A's fans had a lot to be excited about coming into 2011. With a young, strong rotation, a loaded bullpen, and significant upgrades to the offense, the team looked ready to build on last year's .500 record and contend for the AL West crown. The solid starting foursome of Anderson, Cahill, Gonzalez, and Braden were joined by a resurgent McCarthy, with Ross, Cramer, Moscoso, and a recovering Outman providing depth. While some sabermetrically-inclined fans (including myself) may have disagreed with Beane's decision to throw multiyear contracts at Fuentes and Balfour, there was no doubt that the bullpen was both very talented and very deep. The two newcomers joined Bailey, Breslow, Wuertz, Ziegler, Blevins, and a returning Devine to form one of the best bullpens in baseball.

On the offensive side, while many also disagreed with Cust's non-tender, it was reasonable to expect coming into the season that he and Matsui were a wash. Meanwhile, the team kept last year's passable infield together and upgraded from the AAA filler that manned the corner outfield spots in 2010 to legitimate, above average major leaguers in Willingham and DeJesus. With Sweeney back from injury and LaRoche looking like a promising reclamation project, the team also appeared to have useful bench players to provide depth. Some regression should have been expected, particularly with the left-side infield defense and Barton's hitting, but there was plenty of reason to expect significant improvement in position player performance this season.

We're now 60 games in, and obviously things haven't gone as planned. Braden went down for the year, McCarthy is out indefinitely, Bailey took forever to return from his spring training injury, Geren has badly misused Fuentes, and the offense, rather than improving on 2010, has turned into a giant vortex of suckiness. In last place and suddenly seven games out, the A's don't appear to have much of a shot at the playoffs this year. All that said, I am not part of the crowd that thinks this team is terrible. In fact, as crazy as it may sound, I like the current group quite a bit. The starting pitching is strong, the bullpen looks like a strength again, and I still believe that an offensive rebound is coming. With some luck and a timely winning streak, the A's could get back into the AL West race and challenge for a playoff spot.

However, the organization has serious problems to deal with. The major league squad faces the possibility of losing its starting second baseman, DH, and entire outfield to free agency this offseason. Also, while the current starter at third base has a year of arbitration eligibility remaining, he would be a mortal lock for a non-tender if he were to stay on the roster for the rest of the season, which looks more and more unlikely. That leaves six positions unaccounted for in 2012. Meanwhile, the farm system is a mess and won't provide enough help to turn this team into a serious competitor in the next few years.

So, after that rather lengthy intro, let me present an alternative to blowing everything up and going into another extended rebuilding period. Here is my simple, 7-step plan to sacrifice 2011 in order to field a reasonably competitive team in 2012-13 and restock the system for a serious run in 2014 and beyond:

1. Keep Willingham and DeJesus for 2011, then offer them arbitration and let them walk.

According to this MLBTradeRumors post, Willingham appears likely to achieve Type A status, and DeJesus is right on the line between Type A and Type B. Both should get multiyear contracts this offseason and thus would be unlikely to accept arbitration. The A's should continue to limit DeJesus's exposure to lefties and hope he turns it on for the rest of the season. With a little luck, this could net the team two extra first rounders and two supplemental picks.

Of course, if a contender offers a nice package of prospects for either player, the A's should definitely consider it. It would have to be good, though, because four extra first rounders in 2012 would go a long way toward restocking the farm system.

2. Leave Mark Ellis as the starting second baseman for the rest of the season.

I was surprised to see that Ellis is also listed as Type A in the above-linked post, after getting tagged with Type B status after last year. One possible explanation is that the Elias rankings use batting average as one of their criteria and only look at the past three seasons. This means that last year they included his 2008 season, in which he hit .233 over 442 at bats. They will wipe 2008 off their books this offseason, but Ellis obviously cannot hit .213 all year and keep the Type A ranking. However, even if he does rebound this season and end up a Type A, I doubt the A's want to risk having him accept arbitration. Also, even if they did offer and he did decline, unless he hits like he did last September for the next 100 games no team is going to give up a pick for him. In other words, it is highly unlikely that Ellis will earn the A's draft picks this offseason.

If we're dumping 2011, and Ellis will be a free agent, and he's unlikely to earn the team draft picks, then this would suggest a trade. However, his value is at an all-time low, and I seriously doubt the team could get anything approaching even a poor prospect for him. For that reason, I suggest simply keeping him at second base for the rest of the season and then letting him go. This would allow Jemile Weeks to get a full season of AAA seasoning under his belt and delay his service clock. I also don't think Weeks is ready for the majors. The main reason to call him up now would be to replace Ellis's bat in the lineup, which is not of particular concern if the team isn't competing this year. Finally, it would be a nice bonus to let a guy who has been a cornerstone of the franchise for a decade finish out his last season here with some dignity.

3. DFA Kouzmanoff right now and call up Scott Sizemore.

I wanted to like Kouzmanoff. I wanted him to succeed as an Athletic. At this point, I am completely convinced that he is beyond reclamation. I have no problem with the A's dumping him for nothing right now and giving someone else a shot, and I'm sure I'm not alone in that. Some have mentioned Cardenas as a replacement, but the organization clearly does not believe in his ability to play third base, and I am not sold on his BABIP-fueled AAA batting line. He looks like little more than a utility player to me. Sizemore, on the other hand, is an interesting option. He has posted a very solid .315/.392/.487 career line in the International League, which is pretty tough on hitters. He has had trouble in limited time in the majors, but a 65 game trial is hardly enough to label him a bust. He's got nothing left to prove in AAA. The A's should get him in the major league lineup, stick with him for the rest of the season, and see if he's the solution at third base.

4. Trade Suzuki, Bailey, and anyone else in the bullpen that a contender wants.

I am no good at trade scenarios, so this will be brief. Suzuki is probably the most valuable trade piece on the major league roster that's not named Anderson, Cahill, or Gonzalez, as he's got a slightly below average bat at the toughest position, is well-regarded (deserved or not) on defense, and is on a team-friendly contract. Matt Klaassen at FanGraphs recently suggested that he could bring back a B and a C prospect. The Red Sox definitely make sense as a trade partner. I wonder whether the A's could get something like Ryan Lavarnway, who is a decent catching prospect, as well as a third baseman such as Kolbrin Vitek or Will Middlebrooks for him.

If Bailey reestablishes himself over the next month or two, he could be very attractive to a contender at the deadline, and teams frequently overpay for relievers. In 2009, the Orioles got Josh Bell, whom Sickels rated at C+ prior to the season and B afterward, for George Sherrill. Last year, the Nationals picked up Wilson Ramos for Matt Capps. Wuertz, Balfour, and Fuentes, who has that closer experience that teams like, could also draw interest.

5. Sign Crisp, Barton, Pennington, Gonzalez, and Braden to long-term deals.

These five would join Anderson, who is under team control through 2015, and Cahill, under control through 2017, to form the core for both the "bridge" phase of 2012-13, when the team is reasonably competitive, and the "go for it" phase starting in 2014, when current prospects in the lower minors like Choice, Stassi, and Cabrera are ready, and the team starts to reap the rewards of this season's trades and next season's draft picks.

Currently, Crisp will be a free agent after the season, Braden will be arbitration-eligible through 2013, Barton through 2014, and Pennington and Gonzalez through 2015. Although Crisp is likely to be Type B and might also draw trade interest, I see him as an undervalued player who is likely to contribute more here than he would bring back in a trade. He does have an injury history, but the DL visits he's made while a member of the A's have been due to bad luck injuries rather than chronic issues. I think he's worth the risk of a 3-4 year deal in the $20-30 million range. He's a superb defender at a premium position with a passable bat. Those are not easy to find.

None of the arbitration eligibles mentioned above are highly hyped guys, so the organization should be able to lock them up on relatively team-friendly contracts.

6. Steal Kevin Slowey from the Twins.

Slowey is a very talented starter under team control through 2013, of whom the Twins think poorly enough to relegate to the bullpen. No, it does not make any sense, but they are now rumored to be shopping him. He has elite control (career 1.48 BB per 9 innings), a decent strikeout rate (career 6.79 K per 9 innings), and as a flyball pitcher would fit perfectly in the Coliseum. As I said, I'm terrible at trade scenarios, but I wonder whether the A's could get him for a package centered around a relief prospect or two. Perhaps the Twins would be interested in Fautino De Los Santos. Getting Slowey would further bolster the starting rotation depth for the next couple of seasons.

7. Use some of the $20 million+ in free 2012 money to sign free agent hitters.

The A's have nearly $35 million coming off the books if they let DeJesus, Willingham, Matsui, Ellis, and Jackson walk, cut Kouzmanoff, and trade Suzuki. Arbitration raises and the escalating contracts of Anderson and Cahill will eat into this, but they should once again have plenty of money for free agents this offseason. On the pitching side, they will be set for starters with the core four plus Ross, Slowey, and McCarthy, who is arbitration eligible. I'm not a believer in signing free agent relievers and think the team should fill any holes left in the bullpen by trades from within. However, there probably will, as usual, be problems signing hitters to play in the Coliseum. There will be internal options to fill some of the open position player spots, as Carter may be ready to hit in the majors and could DH, Taylor might be an outfield option if he can sustain this year's rebound, and Weeks looks likely to earn a shot at second base by then. Still, there will be big holes, so here are some players that may be in the A's price range: Kelly Johnson, Lance Berkman, J.J. Hardy, Aramis Ramirez, Dioner Navarro, J.D. Drew, Mike Cameron, Michael Cuddyer, Jason Kubel, and Ryan Ludwick.

None of these are particularly exciting names, but by following the first six steps of the plan and then making a couple of good signings, the A's will have put themselves in a decent position to compete next season, while simultaneously significantly rebuilding the system for a serious run in a couple of years. Given where the major and minor league talent is right now, we should be happy with that outcome. The alternatives are to dwell in perpetual mediocrity, or to blow everything up for another long term rebuild and endure four or five years of Piratesville.

Over at insidethebook, some interesting thoughts about Evan Longoria and his ridiculous contract. Tango suggests that perhaps half the teams in the league would win by trading their entire farm system for Longoria, and that the list might expand to all teams with the addition of a "protect one player" clause.

Just a refresher for those who don't want to look it up. Longoria is perhaps the best third baseman in the game (he's certainly in the discussion), is an all-star with the bat alone and adds to that far above average defense, is 24 years years old, and has the following remaining on his contract (via Cot's):

2010: $0.95 million
2011: $2 million
2012: $4.5 million
2013: $6 million
2014: $7.5 million club option ($3 million buyout)
2015: $11 million club option
2016: $11.5 million club option

Continue reading this post »

If you had to name one thing Oakland has done an excellent job at over the past few years, developing relievers would probably be high on your list. Recently, the A's have been able to crank out quality bullpen arms in virtually every way an organization can: through the draft (Bailey), via trade (Devine, Wuertz, Blevins), by picking up other teams' junk off waivers (Breslow), and by signing minor league free agents (Ziegler, H-Rod).

Since they appear to have a comparative advantage over other teams in cheaply developing relievers, it makes sense for the team to deal from this area of strength in order to bolster other areas where development has not been so successful. And the trade deadline is the ideal time to do this, as every year teams convince themselves around this time that one more good reliever is essential to a playoff push.

As anyone who has paid even cursory attention to the A's can tell you, the offense stinks this season. The organization has legitimate prospects in the system at every position, but they vary in quality and distance from the majors. In the near term, there seems to be a fairly heavy reliance on the success of Chris Carter and Michael Taylor. Adding a hitter or two who projects as a decent major leaguer in the next couple of years would really brighten the team's outlook. Two questions remain: who would the A's trade, and what kind of return could they hope to receive?

Continue reading this post »

I was looking into the numbers on Ryan Sweeney and Nate Schierholtz for an article about the two of them, and I thought AN would be interested in the results.

As has been much discussed here, Sweeney, in particular, just looks like someone who should hit for power. He does everything else well -- plays great defense, makes really good contact, works some walks -- but he can't seem to get the ball over the fence. While about 9% of fly balls MLB-wide have left the park over the past three years, Sweeney rounds the bases only about 4.4% of the time he puts the ball in the air. Similarly, 2.2% of MLB liners have left the park since the start of 2008, while Sweeney has never hit a home run on a line drive. All numbers are from Baseball Reference's batting splits pages and are through Saturday's games.

Just for fun, I took all of Sweeney's fly balls and line drives and gave him the MLB average home run rates. Specifically, I converted a few outs into home runs to see what his stat line would look like if he hit the ball just a little harder -- as hard as an average player. Note that real power hitters get ridiculous home run/fly ball numbers. The benchmark for this is Ryan Howard, who has had more than 1/4 of his fly balls leave the park over his career.

Continue reading this post »

This post will run on my website tomorrow. I thought Athletics Nation would be particularly interested since it concerns a recent feat by a pitcher named Braden, so I'm previewing it here.

Dallas Braden threw a perfect game in Oakland on Sunday. Within a few hours, analysis started to pop up around the web. Jack Moore of FanGraphs was one of the first on the topic, looking into the chance of Braden's feat and finding it to be about a one in 66,000. Probability is a tricky thing, and with so many variables like park factors, the defense, the batting team, and slight changes in a pitcher's skill over the years, it is not really feasible to come up with accurate numbers. However, with some very imprecise estimates, I will check Moore's work and add additional thoughts on the general probability of perfect games.

Moore used approximations in his calculation, and he left out hit batsmen. A perfect game involves 27 straight outs; to calculate its probability, it is necessary at some point to raise to the 27th power, so tiny differences really add up. I added up the hits, walks, hit batsmen, and bases reached on error that Braden had allowed in his major league career before Sunday, for a total of 467. Before Sunday, he had faced 1371 batters. Divide the first by the second, and this results in a career .34 probability of a batter reaching base against Braden. This means there was about a .66 chance that he would retire each batter, and raising .66 to the 27th power gives the probability that he would, on command, do it 27 times in a row.

Continue reading this post »

The A's have played about 1/8 of the season and just had an off day, so now seems like a perfect time to take a deeper look at their progress. The record, at 12-8, leads the division by a game and a half. Possible injuries to ace Brett Anderson and OBP-monster Daric Barton aside, even the most optimistic of A's fans have to be pleased with the results thus far. Let's take a look at what's going on under the hood.

A simple test is to look at the team's pythagorean winning percentage. Wikipedia has the formula, and plugging in the A's 92 runs scored and 65 runs allowed gives a .667 winning percentage. The team has actually achieved a winning percentage of .600; with this run differential they "should" have won one more game and "should" be sitting at 13-7. But pythagorean expectation, especially with just 20 games in the books, does not tell the whole story. Prior to the recent series with the Indians, the A's had an expected .561 winning percentage. By pounding Jake Westbrook and Justin Masterson, they picked up nearly four pythagorean wins in just three games. Late in the season, when the team has several hundred total runs scored and runs allowed, a 19 run difference would not move the needle nearly so much.

Continue reading this post »