"I'm in the best shape of my life." Spring Training Edition No. 10,581

Maybe the sub-title comes across as too cynical. But as spring training approaches, the ritual of players telling us about their excellent athletic condition is upon us. While Chris Johnson's general theme as told to Brian McTaggert falls in the category of normal spring training fare, his prediction of a break out season is more bold than usual. Also, Johnson's admission that he was too comfortable, and perhaps even ill prepared, last year is more candid than the normal spring quotes.

In some ways, I think Chris Johnson is the victim of his own success in 2010. Riding on the crest of a .387 BABIP, Johnson showed off an impressive rookie offensive performance. As we continually reminded people here at TCB, his BABIP was unsustainable and made it unlikely that his performance would be repeated in 2011.. His 2010 offensive stats set expectations too high among fans, and when he struggled as a hitter in 2011, many fans soured on Johnson's future as an Astros third baseman. The 2010 numbers apparently affected Johnson's mindset and preparation in 2011, which he describes as coming in "on your high horse after a good rookie season."

The Astros have told Chris that he will be given an opportunity to compete with Jimmy Paredes in spring training for the starting 3d base job. So, let's evaluate whether Johnson can salvage his major league career this season.

First, let's examine the general positives and negatives for Chris Johnson's case for becoming the starting third baseman.

The negatives:

• Age. Johnson will turn 28 at the end of next season. That's too old to be a prospect, and "break outs" are less frequent at that age. The Astros have to wonder if Johnson's age makes him less likely than Paredes to be part of a future contending Astros' team.
• Defense. Johnson has struggled to field well in the majors. This is reflected both in errors and advanced fielding metrics. Over the past two seasons, Chris averaged -15 runs, according to DRS, and -20 runs/150 innings, according to UZR. Paredes wasn't a great fielder--he is raw and sometimes isn't fundamentally sound--but he has both youth and great athletic ability on his side.
• Plate Discipline. Johnson strikes out too much and draws walks infrequently. His 0.16 BB/K ratio in the majors is terrible, and his minor league ratios don't foretell much improvement. Jimmy Paredes suffers from the same problem, and his BB/K ratio isn't much different. However, perhaps improvement is a greater possibility, given his age. For Paredes, the question might be whether he can improve his plate discipline more readily in the minors than the majors.

The positives:

• Likely Improvement Over 2011. Chris has his positives as a hitter; he sprays line drives to all fields, which can make him a tough hitter to defend. Johnson is unlikely to repeat 2010, but he isn't as bad a hitter as his 2011 stats would indicate.
• Potential regression by competitors. Paredes' .383 BABIP in 2011 puts him in a surprisingly similar position to Chris Johnson's 2010 offensive splurge. Paredes is unlikely to sustain the BABIP, and, as a result, he may be unable to meet offensive expectations in 2013. It is unclear if Matt Downs will be given a shot at starting at 3d base or whether he will be slotted for a utility role. There are signs that Downs' 2011 BABIP is higher than expected (though by not as much as Paredes), and his offensive performance may regress somewhat in 2012.
• Power. Home run power is in short supply in the Astros' lineup. Chris Johnson is a strong hitter who can hit the ball as far as anyone. If Chris can make adjustments in areas like pitch identification and understanding how pitchers are approaching him, he might flash the 15 - 20 HR type hitter that seemed possible after 2010.

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Kyle Weiland came to the Astros in the Melancon trade, which creates some curiosity among Astros' fans. Conroestro wrote about the competition for the No. 5 spot in the rotation; since Weiland is a bit more of a mystery to Astros' followers, I will provide a more in-depth profile of the former Red Sox prospect. Among the five potential starters in conroestro's article, the 25 year old Weiland joins Harrell and Lyles as 4 pitch pitchers, which may give them an advantage in competition for the rotation.

I should give a hat tip to conroestro for finding this article by alex speier, which I use liberally. Weiland's interview at Soxprospects.com was also useful. Weiland impresses me in the latter article as a young pitcher who has given some thought to his craft.

BACKGROUND

Weiland went to Eldorado High School in New Mexico Weiland showed promise at a young age as a swimmer, but switched to baseball at age 10. While in little league, Weiland received instruction from two star pitchers at Eldorado High School who would, themselves, become draft selections. One of those players, Kyle Evans, went on to have both a college (Baylor) and minor league career followed by work in major league front offices as a scout. When Weiland was eligible to be drafted out of Notre Dame, Evans happened to be an advance video scout in the Red Sox front office and he encouraged to the Sox to look at Weiland.

Weiland was a good college closer at Notre Dame, relying upon a sinking fastball and good curveball. But the Red Sox believed that Weiland had the ability to pitch as a starter. Going into the 2008 draft, the Sox believed that Weiland could be a bargain draft pick, because most teams were unaware of his pitch repertoire and would view him as a reliever. Because Weiland might only pitch one inning in a three game series in South Bend, he was hard to scout. The Red Sox scouts compared Weiland to the groundballer, Justin Masterson, who they believed was a bargain draft selection in the preceding year. When they drafted Weiland in the third round, the Red Sox front office felt that they had gotten a first or second round talent with a lower draft pick.

Weiland signed quickly so that he could begin the transition process to becoming a starting pitcher in short season ball, and he was very impressive. He was pushed up to High A Salem, where he initially struggled until he adjusted to the competition and ended the season brilliantly. Although Weiland's FIP and ERA increased in AA, the fact that he increased his K rate (8.4 per 9 IP) and BB rate against better competition was a more important indicator. The results looked worse due to an increase in his HR/fly rate. In AA, Weiland learned how to use his curveball as a backdoor pitch against lefties. As a result, Weiland became equally effective against batters on both sides of the plate.

Weiland put everything together when he moved up to AAA in 2011. During spring training last year, he added a cutter to his repertoire, giving him another weapon against lefthanded bats. This Baseball America report at mid-season raves that Weiland has shown both dominance and consistency. When BA posted that note, he had allowed 2 runs or less in 13 of his 16 starts; and he had just pitched a gem in which he allowed only 1 walk and 1 hit with 12 strike outs for Pawtucket. Overall, he posted a 3.58 ERA, 47% GB rate, and an impressive 23.5% K rate in AAA.

Weiland was called up to the big league team and posted unimpressive results in a small 24 inning sample. A couple of things need to be kept in mind about his big league cup of coffee. First, due to the Red Sox's desperation in a cratering season, Weiland was thrown into critical playoff-critical games while the Red Sox were in the midst of a chaotic team losing skid. The associated pressure is far from an ideal situation for a piayer to pitch in the big leagues for the first time. Second, in some of his previous promotions in the minors, Weiland sometimes got off to a bad start until he adjusted to the new level. Since scouts say that one of Weiland's positive traits is the ability to make adjustments, he may not show the desired results in the majors until he has a more extensive adjustment period.

Some video from Weiland's minor league days:

Weiland strikes out Astros' catcher Jason Castro

Strike out with a curveball in AAA

Swinging K on a curveball.

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This report says that the Mets placed former No. 1 prospect Fernando Martinez on waivers. Martinez is 23 years old and can play RF and CF. Only three or four years ago, he was a top 10 prospect (at age 19 or 20) in all of baseball. He was the Mets' No.1 prospect for most of his time in the Mets' organization. He continued to be among the Mets' top 5 prospects last year. Fernando Martinez's stock has fallen like a rock because he has yet to meet the sky high expectations placed upon him. Yes, he could be a bust, but he is only 23 years old and he still has the raw ability to hit for power, throw out baserunners, and run with dominating speed.

Just for fun: some YouTube video of F-Mart.....HR in VWL; HR against Sam LeCure in AAA; Opposite field HR in AAA; walk off grand slam in AAA; 2010 spring training HR.

I strongly recommend that the Astros claim him off waivers. I don't know who would be removed from the 40 man roster, but surely we can find someone who isn't worth blocking this project. It's high risk/reward. acquisition. He may turn out to be a bust. But, it's always possible that a change of scenery could put him back on course to be the next Cesar Cedeno. (Ironically, the Astros wanted to trade Lidge for F-Mart instead of Bourn, but the Mets wouldn't budge.) That's my recommendation for the day.

Edit addition: After reading another article, apparently F-Mart had some knee injuries which may have hurt his speed. So that may be a downside. But I still think he is worth looking at in spring training.

the upper levels of the organization look a bit like the baseball equivalent of post-World War II Europe if we had gone in and just kept bombing the cities for a few more years just for the hell of it.

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TCB is the home of Astros bloggers. That's why I'm surprised that we haven't talked about new GM Jeff Luhnow's blogger friendly past. As an executive with the Cardinals, Luhnow had a number of notable interactions with fan bloggers. That has to be a welcome trend for those of us who write for TCB and spend time reading other baseball blogs. It's possible that the GM role will change how much interaction Luhnow can have with bloggers, but it's still nice to know that he sees value in the fan blogs. In an earlier period, before the days of team social media directors, Luhnow's interaction with bloggers probably was frowned upon by some of the traditional baseball guys. So this friendliness was not immediately cost-free for him.

In a 2007 interview, Luhnow said he frequently reads fan blogs and message boards:

Any input is valuable if the person puts some thought behind it. I read the blogs and message boards all the time and there is tons of good stuff in there, mixed in with some "puh-leeeease" stuff as you call it.

If you have been following along here at TCB, you may have already read Luhnow's previous interviews at the SBN sabermetric blog, Beyond the Boxscore, as well as Baseball Prospectus. Perhaps even more interesting is the two interviews he gave TCB's sister blog, vivaelbirdos, in 2007. The first is here and the second ("letter from luhnow") is here. (I joined TCB around then, but I was already aware of the VEB interviewer, "lboros," or Larry Borowsky, who I considered one of the best writers in the baseball blogosphere at that time.)

Luhnow's willingness to give meaty, thoughtfull answers--not just courtesy time--to a fan blog is impressive. Though many of the questions are specific to past tense Cardinals' prospects, I think you will find some of his explanations of scouting and farm philosophy interesting.

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NBC Sports Hardball Talk discussed a Jon Heyman rumor that the Astros would have interest in the Cardinals' infielder Ryan Theriot if he is non-tendered. With the signing of Rafael Furcal, Theriot's future with the Cardinals is questionable. Since similar rumors appeared a few weeks ago, this report doesn't appear to be linked to the new GM's past history as a Cardinals' executive.

I am skeptical that the Astros are really that interested in Theriot. Unless Theriot will come at a bargain basement price, this wouldn't be an overly appealing move for the Astros. I can see the possibility that the Astros will sign a lower rung veteran shortstop. But Theriot is a similar player to Angel Sanchez, another veteran middle infielder on the team. Theriot is a better player than Sanchez, but probably not by a wide margin. Yes, Theriot might improve the team if he replaced Sanchez on the roster. But is the improvement significant enough to justify the difference in salary? Theriot was paid a little over $3 million last year, while Sanchez was paid $440,000. Sanchez is not yet arbitration eligible--but even if we assume that Sanchez would get a pay raise to $900,000 and Theriot accepted a pay cut to $2 million, Theriot increases team costs by $1.1 million. That doesn't seem like a lot, but if the Astros are in a severe cost cutting mode, increased costs will be under the microscope.

Based on the advanced defensive metrics Theriot and Sanchez appear to be similar players, which is to say that they both are below average at shortstop and above average at 2d base. Both players have little power. However, Theriot is somewhat of an improvement over Sanchez on offense. Theriot's offense won't set the world on fire, but he is likely to provide a better on base percentage than Sanchez. Bill James projections for Sanchez and Theriot are shown below.

(BA, OBP, SLG, OPS, wOBA, BB/K)

Theriot .278, .338, .334, .682, .304, 71%

Sanchez .256, .314, .317, .631, .296, 51%

Sanchez's on base skills are poor, and that is the main reason that Theriot looks to be better. In his younger days, Theriot was valuable because he provided decent defense at shortstop with a good OBP. In his later years, Theriot's ability to play shortstop defense has diminished with age, and his walk rates and OBP have declined. But he still appears to be a better offensive player than Sanchez.

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With the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) making significant changes, particularly with respect to acquiring amateur players, sports writers and bloggers have written a lot about how the "haves" and "have nots" will be affected. 

Most, but not all, of the opinions view the changes to the draft and international signings as disadvantaging small market teams and teams that rely primarily on the draft to rebuild.  Here is a sampling: "Why It's the Worst Possible System," "Baseball Sticks It to the Pirates," "CBA Draft Provisions Will Lessen Value of Franchises," How New CBA Provisions Could Alter Jim Crane's Plans for the Astros," "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of the MLB's New Labor Agreement." Super agent Scott Boras is far from an unbiased party, but Astros fans might take notice when he says that new franchise owners:

can no longer rely on the draft to improve their franchise in a major way. The GMs now have less flexibility, less ability to do it. It’s going to take longer to improve your team in a meaningful way.

After reviewing what we know about the new CBA provisions, I have been pondering how the changes that affect prospect acquisition may affect the Astros' rebuilding effort.  I won't try to answer whether the provisions ultimately are good for baseball or not---that's a larger and more difficult question.  I think that the new rules will decrease the impact of some of the rebuilding tools available to the Astros.  But, frankly, I doubt that the overall effect significantly changes the Astros ability to rebuild.  There are some unknowns, like how the rules will affect the behavior of amateurs, and some gaps in our knowledge of the details of the rules.  So, I could be wrong, but my best guess is that the Astros' player acquisition strategy won't be hurt that much.

The caps on both draft and international spending will  reduce the relative value of those avenues for building teams--somewhat.  The draft inherently gives an advantage to losing teams (by virtue of the draft order), but smart front offices had found that this advantage could be increased by expanding investment on the draft and international signings.  To some extent, the spending pool limits will flatten the advantage that some of the small market teams learned how to exploit.  The spending limits will also reign in the ability of big market teams to use their money on amateur players, but teams like the Yankees and Red Sox have more resources to turn to other options, like acquiring major league free agents.

Although the Astros are in a rebuilding mode just like the Royals and Pirates, the Astros are not exactly in the same position.  The Astros are not a small market team, and the Astros' market will support the use of additional options for player acquisition, like free agent signings, in the long run. 

Furthermore, there is no indication that Jim Crane intended to undertake blockbuster spending on the draft.  Perhaps some level of increased spending would have been expected, but I doubt that the Astros intended to spend like the Pirates did last year---the $17 million that the Pirates spent on the draft last year was the most spent by any team in the history of the draft.  Crane has said that the Astros' revenue is declining and that expenses have to move in line with changing revenues.  That kind of statment doesn't make me think that new ownership planned a massive splurge in draft expenditures.  Given what we know, assuming high draft positions for several years, the new system will allot sufficient money to permit the Astros to significantly increase its draft spending; and it's doubtful that the CBA will substantially impede the Astros' draft plans.  It's even possible that the CBA will improve the Astros' comparative position.  The advantages of the new draft primarily will flow to drafting order rather than willingness to spend money.  The Astros will have a draft order advantage in the next few years, but the gap between the Astros and other teams in willingness to spend will diminish.

Here are my thoughts on each of the provisions that may affect the Astros' rebuilding.

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This is my second time for posting an update on Arizona  / Carribean fall and winter league stats for Astros' players.  All of the usual caveats about sample size and quality of competition apply.  The sample sizes for hitters are beginning to raise our level of interest.  The sample sizes for pitchers are still fairly small.

Jose Altuve continues to be the most prolific hitter among Astros' off-season stars.  The guy has great contact skill, and if he faces mediocre pitching, he can show off eye popping, high-.300's batting averages, like his current .375 average. He also has exhibited good doubles pop, which isn't surprising. However, off-season leagues tend to have lessor pitching, since teams will protect their best pitchers from overuse.  The question for Altuve will continue to be his ability to translate his batting skill into similar performance against high quality major league pitching.  Some of the commenters at TCB have suggested that Altuve's excellent contact skill works against him at the major league level, because his confidence about hitting everything hinders his selectivity.  I'm not sure, but there may be something to that.  In the winter league, Altuve continues to show the low walk and strike out rates we have seen in his brief exposure to the majors league.  It may well be that a better metric for evaluating his future improvement will be "pitches seen" rather than BB% and K%.  In any event, Jose is putting up some good offensive numbers in Venezuela.

Brian Bogusevic is also in an offensive groove.  Both his OBP (.405) and SLG (.516) are in admirable territory.  I recall when Luke Scott's rise to the major leagues was foretold by a scorching OPS in Venezuelan winter ball.  We can hope that Bogey's strong Dominican campaign presages a similar leap in his major league performance.

Brett Wallace has one of the strangest slash lines of the off-season: .188, .385, .354, .739.  A 200 point differential between his batting average and on base average is (take your pick): (1) awesome; or (2) terrible.    Both his walk rate and K rate are astoundingly high.  A low .700's OPS is not where we want to see a first baseman.  Glass half full: he is showing great on base skill.  Glass half empty: why doesn't he show more power?

Kody Hinze is the only Astros' hitter with noteworthy stats in the Arizona Fall League.  His three HRs, which lead Astros' off-season hitters, are accompanied by a high OBP.   The blemish on his performance is the high K rate.  One can hope that the high K rate is an artifact of the sample size. 

There is less to report on the pitching side.  Sergio Perez continues to impress as a starting pitcher.   He has allowed only 19 hits, with no HRs, in 28 innings.  Aneury Rodriguez has been reasonably successful as a starter, with a 1.11 WHIP and 15 Ks in 18 IP.  However, he has been hurt by 4 HRs.  Although he isn't shown below, due to small sample size, David Carpenter has pitched fairly well in relief with a 3.86 ERA.

Below, the hitters are ordered by OPS and the pitchers are ordered by ERA.

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I have seen a comment or two asking for an update on Astros' fall and winter league performance.  Since I was curious to look up those stats for the Dominican, Venezuelan, and Arizona off-season leagues,  it doesn't hurt to expand this to a story.  As most of you know already, off-season league stats should be taken with a grain of salt.  The Arizona Fall League has some top prospects as well as a few suspects.  The Dominican and Venezuelan winter leagues are mixed bags, in terms of the quality of players.  And of course the sample sizes are quite small.  Still, it's nice to see how Astros' prospects are performing in the off-season.

Jose Altuve, Jimmy Paredes, Brian Bogusevic, and Jay Austin are among the hitters who have gotten off to great starts.  Among the pitchers, Sergio Perez also has gotten off to a nice start.  Dallas Keuchel has pitched quite a bit in the Arizona Fall League with some mixed results.  Several of the pitchers have been used as relievers, and the sample sizes are quite small at this point.

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I think it's a good idea to shift our attention to topics other than whether the Astros will be moved to the AL.   Rany Jazayerli at Baseball Prospectus recently wrote a series of articles contending that MLB teams' drafting/scouting practices do not adequately account for the difference in age between old and young high school hitters. I don't know if he is right, but if he is on to something, Astros fans should be particularly interested in what he has to say.  After all, the Astros will have to the top pick in 2012; and the 2012 draft, in general, may be one of the most important in team history.  B-Pro published part I and part II of the series.  The article has some critics, and you can see some skepticism in the comments at Baseball Think Factory.

Jazayerli studied two large samples of drafted high school hitters and concluded that only a few months difference in the age of the players when they were drafted resulted in a significant difference in career performance relative to expectations.  (The point of comparison is the career performance expected for players selected at that level in the draft.)  You can read the articles to get a more detailed description of the methodology. The study divided the 17 to 19 year old age range into very young, young, average, old, and very old. (18 years 201 days old is "very old" in the study, which seems humorous to those of us who are actually old.)  Rather than attempt to summarize his conclusions, I will excerpt some quotes.

Let me repeat that: a team that drafted one of the five youngest high school hitters selected among the top 100 picks could expect MORE THAN TWICE AS MUCH VALUE from him as a team that selected one of the five oldest high school hitters. And that’s not a small sample size fluke; that’s a result derived from 32 years of the draft, looking at 160 players from both camps...Young high school hitters are simply much more likely to develop into stars, particularly players who weren’t elite picks...This is, all modesty aside, quite possibly the most impressive and significant finding of my career. When it comes to the drafting of high school hitters, even slight differences in age matter. At least when it comes to high school hitters, young draft picks are a MASSIVE market inefficiency.

Examples of some of the youngest players of the draft in particular years: Ken Griffey Jr., Ricky Henderson, George Brett, Alex Rodriguez, Gary Sheffield, Derek Jeter, Jimmy Rollins, and Jason Kendall.  More quotes from the article:

According to the data, it appears that the importance of a draft pick’s age has, in fact, changed over time… but not in the direction you’d expect: the advantage enjoyed by young players increased dramatically from 1997 to 2003. The average return from the youngest 20 percent of draft picks during this span was more than triple the return of the oldest 20 percent... If a player who might look like a third-round pick on talent alone happens to be a full year younger than his draft class, he ought to be considered a late-first-round pick....The conclusion is clear: at least as recently as 2003, the baseball industry as a whole massively underrated the importance of age in drafting high school hitters and massively undervalued high school hitters who still needed their parents’ permission to sign their contract.

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It's the time of year to sum up the players' seasons.  And inquiring minds want to know which hitters are likely to improve on this year's performance, and which are likely to suffer regression.  To suggest some answers, I will analyze the Batting Average on Balls in Play (BABIP) and batting average on line drives. 

A similar review after last season revealed  Hunter Pence, Michael Bourn, and Carlos Lee as likely to have a rebound in 2011 over their 2010 batting stats, while Chris Johnson appeared to be a candidate for significant downward regression.  And it turns out that Pence, Lee and Bourn each enjoyed 30 - 32 point improvements in their batting average. Chris Johnson's 2011 batting average declined 22 points, compared to 2010.  For this article, I will omit players, like Bourn and Pence, whom were traded away, since they will not be part of the 2012 Astros' team.

BABIP

BABIP tells us about the apparent "luck" experienced by batters and hitters on batted balls.  The luck can take the form of fortunate bounces of the ball, good or bad defense, etc.  For pitchers, BABIP is expected to be distributed in a narrow range around league average BABIP.  This is due to the limited extent that pitchers can control whether batted balls are caught or not.  Batters have more control over how hard the ball is hit, and the trick is figuring out the normal or "expected" BABIP for a particular hitter.  Hitters with BABIP far above or below the expected level in 2011 are  likely to see a reversion to their normal level in 2012.

For this article, I have estimated the expected BABIP (x-BABIP) in 2011 for each Astros' batter and compared that to the hitter's actual BABIP in 2011 to determine whether the BABIP can be sustained in the future.  I used a BABIP calculator to estimate the expected BABIP for 2011.  The BABIP calculator is a simplified formula based on statistical regression analyses published in the Hardball Times. The formula, which is park adjusted, is a strong predictor of future performance.  The inputs to the formula are batted ball data and other peripheral stats for the hitter in 2011.

In the summary below, I consider a difference of less than 10 points between x-BABIP and BABIP as neutral.  Higher differences are indicative of a potential correction in the direction of x-BABIP in the future.

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As we begin to untangle the wreckage of the Astros' 2011 season, the statistical pieces are strewn about like a big puzzle.  Although the Astros were not, by any means, a good team in 2011, the Astros' biggest loser team of all time had a record which reflected significant under-performance,  You can call it bad luck if you want, or you can call it a statistical outlier.

You probably know that the Astros' Pythagorean Record indicates that the Astros' should have been a 62 win team, instead of the actual 56 wins, based on the team's runs scored and allowed differential.  Teams' over and under performance of their Pythag projection is shown here. The luck column displays the deviation of actual wins from the Pythag result.  The Astros had the third biggest margin of under-performance (-6), behind the Padres and Royals at -7 and -8.  The Brewers, Tigers, Giants, and D-Backs were "lucky" to the tune of +8 above the Pythag result.

The Pythagorean results show deviations in results at a relatively high level--runs.  A more detailed view of performance can be seen at the level of hits, extra bases, and walks.  OPS gained credence as a measure of offense because it correlates well with runs. Similarly OPS-against reflects pitchers' ability to minimize hits, extra bases, and walks. The Astros' runs scored and allowed significantly underperformed the offense's OPS and the pitchers' OPS-against.  If the Astros had converted OPS into runs, and OPS-against into runs allowed, at the same rate as the league average, the Astros would have scored 7 more runs on offense and allowed 17 fewer runs, for a net gain of 2 - 3 wins.  If the Astros' actual runs scored and runs allowed are normalized for the team's OPS and OPS-against,  the Pythagorean formula would project the Astros as a 65 win team.

A number of factors can affect a team's ability to under or over perform its OPS and OPS-against.  But one of the most important factors is the timing of the events which comprise OPS---whether the hitters and pitchers performed better in clutch situations.  I use Fangraphs' clutch statistic, which is based upon players' win probability added (WPA) for high leverage situations compared to normal situations.   Based on this statistic, the Astros were the 9th worst clutch team on offense and the pitchers were 4th worst in clutch situations.  Undoubtedly, the Astros' poor clutch performances made the Astros less efficient in converting OPS into runs and preventing opponents' OPS from turning into runs.  The Astros' -2.6 clutch hitting score implies that the Astros lost 2.6 wins due to poor hitting in the clutch.

Relationship Between Pythag and Clutch

After the 2010 season, I wrote about the Astros' clutch team performance.  In 2010, the Astros over performed their Pythag projection by 8 games (68 win Pythag vs. 78 actual wins)---the highest over performance in the majors.  The Astros also were the best clutch hitting team in 2010.  The Astros also had the highest actual win margin above their Pythag for the three year period 2008 - 2010, accompanied by the highest clutch hitting statistic for the same period.  The top five clutch hitting teams for the same three year period also over performed their Pythag projection for the same period.

Between 2010 and 2011, the Astros shifted from extreme over performance for both Pythag and clutch to extreme under performance for both Pythag and clutch. Is there a cause and effect relationship?

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Author's Note: This article is based on the idea that we might learn something about how the Astros should construct a starting rotation, based on how contending teams built their starting pitching.

Ian Kennedy, with the Diamondbacks, became the first NL pitcher to achieve 20 wins this season.  Although he may be a dark horse, he has to be in the conversation for the NL Cy Young Award.  That's not bad for a 26 year old pitcher in his second full season in the majors.  For Kennedy's 20th win, the headline in my local Austin, Texas newspaper referred to Kennedy as a "Yankees Castoff."  That seems to have a negative connotation--as if he was just unwanted refuse.  And, if the headline writer really meant it that way, I think the headline was sloppy.  Kennedy was a first round draft choice of the Yankees in 2006, and as a Yankee minor leaguer, he was ranked as the 45th best prospect in baseball.

Why did the Yankees trade Kennedy?  That's unclear. Going into 2008, the Yankees had a starting pitcher prospect trio of Hughes, Chamberlin, and Kennedy.  Kennedy's fastball velocity isn't as fast as the other two, and the Yankees apparently viewed him as expendable.  As one Yankees' blogger said this year, the Yankees simply may have traded the wrong guy out of the three prospects.  Kennedy had suffered some injuries, but they were not directly related to his arm.  I don't recall any great concern or misgivings among serious Yankees' fans at the time of his trade.  It's true that Kennedy had some rough outings in his brief outings with the Yankees' major league club--but surely he wasn't dismissed based on a sample size less than 40 innings.  (However, I think there is some feeling that Yankees' fans and ownership can be unusually impatient with their pitchers.)  Kennedy's minor league record was good.  Kennedy kept his FIP close to 3 or below; his K/9 was 9.9 and his BB/9 was below 3.  With a fastball velocity in the 91-92 range, and good off-speed and breaking pitch offerings, it's hard to find a closely comparable Astros' pitcher; maybe Lyles if he can gain a tick on his fastball or even Paul Clemens.  In the end, I just have to chalk this up to a good trade by the D-Backs.  The Diamondbacks apparently had a better appraisal of Kennedy's potential than the Yankees.

Without spending too much time on the Diamondbacks, their rotation has benefitted greatly from trades.  The D-Backs set up their 2011 contending team by trading for two ML-ready starting pitcher prospects.  The D-Backs obtained Daniel Hudson out of the White Sox organization--and if you look at his minor league numbers they are quite similar to Kennedy's.  Yet Hudson was another young pitcher who seemed to be underrated among prospectors, but turned out to be a solid major league starter.

This article isn't intended as an evaluation of the D-Backs trading acumen.  I'm leading up my real question.  How did the contending teams construct their rotations?  Do they rely on the draft?  Do they have to use the free agent market?  Or do they make trades, like the D-Backs' example.  I think this can provide some context for what we should expect from the Astros if they are to put together a good rotation.

I looked at the top six starting pitchers for each of the following teams, all of which continue to be in contention for the playoffs: Phillies, Braves, Brewers, Cardinals, Diamondbacks, Giants, Yankees, Red Sox, Rays, Tigers, Rangers, and Angels.  I categorized the acquistion of each pitcher as follows: Amateur Signing (whether drafted or undrafted); Prospect Trade (trade of minor leaguer or young pitcher with less than rookie eligibility); Veteran Free Agent signing (excluding rehab projects); Buy Low signing (includes veteran rehab or comeback projects, Rule 5 picks, and minor league free agents); Veteran Trades (trade of major league veteran pitchers).  I'll summarize the results for each category, with the percentage of contenders' starting pitchers in each group.  The D-Backs' trades for Hudson and Kennedy fitted into the prospect trade category.

Amateur Signings (46%)

Almost half of the contending teams' starting pitchers were products of the team's farm system, whether drafted or signed as an amateur free agent.  There is quite a bit of variance among the 12 teams.  The Rays and Giants are outliers, with the Rays producing all six starting pitchers, and the Giants five of six starting pitchers, out of their farm systems.  Both teams relied upon a combination of high first round picks and late round picks.  Without those two teams, amateur signings would constitute only 36% of the contenders' rotations.  The D-Backs and Brewers relied the least upon amateur signings, with 1 each in their rotations.  Most contending teams had 2 or 3 amateur signings in their rotations.  The American League contenders were somewhat more likely to rely upon amateur signings than the National League.

Prospect Trades (6%)

Trading for pitching prospects is risky business, and fairly difficult.  So, perhaps it's no wonder that this isn't a significant source of starting pitchers.  The D-Backs reduced their risk by trading for two major league ready prospects, and they dominate this category.

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We know a couple of things about Brett Myers and J.A. Happ this year.  Both pitchers had disappointing first halves in 2011.  And both pitchers have enjoyed a resurgence of sorts in the last month and a half.  Happ's spiraling production gave him a plane ticket to AAA Oklahoma City.  Both pitchers came into this season with excessive expectations associated with unsustainably low ERAs in 2010.  However, with a changing team composition after the trade deadline, both pitchers' ERA has improved since August 1.  There is some evidence that the Astros have enjoyed improved defense over the same time frame.  So, that may partially explain the declining fielding independent pitching (FIP) statistic over that period. 

Probably both pitchers will be back in the rotation next season.  Myers has a contract that is likely to keep him in Houston.  Happ is one of the key pieces in the Roy Oswalt trade, and the Astros are likely to give him every chance to show that he is part of the Astros' future.  In a recent comment on a TCB thread, AstrosB wondered whether the recent strong showings by the two ex-Phillies pitchers indicates a rotation revival or whether that is the type of thinking which fooled the Astros last year.  That's a good question.  To shed some light on that question, I will look to see if there are indications of over or under performance in both pitchers' recent work.

Here are the stats we will utilize: (1) Earned Run Average (ERA); (2) FIP, which is a peripheral based statistic, and indicates the equivalent of ERA unaffected by defensive performance; (3) Expected FIP (x-FIP) which shows the FIP result with a normalized HR rate; this is a stat that is better  at predicting future pitching performance than either ERA or FIP; (4) Batting Average on Balls in Play (BABIP), which provides an indication of the extent that the pitcher has gotten lucky or unlucky with batted balls; (5) league average BABIP; and (6) ZIPS projected ERA for each pitcher entering this season, which is displayed as a measure of what some analysts reasonably expected from each pitcher.

The stats will be provided for the full 2011 season so far, and for the period August 1 through Sept. 15 of 2011.

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