SB Nation User Blog: jae

Weighing the Rumor: cases for and against a deal for Stoudemire

jae — Sat, 27 Jun 2009 06:55:12 -0000

Firstly, these rumors are worth discussing because the trade is entirely plausible. It meets several requirements of a realistic proposal. There is an argument for it from both team's perspectives. It could benefit both teams.

But importantly, it stings a bit. It is not some far-fetched scheme that somehow transforms a sign-and-trade of Kurz into Lebron James. We are talking about giving up a young, quality center with a reasonable, well designed long term contract for the duration of his peak years. Add to it some assortment of young guys who have performed reasonably well in limited time and have (and I use this word with great hesitation) potential to be better than pretty good players. This is not a freebie. It means giving up something real, something you do not want to give up. Still, it is a deal that could net us one of the few dominant big men, a guy who has shown he can score a bunch of points with elite efficiency. Stoudemire is a rare talent and has in the past been real, real close to the sort of high octane player who you can build a winner around. Opportunities for the elite big man do not come around often, and your odds of winning it all go up considerably if you have one. And this is why this subject is worthy of debate.

Just for starters, any deal assumes an extension for Stoudemire as the gamble on a one and done should mean immediately rejecting the deal. But the assumption of an extension should mean the assumption of a Max contract extension. He will not come cheaper. So assuming these things...

The case for Stoudemire:

There are not many guys who score as efficiently as Stoudemire with his shot volume. He takes shots and makes shots. He gets fouled and he converts from the line. In the paint, there are very few guys in the game who are as lethal as Amare and other teams know it. If you play against him, you have to figure out a way to contend with his considerable abilities, else pay a penalty for poor planning, a penalty that usually shows up in the "L" column. We want what he can do and there are not many chances to get a player like him, especially one who is still in the prime of his career.

In the past, Amare has been a reasonable rebounder. Some years, he's been even better than that. He has played a combination C/PF roll for the Suns and would likely be the nominal center after a trade, and he's done it well enough to see his team win far more often than not.

And that, as short as it is, is a real strong case for getting him. Odds do not favor that anything we give up, no matter how promising it is, will match that value. That is, if we get what we have seen.

The case against a deal:

The real worry is not that we would have to give up too much. There is not any sure way to know, though it seems that in most NBA trades, the team that gets the best player wins and a greater volume of lesser talent and "potential" rarely if ever outperforms one dominant guy. So for now, I try not to think too much about Brandan Wright (with a world of potential) or Marco Belinelli (with less than a world of potential, but still seemingly capable of producing), or even the newly minted Stephen Curry (who is in the wonderful position of never having played a game and is thus just oozing with "potential"). Odds do not favor any of them being a dominant player just because so few players ever are. It could happen, but that seems to be said of several players every year, and yet here we sit with two winning seasons and one playoff appearance in the last decade and a half. We could discuss their potential, but better money says that these guys remain afterthoughts "oozing with potential". Potential does not win games.Market your deal on potential. If we can get a buyer for it, you make the sale. Sure, in negotiations, try to keep the best parts you can, but do not get distracted by what this trade will likely mean.

No, the real worry is that we will not get the best player in the deal, though we will pay like we did and pay for years to come.

My fear is that the proposed trade will be Biedrin and change, not for the Amare Stoudemire who led the Association in scoring efficiency just one season back, but rather a lesser version. Do I mean the knee? The microfracture seems to have been dealt with. He has played better since the surgery and has not missed games because of it. The eye? A freak accident. It is more likely to be a recurring problem than Biedrins's no longer extant appendix, but only slightly more likely. Ignore it. It is not a real concern. I do not mean these things.

The fear is time. The real fear is that the decline in rebounds and FG% last year was not just a lack of motivation due to having to share the paint with Shaq, but the early stages of a decline in skill. Few guys his size have ever been as explosive, as quick and nimble as Stoudemire. But one player who might have rivaled him in such regards was Shawn Kemp. Or at least the under 27 version of Kemp, before a bulging waistline robbed him of enough speed and agility to turn him into a bloated (in both body and contract) version no longer capable of driving his team into the win column. When your game is so significantly reliant on overwhelming athletic ability, a decline in this ability for whatever reason means a less effective player. A fully effective Stoudemire did not quite get his team to the finals. Close, but not quite. We are not likely to see him improve at his age, but should his deal run into his early to mid 30s (and an extension on his contract will almost certainly mean that) means we are likely to see his maximum earnings come after he has lost a step. Or two. Or three.

The fear is also that the Amare Stoudemire who could score nearly 27 points on just over 16 shots does not exist without Steve Nash to get him the ball. Indeed when Nash was not on the court, Amare's production declined significantly. Nash is one of the best in the game at improving the offense of his teammates. But he does not come with the deal, so the Amare we get is unlikely to be able to match that sort of production. He will undoutedly still be very good, but very good may not be good enough, especially when it is all but certain that Stoudemire will command a max contract, making it unfeasible to acquire another dominant player if he turns out to be insufficient.

Either of these fears should be enough to give pause to sending out a quality center for the opportunity to put $16mil a year, increasing by a couple of million each year, into his pockets regardless of what happens on the court in the future. There is no money-back guarantee if the guy who you ink to a max contract turns out to be a thing of the past sharing a name (and bank account in which you deposit ridiculous sums of money) but not game with the player you thought you were acquiring.

This is a one time opportunity in more ways than one. An opportunity to hit big, perhaps big enough that paying the back end for his declining years would be worth it. But also an opportunity to blow another half decade waiting for a mistake to come off the books. We have been waiting for mistakes t come off the books for a long, long time, but just because we should be used to it does not mean we should continue to accept it.

And though I would tend to discount most of the 'high potential' kids tossed into the deal, we are not talking about giving up spare change to take this chance. Andris Biedrins, for his faults, is still a good player, a good starting center, something that is tough to come by. He has a responsible contract that does not grow and will look better and better in years to come. He is young and should see this contract though the best years of his career. While substantial improvement may not occur, he is still at an age where players tend to refine their game. It is unlikely we have seen his best. And already he does several things better than most in the game. He is a very good rebounder. Rebounds help win games and it is highly unlikely that Stoudemire would equal his production on the glass. While not as flashy as high octane offense, silently ensuring more clean possessions for your team has great value towards getting your team into the win column.

While Biedrins does not yet appear to be much of an individual defender in the paint, I am of the mind that Biedrins' value would be much more apparent on a better team. Already his rebounding meant that the team was as good defensively as they were when the better post defender but weaker rebounding Turiaf manning the middle. If guards were forcing the opposition to take bad shots from the perimeter, a fantastic rebounder – and nonsense about how his totals are "inflated" aside, Andris is a fantastic rebounder – would be even more valuable. There would be more missed shots to haul in and fewer chances to be abused in the pain. Each defensive rebound means a defensive stop. It means getting the ball back without surrendering a bucket. Real defense. Half the game. But that was not the Warriors' game last year. Guards did not prevent the entry passes to big men who can take Biedrins one on one, or two on one since he often had Corey Maggette "backing him up" (and I use the terms real, real loosely) at PF to go against the opposition's big men.

No, Biedrins does not have a polished offensive game. But per minute, he scores more than the average center and he does so without needing to have the offense designed for him. It may be nothing but "dunks and layups and putbacks" but they count just as much as a rainbow jumper or crafty spin move, and if was so easy to convert these, why then do so few players actually manage to do so. It is an exceptionally under-appreciated skill, and one that helps wing games.

And yet, we did not win many games last year, and without something to shake it up, the improvement we are likely to see hinges either on the ever elusive "internal development" or a whole lot of luck. Those are not things that suggest you hold your cards and pray you have already drawn a winning hand. Those are things that make a move, especially one that offers as much as thing one might, look enticing.

A conclusion?

Do not take the relative length of the pros and cons to mean one is more favorable than the other. The devil we know is more easy to discuss and perhaps superficially more appealing. But this does not make it better just in that regard. It is a very, very close call. Tantalizingly seductive yet terrifying nonetheless. Were it that Stoudemire would agree for a shorter extension, or less than Max money, it would not be. Were it that Biedrins was a couple years older, or Stoudemire a year or two younger, it would not be.

But as it is, it is not an easy decision. If you think it is, think harder.

Exploring the rumored Crawford for Claxton and Law Trade: CBA and salary implications

jae — Thu, 25 Jun 2009 00:05:07 -0000

More photos » by David Zalubowski - AP

"You're sending me where?" (AP Photo/David Zalubowski)

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I have no idea how reliable the sources are, but ESPN seems to be discussing the proposed "Crawford for Law and Claxton like it has real legs. (Perhaps the legs stolen from Speedy, hence his state of perpetual inability to play). The NBA's own website is similarly posting it as a not yet done deal, but one that's in the works. But as "it's more than a rumor goes", we are all still rather in the dark as to what, when, and, perhaps, why.

Big questions abound. Important questions. It isn't quite "what did the president know and when did he know it", but at least as far as our Warriors go, it's "what do we know about the trade and could it possibly be real?"

As of posting time, it does not appear that anything has happened. Nothing can happen unless Crawford waives his player-opt-out and agrees to honor the last two years of his contract as originally signed. If this does not happen, then the deal is dead for now. For trade purposes, Jamal is a free agent until he signs away his option or the deadline exercise it passes.

Technically, Crawford has an "early termination option" (ETO) where he can invalidate the remaining two years of his contract. Jamal has until the 1^st of July to exercise his option to opt out. If he does not, he's eligible traded. There's a minimal difference from a "player option year" in that it takes Crawford's people notifying the league if he wants out, while an option year would be something he'd have to say he wants in on. (You'd think this wouldn't happen, but it's amazing how incompetent some "professional" agents can be about this sort of thing.) Until he opts out, or until the first comes and goes and he's done nothing at all, he cannot be included in a deal, either in principle or practice. That is UNLESS* Crawford gives notice that he will not exercise this option. [*The actual CBA and Larry Coon's excellent CBA FAQ do not clearly state if signing a notice waiving the ETO allows him to be traded immediately. Some of these details appear to be covered in "NBA by-laws" separate from the CBA. However, most reports appear to support that such notice will make Crawford eligible to be traded. As the NBA's own website is reporting that Etan Thomas has been traded, a situation that was permissible only after he signed a similar agreement not to opt out, it would appear likely that such a situation is entirely permissible.]

If Crawford DOES opt out (though there are no reports yet that suggests that he will), then this trade is dead. The Warriors would not have his salary on the books, but would not be able to trade him, save for an unlikely sign-and-trade agreement after the "July Moratorium" ends on the 8^th of July.

Presuming the deal does go through in the most basic Claxton and Law for Crawford, the Warriors would receive two potential expiring deals. Claxton is unlikely to ever play again. Some reports suggest that the Warriors would waive him, though I suspect that this would not happen immediately, as once waived, his expiring deal is no longer a piece we'd have to work with. His actual salary of $5,209,454 counts against the tax and the cap, waived or otherwise, though it appears that an insurance policy is covering the bulk of it while he remains injured and unable to play. The only reason to waive him would be to make room for additional players on the roster. Of course, this assumes that Warriors management are rational actors, an assumption that I do not feel safe making myself. Your mileage may vary.

Acie Law similarly could be an expiring deal if the Warriors (or whomever he winds up with) do not exercise their 4^th year option on his rookie scale deal. He's due $2,216,160 for the upcoming season and the Warriors would have until October to decide if they wanted to exercise the option for the 2010-11 season or allow him to be a free agent, Marcus Williams-style at year's end. Acie hasn't provided terribly much on the court in his two seasons, and may be worth more as an expiring contract than the $2.9 million gamble that he'll be better than terrible would require.

Still assuming that this deal goes down, Law and Claxton can be traded on their own immediately, so long as the deal is permissible under the CBA (e.g. another team has cap space or provides appropriate "matching" salaries of no more than 125% +$100 of their respective deals back to us). So long as we do not send out another player, they can be swapped with or without picks for any combination of picks and players coming back our way provided the numbers work. Picks themselves do not count for salary matching in trades until the player is actually signed (though they do count against the cap immediately upon being drafted.)

One has to think that they're not particularly valuable as individual components though, but as part of a package, they may make salaries match or provide expiring deals that would make some other bigger trade including other players more attractive. For this though, they'd have to wait two months following the official completion of the deal. Hence, it's unlikely that, should this trade be completed before draft time, that there would be more *official* dealings with either player before the draft. We're likely going to have to wait and see.

Before anyone gets terribly excited about the insurance policy on Claxton's contract, this has absolutely no effect on how his salary counts towards the salary cap. While it matters to the bottom line of the Hawks or Warriors (or whichever team he winds up playing for when all is said and done), his full salary based on the contract he signed counts against the cap and lux tax for whatever team winds up owning his contract. That AIG or some other recently or soon-to-be bailed out financial giant is footing the bill does not change this in the slightest. Sure, Cohan would have a bit more money in his pocket, but it isn't money that can be applied for a free agent or extra space below the luxury tax to spend elsewhere. <start sarcasm> I have ever bit of confidence that he'd repay the fans and use the roughly $4mil to help keep the price of beer and nachos at the Oracle down. <end sarcasm>

Also see: BREAKING NEWS: Warriors and Hawks closing in on Jamal Crawford for Acie Law and Speedy Claxton swap

Droppin' grilled cheese science: rebounds

jae — Thu, 11 Jun 2009 04:38:39 -0000

More photos » by George Nikitin - AP

Anthony Randolph battles for a rebound. Playing the percentages, I'm betting he got it. (AP Photo/George Nikitin)

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I've said it before. Odds favor me saying it again: It's rare for players to see substantial improvement in his rebounding over the course of his career. Here's a preliminary look showing exactly that.

So here's a series of box plots. They aren't very pretty unless you're a stats-fiend like myself. But what they lack in aesthetic beauty they make up for in information.

These plots are a product of a dataset including every player who began his career after 1981 until the present. To generate these plots I took every player's per-minute rebounding stats. Since we're interested in how a player improves or declines over time, the figures are based on each player's yearly fraction vs. their best season. For example, if a player had his best season in year 4 of his career, getting a rebound every 3.6 minutes (10 per 36, roughly the average for an NBA center), year 4 would receive a value of 1 and all other years would be expressed as their fraction of his year 4 rebound rate. This provides a way of comparing players of differing initial abilities across time and across positions. The closer to 1 any other year is, the less change there's been in the player's rebounding rate.

Follow? Maybe? (Maybe not?)

I looked at three groups: all players, players who started their NBA careers after turning 22 and players who entered the league prior to their 22nd birthday. For each group, I looked at the average and spread of the Max_rate fraction for every season of the player's career. Only the first 10 seasons are charted as ridiculously few players play that long.

In all three cases, what you should see is that the average fraction (marked by the thickest black line in the middle of each box) in year 1 is the highest. This is in very large part a product of players who only play one season, including the 10 day call-ups you'll never hear from again. Similarly, players who only play 2 years must have their highest rate (the "1" fraction) in either year one or year two. But as time goes on, the average levels off and stabilizes. This suggests that even among those players who play 3, 4, 5, 6 or more seasons, there's not much change, and, as a group, not a noticeable improvement in rebounding over time. Were more players improving, more would find their "1" fraction later in their careers. And while this happens (the stats savvy out there should note the standard error does reach the maximum value across the board, the lack of an upward trend in the average after the initial 'short career' bias suggests that it isn't long into a player's career that what you see is what you get.

Of course there's a degree of variation and the particular cases don't have to follow the general rule. But overall, the trend suggests that rebounding isn't something that you can expect to change much for a player over the course of his career. And it doesn't seem to matter much if you came into the league early or played 4 years of college ball. If you can board, you do. If you can't, you don't and you won't.

This is still preliminary data. I churned it out while watching a baseball game and burning a couple of grilled cheese sandwiches. I repeat: this is preliminary data, and anyone with some advanced statistical training should see that this "study" is woefully incomplete in the way it deals with small sample sizes in particular year and short careers among other things. (It very likely ignores the rising cost of gasoline for the summer driving season.) But it's certainly something to think about.

More to come...

2009 NBA Finals: Game 3 Lakers @ Magic - crunch time started long ago.

jae — Tue, 09 Jun 2009 18:59:11 -0000

Game 1 was over before the 4^th quarter started. To say it was all Lakers gives the Magic too much credit. But you don't find many games closer than game 2. Save one brief point in the 2^nd quarter, it was never more than a two-possession game leaving it all knotted up at the end of regulation. Courtney Lee hits that shot and we've got a series.

But that's history. Instead of 1-1 with the home court advantage reversed, Orlando is now and NBA worst 0-6 in NBA finals games. It is over? Miami in 06', Portland in '77, and Boston in '69 would suggest "no". They are the only teams to come back from 0-2 finals deficits to win the title.

Since no team has ever recovered from a 3-0 deficit in an NBA finals this one is huge. It's not make or break. It's "still more than likely to lose, but you can't rule it out" or break. History says that for the outside shot at the title, the Magic need to pull the rabbit out of the hat quick.

Silver Screen and Roll's Josh Tucker breaks down why Orlando still has a chance:

"In the playoffs, the Lakers have yet to win three straight games against a single opponent. Meanwhile, the Magic have yet to lose three straight games at all. That doesn't seem to bode well for the Lakers."

But that said, they're not giving Orlando much of a chance:

"I'll be honest with you: I have serious doubts as to whether the Magic can even win two during the three-game stretch in Orlando. Not because they aren't good enough – mark my words. Not, this is more about the Lakers. I simply don't see them losing two out of three games. Do you?"

Meanwhile at Orlando SBNation blog (perhaps overly presciently titled Third Quarter Collapse) they haven't moved on to finger pointing per say, but they're discussing if Gorat and Howard can coexist.

Dwight Howard is trying to keep his head up though, predicting a long series:

"This is going to be a long series and we’re a long way from done. Game 3 is all we’re thinking about, so let’s go get one win and really protect our homecourt the way the Lakers did. We still know we can do this. We tweak a few things here and there, we’ll be right back in this series before ya’ll know it."

Myth-busters, Basketball edition Pt II

jae — Fri, 05 Jun 2009 00:13:02 -0000

Sequels are almost never as good as the original, but my agent negotiated for at least two more installments when they greenlighted part I. So with that, I bring you more basketball myths to bust, debunk and generally scoff at.

Bust, debunk and scoff at the busting as you see fit.

Myth: Player X just needs to work on his shooting.

Truth: I couldn't actually find the numbers for Player X. He doesn't appear anywhere in either the NBA.com or Basketball-Reference.com player archives. I don't have him in my personal database either. I'm not even sure who he plays for and can't remember when he was drafted, what position he plays, or if his shooting is really that bad to begin with. But in general, we can make some assumptions about Mr. X without seeing his box score results. Players can and do improve their outside shooting. Many players have entered the league with sub-standard to non-existent long range shots and have developed into accurate three point shooters, to point (and perhaps detriment) that some seem to forget how to do anything else. That said, guys who seem to be inaccurate shooters are often plagued by this for their whole career. It is not impossible, however, and better shooting is something both helps a team and seems to be a not completely unrealistic goal.

Myth: Player X just needs to box out and rebound.

Truth: Rebound rates are among the most stable statistic in the game. Players who are not good rebounders almost never improve substantially even to the level of being adequate. Conversely, guys who are good rebounders seem to rebound well throughout their careers. Should Player X try to box out and rebound better? Yeah. Rebounds are valuable means to secure possessions for your team and correlate strongly with winning. Is it going to happen? Probably not. Anything more than very, very moderate improvement is expecting something that isn't likely to happen, and when it does, it's usually a player who improves in his first couple of years in the league. Harrington will never be a good rebounder. Turiaf isn't likely to become a very good rebounder. Wright has an outside shot at improving his rebounding but I wouldn't bank on it. Biedrins and Randolph will likely be very good rebounders until the day you have to cart them off the court in wheelchairs.

Myth: Player X's stats are 'inflated'.

Truth: Statistical totals are in part a product of the situation. However, the major influence is almost always the ability of the player himself and it is rare that statistics are 'inflated' to a degree that anyone would actually notice. In particular, while many suggest that a particular player's rebounds are "inflated" by a lack of other teammates competing for the boards, the actual effect on rebound totals does not seem pronounced. Such arguments rarely hold up to much scrutiny when looking at the rebound rates across time and with various lineup combinations and when looking at the rebounding rates of replacements players in the same circumstances. Ronny was somehow or other not able to capitalize on the same situation that 'inflated' Andris's rebounds. Scoring totals are the most susceptible to being inflated when a player is allowed to shoot more or less at will. However, analysis of scoring efficiency easily reveals if a player's point totals are likely helping or hurting his team.

Myth: Player X just needs to cut down on his turnovers.

Truth: Turnovers are very costly to a team. A turnover means that the other team gets two consecutive opportunities to score without your team having a chance to make a basket. You can't score if you don't get a chance to shoot and if you turn over the ball first, you don't get a chance do this. For a particular player, turnover rate does seem to be something that can improve over time, though turnover prone players tend to be turnover prone. Should Player X try to cut down on the turnovers? Yeah. Absolutely. It would make him a better player and improve the team. Is it going to happen? Probably not, but it's more likely that someone will cut down on the turnovers than that he'll improve his rebounding.

Myth: Player X just needs to pass the ball more.

Truth: If we are measuring passing with assists, or using it as a proxy for a player's passing, it's rare to expect changes. A team's offense does have an affect on the number of assists the team in general and each player in particular gets. Players not known for being superior passers have later changed this. Brad Miller more than doubled his assist rate without substantially changing his turnover rate from when he started in the league with Chicago to his peak production with the Kings. However, such changes are rare and in general, guys who do not get a lot of assists rarely start to do so. This is not just a matter of teammates missing or hitting shots, as the difference between passing to the best shooting team and the worst passing team would only equate to 3 or 4 assists per game for the entire team. Should Player X pass more? Yeah. Is it going to happen? Probably not, but it's more likely that someone will start getting more assists than that he'll improve his rebounding.

Myth: Player X is an average player.

Truth: Most fans seem to have a rather liberal view of what "average" actually means. In most seasons between 400 to 500+ players suit up for NBA games. This includes everyone from Lebron James to 10-day call-ups from the D-league who are lucky to see a couple seconds of court time to Patrick O'bryant. Average is somewhere in the middle of all of this. Since in any given game there are only 5 starters per squad but 12 players on the active roster and up to 3 players on an injured or innactive list, the 'average' player is not a starter, but a part time bench player. On straight statistical average, the average player gets a touch more than 20 minutes per game, scoring between 9 and 10 points on ~45% shooting (and ~35% from behind the arc), while pulling down four or five rebounds and tossing out a couple of assists. That's average. An example of that sort of production? Think Matt Barnes in 06-07.

Myth-busters, Basketball edition Pt I

jae — Sun, 24 May 2009 23:19:01 -0000

Because someone requested it, here's the first installment of what will be an ongoing look at the 'common knowledge' surrounding the great game of basketball, the (wouldn't we all be happier if they were great) Golden State Warriors, and some truth behind this conventional wisdom.

Part I focuses on defense. Why? Because someone has to focus on defense, and it certainly didn't look like anyone on the court or coaching staff was, so we'll just have to step up the plate ourselves.

Debunk the debunking as you see fit!

Myth: Half the game is defense.

Truth: This is true. If we look at an opposing team's offensive and defensive fg%, both have an equal effect on their opponent's performance in any given game, as would be expected if a team's offensive and defensive abilities (or lack thereof) had equal impact on the game. Yet while this is true – half the game IS defense at least in terms of a team's ability to influence outcome of the game – , when it comes to evaluating players fans, writers, coaches and GMs alike seem to favor scorers and largely ignore defense. A player's points per game is the single biggest factor in his future contract size, selection to all-star games and awards and in many cases, playing time received. Great scorers who can't defend jr. high opponents will get big contracts while the best defenders in the game, if they can't score, are lucky to wind up with even an average salary. The notable exception are for some big men who are also prodigious rebounders and shot blockers, but this is the exception. Offense is rewarded. Defense is ignored.

Myth: Player X is a below average/terrible defender.

Truth: Any particular player may be a below average player. However, to believe the assessment of fans in forums such as this, the majority of players in the league are below average defenders, an observation that defies rational explanation, other than that the lack of reliable and ready-present defensive metrics makes this an easy charge for upset fans to level at players without empirical support and a difficult one to easily refute. That said, Jamal Crawford is a terrible defender. It's nothing personal. He appears to be a good person and good teammate, but his defense killed us.

Myth: Player X is a good player but a terrible defender.

Truth: It is difficult to be a good player in the meaningful sense of making your team more likely to win through your play, unless you can play at least some defense. It does not seem it as difficult to be acknowledged as a good player if you are also a terrible defender if you score a lot of points. That these players seem to be on the less successful teams is a point that seems lost on the fans, writers, coaches and GMs who refer to such players as good though. Scoring, it seems, is what gets you noticed, even if defense is half the game.

Myth: great scorers are great players.

Truth: Scoring total and points per game is a poor measure of a player's value. 20+ point per game scorers tend to be rather substantially rewarded regardless of how they got their points. But the number of minutes played, shots taken and possessions employed to get 20 points in a game is far more important than the total. An inefficient 20 will result in losses, as this inefficiency detracts from the offense of teammates, while scoring efficiently is the single greatest correlate with winning basketball. While the greatest players tend to be great scorers, the tend to be the more efficient scorers. They also tend to be better passers, rebounders and often, defenders. Jamal Crawford may score close to 20 points per game, but it is not entirely an accident that he has never sniffed the playoffs.

Myth: all we need is a big guy who can rebound and play some defense.

Truth: We need big guys who can rebound and play some defense. These skills are probably more important in a big than his scoring totals (especially if that scoring doesn't come on efficient shooting). They're also skills that are very tough to come by. There aren't superior rebounding bigs a-plenty out there for the pickin'. Whether or not this is all we need is up for debate, but a team can go far with a defensive minded, powerful rebounder in the paint (see: Mutombo, Dikembe and Wallace, Ben [please note the rings on Mr. Wallace's fingers]), much further than with a big who can score but rebounds like he had his thumbs amputated (see: Curry, Eddy).

Draft history Part I of ???: on trading picks

jae — Mon, 11 May 2009 05:29:28 -0000

With the draft lottery still a little more than a week away, it is too early to really recommend a 'draft strategy', but it is not too early to look at what becomes of various picks. In this multi-part pre-draft assessment, we'll look at various aspects of the draft, including trading picks, drafting for need vs. talent vs. tossing a dart at a board with a bunch of names on it and hoping for the best.

Part 1: Trade up, trade down? A little history on the perils and potential windfalls of swapping picks.

In 1993, as most know, the Warriors traded up from #3 to take the #1 overall pick, Chris Webber. The lure of the franchise big man loomed large though and Golden State ponied up big to get him. In a 'deep draft', with a potential 'franchise players' still on the board after Webber, this move still cost the Warriors the rights to Anfernee Hardaway and three future first round picks. (Note: a similar deal will not happen this year, even if the Warriors did wind up with the cursed #3 pick. The Marcus Williams deal means that our 2011 through 2013 picks are off limits as the conditions on that conditional pick mean that one of those picks might be spoken for, complicating future trades.) While the short term rewards looked promising, the long term penalty for this trade stung. Webber lasted one year with the Warriors before bringing about the Apocalypse, or perhaps it was Armageddon. I get my catastrophic metaphors confused from time to time.

Perhaps as a franchise, their institutional memory was short, as anecdotal history suggested that such a move and such a price could backfire. In 1980, the Warriors also held the third pick and wanted to move up to get the seldom available franchise center. Joe Barry Carroll, a nimble, Final-Four tested All American out of Purdue seemed to be that center, someone who could match up against Kareem and Lakers. The Warriors sent away Robert Parish, a serviceable seven footer perceived as having motivation problems who would eventually become a Hall of Famer and the pick that would eventually become Kevin McHale. Perhaps the 'motivation problems' were inherent to the position of Warriors' center and not Parish. Joe Barley Cares was not a terrible player, but his career never warranted the steep price and never made them regular playoff contenders (one appearance in his time with the team). Carroll, now apparently an investment advisor, would likely admit that this gamble did not work out as planned for the Oakland squad.

This is not to say that standing pat at #3 is a better option for the Warriors. When that happens, the Warriors have wound up with one of the many underwhelming “next Larry Birds” in Mike Dunleavy Jr. and the infamous Chris Washburn. Dunleavy was a rather average player with no charisma who never lived up to expectations. Washburn once sued CBS for portraying him as a drug addict at NCState in their made for TV movie about the career of Jimmy Valvano. Chris claims he was not addicted to crack until he made it to the NBA.

Such moves assume of course that the Warriors move up in the lottery. More likely though is that we will wind up picking 7^th, 8^th, or very remotely, 9^th or 10^th. In 1999 draft, GSW sent their #10 pick to ATL for Mookie Blaylock and the #21 pick. Mookie will be remembered for being a total bust of an acquisition in Oakland. It is a shame that he isn't better remembered for lending his name to the early incarnation of the band aka Pearl Jam. [If anyone remembers the early days of the “Rock and Jock” basketball competitions, you would also remember that Pearl Jam bassist Jeff Ament was a pretty good ball player. He was a star on his state tourney qualifying HS team with aspirations of playing at the college level. If his play on the mixed pro/celebrity squad was an indication, that dream wasn't the least bit unrealistic. If only he'd committed himself to it...I guess he'll have to console himself with the untold millions he's made as a rock star.] As bad as it was, the Warriors thought they were getting a legitimate above average starter for the pick swap. Indiana then swapped their pick at 26 (Vonteego Cummings) to move up 5 spots and take ours (Jeff Foster) paying the price of a future protected 1^st rounder (to become Troy Murphy).

This history suggests that the price to move is usually reasonably high, though some moves seem less costly as an initial investment. To trade picks with Toronto in '98, GSW only had to part with cash and what little credibility they had as an NBA franchise when for several years Vince Carter looked like the real deal while Antawn Jamison looked like a tweener forward who could score, rebound and, try as he might, failed to defend anyone.

Ok, so that's what happens when the Warriors swap places in the draft. It is not the most encouraging history, but not all teams have been so cursed. None other than Don Nelson engineered a draft-day swindle, trading the rights to Robert “Tractor” Traylor to Milwaukee for Dirk Nowitzki, taken a few picks later. Something else went Dallas' way too, but it matters little. It was lopsided enough without anything else. Another great swindle: In 1987 Seattle traded the rights to Scottie Pippen to Chicago for Olden Polynice. Olden was a serviceable utility center for more than a decade and a half with an apparent desire to go into law enforcement. Seviceable centers aren't abundant, but without crunching the numbers, my gut says that Chicago got the better of this one.

Comment starter: Can any good come of trading our pick regardless of where we do wind up drafting? Are we doomed, cursed or has it just been a run of bad luck? Maybe we're due to be on the receiving end of a great swindle for a change.

Poll

Which option do readers prefer voting for? (Please be truthful. This is for science.)

This one

67 votes

Or this one

51 votes

None of the above

86 votes

204 votes | Poll has closed

Unorthodox Strategies: David and Goliath and the full court press

jae — Thu, 07 May 2009 16:42:21 -0000

It seems to me that the team that dictates the style of play in a game has a much better chance of winning. Think back on those Loyola Marymount teams from the early 90s that pressed and ran and scared the pants off of more talented squads in the NCAA Tourney. No one was ready for them. Think of the RUN-TMC era squads that would at times feature Rod Higgins at center. Nellie-coached teams have been characteristically unorthodox and make the opposition uncomfortable, forcing up the pace when the other team wants to slow it down, to have forwards handling the ball and to come at you from all directions, to bring something that the opposition just cannot regularly prepare for. It doesn't always work, but it certainly is interesting.

Journalist/Author Malcolm Gladwell has an interesting article in the latest issue of the New Yorker entitled: How David Beats Goliath: when underdogs break the rules. I never thought I would find an article that details the story of a Jr. High School aged girls' basketball team to be even remotely interesting, but this one is definitely worth the (rather lengthy) read. The short story: if you aren't better than your opponent, don't try to beat them at their game. Make them play yours. It's got some local angles; the team was from Redwood City. Also featured: a where_is_he_now sighting of former 49er great running back Roger Craig.

Hey, it's not my money...

jae — Wed, 06 May 2009 04:20:12 -0000

There's a lot of blame to go around for the sorry state of the Warriors for most of the last decade and a half. Bad coaching, bad drafts and poorly constructed lineups, team chemistry problems and some plain old bad luck. But the constant is the guy who writes the checks (or more likely has some staff underling set up automatic transfers, least he accidentally get ink on his hands), majority controlling owner Chris Cohan. We know Cohan's made some mistakes and we should afford him the same sort of love that anyone who has ruined our hopes and crushed our dreams year after year should get. We deserve better, Chris. A common charge leveled at not just Cohan, but owners in general whenever teams perform poorly is that the aren't spending enough to win, that if they just shelled outmore cash, they could do better. But on this front, I think Cohan's getting a bad rap.

Stacey Brook, Economics Prof. at Nellie's alma mater, U of Iowa has studied the relationship between team pay and winning and finds that it isn't really all that clean. He's got better credentials to look at the $$$ and make conclusions than I do and presents a summary of his case at Hawkonomics (everyone's favorite University of Iowa Economics Professor blog). It's worth a read.

Sure, the Celtics shell out big bucks, but the Knicks have been paying more for less for a while now. And they aren't the only team that's spending like drunken sailors while the losses pile up.

Just for fun, here's a chart I tossed together this chart with team salary vs. wins in 08-09.

The dotted line is the lux tax threshold. and the solid upward slant is the correlation trend. While there's a loose relationship between what you spend and how much you win, the shotgun splatter of data points should indicate that there are teams that aren't gigantic spenders who still see the postseason and there's some teams leaking money who might be competitive in the NBDL.

And our Warriors are pretty close to the median in spending. They aren't breaking the bank, but there's plenty of teams spending in the same range who are getting more mileage out of their dollar. A lot of teams are right in their range, pushing close to the tax threshold, but not much more. That bunch isn't producing the top contenders, but more there's quite a few of them that saw court time after Nellie took off for Maui. From my vantage, it doesn't look so much like Cohan has been cheap as that he hasn't spent it wisely.

Just a note: Dr. Brook links to a story on NBA salaries in USAToday and their database of team salaries. Their figures include only players still on a team's roster and don't include money still being spend on retired players of contract buyouts. So the USAToday does not include the $6mil that was charged for Foyle's buyout even though that figure counted against both the cap and the luxury tax.

Poll

Are these ridiculous sums of money?

Yes

129 votes

Yes

82 votes

211 votes | Poll has closed

Starter Minutes, Take 1

jae — Wed, 25 Feb 2009 02:28:15 -0000

I've computed what I'm calling "average starter minutes". Essentially, it's a weighted average of the number of opposing starters on the court when a player is in the game. If two teams played without substitutions, all 5 players on each squad would have an average of "5 starters faced". If a reserve only comes in when the opposition has cleared their bench, he'd have "zero starters faced". While some teams have better reserves than others, I think it gives a rough guide to the quality of players on the other team when a player is in the game.

NAME	Opp. Starters on Court Average
Biedrins	3.8
Ellis	3.6
Crawford	3.6
Jackson	3.5
Wright	3.4
Maggette	3.4
Azubuike	3.3
Belinelli	3.3
Turiaf	3.0
Watson	2.9
Morrow	2.8
Randolph	2.8
Kurz	2.7
Williams	2.1
Davidson	1.2

When Maggette came back from his injury and started coming off the bench, he started playing better. It hasn't just been a little bit better either. Since returning he's now scoring about 21 points a game in just a bit over 31 minutes of court time on ~52% shooting from the floor. His rebound rate is up a touch too. Not too long after he returned when it was clear that he was a different player from the 41% shooting bloated contract who opened the season, I remember someone saying that he was doing better because, as a 6th man, he was going up against reserves rather than starters. This didn't sit right with me since I don't see wholesale substitutions in games such that Maggs would only be playing against second stringers. I figured it was more likely that he was a) healthy and b) more used to his teammates and c) the team in general had stopped waiting for Baron's ghost to make the offense into what it was last year.

For what it's worth, since he returned, Maggs has been seeing an average of 3.1 opposing starters per minute he's on the court, down a touch from the 3.7 he'd seen in games before when he was almost exclusively a starter. I suspect that this is almost entirely a result of not being on the floor at the opening tipoff when, by defintion, everyone is facing 5 opposing starters and that will bump up the average.

It's also interesting that Biedrins has the highest average on the team. Turiaf seems to be just under one opp. starter fewer. It does seem like it's possible that Turiaf goes in when the opposing starting center goes out.