SB Nation User Blog: spock

Orton vs Cutler — a Statistical Comparison

spock — Wed, 24 Jun 2009 12:39:29 -0000

The following, culled from nfl.com, analyzes Kyle Orton's and Jay Cutler's stats for passes 1-10, 11-20, 21-30, and 31+ in a game, and their performance during the first, second, third and fourth quarters. The desirability of such a comparison occurred to me while I was reviewing Orton's stats and discovered that he appears to be extraordinarily effective early on and then tails off. I wondered why that was so and also how it differed from Cutler's pattern. First, the stats themselves. For each line I list the completion percent, yards per attempt, TD-INT ratio, first down percent and quarterback rating.

                          Comp%           Y/A         TD-INT          1st Down%        Rating
Orton

1-10 65.3     7.3      7-1    34.7                99.8
11-20    57.6 5.8      3-3    27.8 72.7
21-30                      52.1                 6.2                6-8                  28.1                 60.2
31+                          56.0                 5.7                2-0                  30.6                 86.0

Cutler

1-10                       64.4                 8.0                8-6                  40.6                 90.3
11-20                      66.2                 8.0              5-4                  38.1                 90.6
21-30                      59.2                 6.8                4-3                  30.6                 80.3
31+                          59.1                 6.4                8-5                  34.2                 82.0

Orton

1st quarter           70.5                  8.2                6-0                  38.9               116.1
2nd                         56.3                  5.8                5-3                  27.5                 76.2
3rd                          52.7                  5.8                5-5                  24.5                 66.5
4th                          57.1                  6.0                2-4                  31.2 65.7

Cutler

1st quarter          65.7                   7.4                7-5                  39.9                 89.4
2nd                        62.3                   7.6                5-4                  34.9                 85.5
3rd                         61.9                   7.2                2-5                  34.4                 74.9
4th                         59.9                   7.3               11-4                 35.3                 94.2

Notice that Orton has a QB rating of 116.1 for the first quarter, 76.2 for the second quarter, then 66.5 and 65.7 for the third and fourth quarters. The 116.1 is the number that jumped out at me and ultimately led to this mini-project. It was totally unexpected. Why was he so brilliant so early and so ordinary thereafter? Further, notice that his rating for the first 10 passes is lower, meaning he was especially effective the first 6 or 7 passes (because on average he'd have thrown fewer than 10 passes per quarter). I included Cutler to see how his pattern differed. We know his overall numbers, except for red zone and last two minutes, are much better, and we've already, in numerous threads, speculated about the extent to which having a better line, receivers and coaching, and a more pass-friendly offense, was a factor. What I'm interested in here is how and why their numbers changed over the course of a typical game.

On the face of it, especially in the breakdown by quarters, Orton tended to start strong and finish weak, with a drastic drop-off between the first and second quarters and a much smaller but still noticeable dip between the second and third. Cutler, in contrast, was solid in the first half, had a noticeable dip in the third quarter, then bounced back for a strong fourth-quarter finish. Was he better in crunchtime or was he playing catch-up against a prevent defense with the Broncos trailing by one or more TDs? Did Orton start strong when playing for the lead and then play defensively and less effectively trying to protect that lead? Was the coach's offensive play-calling, when the Bears were ahead, a factor in Orton's performance?

One reason I included both sets of stats, even though they cover much of the same ground, is that the analysis by passes rather than quarters reveals an interesting subpattern, namely that Orten tended to drop off after the first 10 passes, Cutler after the first 20. Did Orton tire sooner than Cutler? We've talked about arm strength but not arm endurance, how much a QB's passing performance falls off due to fatigue over the course of a game. It could be argued that Cutler has so much excess strength that even when fatigued he throws a powerful ball when lesser QBs are reduced to wounded ducks. But it's also possible that in addition to QB fatigue and coaching strategy, receiver performance over the course of the game is a factor. How well-conditioned and disciplined were the Bears' receivers? Did their performance deteriorate as the game went on?

I haven't offered as many answers as I usually do in an article. Instead, I've highlighted an interesting anomaly and offered a sketchy preliminary analysis in hopes that others might join in and offer their own thoughts about the cause and significance of these differences. Thanks to all who take the time to read and ponder this.

Cutler seemingly proves Angelo's quarterback theory

spock — Tue, 23 Jun 2009 15:00:51 -0000

Cutler seemingly proves Angelo's quarterback theory

Larry Mayer moronically asserts that "Cutler seemingly proved Angelo’s theory that the quarterback-makes-the-receiver the past few seasons with the Broncos" by citing the emergence of BM and Royal during his tenure. Obviously, in his logically challenged mind, any receiver who does well does so due to Cutler, not due to any attributes he might possess. "Cutler isn’t the only example of a great quarterback making his receivers into elite players." Article has no comments section. If it had he'd have gotten an earful from me.

Evaluations: Cutler, Orton, McDaniels

spock — Sat, 04 Apr 2009 14:05:15 -0000

How did it get so far? Saying that McDaniels blundered, or that Cutler took McDaniels' willingness to entertain offers too personally, or that Cook had a game plan for which the Cassel incident supplied a handy pretext are not totally satisfying, although I've subscribed to each. I can even add another, call it the evil genius theory, in which McDaniels doesn't think Cutler is a winner but realizes that if he just puts him on the block teams will be wary. What does McDaniels know that we don't? Even if they bid they'll do so more cautiously and ultimately less generously. If, however, he subtly pushes Jay's buttons until Jay "forces" his way out of Denver, others will see not questions about his abilities but immaturity, which they think they can deal with. Hence his trade value will be maximized.

The first and fourth scenarios raise, one tacitly and the other overtly, the issue of evaluation. Why was McDaniels willing to consider deals involving Cutler? That it's a coach's duty to listen to all offers is true but ultimately not convincing. If that's the case, why was McDaniels unable to sufficiently reassure Jay when so much seemingly depended on it? Yes, Jay was petulant, yes he should have realized it's a business. But if McDaniels really, really wanted Jay to stay he could have made it clear that even though you can never say never, still, there's no quarterback he would rather have than Jay and he can't imagine him not being his quarterback in the future. Somehow he was never quite able to express, even in accounts sympathetic to his point of view, that kind of whole-hearted commitment to "the player".

In a recent article in the Denver Post the authors write:

Josh McDaniels didn't say it, but by making a deal with Chicago, and not Washington, it was apparent the Broncos coach preferred Kyle Orton to the Redskins' Jason Campbell. Bears general manager Jerry Angelo said at his news conference Thursday that the Broncos "did a lot of work on Kyle, spent a lot of time breaking down the tape. I think that was a key component to making this happen."

If McDaniels put that much effort into evaluating Orton and Campbell, think how much more time he must have spent on Jay Cutler, the quarterback of the team he was auditioning for. Apparently he wasn't totally satisfied. That doesn't necessarily mean he didn't think he could win with Cutler, only that he was willing to consider other possibilities. In Why Jay Faded I suggested that:

Many people have commented that Jay still doesn't go through his progressions very well, that he locks in on one receiver. They also say he makes too many bad decisions. There are at least two senses in which this can be said, and the term "bad decision" doesn't have quite the same meaning in both instances. It's often used when a quarterback attempts a pass because he either doesn't see a defensive player or doesn't realize his potential for making a play. The term "bad decision" implies bad judgment, but in those instances the quarterback simply doesn't have time to recognize the danger before he releases the ball. The culprit isn't his judgment but the speed of the pass rush, his inexperience, an inherent limitation in how fast he can process information, or some combination of the three. With Cutler the first rarely applied due to excellent protection, and the third hopefully didn't, but the second most likely did.

But it didn't do so obviously, because Cutler has abilities that have tended to mask that deficit. His throws have tremendous velocity and accuracy, particularly when he's throwing on a straight line. That means he can often get the ball in even when the receiver's covered, because the ball's so perfectly thrown and gets there so fast the defender doesn't have time to react. But the other side of the coin is that Jay has to be perfect in order to avoid picks. And having to be perfect play after play, game after game, takes its toll over the course of a season. I suggest that's why Jay faded.

But Jay also made bad decisions in a second and more literal sense. Trusting his velocity and his accuracy, and preferring to risk a bad play in order to make a good one, Jay often tried to fit the ball in even when he knew the receiver was tightly covered, not simply because he didn't see the defender in time. That's a mindset McDaniels will surely want to change, if he can, and is most likely the factor that made him willing to consider Cassel as an alternative.

In an insightful response styg50 added:

What you are saying seems to be that Jay's decision making took a hit precisely because he stopped making decisions. The more the pressure mounted, the less he relied on thinking and the more he relied on his natural abilities. He wasn't choosing to thread a needle with arm strength and velocity over throwing it away or checking down to a RB, he wasn't choosing at all. By the end of the year our offense was inefficient sandlot football, and the exact opposite of week one against the raiders, where we were a relentless machine.

In a similar vein SlowWhiteGuy writes:

I think fans who don't know how to evaluate QBs don't realize how far Cutler's game needs to improve before he will actually be an elite QB. He has great tools but he is barely playing about [above?] a college QB level [in] his situational awareness, his reads (especially against zones) and his patience to work through his progressions. Based on what we've seen over the past 6 weeks I have doubts that he is humble enough to progress much farther as a QB.

Clearly there are legitimate doubts regarding Cutler's abilities as a pro quarterback. Not only does his raw talent mask deficiencies that are more central to success, having such talent also makes it less likely that he'll be motivated to develop those capabilities. But that's not the only kind of doubt that's relevant. In baseball I've often noticed that a given pitcher will have a better won-loss record than another on the same team with a better ERA. In such cases close inspection often reveals that the pitcher with the better record consistently gets better run support from his hitters. Indeed, there are "hard-luck" pitchers who seem to frequently lose games 1-0 or 2-1. Why do such pitchers get less help from their teammates? Are they really unlucky? Consistently? Less likeable? Less inspirational? Is there something about their body language? Do we really want to say they're better than the "lucky" teammate who consistently wins more games?

In today's New York Times Stefan Fatsis, who spent the summer of 2006 with the Broncos as an ersatz placekicker while researching a book, has one of the most insightful articles I've yet seen on this whole affair. After making some shrewd observations about Bowlen and Shanahan he asks, "Why would McDaniels have considered trading Cutler in the first place?" He considers various possibilities, some of which have been relentlessly rehashed in the press, then comes down to this:

I met Cutler when he was the first-round draft choice in 2006 who was expected to ride the bench for a couple of years behind Jake Plummer and then lead Denver for a decade or more. The new Elway! Finally! But Cutler is virtually absent from my book. That's because he was uncompelling journalistically and off-putting personally. I sought out players who thought deeply and were interested in explaining the physical and emotional realities of playing in the NFL. That wasn't Cutler. His demeanor often was that of a bored, eye-rolling teenage girl, with a dash of smugness for good measure. Since then, I've received unflattering reports about his behavior and indifferent-to-negative ones about his relationship with his teammates.

Should those sorts of perceptions outweigh a laser arm on a 25-year-old body and 4,500 passing yards and 13-1 record in games in which his team gave up no more than 21 points and any of the other stats rolled out by his supporters? Certainly not. But football teams, like other businesses, consist of human beings whose ability to interact is integral to their success. And no human being is more important to the success of a football team than the quarterback. Josh McDaniels may be young and inexperienced, but he's not dumb. He didn't want to sabotage his new team, or his own future. So something else must have been going on.

Here's a radical thought: Maybe McJayGate, as the Denver press dubbed it, wasn't about who dissed whom or who ignored whose text messages or whether a new coach has to earn the respect of his players. Maybe it was about something more prosaic but also more substantial: the future of the team. Maybe Pat Bowlen, Josh McDaniels and other team officials examined Cutler's statistics, his physical traits, his emotional temperament, his suitability to the coach's offensive system, his leadership ability, his off-field behavior and his overall attitude — including the evolution of his relationship with his new boss. And then they decided that the Denver Broncos had a greater chance of winning with someone else in the huddle. Even someone named Kyle Orton.

Fatsis' observations are eerily reminiscent of the impression I got from my co-worker, who was Cutler's high school teammate, which I mentioned in this comment:

As rabid a Broncos fan as he is, and as proud of Jay as he's been, it always struck me odd that when I'd say wow, it must have been great playing with him, he was always reticent about it and sort of implied, without really coming out and saying so, that he wasn't that great a guy to play for. I thought maybe he was kind of jealous. Maybe now we're seeing what he already knew.

Maybe those fans who've harped on Cutler's 17-20 won-loss record are on to something. Yes, the defense has been awful, but would it have been as awful, or as bad in critical situations, for another quarterback? In 2006 the Broncos were 7-4 despite averaging only 17.8 points per game when Cutler replaced Plummer, and went 2-3 the rest of the way, and lost the last game to miss the playoffs, despite averaging 24.8. Yes, the defense suddenly became much less effective, as it has been ever since Jay became quarterback. The coincidences keep piling up. Is Jay like those "unlucky" baseball pitchers who don't get much help? Conversely, Plummer, who had a very good won-loss record with the Broncos, was known to be extremely popular with his teammates. I don't mean to minimize his deficiencies, which in Shanahan's opinion, which I agree with, limited how far the Broncos could go. But Plummer's teammates supported him, in the most meaningful way possible, by playing their hearts out on the football field even when Jake was playing badly. It has been during Jay Cutler's tenure, and only during his tenure, that the Broncos have regularly and embarrassingly underperformed. Is leadership what we've been missing?

Denver fans have been so mesmerized by John Elway's howitzer arm that this factor has defined the quest for his successor. But John's relatively low completion percentage and early tendency to throw into coverage weren't temporary deficiencies due to inexperience. He won not because of his cannon arm, not because he could quickly find the open receiver a la Joe Montana, but because of his mobility — keep running around until you find someone — and his leadership and iron will. He's the greatest Bronco ever and a Hall of Famer because time and time again he somehow found a way to win. His biggest play in the biggest game of his life was not a pretty pass but the helicopter first down. The unalloyed joy he felt when he lifted that trophy high was made possible by teammates who gave everything they had in response to his leadership.

About Orton we know very little, except that he's 21-12 overall and 15-2 at home. McDaniels, who like all members of the Parcells-Belichick coaching tree is acutely aware of the bottom line, has to have been affected by this one. For better or worse it's McDaniels' judgments that will determine the Broncos' fate during his tenure, and Bowlen, as is his want, has chosen who he thinks is the best man and left him to succeed or fail on the strength not only of his coaching but also his evaluations of men and situations. As fans we can do no less.

Why Jay Faded: His Prospects for 2009

spock — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 10:57:54 -0000

Recent analyses of Cutler's 2008 season have been paradoxical, seeming to indicate both that he performed well under pressure and that he choked. On the one hand I recall someone mentioning that his third-down conversion percentage was 45 percent vs the league average of 37, and that he did relatively well in the fourth quarter. On the other hand Denver was one of the top scoring teams after three games but was something like 24th the rest of the way; and Jay's QB ratings for the last three games were 74.3, 72.4 and 74.9, respectively, when one big game might have been enough to get us into the playoffs. Can we resolve this paradox and arrive at a deeper understanding?

I believe a key to this apparent contradiction is the notion that sustained perfection takes a toll. We see it in winning streaks. Game after game the team has to play just intensely enough, just well enough, to add one more win to the string. The strain is cumulative. The 2007 Patriots outscored their opponents 331-127 during the first half of the regular season, 258-147 during the second half. Their average point differential for the two halves was 41.4-15.9 vs 32.3-18.6. The closest they came to losing during the first half was 34-17 against Cleveland, but during the second half they barely beat the Colts 24-20, the Eagles 31-28, the Ravens (a week later) 27-24, and the Giants 38-35. Clearly, they were beginning to struggle. And in the playoffs they beat the Jaguars 31-20 and the banged-up Chargers 21-12 before finally succumbing to the Giants in the Super Bowl.

The 1972 Dolphins don't at first glance follow this pattern, with an average point differential of 24.0-12.4 during the first half of the season and 31.0-12.0 during the second half. They held up so well, I think, because their offensive strength was a dominating running game. Yet even they struggled in the playoffs, winning 20-14 over the Browns, 21-17 over the Steelers and 14-7 over the Redskins in the Super Bowl. The 1985 Bears, in contrast, roared through the playoffs, 21-0, 24-0, 46-10, having picked up one loss (24-38 to the Dolphins) late in the regular season. That loss relieved the pressure and they gradually picked up steam - 17-10, 19-6, 37-17 - before their dominating playoff run.

I think this same notion applies to individual performances, in Jay Cutler's case in two senses. First, because the Broncos started so many drives deep in their own territory he often had to gain more yards and convert more third downs in order to score. More plays, especially in a predominantly passing offense, means more opportunities to lose the ball on downs or make a mistake. Second, and more important, his style and developmental level created a dynamic that wore him down over the course of the season.

Many people have commented that Jay still doesn't go through his progressions very well, that he locks in on one receiver. They also say he makes too many bad decisions. There are at least two senses in which this can be said, and the term "bad decision" doesn't have quite the same meaning in both instances. It's often used when a quarterback attempts a pass because he either doesn't see a defensive player or doesn't realize his potential for making a play. The term "bad decision" implies bad judgment, but in these instances the quarterback simply didn't have time to recognize the danger before he released the ball. The culprit isn't his judgment but the speed of the pass rush, his inexperience, an inherent limitation in how fast he can process information, or some combination of the three. With Cutler the first rarely applied due to excellent protection, and the third hopefully didn't, but the second most likely did.

But it didn't do so obviously, because Cutler has abilities that have tended to mask that deficit. His throws have tremendous velocity and accuracy, particularly when he's throwing on a straight line. That means he can often get the ball in even when the receiver's covered, because the ball's so perfectly thrown and gets there so fast the defender doesn't have time to react. But the other side of the coin is that Jay has to be perfect in order to avoid picks. And having to be perfect play after play, game after game, takes its toll over the course of a season. I suggest that's why Jay faded.

But Jay also made bad decisions in a second and more literal sense. Trusting his velocity and his accuracy, and preferring to risk a bad play in order to make a good one, Jay often tried to fit the ball in even when he knew the receiver was tightly covered, not simply because he didn't see the defender in time. That's a mindset McDaniels will surely want to change, if he can, and is most likely the factor that made him willing to consider Cassel as an alternative.

Jay's yardage total last year was partly misleading. On the one hand it owed much to his ability to pick up third downs and get four more, and was thus a fair measure of his ability. But on the other hand it was an artifact of the sheer number of times the Broncos threw the ball, and of how far they had to go to reach the red zone, and thus misleadingly suggested a breakout when none had occurred. A breakout normally occurs, I believe, when a quarterback's information processing speed makes a more or less discontinuous jump to the level that he maintains for the rest of his career. If Jay hasn't already maxed out (which would be bad news), that's something that will probably occur this year. Once it does he'll be able to go through his progression more rapidly and find the open man, and will be better at sensing danger and "deciding" against throwing to a particular receiver. When that happens he'll have a greater margin for error and won't have to always be perfect in order to complete passes and avoid interceptions. Then, perhaps, his ability to perform under pressure will not be eroded as the season wears on by the necessity of being perfect time after time after time.

But this improvement in his performance will be maximized if he can be persuaded by McDaniels to live to fight another day, to throw passes, especially near his own or the other team's goal line, that only his own receiver, if anybody, can get to, to settle for the sure three, if necessary, rather than insisting on seven or nothing. If his neurological functioning, his ability to process information as the play unfolds, reaches a new level, and if his decision-making matures in this second and more consciously accessible sense, Denver will become the kind of team that makes the most of its scoring opportunities. And Cutler will have become the kind of quarterback, the kind of winner, we all want him to be.

Winning

spock — Fri, 20 Feb 2009 22:44:56 -0000

Vindication is sweet. I've always felt that subtleties matter, that the "best" player in a game isn't necessarily the one with the gaudiest stats. Best in this context means the player who most enhances his team's chances of winning. I just got through reading an article, "The No-Stats All-Star", that brilliantly explicates this notion. The article is about a basketball player but it's relevant to football, to coaches and players, and to the upcoming draft.

The player in question is Shane Battier of the Houston Rockets, an apparently not-very-talented player whose team inexplicably plays better when he's on the floor, and whose opponents inexplicably play worse. The guys he guards regularly say they had an off night, not because they're trying to save face but because they honestly can't see what he could have done to have caused them to be so ineffective. The things he does, some of which are nicely pinpointed by author Michael Lewis, are amazingly subtle, like causing the other team's best shooter to shoot from places on the floor where he's statistically less effective, like always blocking the shooter's view of the basket at the moment he releases the ball, like leaving his man and blocking out the other team's best rebounder. Although the details of how a guy who's slow, who can't jump, who can't dribble, and who doesn't have much body control can be that effective are fascinating in themselves, they're ultimately not the point. The point is foreshadowed in Lewis' assertion that "There is a tension, peculiar to basketball, between the interests of the team and the interests of the individual. The game continually tempts the people who play it to do things that are not in the interest of the group." The most obvious exemplification of this tension is the superstar who scores 40 points in a losing cause on 30 percent shooting. If less talented but more open teammates had taken some of those shots the team might have scored more points and won the game.

The connection between this basketball article and football can now be made explicit. It's psychology. Basketball might be the sport in which the interests of the individual and the team diverge most drastically, but this divergence is arguably characteristic of team sports in general. Most players undoubtedly feel that the better they do the better the team does. That's often but not always the case. A very few players transcend this mentality. They're willing to look bad in order for the team to look good, and occasionally even make "bad" plays that win games. They're able to do so because they're focussed less on playing well than on the team winning. They're so totally focussed on winning per se irrespective of their own welfare that they instinctively react to opportunities other players miss. These are players that a savvy coach calls "winners". The team of the last decade in which this mentality has been most pervasive, it seems to me, is the New England Patriots.

McDaniels comes from that environment, and I hope that this aspect of Bellichick's ability to build a winning team has rubbed off on him. Recently he's been cutting players who don't fit his program. In his description of the kinds of players he's after, who are tough, smart, and who play well under pressure, do we see a hint of the kinds of winners Bellichick has been so adept at collecting? Conversely, in his cuts has he been jettisoning players who are the antithesis of such winners, who are "losers" regardless of apparent ability? Many of us have felt that the Denver defense has been so bad because the players haven't been effective as a team. Overpursuit and failure to protect the back side on running plays are the most obvious indices of this lack of teamwork, in which players' concern with getting in on the play or making the big hit often work to the team's detriment. Perhaps McDaniels is weeding out these players. I've long been a fan of Foxworth, who has always struck me as a winner. Without a pass rush he, like Bly, gives up completions, but unlike Bly he's an excellent tackler. I wonder if McDaniels would have jettisoned Foxworth if he rather than Bly had been with the team? I wonder if McDaniels will see him as good value and go after him in free agency?

The notion of good value brings up a further point. The article cited above wasn't just about Shane Battier. It was also about a shift in emphasis from statistics that are easy to collect to those that really matter, and to a new breed of executive sensitive to such nuances. Daryl Morey, the Rockets' general manager, is such an executive. As the caption for his picture states, he was "hired by the Houston Rockets as a 33-year-old to look at players in new ways." As he put it, "We couldn’t afford another superstar so we went looking for nonsuperstars that we thought were undervalued," which is to say underpaid. I suspect Brian Xanders is a member of this new breed, and that this is what Bowlen saw in him. I wonder if this is also the sense in which McDaniels and Xanders see eye to eye on player personnel? Although McDaniels' strength is arguably evaluation and Xanders' valuation, I suspect their complementary strengths merge in their estimations of player value.

Turn now to free agency and the draft. Who will they choose? I think their emphasis, where there's a choice, will be on smartness and instinct over raw physical ability, on James Laurinaitis over Rey Maualuga. That might not be the most apt comparison, but I think that wherever there's a choice between two players who are otherwise equal that they'll go with the one who's more cerebral, who's more opportunistic than a big hitter. A team of such players will play above their obvious talent, will win close games, will be "lucky" at critical times, like you know who.

Saints not only team looking for safety help

spock — Mon, 16 Feb 2009 02:32:49 -0000

Saints not only team looking for safety help

Piece on the evolution of the position of safety along with some draft reviews.

Evaluating Talent - IPS Revisited

spock — Wed, 28 Jan 2009 10:45:59 -0000

It's that time of year when a major concern of the coaches and of us, the fans, is judging college talent as a prelude to the draft. About nine months ago, just before last year's draft, I wrote a piece titled "Information Processing Speed". The impetus was my desire to understand why some can't-miss players, like Ryan Leaf, flame out and why some late-round nobodies, like Tom Brady, unexpectedly blossom at the next level. I suggested that a key factor was the upper limit of the speed with which a player is able to process information, to track who's where and what's happening in the pellmell chaos of a developing play and react decisively and fortuitously. What clued me in to the possible utility of such a category were the frequent remarks by players that what shocked them most when they turned pro was how fast things happen; and critiques of third or fourth-year quarterbacks who'd shown dramatic improvement that amounted to some version of, "The game has slowed down for him."

Naturally, familiarity with game situations and with the ways various plays develop - experience - enables any given player to see more and react faster and more effectively than he did as a rookie, but my point was that some players have a relatively low limit to how much faster they can become with experience, and how fast they are initially (so as to make the team in the first place). A lower limit negates other abilities. Leaf might have been more accurate than Brady in practice situations involving only himself and the receiver, but not in game situations in which he had to track not only the receiver but also the back covering him, perhaps another defensive back coming from the opposite direction (in a crossing route), and a linebacker cutting underneath, all the while avoiding the rush or getting rid of the ball just in time, with all this taking place in a frantic few seconds.

Wondering how to translate this idea into practice I noted that "The Sporting News ranks players in a number of categories" and that "[r]un/pass recognition strikes me as possibly relevant" to information processing speed. I then remarked "that Nick Hayden of Wisconsin, who's [ranked] 18th overall [at DT], is 3rd in that category. Would that make him a good late-round sleeper pick?" In the give and take that followed one reader, r8erh8er, offered that Hayden was one of his value picks, which led me to respond that "I think I’ll make a mental note to see how well he does just to satisfy my curiosity."

And that's the last I thought about that. Until now. With the draft just around the corner I decided to do a little googling and discovered an article titled "Panthers' Hayden learning quick". It turns out he was drafted in the sixth round by Carolina, was on the practice squad for much of the season, and then was added to the team late in the year and started a couple of games when the Panthers had injuries at DT. In his first game, against the Giants, he was schooled, but in his second game, against the Saints, he did much better. That was the "learning quick" part of the title. So far his career trajectory has been much like Barrett's, developing on the practice squad and then coming in late in the season and contributing. He's done surprisingly well for a low-round pick.

Marcus Thomas also scored high in run/pass recognition - if I recall correctly he was ranked first in that category - and he played extensively this last year. Now it might be remarked that our run defense, due in no small measure to our play at defensive tackle, was awful, and also that Carolina's run defense tailed off badly at the end of the season. But it's also true that at defensive tackle even a successful rookie is often much less productive that an ordinary veteran. If he starts at all during his first or even second year, even if not very productive by veteran standards, he's probably going to be pretty good when he gets another year or two under his belt.

It occurs to me that for a nose tackle information processing speed is especially important because it's a read and react position. He has to diagnose the play in a heartbeat and react appropriately rather than just charge into a single assigned gap. That's why Warren couldn't adapt. He was quick enough to penetrate his gap and disrupt plays, but he couldn't diagnose plays rapidly enough to decide which to focus on when he was responsible for two. When I renew my subscription to The Sporting News war room I'll be following with interest the run/pass recognition rankings of the various defensive linemen, especially the tackles. The fact that Hayden has done relatively well for a low-round pick, and that Thomas is still on track to being a pretty good lineman, isn't conclusive, but is intriguing enough to make it worth using run/pass recognition rankings as a way of looking for sleepers in this year's draft.

Our Safety Situation

spock — Thu, 11 Dec 2008 23:06:48 -0000

A recent article on Josh Barrett, titled "Barrett seizes chance to shine for Broncos", along with D.J.'s impending return to his weakside linebacker spot, which Wesley Woodyard has been manning in spectacular fashion, has me thinking about next year's safety situation. I'm not the only one wondering where Woodyard will play in the coming weeks, given that all of us, including apparently Coach Shanahan, agree that he needs to play somewhere. But what about next year, when a more permanent solution can be developed? Can you imagine Woodyard, who has played the position before, and Barrett as our starting safeties?

An interesting sidenote in the article, which relates to something written by HT (or was it Styg or Guru?), is this comment from Barrett: "Barrett said he’s actually thankful he was on the practice squad for the first 11 weeks. That experience allowed him to absorb more knowledge. 'It’s been gradual, but the amount of information and the validity of that information that I’ve gotten, you can’t put a price to it,' he said." Since the point has been made in these pages that it was better for him to learn on the practice squad than being prematurely thrown to the wolves and perhaps losing confidence, someone needs to take a bow.

In the offchance that this does come to pass, that Barrett and Woodyard become (next year) our starting safeties, which position should each play? At first glance one would think Barrett, with his blazing speed, should be the free safety, but I think Woodyard's remarkable read and react skills--he appears to be far ahead of Barrett in that respect--make him the better candidate. What do the rest of you think?

Chargers miss an opportunity, but Broncos leave door open

spock — Mon, 24 Nov 2008 22:44:45 -0000

Chargers miss an opportunity, but Broncos leave door open

The comments are what makes this worth reading. We all feel horrible at the egg the Broncos laid, but it makes me feel better (not a lot, but a little bit) to hear the Charger fans bitch and moan at the missed opportunity, at the poor play of the Chargers (and Phyliss!), and the coaching job Turner has, um perpetrated. Reminds me of the movie in which two guys are digging in a graveyard and one's complaining. The second one says, "Could be worse." The first one says, "How!?" Second guy says, "Could be raining." And then of course the thunder rolls and the downpour commences. Well, for those fans unhappy with Shanahan it could be worse. We could have Norv Turner coaching our young and inexperienced players and looking for his first or second win.

Delayed reaction

spock — Fri, 07 Nov 2008 16:18:54 -0000

Just got home from work a little while ago. When I left it was halftime with Denver trailing 20-10, and I hadn't heard anything in the interim. I was oh so tempted to crack open the paper I had picked up on the way home, to see how badly the Broncos lost. Instead, I resumed watching the game, cringing at the thought of what was to follow, wondering about my own masochism for putting myself through it. Then, after trading field goals, Royal's big play. Do they have a chance? No, don't get your hopes up. It'll only hurt worse. And then the turnover. The defense actually forced a turnover. Ohmigod! And the Broncos drive down and score again. And after Cleveland scores to retake the lead, the Broncos drive down and score again, thanks to an amazing fourth down effort from Hillis.

Some post-game impressions. One, it was so good to see the Broncos, led by some of their youngest, least experienced players, pick themselves up off the ground when all seemed lost, when the season seemed to be circling the drain. Two, some of the defenders need to have stenciled on their foreheads, "Just do your damned job." Early in the game I watched Winborn come crashing in from the left, trying to get in on the play, and losing contain as the runner went thataway. Later in the game I saw Ekuban do the same thing. Just do your damned job! Three, Hillis is the real deal. So is Woodyard. So is Spencer. We already know about Royal and Clady. Ryan Harris has been solid. Moss is beginning to show signs of life. Many other young plaers are showing promise. Our recent drafting has been brilliant and we are building the nucleus of a powerful football team.

Four, much of Cutler's recent struggles and interceptions appear to be due to miscommunications with his receivers, especially Marshall, and the fault is less Cutler's than Marshall's. But it has made Cutler hesitant and less effective. Let's hope they're back on the same page and Denver's offense is back on track. Five, the scenario I casually threw out before the game, Spencer at fullback blocking for Hillis at tailback, might be surprisingly effective and not just a stopgap. Finally, six, way to go Broncos! As always, Cleveland is good for what ails us.