as a classic example of why ERA stinks as a talent evaluation tool. Jackson had a significantly better ERA than Scherzer in 2009, but Scherzer was by far the better pitcher. And then the Tigers also got a strong outfielder prospect in Austin Jackson, a decent reliever in Phil Coke, and a first-round relief prospect in Schlereth. The comparison between Joyce and Austin Jackson is interesting; Joyce has more power and is more patient, but Jackson plays centerfield and has more speed. Jackson's about three years younger, though, so he has more time for development.

Anyway, these are just my random thoughts. Let's see how the off-season continues developing; maybe we'll have more trades showing up.

J.P. Howell: The Man, the Myth, the...Starter?

Steve Slowinski — Sun, 20 Dec 2009 04:46:40 -0000

More photos » by Ed Zurga - AP

5 months ago: Tampa Bay Rays catcher Michel Hernandez, left, and pitcher J.P. Howell celebrate the Rays' 4-3 baseball win over the Kansas City Royals on Sunday, July 19, 2009, in Kansas City, Mo. (AP Photo/Ed Zurga)

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During Eric's interview with Carson Cistulli on Thursday, Carson brought up a point that I was pondering myself about a month ago: how good of a starter would JP Howell be if given the chance again? Here's what he had to say on the matter:

"The real question, for me, is how this affects J.P. Howell. I've been the giantest Howell apologist for some time now. It seems like he could make a fantastic starter. From 2005 to 2007, Howell made 33 appearances (all starts) and posted xFIPs of 4.41, 4.08, and 4.12, respectively. His tRA*s (that is, regressed tRA, available at StatCorner) are less friendly over that time period (5.16, 5.21, and 5.24, respectively), so maybe I should just can it. Still, if he's down with it -- and I don't know, maybe he's not -- then I think it's worth a shot."

We all know that starters are much valuable than relievers, with even the best relievers only racking up around 2+ WAR over the course of a season (there is an argument to be made that WAR undervalues high-leverage innings, but the point still holds). This is why players like Joba Chamberlain and David Price are transitioned back into the starting rotation, even after proving to be dominant coming out of the bullpen; they're simply too valuable to not have them in the rotation. JP Howell has been dominant out of the pen - no doubt about that - but there hasn't been any sort of murmurings to move him back into the starting rotation. How come? Should he remain in the pen, or are we being silly to not consider him for the starting rotation?

For those that forget, JP Howell was initially a starter when first acquired by the Rays in exchange for Joey Gathright. He started 15 games over the course of the 2006 and 2007 seasons with the Rays, compiled ERAs of 5.10 and 7.59 respectively, and was moved to the pen at the start of the 2008 season as the long man. Since then, well...I don't need to tell you how he's done since then. Here's a look at all his important stats (remember, the numbers from 2005-2007 are from the rotation, and 2008-2009 are in the bullpen):

	K/9	BB/9	K/BB	HR/9	BABIP	LOB%	FIP	xFIP	tRA
2005	6.69	4.83	1.38	1.11	0.298	59.80%	5.00	4.41	6.37
2006	7.02	2.98	2.36	0.85	0.357	69.40%	4.02	4.08	5.28
2007	8.65	3.71	2.33	1.41	0.391	58.70%	4.77	4.12	5.57
2008	9.27	3.93	2.36	0.60	0.259	78.70%	3.39	3.54	3.62
2009	10.67	4.46	2.39	0.95	0.268	83.30%	3.71	3.47	3.95

Despite the bloated ERAs, it looks like Howell may have been a fairly talented starter. His K/BB ratio is very similar to Matt Garza's K/BB from this past year (and you notice, didn't change any upon moving to the bullpen), and his BABIP and LOB% suggest that he was the victim of bad luck. His xFIPs (a predictive statistic) also seem to imply that he's a serviceable major league starter; however, tRA begs to differ, probably because tRA accounts for batted ball data as well:

	GB/FB	LD%	GB%	FB%
2005	2.28	21.30%	54.70%	24.00%
2006	1.55	25.50%	45.30%	29.20%
2007	1.48	22.80%	46.10%	31.10%
2008	1.82	16.70%	53.70%	29.50%
2009	1.42	16.40%	49.10%	34.60%

The first thing that jumps out at me (and I mean jumps out at me) is the steep drop-off in line-drive percentage in 2008. Howell gave up a pretty high percentage of line-drives as a starter, including a ridiculously high 25.5% in 2006. Upon moving into the bullpen, though, Howell started giving up significantly less line-drives and creating more groundballs, both of which are huge helps. Looking at all of these numbers, we can come to one of two conclusions: either we believe that Howell was an effective starter but merely an unlucky one, or we believe that there is some underlying reason why Howell let up large numbers of line-drives and was ineffective as a starter. Which one is it?

To be honest, this argument could probably be argued effectively in both directions. Over the past two years, Howell has proven that he has dominant stuff and that he's an expert at deception and mixing pitches. Maybe his luck improved when he moved to the bullpen, and he received the typical boost in performance that starters typically gain upon pitching out of the pen (approximately .75 FIP, if I remember correctly). At the same time, though, I can't help but notice this fact:

Effectiveness	wFB/C	wSL/C	wCB/C	wCH/C
2005	-0.91	-0.38	3.1	-0.32
2006	-0.25	0.19	-0.37	-0.54
2007	-1.96	4.4	0.76	-2.27
2008	0.6	3.84	1.17	1.74
2009	0.37	-5.63	1.58	3.2

Avg. MPH	FB	SL	CB	CH
2005	85.4	80.7	76.5	78.8
2006	82.7	77.8	76.2	76.5
2007	82.7	78.4	78.9	77.2
2008	86.4	81.0	80.5	79.7
2009	85.6	79.7	80.9	79.6

Before moving to the bullpen, Howell's fastball averaged around 82 MPH, giving him only 5 MPH separation from his change-up. This lack of velocity made both his fastball and change-up ineffective, which changed when Howell moved to the bullpen. In the bullpen, Howell's fastball gained velocity and separation from his change-up, and as a result, they became some of his most effective pitches. Heck, as FreeZo discussed in this piece, Howell's fastball froze batters for called strikes 37.5% of the time this past season. Even with good mixing and deception, would that same fastball freeze batters if it only went 82-83 MPH? I tend to doubt it. It's a small decrease in velocity, but it may be enough to make a meaningful difference.

With these reasons in mind, I believe the Rays are making the correct choice leaving Howell in the bullpen. If moved back into the rotation, he probably wouldn't be as bad as he was in 2007, but also not nearly as good as he's been in the bullpen. Best estimate: a 4.25 FIP, which certainly isn't horrible, but also isn't awe-inspiring. Of course, he could always be better than that, but considering the starting pitching depth the Rays have in the franchise, their lack of dominant bullpen depth, and their position on the win curve, it'd make no sense for them to move a valuable, cheap, dominant arm out of the bullpen. If Howell were still on the Royals, on the other hand, it might make more sense for them to leave him in the rotation, since they have little starting depth and they could afford to take the time to see how Howell fared. Also, what's the point of having a dominant closer if you can't get him a lead (*cough*Soria*cough*)?

So Carson, I definitely agree with you in that I think J.P. could still be a valuable starter and it's fun to ponder about intellectually (I spent many lunch hours daydreaming about it myself), but it isn't going to happen anytime soon. At least not on the Rays.

Winter Meeting Wrap-Up

Steve Slowinski — Sat, 12 Dec 2009 04:51:09 -0000

More photos » by Michael Conroy - AP

16 days ago: Tampa Bay Rays manager Joe Maddon responds to a question during a news conference at the baseball winter meetings in Indianapolis on Tuesday, Dec. 8, 2009. (AP Photo/Michael Conroy)

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With the winter meetings all finished up, the Rays stand in a rather different place now than they did five days ago. Looking back at all the action and moves, what have we learned about the Rays' front-office during this past week? And judging from their actions this week, what can we expect in the future? Here's the long and the short of it:

2010 or Bust - With contracts for Crawford, Pena, and Burrell expiring after the 2010 season (and Balfour hitting free-agency), the Rays stand to lose a significant portion of their "core" of players after this season. So although I initially pegged the Rays as not having much salary room this off-season, the $7M signing of Soriano appears to be saying that the front-office has decided to go all-in this year (for discussion on the rationale behind the trade, see here and here). Since adding an additional win or two would significantly help the Rays' playoff odds, and there stands to be a big personnel change in 2011, they seem to be taking the calculated risk of spending a bit more money now and making a run at the playoffs. If the Rays are out of the race in July, they can always trade CC or Pena then and the only thing they'll have lost in $7M for one year of Soriano. Not a bad strategy, and not one that sacrifices the future beyond 2010 either.

Rays' FO = Quiet and Sneaky - "There will be no $7M closer showing up," Andrew Friedman, December 4^th. While the Rays' front office has always been very good at suppressing rumors and preventing leaks, the Soriano trade was quite the shocker considering how recently Friedman had stated this. Was it a negotiating tactic? Did their plans change that quickly? Or does Friedman simply have a weird sense of humor, and he loves seeing us agonize over trying to deduce his strategy? My guess is a little bit of all three.

Bradley? - Those Cubs don't know who they're dealing with. They're trying every trick in the book to get the Rays to concede some ground, but it's not happening. Simply put, they have no leverage; they're most likely going to have to suck it up and keep Bradley, trade him to a less-astute GM, or trade him to the Rays for pennies on the dollar. It reminds me of a classic back-and-forth from the movie "Stardust":

"Captain Shakespeare: 200.
Ferdy: 180.
CS: 200.
F: That's not negotiation! I'm changing my number! 185.
CS: Did I hear 200?
F: From you, you did. Yeah.
CS: You said 200?
F: If I did, you're a ventriloquist. Okay, 195. Final offer.
CS: 195 it is.
[they shake hands to seal the deal]
CS: So, with sales tax, that's... let's see... 200.
F: [resignedly] Brilliant. Put it in the back." (IMDB.com)

Yankees = Tough, Red Sox = TBD - The Yankees kept improving an already stacked team, adding Curtis Granderson while having to give up little of value (to them at least) in return. This trade has already been analyzed ad nauseam by every major sports news outlet, so there's no need to get into it more, but the fact of the matter is that the Yankees are looking poised to enter 2010 with a team just as good, if not better, than their team last year. The Red Sox are another matter, though; they've still got a good amount of holes to fill this off-season and although I don't like the idea of Beltre and/or Holliday signing with them, at this point the Sox look to be potentially vulnerable come 2010. It's a long off-season, though, so we'll see what shakes up.

Aki Trade String - This is too much fun. I present to you our franchise's most recent trade string, the Aki String:

Is that a thing of beauty or what? Now let's see if Friedman can trade Gross for Soria and then Soria for Pujols, and we'll call it an off-season.

***

If anyone else has any thoughts on where the Rays stand currently, feel free to voice them in the comments. This is simply my way of thinking through the current direction of the franchise in the aftermath of the Soriano deal and the winter meetings.

Ladies and Gentlemen, The Hit Show!

Steve Slowinski — Sat, 05 Dec 2009 05:41:56 -0000

More photos » by Shizuo Kambayashi - AP

Jose Canseco, former member of the infamous "Hit Show" (AP Photo/Shizuo Kambayashi)

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If you were to go up to a random person on the street and ask them what they knew about the Tampa Bay (Devil) Rays organization, what do you expect the top answers would be? Right now, my guess is the answers would fall something like this: 1) they stunk for a really long time, 2) they made the World Series recently, and 3) Carl Crawford and Evan Longoria. These are just random guesses made off the top of my head, so they are quite possibly wrong, but I'm guessing the most common answers would fall somewhere along these lines. The World Series run in 2008 is now the defining moment of our franchise, and I would expect most people's answers to focus on that moment in some form or another.

Now, how would people have answered that same question before the 2008 season? What was our franchise's defining moment before we made the playoffs and World Series? This is a much tougher question, and I think there are a couple potential answers. Some people might have mentioned Rocco Baldelli and his explosive entrance to the majors in 2003. Others may have brought up the Scott Kazmir trade, which is still infamous among Met fans at the very least. And then some people probably would have brought up "The Hit Show".

For those of you that don't know or want a refresher, "The Hit Show" was the slogan that the Devil Rays front office chose for the 2000 team. Specifically, they labeled sluggers Fred McGriff, Jose Canseco, Greg Vaughn, and Vinny Castilla as the Hit Show, since they supposedly represented four of the best hitters in the league. McGriff and Canseco had been with the Devil Rays the previous season, while Vaughn and Castilla were billed as big additions that off-season. And rightly so: Vaughn had launched 40+ homeruns the last two years in a row and Castilla hit over 30 homeruns in each of the past five years. McGriff and Canseco had been quite productive players in 1999 as well, and it appeared that the Rays would have a strong offense going into the 2000 season.

Of course, though, the Hit Show flopped. The conventional wisdom goes that the players were all too old and fell off a cliff, making this a defining moment of the Devil Rays ineffective front office. Maybe I'm attributing more fame to the Hit Show than it actually garnered, but at least in my mind, the Hit Show has always been the moment that aptly defined our franchise's early history. It highlighted the ineffective front-office, the poor decision making, the faulty talent evaluation - all of these things rolled into one. Just like the Curse of the Bambino defined the Red Sox for decades, I felt like the Hit Show defined the Rays.

Since I've been in a retrospective mood recently, I was looking back over the statistics for the players on the Hit Show the other day and received a bit of a shock. You know, the Hit Show wasn't half bad.

Take a look at these stats from the 2000 season:

	OPS	ISO	wRAA	wOBA	Salaries
Greg Vaughn	0.864	0.245	16.1	0.375	$7.0M
Fred McGriff	0.826	0.175	10.6	0.359	$5.9M
Jose Canseco	0.832	0.193	6.8	0.370	$3.0M
Vinny Castilla	0.562	0.088	-30.3	0.243	$6.25M

Granted, Vinny Castilla's 2000 season was a giant albatross sucking the life from the Devil Rays' lineup, but besides for that, that's not half bad, right? Nothing incredibly inspiring, but a far cry from downright atrocious. Vaughn may have only hit 28 homeruns, but he got about 100 less plate appearances in 2000 than in 1999 and his ISO remained nearly the same between the two years (thanks to a great increase in doubles). McGriff and Canseco provided solid value and some nice pop, performing just about as good as anyone could reasonably expect from them. If it weren't for Castilla forgetting how to hit, we may not remember the Hit Show for any particular reason today.

Should the Devil Rays' front office have seen Castilla's drop-off coming? Looking back, is there anything we can glean from his stats that would suggest this was a bad move at the time? To be honest, there's really not a whole lot to see:

	Team	AB	2B	HR	R	RBI	AVG
1995	COL	527	34	32	82	90	0.309
1996	COL	629	34	40	97	113	0.304
1997	COL	612	25	40	94	113	0.304
1998	COL	645	28	46	108	144	0.319
1999	COL	615	24	33	83	102	0.275
2000	TB	331	9	6	22	42	0.221
2001	TB/HOU	538	34	25	69	91	0.260

	Team	BB%	K%	BB/K	ISO	BABIP
1995	COL	5.40%	16.50%	0.34	0.254	0.321
1996	COL	5.30%	14.00%	0.4	0.245	0.301
1997	COL	6.70%	17.60%	0.41	0.243	0.315
1998	COL	5.80%	13.80%	0.45	0.270	0.314
1999	COL	7.90%	12.20%	0.71	0.203	0.268
2000	TB	4.10%	12.40%	0.34	0.088	0.236
2001	TB/HOU	6.10%	20.10%	0.32	0.206	0.284

Castilla had played in Coors for the previous seven seasons, and his statistics there were almost certainly inflated as a result, but that doesn't change the fact that Castilla was an above-average bat during his time with the Rockies. His dip in offensive value in 1999 is concerning in retrospect, but I could also see a team interpreting it as unlucky. Castilla suffered a severe drop-off in his BABIP in 1999, which made his value much lower than it would have been otherwise, without seeing many other drops in some of his peripheral stats. His BB% increased to a career high and his K% decreased to a career low, while his ISO dipped but was still certainly respectable. Maybe the Devil Rays saw this as a chance to grab a valuable bat at a reasonable discount, since other teams may have been scared off by the dip in production in 1999 and the effect from leaving Coors. Maybe that interpretation is giving the Devil Rays' front office too much credit, but it's certainly not out of the realm of possibilities. Castilla was only 32 during the 2000 season, which is getting old for a slugger, but it's not as if Castilla was 36 at the time he was tendered a contract.

Castilla is a good example of all that was good and bad about the Hit Show. While the processes behind signing each individual player weren't horrible - even Vaughn's signing can be justified like Castilla's, although the length of his contract was a bit much - they also weren't terribly great. Individually, I don't have a huge issue with any of the contracts tendered to the Hit Show members; however, when looked at in its full context, the Hit Show was a very poor investment. No team should ever sink that much money into aging sluggers, especially when you're attempting to build a competitive team from the ground up. Investing in one older slugger would not have been a bad strategy, but four of them at once diverted way too much money away from other critical aspects of development.

So in the end, my final assessment of the Hit Show ends up being rather similar to what our conventional wisdom tells us: it was a poor investment that handicapped the team going forward, and it turned out badly. However, at the same time, the Hit Show wasn't as bad a disaster as everyone claims, at least during the 2000 season. I think what fascinates me about the whole situation is that despite the processes being so wrong for where the franchise was at the time, the Devil Rays nearly got what they were hoping for: a strong offense for a season or two. If Vaughn had only been signed for a one or two year deal, and Castilla had merely regressed as opposed to flopped, we could be having an entirely different conversation about the Hit Show now. Heck, it may have actually been a show worth watching.

Past Trade Analysis: Joey Gathright Runs Faster Than J.P. Howell’s Fastball

Steve Slowinski — Sat, 28 Nov 2009 17:08:48 -0000

If you were to go through all the players on the Opening Day roster for the 2006 Devil Rays, it's incredible how few of them survived on the team for long. Actually, considering the talent involved, maybe it's not such a surprise. This isn't a complete list, but take a look for yourself:

Position	Player	History
C	Toby Hall	Traded mid-2006
1B	Travis Lee	Released post-2006
2B	Jorge Cantu	Traded mid-2007
SS	Julio Lugo	Traded mid-2006
3B	Aubrey Huff	Traded mid-2006
LF	Carl Crawford	Still on team.
CF	Rocco Baldelli	Let go post-2008
RF	Damon Hollins	Released post-2006
UTL	Ty Wiggington	Traded mid-2007
UTL	Greg Norton	Released post-2006
UTL	Joey Gathright	Traded mid-2006
UTL	Tomas Perez	Released post-2006

Once the new ownership group took over, they made it pretty clear that they were entering into re-building mode fast. Of the positional players that started the 2006 season with the Rays, four were traded by the July trading deadline, three were released or granted free-agency after the 2006 season, and two were traded by the 2007 trade deadline. In short, the 2007 line-up looked nothing like the 2006 one. Carlos Pena started at first, Aki was at third, Delmon was in right, Dukes and Upton were in center, Harris was at short, and Navarro was behind the plate. It was a classic rebuilding strategy - relying on young players and picking up undervalued veterans off the scrap heap - and instead of being intimidated by the new industry, the Devil Rays' new front office jumped in with a fury.

While there is plenty of material to choose from, one trade that happened mid-2006 stands out to me a little: the Joey Gathright (and Fernando Cortez) for J.P. Howell trade. In retrospect, this deal has obviously turned out well for the Rays and not so well for the Royals, but what did we know at the time? Let's walk through each of the six steps of past trade analysis: context, rationale, gut reaction, current knowledge, outcome, and future ramifications.

Context

Completed in mid-June, this trade wasn’t a deadline deal and certainly wasn’t a salary dump. Joey Gathright and Fernando Cortez were both minor leaguers that hadn’t racked up enough major league time to be expensive yet, and Gathright earned just $337K during the 2006 season. Drafted in the 32^nd round of the 2001 draft, Gathright was 25 during the 2006 season and had gained notoriety for 1) being incredibly fast, and 2) jumping over a car. He was incredibly tool-sy and he’d flashed some signs of potential during brief stints in the majors over the 2004 and 2005 seasons, stealing a total of 42 bases out of 56 attempts (75% success rate). Cortez, on the other hand, had been drafted much higher (9^th round of 2001), but had displayed less success in the minors. He was 24 and in Triple-A during the 2006 season, where he was batting .222/.265/.271. He’d gotten a brief taste of the majors in 2005 for 8 games, but for all intents and purposes, he was viewed as a non-prospect. For example, after the 2004 season, Gathright was ranked as the 3^rd best prospect in the Devil Rays’ system by Baseball America, while Cortez didn’t crack the top-10; however, Cortez was ranked as having the best infield defense of any player in the system.

On the other side of the coin, the Royals were in desperate need of young outfield talent at the time (Emil Brown and Reggie Saunders were the other outfield starters at the time, and were both well north of 30) and were willing to pay for it. J.P. Howell had been drafted in the 1^st round (31^st pick) of the 2004 draft and he was had displayed success in the minors in 2005 before being rushed to the majors by the end of the season (101.2 IP in A+, AA, and AAA combined before promotion). He posted a 6.19 ERA over 15 starts for the 2005 Royals, and he began the 2006 season as a 23-year-old in Triple-A, where he posted a 4.75 ERA in 36 IP before being traded to the Devil Rays. Although not ranked by Baseball America as one of the Royals’ top-10 prospects going into 2006, he was still a highly touted pitcher and his star had been dimmed by being rushed through the minors.

To highlight this point, I found a really entertaining quote from a Baseball America chat before the 2005 season:

"Q: After coming off an All-American year at Texas, what is JP Howell's ETA? Should we expect the Royals to take it slow with him or will he fly through the system like Greinke?

A: (Will Kimmey) He'll go as fast as he's capable of. There's not a rotation of Cy Youngs in KC, and I'm not saying Howell will be that either, but it's not like he's got a lot of road blocks. A lot of people can hate on Howell because he doesn't have great velo, but he can take his four, five-pitch repertoire and make it work like 10 pitches because he can add, subtract and locate. I hate to keep bringing Greinke back up, this has to be the fourth time in this chat, but it's a similar feel for pitching for Greinke and Howell, who's the consummate crafty lefty. He'll be a solid middle of the rotation guy because of his guys and guile, and at worst he's going to reach the majors as a shutdown LH setup guy because his breaking stuff can eat up lefties."

Rationale

Like I said above, the Rays were in full rebuilding mode during the 2006 season and while this move wasn’t a salary dump, it was a swap of talent from an area of perceived organizational strength (outfield depth) to an area of weakness (pitching depth). For the Royals, it was a swap of talent from an area of perceived depth (with Grienke and others "stocking" the system with pitching depth) to an area of weakness. Gathright had also been around the Devil Rays for an extended period of time without ever blossoming into the star many had forecast, and the new front office most likely believed he was never going to rise as far as the other outfielders in the system at the time.

Gut Reaction

At DRaysBay, this trade was initially received with plenty of bad feelings. Gathright was toolsy and had been a top prospect in the organization for so long, many fans believed we were selling low on him. Howell had displayed limited success in his time in Triple-A and in the majors up to that point, and many pointed to his 83-85 MPH fastball as a sign that he could never become a successful major league pitcher. Although these reactions did change at DRB after getting a chance to see Howell pitch for the rest of the season, the initial reaction to the trade (and I’m sure how it was viewed by the general public) went something like this:

"But everyone was blinded by his [Gathright’s] poor play this year, including the Rays front office, and because of that we sold low, extremely low, and gave away a player for less than his value. When you don't have a good offer, you don't take one. You don't take the "best offer", you wait and let your player come back to becoming what he has shown he can be in the past. I would love to have J.P Howell if we traded a player of lesser capability for him or plucked him off waivers, but trading Gathright for him was too much, and it is a move that I think the DRO and Rays fans will come to regret."

Current Knowledge

We can delve into the numbers and evaluate Gathright’s hitting ability, which was obviously sub-par at the time, but there are two other facets of this trade that bear more scrutiny: the age of the players involved, and Howell’s velocity. Gathright was 26 when he was traded, which is quite old for prospects. Since most players hit their peak around age 27, Gathright likely didn’t have much growing and developing left; while his tools had made him an attractive prospect at ages 22 and 23, he never grew into those tools and made them valuable.

Also, Howell’s velocity (or more specifically, lack thereof) was a huge concern at the time, and it skewed the public’s view of him. Since then, we’ve seen how players like James Shields and Andy Sonnanstine (the 2008 version) can have great success without an overwhelming fastball velocity, but at the time, the lack of velocity seemed to doom Howell.

Outcome

Gathright played out the remainder of the 2006 season as the Royals’ centerfielder, and stuck with them until after the 2008 season, when he was let go as a free agent. He reached his peak talent in 2007 when he racked up 1.1 WAR in 228 at-bats, posting quality defense and a .318 wOBA; however, during that same year, his talent of the base paths seemed to disappear (9 for 17 on stolen base attempts). He was helped along by a .365 BABIP, though, and returned to his previous baseline in 2008 (.280 wOBA). Since being released by the Royals, Gathright has floated between clubs, splitting 2009 between the Cubs, Orioles, and Red Sox.

Fernando Cortez made the majors briefly with the Royals, but he was released in July of 2007. He was picked up by the White Sox in 2008, was released again, and now he’s back in the Rays’ minors. He played the 2009 season with the Montgomery Biscuits.

There’s not much to be said about J.P. Howell. After losing out to Edwin Jackson for a rotation spot in 2008, the Iceman has become one of the best relief pitchers in the American League. He’s racked up 4.0 WAR during his years with the Rays, and he’s under team control for another four years.

Ramifications for the Present

Since this trade worked out so well, there is little that needs to be said going forward. The new front office made a great trade, getting a young, promising pitching prospect in return for an aging outfield prospect that had done little to live up to his hype. They weren’t blinded by history or Gathright’s tools, and weren’t dissuaded from Howell because of his velocity. It was a really, really smart trade.

Conclusion

I don’t think this trade could have worked out any better for the Rays, and in retrospect, it was a really, really smart trade at the time. I had never realized that Howell had been so highly touted and drafted so high, and I think everyone (except the Rays’ front office) really overvalued Gathright at the time. So although it’s easy to claim this as a victory for the Rays considering the outcome of the trade, it was also a very shrewd trade at the time. If it occurred today, I would consider a resounding win for the Rays.

All stats courtesy of Baseball-Reference and Fangraphs.

The Rays’ All-Time Offensive Leaderboard: The Sabremetric Edition

Steve Slowinski — Sat, 21 Nov 2009 03:31:52 -0000

More photos » by Gail Burton - AP

(AP Photo/Gail Burton)

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While writing my piece for last weekend, I spent a lot of time looking at the Fangraph win values of historical players on the Rays. I'm a huge fan of baseball history and lore, and looking at those old totals sparked an interesting question in my mind: I wonder who's had the worst offensive year ever while on the Rays. For being one of the two youngest teams in baseball, our franchise already has a long history of suckitude - to be precise, 10 years with a record of 645-972 (.399 Win%). I don't know where that ranks in terms of all-time worst stretches, but it's got to be up there. Anyway, since our franchise had been so bad until recently, I figured we must have a good amount of sucking in our history. The trick is, how best to quantify it?

To answer this question, I decided to rank all the players that have played with the Rays by their Fangraphs Weighted Runs Above Average (wRAA). For those unfamiliar with wRAA, this statistic measures how many offensive runs a player contributed to their team when compared to the league average for that year. It's a counting stat, like RBIs and HRs, meaning that in order to accumulate a really low wRAA, a player not only has to be bad, but they also have to be given playing time. That said, here's your list of the lowest of the low, the ten worst offensive seasons in the Rays' history:

	Player	Year	wRAA
1	Vinny Castilla	2000	-30.3
2	John Flaherty	1998	-26.8
3	Dioner Navarro	2009	-24.0
4	Tomas Perez	2006	-23.8
5	Brent Abernathy	2002	-23.3
6	Bobby Smith	1999	-21.9
7	Geoff Blum	2004	-20.6
8	Kevin Stocker	1998	-20.2
9	Dioner Navarro	2007	-18.6
10	Felix Martinez	2000	-18.4

I figured that Navarro's 2009 season would rank towards the top of the bottom, but I didn't know that he'd own the dubious honor of being the only player with two seasons in the bottom ten. It helps that he catches - the bar is set so low, managers can justify playing poor hitting catchers for longer than they would be able to otherwise. Castilla's 2000 season truly was one for the record books, though. If you thought Navarro was painful to watch this year, imagine this: Castilla ranked up his -30.3 wRAA in only 354 plate appearances (compared to Navarro's 410). And he was a third baseman! Look at this line: .221/.254/.308. That's just...wow.

Now that we've taken some time to marvel at the lows of our organization, what about the high points? What have the ten best offensive seasons been? And along those lines, who is the Rays' all-time offensive leader in wRAA? The answers are after the jump, but first, take the time to answer the poll in the post down below if you haven't already.

Let's start with the ten best offensive seasons, as measured by wRAA:

	Player	Year	wRAA
1	Carlos Pena	2007	51.0
2	Ben Zobrist	2009	39.3
3	Fred McGriff	1999	35.7
4	Aubrey Huff	2003	32.0
5	Evan Longoria	2009	28.3
6	Jason Bartlett	2009	28.1
7	B.J. Upton	2007	25.8
8	Jose Canseco	1999	23.3
9	Carlos Pena	2008	23.1
10	Carlos Pena	2009	21.6

Four, count ‘em, four players from the 2009 Rays made the top ten; that speaks wonders about the strength and depth of our current offense. Also, holy cow, I had forgotten just how amazing Pena was in 2007. For an equivalent, Joe Mauer created 54.9 wRAA this past season; Pena created 51.0 wRAA in 2007. The second best season in Rays' history, Zobrist's 2009 season, falls 11.7 wRAA behind Pena's 2007 season, a difference equivalent to the entire offensive value of Magglio Ordonez this past year (which wasn't shabby at a .356 wOBA). Pena was a force of nature that year, and his .345 ISO from that season is far and away the highest in franchise history (second place: Pena, 2008, .310 ISO).

And now, the list you've all been waiting for: the all-time Rays' offensive leaderboard. I always find it fun to see which players lead franchises in counting stats like homeruns, RBIs, and hits, but those lists don't actually tell us how much value each player contributed to the team. With that in mind, this list can serve as our sabremetric response, as we answer the question: which player has contributed the most runs to the Rays over the course of their tenure?

	Names	wRAA
1	Carlos Pena	95.7
2	Fred McGriff	74.2
3	Carl Crawford	57.4
4	Aubrey Huff	52.2
5	Evan Longoria	47.0
6	Jose Canseco	30.1
7	Julio Lugo	24.9
8	Bubba Trammell	24.4
9	Jason Bartlett	21.0
10	BJ Upton	19.5
11	Ben Zobrist	17.6
12	Ben Grieve	17.2

Going into this exercise, I knew that Pena had created a lot of offensive value for the Rays over the course of the past three seasons, but I don't think I appreciated exactly how much. He's been incredible and while we don't have the most illustrious franchise history (it's telling that Bubba Trammell sits in 8^th place), he deserves his place at the top of the list. Also, how many people would have said Fred McGriff was the second most valuable offensive player in Rays' history? Maybe I jumped on the Rays' bandwagon too late and missed being able to appreciate McGriff, but I though Crawford would be ahead of him by now. And wait...Jose Canseco was actually good? Somehow I missed this, but at least one part of the "Hit Show" was a success for a season or two.

Looking at next year, if Crawford is with the Rays for the whole time and Longoria produces like he has the past few years, we could see Crawford move into the #2 spot and Longoria ending up close to McGriff. Upton, Bartlett, and Zobrist all figure to move up spots as well, thankfully moving names like Bubba Trammell and Julio Lugo back down towards the bottom. Pena stands to increase his lead, and although Longoria appears poised to pass him eventually, he'll have his work cut out for him.

So congratulations to Carlos Pena, the Rays' all-time leader in wRAA. This list may not get the most mainstream attention, but considering how sabremetrically-slanted our front office is, it holds more importance than the title of all-time leader in RBIs, for sure.

Rays' Offensive Leaderboard

Steve Slowinski — Sat, 21 Nov 2009 05:34:13 -0000

Ponder this question, answer it, and then mentally rank the options in order from one to five. Leave full rankings in the comments section. And no Fangraphs-peeking allowed!

No worries, the answer will be coming at 10 AM today.

**For those that haven't heard of wRAA, imagine the question this way: who has provided the Rays with the most offensive value during their time with the Rays?**

Poll

Who do you believe is the Rays' all-time offensive leader (as measured by wRAA)?

Fred McGriff

24 votes

Aubrey Huff

53 votes

Carl Crawford

80 votes

Carlos Pena

51 votes

Evan Longoria

24 votes

232 votes | Poll has closed

Past Trade Evaluation: Remember Aubrey Huff?

Steve Slowinski — Sat, 14 Nov 2009 05:38:47 -0000

More photos » by Nick Wass - AP

Thank this man for Zorilla, although wow, what an awkward photo (AP Photo/Nick Wass)

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When I first started following the Rays back in 2001-2002, there were only a couple of bright spots on the team. Eventually, Baldelli and Crawford sparked hope for the franchise, but Crawford's first full season wasn't until 2002 and Baldelli didn't burst upon the scene until 2003. They were both young stars that had the potential then to be the foundation of the franchise moving forward, but until they both arrived, there was another player that (at least in my mind) served as the franchise's face and hope: Aubrey Huff.

Back when I was merely a casual fan of the game, Huff seemed to brim with potential to me. Even then I loved prospects, and since I'd jumped on the Rays' bandwagon (if there was such a thing) too late to be enamored with Ben Grieve, Huff became my first real crush. He could play at a bunch of positions, he could hit really well, and he was young! Who knows what he could end up as! At the time, he seemed to me like a potential above-average to star player, and a piece the Rays should build around for the future.

Of course, in retrospect, this was a rather flawed analysis. Although Huff could definitely hit, his defense was drove his value down lower than I realized. Yes, Huff could play a bunch of positions, but none of them particularly well. Looking at his UZR rates going back to 2002, his defensive skills were never his strong suit, regardless of where he played on the diamond (UZR/150: -4.0 at 1B, -4.4 at 3B, -9.8 in RF). Also, Huff had his first real breakout year in 2002, hitting 23 homers and checking in at 21.8 wRAA, but he was 25 during that year. Back then I still believed that he had plenty of years to grow and hit his peak, but the reality is that Huff probably didn't have much more developing to do. A little bit of growth over the next couple of years, but then he'd hit his peak around 27-28 and most likely fade.

Huff went on to have a couple of great years in 2003 and 2004, posting WARs of 3.9 and 4.7 respectively, and then faded quite dramatically in 2005 (0.3 WAR) due to defensive regression, bad luck, and a decrease in patience. The new ownership dealt him during the middle of the 2006 season (along with just about everyone else on the team, but more on that in another post), getting back in return Mitch Talbot and Ben Zobrist.

In order to properly evaluate this trade, we've got to keep a couple of things in mind. Evaluating past trades is tricky, since it's tempting to look at how players have performed since the trade and declare a winner and loser. That'd be results-based analysis, though, which is something we abhor on this blog (and in life in general). What we really want to focus on is the process, which can be a lot tougher to analyze. Here are some general questions to keep in mind whenever attempting to analyze a trade completed sometime in the past:

Context: What was the initial context for this trade? Was it completed at the trade deadline or during the off-season? What was the contract-status of the traded player(s)? What was the level of competitiveness of the franchise? Who were the received player(s)?
Rationale: What was the initial reasoning behind this trade? Did this rationale make sense at the time and fall in line with the franchise's declared goals?
Gut Reaction: What was the initial reaction to this trade when it was completed? Who was declared "the winner"?
Current Knowledge: Is there any light our current knowledge sheds on the trade? For example, my initial analysis of Aubrey Huff's talent was flawed due to my lack of knowledge of sabermetrics at the time. Maybe we lacked knowledge or information at the time that prevented us from evaluating the trade properly.
Outcome: How have all of the players involved performed since the trade? Did the processes result in successful trade or a flop? Has luck or injuries been a factor in any of the players' performances?
Ramifications for the Present: Does this trade teach us anything going forward?

With those questions in mind, let's take a deeper look at the Huff/Talbot/Zobrist trade.

Context

Occurring right at the 2006 trade deadline, the Rays were unloading Huff during the final year of his contract. He was making close to $7M that season, and was coming off a very poor 2005 season (0.3 WAR). His performance had been better in 2006 (although still nothing like his peak years) and he was currently riding a hot streak in July. The Rays were in last place at the time, and Huff had proved to be a negative clubhouse presence.

As for the players they received, Ben Zobrist was ranked 16^th in the Astros' farm system at the time by "Baseball America", and Mitch Talbot was ranked at 26^th. Both were in Double-A, although Zobrist was 25 years old and Talbot was 22. Zobrist had flashed good on-base skills (if limited power) and a solid glove at shortstop, a position of weakness for the Rays at the time (with Upton struggling defensively and Lugo being traded at the deadline as well). Talbot had been rated as having the best change-up in the Astros' organization in 2005, and he currently had a 96:26 K:BB ratio in 90.1 IP.

Rationale

The new Rays front office had made up their minds that they were rebuilding, and were intent on stocking the farm system. Huff was expensive, his value was at a recent high point, and he was getting old, so he was an ideal candidate to get traded. Old (comparatively speaking) and expensive for young and cheap. Also, if they hadn't traded him, there was no guarantee that he'd qualify for Type-A or -B status, and could thus have left the Rays without any compensation.

Gut Reaction

At the end of the season, DRaysBay readers voted it the best trade completed by the new FO, although I believe Aubrey-Huff-hate played into that selection. To quote the DRaysBay staff at the time, the general reaction to the trade seemed to be "meh". It didn't seem like either side had gotten robbed, but both teams got what they wanted. The prospects didn't seem overwhelming, but they were also more than the Rays would have gotten otherwise.

Current Knowledge

As stated in the beginning of this article, Huff was a poor defender and although we couldn't quantify that at the time, we can now. Also, Huff has shown signs of decline in his BB% and isolated power, the two areas that made him a valuable offensive piece in the first place. His LD% had decreased for two years straight from 22.1% to 15.4%, and he was striking out at an unprecedented rate for himself (15.3% vs. 12.3%). His was suffering from a mildly low BABIP (.275 as opposed to his average of .300), but nothing else in his numbers suggested he was getting unlucky. He had most likely hit his peak and was beginning to decline, especially since he was 29 that season.

Although scouts claimed he had underwhelming stuff, Talbot had put up some impressive numbers in Double-A. He somehow posted a 3.39 ERA while having a .362 BABIP and a 64.8% LOB%, and his 3.31 K/BB ratio helped give him a sparkly 2.81 FIP. Zobrist was older and therefore had less time to develop, but he had put up impressive enough numbers in the minors (.410 wOBA in Double-A) to make himself a viable utility infielder with a bit of upside.

Outcome

Since being traded, Huff has bounced back and forth between being a 4 WAR player (2008) and a -1 WAR player (2009), oscillating every which way. In total, he's produced a bit over 4 WAR in value for his various teams. Zobrist became a super-utility man for the Rays before visiting The Swing Mechanic and exploding this past season; he's been worth a total of 8 WAR for the Rays (he had some negative years in there too) and is still under team control for another 4 seasons. And due to the Rays' stacked pitching depth, Talbot has only had a sip of a cup of tea in the majors, although he's posted consecutive years of a sub-4 FIP in Triple-A (3.03 in 2008; 3.55 in 2009). He's in contention for a spot in the Rays' pen this year since he's currently out of options.

Ramifications for the Present

I wish I had more to say for this section, since I feel like it's a very important step. There's no point in evaluating the past if you can't use it to guide your future actions; this is the step the allows us to realize where we screwed up and fix those issues in the future. In this case, though, not much change is needed. The Rays made a smart move using good processes for a club in their position (they were correct to be rebuilding at the time) and have been fortunate enough to have the results be positive as well. The process was sound, so no tweaking to be done here.

Conclusion

The Rays pulled off a smart trade here and have benefited greatly from it in the end. They've definitely gotten lucky; not all trades work out this well, even when you use good processes. Zobrist's surge is nothing anyone could have foretold, although in my mind, this trade was still a successful one regardless of how the prospects turned out. The Rays had zero leverage when dealing Huff, and he really didn't have all that much value at the time. With that in mind, the Rays got a steal in snagging two solid prospects for him, and so far both of them are panning out. Thank you, Aubrey Huff. Zorilla has certainly been a nice going-away present.

**Information provided by Baseball-Reference.com and Fangraphs.

What To Do With Andy Sonnanstine?

Steve Slowinski — Sat, 07 Nov 2009 19:36:08 -0000

by Mark Duncan - AP

(AP Photo/Mark Duncan)

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Nothing seems to come easily for Andy Sonnanstine. His fastball barely tops 87 and he's forced to get by on mixing pitches and superb control, which is not a way to earn the benefit of the doubt from fans or scouts. The fastball-throwing, strikeout machines are by far sexier and catch your eye easily, which is why players like Daniel Cabrera get chance after chance after chance, while players like Sonnanstine have to force their way onto the scene. I know the term has garnered a very negative connotation among the sabremetric community, but pitchers like Andy Sonnanstine and Brian Bannister are real "scrappy" pitchers...and I don't mean that as a bad thing in this case.

Sonnanstine slowly worked his way through the minors without ever heralding great acclaim, and he managed to crack a spot in the 2008 Rays' rotation as the 5^th starter. He had a great year in 2008, posting a 3.91 FIP, and he entered the 2009 season with a spot in the Rays' tightly crammed rotation. However, despite the fact that he was given a spot to start the season, Sonnanstine had ample reasons to keep looking over his shoulder. He was the Rays' fourth starter, but with David Price and Wade Davis making their presences known in Triple-A and Jeff Niemann out of options and pitching well, he needed to pitch well to keep himself in the majors. Call it bad luck, crumbling under the pressure, hit-ability, whatever you want to - Sonny had a bad year.

	K/9	BB/9	K/BB	HR/9	BABIP	LOB	FIP	tRA
2008	5.77	1.72	3.35	0.98	0.280	66.3%	3.91	4.00
2009	5.42	3.07	1.76	1.72	0.318	58.4%	5.45	5.93

	LD%	GB%	FB%	HR/FB
2008	17.0%	42.1%	40.9%	8.0%
2009	18.8%	42.7%	38.5%	13.9%

A finesse pitcher, Sonnanstine saw his BB/9 rate skyrocket this past year, going from 1.72 to 3.07. He was unlucky (13.9% FB/HR; 58.4% LOB; .336 BABIP), but he still was far from the pitcher that we saw in 2008. Now, with Jeff Niemann and David Price firmly entrenched in the rotation and Wade Davis poised to take over the 5^th spot, we're left with the question: what to do with Sonny?

Going into 2010, there are four main options for the Rays: trade Sonny, put him in the rotation, leave him in the minors in case of an injury, or turn him into a reliever. In my opinion, the first two options are highly unlikely. Trading Sonny makes little sense at this point, since his value is at an all-time low and he would garner little in return, and putting him in the rotation would force Wade Davis back down into Triple-A, where he has little left to prove. If given the chance in the rotation, Sonny may have a big comeback year and rebound, but with the pitching depth the Rays have and the competitiveness of the franchise, I feel like the chance of him getting a gig in the rotation to begin the year is slim to none. That leaves us with two final options: leaving Sonny in Triple-A or putting him in the bullpen.

Both options certainly have their merits. Having starting pitching depth is always a good thing and Sonny still has options left, so sending him down is certainly a viable option. However, I can't help but feel that putting Sonny in the minors is a waste of his talent for the organization. The Rays have plenty of other starting pitchers in Triple-A that could fill in for an injured starter (Hellboy, Talbot, Hernandez), and anyway, putting Sonnanstine in the pen wouldn't keep him from filling in an odd spot or two if the Rays had him penciled in as their long-man, which he most likely would be.

Remember what the Rays did with Howell in 2008? This could be the same sort of process. Let Sonnanstine start off the year as the long man in the pen and see how effective he is. If he bombs, then you can always demote him without incurring much damage, and if he dominates, eventually promote him to higher leverage situations. Starters typically gain miles an hour on their fastball and increase their strikeout numbers when transitioning to the pen, both of which are changes that could benefit Sonnanstine. I'm not expecting him to be Howell v2.0 (especially since Howell had a higher K/9 total as a starter than Sonny has so far), but it may be the most efficient use of Sonnanstine's talent within our organization at the moment. He's a cheap, team-controlled arm that has displayed major league caliber talent in the past, so why not use him and save ourselves money on another reliever?

Trade Strings: Keeping Talent Alive, or Delmon Young and Victor Zambrano Still Live

Steve Slowinski — Sat, 31 Oct 2009 02:59:36 -0000

More photos » by Elaine Thompson - AP

The Young String is still...well, young, but it has already reaped great rewards (AP Photo/Elaine Thompson)

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Like middle-school history teachers always say, "You can't know where you're going until you know where you've been." With the off-season coming up, and the probability that the Rays will make some trades during it rather high, it's a perfect time to take a retrospective look at many of the trades the Rays have made in the past and attempt to glean some insight from them. Since there are too many trades to discuss all in one post, this will be a series that I'll return back to every other weekend or so. I intend to focus mostly on trades completed by Andrew Friedman and the new ownership group, but on occasion I might dabble into some old trades and look at their current ramifications.

To lead off this series (no pun intended), I want to look at a concept that has always fascinated me: trade strings. I'm pretty sure I just made that phrase up, so let me explain what I mean. "Trade strings" are trades that eventually result in future trades. And then those trades beget future trades. And so on and so forth down the road until eventually, a prospect or two doesn't pan out and the trade string fades. Theoretically, if a team was exceptionally good at evaluating talent and got lucky in some trades, a team could keep one player's peak talent within their system for decades, even long after that original player had declined and fallen out of baseball.

Mostly, trade strings serve as a fun amusement and don't serve a huge analytical purpose. They're like the Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon - fun and rather weird, but still trivia. However, there is an important reason why we should look at trade strings. Franchises can only acquire new talent three ways: drafting and signing amateur talent, signing free-agents, and through a trade. Each of these options has its downside, though: prospects bust more often than they boom, free-agents are quite expensive for small-market teams, and trades are normally close to equal in terms of talent (otherwise, who would agree to trade?). Because of this, talent is incredibly valuable to small-market teams; it's tough to acquire and so when they do acquire some, they want to retain that talent for as long as possible. Individual players fade over time, though, so the only way to maintain your talent assets are to constantly keep changing them into newer, younger assets.

That said, smart front offices of small-market teams will constantly be looking to get the most bang out of each player they have. Take a look at an example:

Wow. Just wow. That is a thing of beauty right there. For Mark Mulder, the Athletics originally received Dan Haren, Kiko Calero, and Daric Barton, but they eventually received another 10 player if you follow the trade strings to their current state. They had Dan Haren under control for 3 cost-effective seasons, they obtained Matt Holliday for half a season, and they've received a heck of a lot of solid prospects. Mulder's 2004 talent level has stayed in the organization through shrewd trades, and with little increase in payroll for Oakland, while in the meantime, Mulder has produced a total of 1.4 WAR while being paid around $25 million. Talk about a deal.

So how about the Rays? Are there any instances where the Rays have managed to put a nice trade string together? Although the Rays have not had a savvy front office for as long as Oakland, there are a couple burgeoning trade strings that we can look at.

For our first one, let's look at an obvious example:

This is one of those rare instances where not only did the Rays manage to maintain Zambrano's talent within the system, but they actually got more talent back than they dished out. Zambrano's salary spiked the year after he was traded (from league minimum to over $2M), and his ability level has fallen off the past few years. Although the Mets did acquire an average starter for half of 2004 and the entire 2005 season (.9 WAR and 1.7 WAR respectively), Zambrano fell off a cliff after that and hasn't pitched in the majors since 2007. Kazmir, meanwhile, went on to provide the Rays with 16.7 WAR over the course of his 6 seasons with the (Devil) Rays. The newest incarnation of Victor Zambrano is Sean Rodriguez, who is young, talented, and under team control for the next six seasons. Long live Zambrano!

While the Rays do have a couple other small trade strings that are still alive (Baez to Jackson to Joyce comes to mind), I want to close out by focusing on a trade string still in the infant stages of development. Take a look right here:

There are two things that immediately jump to mind: wow, we absolutely fleeced the Twins, and this deal looks to only get better if we get value back for Bartlett this off-season. Obviously we don't know if we're actually going to trade Bartlett and how much we'd get for him, but as it stands already, the Rays significantly increased their franchise's talent level through the Delmon Young trade.

To sum up, the Rays don't have very many long trade strings, but the new front office has been around for only four seasons. The old front office produced very few trade strings (Randy Winn for Lou Piniella, anyone? Talk about squandering talent), although they did manage to acquire Kazmir and begin that trade string. Completing successful trades require a front office that is skilled at assessing talent, and it also involves large quantities of luck (especially when prospects are involved). Recently, the Rays have had both of these going for them. Let's hope the trend continues.